SealLink Protocol Specification (v1.0.0-draft.2)
Single-File Release Bundle — compiled deterministically from the modular
relux-works/seallink-specrepository. Authors: Ivan Oparin, Alexey Grigorev License: Prose under CC BY 4.0; registries, schemas, vectors, and tooling under MIT.
Table of Contents
Part I — Normative Core Specifications
- SPEC-00: SealLink Architecture, Ontology, and Governance (
spec/SPEC-00-architecture.md) - SPEC-01: Wire Format, Cryptography, Thresholds, and Constraint Algebra (
spec/SPEC-01-wire-and-crypto.md) - SPEC-02: Ledger Interface, Namecoin Binding, ScriptPolicy, Merkle Batching, and UTXO Seals (
spec/SPEC-02-ledger-and-names.md) - SPEC-03: Identity, Name Value, Manifest, Key Taxonomy, Authentication, and Owner Control (
spec/SPEC-03-identity-and-custody.md) - SPEC-04: Origin Certificates, Legal Capacity, and Multi-Guardian Quorums (
spec/SPEC-04-origin-and-guardianship.md) - SPEC-05: Contracts, Symmetric Assent, Verifiable Credentials, and General Notary Acts (
spec/SPEC-05-contracts-and-credentials.md) - SPEC-06: Universal Grants, Invocations, Re-Delegation, Sessions, and Anti-Rollback Journals (
spec/SPEC-06-grants-and-delegation.md) - SPEC-07: Grant-Gated Services, Replaceable Providers, Federated Disclosure, and Extensions (
spec/SPEC-07-services-and-portability.md)
Part II — Standard Profiles
- PROFILE-agent-v1: Bounded Autonomous Agent Tasks, Tool Execution, Isolated Sessions, and Guardian Intake (
profiles/PROFILE-agent-v1.md) - PROFILE-mail-v1: Sovereign Email Hosting and Delegated Mailbox Access (
profiles/PROFILE-mail-v1.md)
Part III — Conformance, Open Questions, and SLIP Governance
- SealLink Conformance Requirements (
CONFORMANCE.md) - SealLink Open Questions and Provisional Parameters (
OPEN-QUESTIONS.md) - SLIP-XXXX: Title of Proposal (
SLIP-TEMPLATE.md)
Part IV — Machine-Readable Registries (Normative SSOT)
- Registry: constraints.json (
registry/constraints.json) - Registry: key-roles.json (
registry/key-roles.json) - Registry: object-types.json (
registry/object-types.json) - Registry: opreturn-actions.json (
registry/opreturn-actions.json) - Registry: refusal-codes.json (
registry/refusal-codes.json) - Registry: service-types.json (
registry/service-types.json)
Part V — Formal Wire JSON Schemas (Normative SSOT)
- Schema: card.schema.json (
schemas/card.schema.json) - Schema: common.schema.json (
schemas/common.schema.json) - Schema: contract.schema.json (
schemas/contract.schema.json) - Schema: credential.schema.json (
schemas/credential.schema.json) - Schema: grant.schema.json (
schemas/grant.schema.json) - Schema: guardian.schema.json (
schemas/guardian.schema.json) - Schema: invocation.schema.json (
schemas/invocation.schema.json) - Schema: manifest.schema.json (
schemas/manifest.schema.json) - Schema: name-value.schema.json (
schemas/name-value.schema.json) - Schema: origin.schema.json (
schemas/origin.schema.json) - Schema: profile-agent.schema.json (
schemas/profile-agent.schema.json) - Schema: profile-mail.schema.json (
schemas/profile-mail.schema.json)
Part VI — Informative Implementation Guides
- GUIDE-01: Custody, Signers, Namecoin PSBT, and Agent Runtime Integration (
guides/GUIDE-01-custody-and-signers.md)
Appendix A — Migration Traceability
- SealLink v1.0 Rule Inventory and Migration Traceability (
archive/rule-inventory.md)
Appendix B — Conformance Vector Manifest
- Conformance Vector Manifest (
vectors/*.json)
Part I — Normative Core Specifications
SPEC-00: SealLink Architecture, Ontology, and Governance
- Version:
1.0.0-draft.2 - Status:
draft(normative rules taggeddecidedoropen; open items tracked inOPEN-QUESTIONS.md) - Evidence / Maturity:
prose - Authors: Ivan Oparin, Alexey Grigorev
- Normative Language: RFC 2119 and RFC 8174 (
MUST,MUST NOT,REQUIRED,SHALL,SHOULD,MAY) - Conformance:
CONFORMANCE.md
1. Abstract and Positioning
SealLink is a protocol that enables intelligent actors — people, organizations, and autonomous software agents — to register sovereign identities, relationships, contracts, obligations, verifiable credentials, and revocable powers of attorney (grants) so that any verifier can validate them independently on its own ledger node without trusting the issuer's server, a central registry, or the message transport.
A name on a public UTXO-and-name ledger binds an actor to its cryptographic role keys and policies. A canonically encoded, cryptographically signed document expresses a relationship or capability. Every revocable relationship is bound to an unspent transaction output (a seal); spending that seal terminates the relationship across all observing verifiers without contacting the issuer's infrastructure.
1.1 Non-Goals and Institutional Boundaries
SealLink defines exact boundaries for what cryptography can and cannot establish:
- Does not replace legal institutions. A civil registry, licensed notary, court, or corporate registrar is represented as an actor with a name and keys. Whether to trust a given notary or registry is strictly a local verifier policy choice.
- Does not prove ground truth or legal validity. SealLink proves who signed what, under which authority chain, and when it was anchored or revoked. Real-world birth, consent free of coercion, and judicial fairness remain outside the protocol.
- Does not mandate key storage, message transport, or agent OS isolation. Hardware enclaves, personal key services, Nostr/Matrix/XMPP transports, and agent isolation runtimes (such as Swarma Runtime) are external specifications consuming SealLink (
guides/GUIDE-01-custody-and-signers.md). - Does not hard-code one blockchain. Core semantics depend on an abstract ledger interface (
ChainView,SPEC-02); Namecoin is Binding Profile v1. - One-way legal capacity model. In v1.0, legal capacity transitions at most once (
ward->autonomous). Adult conservatorship or reversible capacity states are outside v1.0 scope.
2. The Eight Core Principles
Every conforming SealLink implementation and extension profile MUST uphold these eight invariants:
| Rule ID | State | Principle |
|---|---|---|
SL-ARCH-001 | decided | Independent Verification. The party executing an effect or relying on a claim MUST verify every identity, chain history, anchor, and seal on its own ledger view. Pins MUST come from local verifier configuration, never from presenter-supplied input. |
SL-ARCH-002 | decided | Three-Valued Verdict Semantics. Every verification terminates in exactly one of three outcomes: Admit, Refuse (non-closing; transient or invalid presentation), or Close (permanent, durably journaled termination). Unknown, unavailable, or unsupported evidence MUST NEVER degrade to Admit. |
SL-ARCH-003 | decided | Fast to Halt, Slow to Add or Transfer. Revocation via seal spend acts upon first validated observation (including mempool) with durable local closure. Adding devices, appointing successor guardians, changing guardian rosters, transferring names, and recovering identities require confirmed chain state and mandatory delay where governed. |
SL-ARCH-004 | decided | Prose Directs Work; Typed Fields and Scripts Authorize Effects. Mechanical effect executors MUST decide solely from typed machine fields and on-chain scripts and MUST refuse grants carrying operative free-text terms (GRANT_TEXT_FORBIDDEN). Contract termination rules derive exclusively from the contract seal script, never from prose. |
SL-ARCH-005 | decided | Monotonic Attenuation. Delegated authority MUST ONLY narrow relative to its parent across capabilities, constraints, additive quotas, whole-parent pool sums, and validity windows. Every verifier checks narrowing mechanically. |
SL-ARCH-006 | decided | Strict Key-Role Separation. Every key role has a closed set of permitted signing domains (registry/key-roles.json, coherent with registry/object-types.json). Messaging keys NEVER grant authority; authentication keys NEVER authorize effects or contract assents; owner-control device keys NEVER authenticate to foreign verifiers. |
SL-ARCH-007 | decided | Availability-Only Storage and Transport. Off-chain stores, mirrors, and transports (inline, Blossom, HTTPS .well-known, Nostr, Matrix) are trusted for availability only. Content-addressed SHA-256 pins and cryptographic signatures establish authenticity regardless of delivery channel. |
SL-ARCH-008 | decided | Actor-Agnostic Core with Origin-Certified Class. Core mechanics treat all actors identically; refusing an actor solely for being human, corporate, or an agent is invalid unless required by explicit policy. Certified subject class (person, agent, organization) is established solely by a trusted seallink-origin/1 certificate, never by self-declaration. |
3. Actor Ontology and Role Glossary
3.1 Two Orthogonal Axes
Every SealLink actor sits along two independent axes (SL-ARCH-009, decided):
- Certified Class (fixed at origin; immutable):
person— human individual certified by a birth origin certificate (origin_class = "person").agent— materialized software agent certified by a materialization origin certificate (origin_class = "agent").organization— legal entity, collective, or institution certified by an incorporation origin certificate (origin_class = "organization").unverified— any ledger name (or ephemeral key-only actor) without a verified origin certificate. Fully usable for permissionless and pseudonymous interaction.
- Legal Capacity / Autonomy (transitions at most once, one-way:
ward->autonomous):ward— non-fully-autonomous actor (minor human child, or software agent prior to recognized legal capacity). Its name UTXO is controlled by a guardian/custodianScriptPolicy; autonomous commitments signed solely by the ward are rejected at the protocol layer (SPEC-04).autonomous— actor controlling its own nameScriptPolicyand executing grants and contracts in its own right (adult person, organization, unverified actor, or emancipated agent).
3.2 Canonical Role Glossary
| Normative Term (EN) | Companion Projection Term (RU) | Definition |
|---|---|---|
| Actor | Актор | Any participant (person, organization, agent, or unverified key/name). |
| Issuer | Доверитель / Издатель | Actor issuing a grant, credential, origin certificate, or notary act. |
| Recipient | Поверенный / Получатель | Actor (single key, name, or m-of-n group) authorized to invoke a grant. |
| Executor | Исполнитель | Concrete service or host verifying a grant and executing the authorized action. |
| Guardian | Опекун | Autonomous actor holding an active guardianship slot responsible for a ward. |
| Ward | Подопечный | Actor in ward capacity represented by one or more guardians. |
| Notary | Нотариус | Independent third party certifying documents, facts, contracts, or optional delegations. |
| Arbiter | Арбитр | Independent party named in a contract seal or origin recovery/succession rule (e.g., court or arbitration key). |
| Seal | Печать | Dedicated ledger UTXO whose validated spend terminates or consumes a specific right or transition. |
| Provider | Провайдер | Service actor bound by NamePin in a holder's seallink-manifest/1 for a labeled service_type. |
4. Protocol Layer Architecture
The SealLink v1.0 specification is organized as eight orthogonal normative documents plus pluggable domain profiles, machine-readable registries, JSON Schemas, and executable conformance vectors:
| Spec | Layer | Owns |
|---|---|---|
**SPEC-00** | Foundation | Principles, actor ontology, role glossary, threat model, governance. |
**SPEC-01** | Wire & Crypto | Restricted RFC 8785 JCS, dual integers, BIP-340 tagged hashes, 3 hashes, SignatureSet & guardian_approvals, universal policy binding, salted selective disclosure, 7-predicate Constraint Algebra, wire pipeline. |
**SPEC-02** | Ledger Binding | Abstract ChainView, Namecoin Binding v1 (NAME_NEW / NAME_FIRSTUPDATE / NAME_UPDATE grammars, CSV/SegWit), ScriptPolicy, SIGHASH_ALL writer check, multi-node freshness, Witness construction, SLNK OP_RETURN, Merkle batch 0x02, UTXO seals & TRUC/P2A CPFP. |
**SPEC-03** | Identity & Custody | 520-byte name value (multi-role keys / on-chain role-policy pins + uniform origin pin + m head), key taxonomy & cold emergency reserve, manifest/1 (sets, self-service, pinned labeled providers[], auth), card/1, 4-channel cascade, provisional onboarding & name auth, owner control plane (devices, L0–L2). |
**SPEC-04** | Origin & Guardianship | Eternal origin/1 (salted privacy commitments, status_seal, roster_seal, explicit disposer_pk/arbiter_pk/challenger_pk), single-use name-binding/1, N equal guardian slots & 4-class verifier-derived quorums, ward non-autonomy, initial (0x12) & two-stage (0x0d/0x0e) activation, roster transitions (0x0f), consistency invariants, emancipation (capacity/1), end/1, dual-mode name_recovery (0x10 cancel) & seal continuation tables. |
**SPEC-05** | Contracts & Credentials | N-party salted contracts (ward_origin_id for ward parties, machine_clause_indices), framework nesting, confirmed contract seal termination, symmetric assent/1 (guardian_approvals[] for wards), on-chain assent, agreed config hash, verifiable credentials (eternal/revocable, h_c), general notary acts, violation verdicts & salted request attribution. |
**SPEC-06** | Grants & Delegation | Universal grant/1 (unilateral base + optional contract + ward guardian_approvals[]), concrete executor vs stateless executor_ref, UTXO seal vs root-only window_only, acyclic single-use attribution (0x11), invocation/1 & receipt/1, depth-2 re-delegation (R8.5 aggregate budget + R8.6 disjoint coin ranges), early-auth admission pipeline, crash-in-effect-window uncertain recovery, bearer sessions, anti-rollback fenced journals. |
**SPEC-07** | Services & Portability | Grant-gated executor contract, provider authority & pinned transport mutual auth, replaceable service cut-over (migration/1), federated screening & progressive PII disclosure (Contour A), extension/SLIP checklists. |
5. Specification Governance, Authority, and Maturity
5.1 Single Source of Truth (SL-ARCH-010, decided)
- **Prose defines normative behavior;
registry/*.json,schemas/*.schema.json, andvectors/*.jsondefine exact identifiers, grammars, and required outcomes.** If prose, schemas, and test vectors disagree, the specification release is defective. An implementation is NEVER the normative oracle. - Human books and whitepapers are downstream projections of this specification. Where any guide or projection disagrees with
spec/,profiles/,registry/, orschemas/, the normative specification prevails. - Rule States: Every normative rule carries one of two states:
decided(normative requirement) oropen(explicitly unresolved and tracked inOPEN-QUESTIONS.md; readers MUST fail closed on any unprofiled open construct). - Evidence / Maturity Levels: Each specification document independently tracks its empirical maturity:
prose— normative text and schemas authored and lint-checked;vectors— deterministic positive/negative and end-to-end RFC 8448-style byte traces published and verified against schemas and reference cryptography;dual-impl— verified byte-for-byte identical across at least two independent implementations with disjoint crypto stacks (target: Rust + Go);chain-tested— end-to-end verified on Namecoin regtest and/or mainnet.
- Post-Freeze Evolution: Once v1.0 freezes, protocol additions, new standard
service_typeentries, and new canonical object types are proposed via numbered SealLink Improvement Proposals (SLIP-TEMPLATE.md).
6. Global Threat Model and Privacy Default
6.1 Honest Security Guarantees (SL-ARCH-011, decided)
- Issuer-independent, observer-local mempool-speed revocation: SealLink does not promise zero-latency global simultaneous revocation across the Internet. It guarantees that any observing verifier reading its own healthy node permanently closes an authority upon first validated observation of a seal spend (in its mempool or in a block), without depending on the issuer's server.
- Compromised executor limit: Cryptography bounds whom an honest executor admits and creates auditable receipts and dispute bundles; it cannot prevent a compromised executor from misusing credentials it legitimately holds or copying already-disclosed plaintext.
- **Privacy by default (
SL-ARCH-012,decided):** The public ledger MUST carry only cryptographic commitments (hashes and UTXO seals) — never personal names, birth dates, family graphs, private ward lists, or plaintext contract terms. Sensitive fields insideseallink-origin/1(initial guardians and majority timestamps) use salted selective-disclosure commitments (SPEC-01 §5,SPEC-04 §2). Off-chain signed documents default to private delivery (loc_type = 0x00, inline or E2EE transport); public publication viaseallink-card/1or public mirrors is strictly opt-in. Note that public ledger graphs (UTXO spend timing and name-update frequency) remain observable to chain analysts.
7. References
7.1 Normative References
- [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
- [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, May 2017.
- [RFC8259] Bray, T., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259, December 2017.
- [RFC8785] Rundgren, A., Jordan, B., and S. Erdtman, "JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)", RFC 8785, June 2020.
- [RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032, January 2017.
- [BIP-340] Wuille, P., Nick, J., and T. Ruffing, "Schnorr Signatures for secp256k1", BIP-340.
- [BIP-141] Lombrozo, E., Lau, J., and P. Wuille, "Segregated Witness (Consensus layer)", BIP-141.
- [BIP-143] Lau, J. and P. Wuille, "Transaction Signature Verification for Version 0 Witness Program", BIP-143.
- [BIP-112] BtcDrak, Friedenbach, M., and E. Lombrozo, "CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY", BIP-112.
- [BIP-174] Chow, A., "Partially Signed Bitcoin Transaction Format", BIP-174.
- [SEC1] Certicom Research, "SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography", Version 2.0, May 2009.
- [JSON-SCHEMA-2020-12] Wright, A., Andrews, H., Hutton, B., and G. Dennis, "JSON Schema: A Media Type for Describing JSON Documents", Draft 2020-12.
7.2 Informative References
- [RFC8448] Thomson, M., "Example Handshake Traces for TLS 1.3", RFC 8448, January 2019.
- [BIP-431] Sanders, G., "Topology Restrictions for Pinning (TRUC)", v3 transactions in Bitcoin Core v28 / Namecoin Core
nc28.0. - [BIP-433] Sanders, G., "Pay to Anchor (P2A)", witness v1 anchor output
51024e73in Bitcoin Core v28 / Namecoin Corenc28.0. - [NC28] Namecoin Core
nc28.0,src/script/names.cpp,src/script/solver.cpp,src/policy/policy.cpp.
SPEC-01: Wire Format, Cryptography, Thresholds, and Constraint Algebra
- Version:
1.0.0-draft.2 - Status:
draft(normative rulesdecided; seeOPEN-QUESTIONS.mdfor deferred algorithm extensions) - Evidence / Maturity:
vectors(vectors/wire-jcs-and-hashes.json,vectors/constraints-and-schemas.json,vectors/refusal-coverage-matrix.json) - Registries:
registry/object-types.json,registry/refusal-codes.json,registry/constraints.json - Schemas:
schemas/common.schema.json
1. Canonical Serialization (Restricted RFC 8785 JCS)
Every canonical SealLink document — signed or unsigned, including manifests, cards, lists, contracts, origins, credentials, grants, invocations, receipts, and journal entries — MUST use exactly one wire encoding: Restricted RFC 8785 JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS) ([RFC8785], [RFC8259]).
| Rule ID | State | Requirement | Refusal |
|---|---|---|---|
SL-WIRE-001 | decided | Document octets MUST NOT exceed max_bytes registered for its type in registry/object-types.json. JSON object/array nesting depth MUST NOT exceed 16 (the root object is depth 1). | WIRE_SIZE |
SL-WIRE-002 | decided | Input MUST be valid UTF-8 with no BOM and no leading or trailing bytes, parsing as exactly one RFC 8259 JSON object. | WIRE_JSON |
SL-WIRE-003 | decided | No JSON object at any nesting level MAY contain duplicate member names (compared after escape decoding). | WIRE_DUPLICATE |
SL-WIRE-004 | decided | Allowed JSON values are objects, arrays, strings, number-form integers (SL-WIRE-007), and booleans (true, false). The literal null is FORBIDDEN everywhere: optional fields MUST be omitted rather than set to null. | WIRE_VALUE |
SL-WIRE-005 | decided | Every string (including member names) MUST consist solely of Unicode scalar values >= U+0020, excluding U+007F (DEL), the C1 control block U+0080..U+009F, and unpaired surrogates. Multiline prose exception: U+000A (LF, encoded as \n under RFC 8785) is permitted ONLY in designated multiline prose fields (terms_text, contract clause text, termination.reason, card.role); CR (U+000D), TAB (U+0009), and all other < U+0020 code points remain FORBIDDEN everywhere. No Unicode normalization is performed; string equality is exact code-point equality. | WIRE_STRING |
SL-WIRE-006 | decided | The verifier MUST re-serialize the parsed value under RFC 8785 (no insignificant whitespace; object keys sorted by UTF-16 code units; literal UTF-8 strings with ONLY \", \\, and \n where permitted; canonical decimal integers) and MUST refuse unless the re-serialized octets are byte-for-byte identical to the input. A reader MUST NEVER repair non-canonical input. | WIRE_NOT_CANONICAL |
Implementation note: Standard library JSON serializers that HTML-escape
<,>,&, orU+2028, or parse numbers via IEEE 754float64, violateSL-WIRE-006andSL-WIRE-007. Verifiers MUST implement a dedicated strict JCS parser and serializer.
2. Exact Integer Forms
No numeric value in SealLink may pass through IEEE 754 binary64 floating-point arithmetic.
| Rule ID | State | Requirement | Refusal | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
SL-WIRE-007 | decided | **Number form (uint53):** JSON integer token 0 or [1-9][0-9]* with no sign, fraction, exponent, or leading zero, value <= 9007199254740991 (2^53 - 1), and within the schema's field bound. Used for heights, vout, sequence numbers, thresholds, and Unix seconds. | WIRE_NUMBER (malformed token or > 2^53 - 1), WIRE_INTEGER (out of schema bound) | |
SL-WIRE-008 | decided | **String form (uint64_str):** JSON string matching `^(0 | [1-9][0-9]{0,19})$ with unsigned integer value <= 18446744073709551615 (2^64 - 1`). Used for monetary amounts, costs, token counts, byte sizes, quota ceilings, and range bounds. | WIRE_INTEGER |
SL-WIRE-009 | decided | Schema form is strictly enforced: a uint53 where uint64_str is required (or vice versa) MUST refuse without coercion (WIRE_MEMBER). All arithmetic (sums, products, quota debits) MUST use exact integer or exact rational arithmetic without wrap; arithmetic overflow refuses before any reservation or effect (WIRE_INTEGER during parse/attenuation; QUOTA_EXCEEDED during debit reservation). | WIRE_MEMBER, WIRE_INTEGER, QUOTA_EXCEEDED |
3. Object Types, Three Hashes, and Domain Separation
Every registered SealLink object type in registry/object-types.json carries its exact string identifier in type (top-level for unsigned pinned objects, or payload.type for signed envelopes).
| Rule ID | State | Requirement | Refusal | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
SL-WIRE-010 | decided | Closed schemas. Every object type has a closed member set (additionalProperties: false) defined in schemas/ (plus action profile schemas for Invocation.arguments). Unknown, missing, or unregistered type values MUST refuse immediately. | WIRE_TYPE (unknown type), WIRE_MEMBER (schema error) | ||||
SL-WIRE-011 | decided | Three distinct hashes. For any object with canonical payload_bytes (the JCS bytes of payload for signed objects, or the full document for unsigned objects) and signed_bytes (full JCS bytes of the complete signed envelope, either {"payload":...,"signatures":...} or {"guardian_approvals":...,"payload":...}):1. **Object Identifier ( id):** SHA256(payload_bytes) — excludes signatures and guardian approvals; immune to signature randomness.2. **Typed Signing Digest ( digest):** BIP-340 tagged hash H_tag(payload.type, payload_bytes) where `H_tag(tag, msg) = SHA256(SHA256(tag) | SHA256(tag) | msg) and tag is the exact ASCII bytes of payload.type (e.g. "seallink-grant/1").<br>3. **Content Address (content_addr):** SHA256(signed_bytes) — covers the entire signed envelope; used for retrieval pins and signed-form anchoring (0x04, 0x09, 0x0d, 0x0f, 0x11, 0x12`). | — |
4. Keys, Signatures, and Unified SignatureSet
SealLink defines one off-chain multi-signature and threshold envelope used uniformly across single-key actors, multi-key organizations, joint recipient groups, guardian quorums, and notary colleges.
4.1 Key Encodings (SL-WIRE-012, decided)
SealLink v1.0 specifies three exact off-chain signature algorithms plus one on-chain ledger key encoding:
| Algorithm / Role | Public Key Hex Encoding | Signature Hex Encoding | Normative Spec |
|---|---|---|---|
bip340 (default for all protocol objects) | 64 lowercase hex (xonly_64hex): valid secp256k1 x-coordinate (even Y). | 128 lowercase hex (64B BIP-340 Schnorr over digest). | [BIP-340] |
p256 (device keys ONLY) | 66 lowercase hex (02/03 + 32B X): valid compressed SEC 1 point on NIST P-256. | 128 lowercase hex (64B raw r || s, strict low-S s <= n/2, over digest). | [SEC1] |
ed25519 (device keys ONLY) | 64 lowercase hex: valid compressed Ed25519 point. | 128 lowercase hex (64B RFC 8032 signature over digest). | [RFC8032] |
Ledger ScriptPolicy keys (SPEC-02) | 66 lowercase hex (compressed_66hex, 02/03 + 32B X): valid secp256k1 point. | DER ECDSA + 0x01 (SIGHASH_ALL) inside SegWit v0 witness. | [BIP-141], [BIP-143] |
Invalid curve points, non-lowercase hex, wrong byte lengths, or high-S p256 signatures MUST refuse with WIRE_KEY (key defect) or WIRE_SIGNATURE (signature defect).
4.2 Signed Envelope, SignatureSet, guardian_approvals, and Authoritative Policy Binding (SL-WIRE-013, decided)
Every signed SealLink object has one of two exact top-level shapes:
- Ordinary signed envelope (all signed objects without
payload.guardian_context):
{"payload":{...},"signatures":{"policy":{"m":1,"pks":["..."]},"sigs":[{"pk":"...","sig":"..."}]}}
- Ward guardian-quorum envelope (permitted ONLY on
seallink-grant/1andseallink-assent/1whenpayload.guardian_contextis present):
{"guardian_approvals":[{"guardian_name":"id/guardian-a","revision":1,"signatures":{"policy":{"m":1,"pks":["..."]},"sigs":[{"pk":"...","sig":"..."}]},"slot":1}],"payload":{...}}
Verification rules over digest = H_tag(payload.type, canonical_JCS(payload)):
- **Structural validity (
SignatureSet):**policy.mMUST satisfy1 <= m <= len(policy.pks) <= 32.policy.pksMUST be strictly sorted in ascending lexicographical hex order with no duplicates. Each entry insigscarries strictly{"pk","sig"}. - Algorithm restriction:
policy.algdefaults to"bip340"when omitted. Non-bip340algorithms (p256,ed25519) are permitted ONLY onseallink-owner-command/1andseallink-statement/1when signed by a registereddevicekey (SPEC-03 §6). All other signed objects (including everyguardian_approvals[i].signatures) MUST use"bip340". - **Cryptographic verification (
SignatureSet):** Each entry insigsMUST name apkpresent inpolicy.pks, MUST appear at most once perpk, and MUST verify strictly againstdigestunderpolicy.alg. Verified distinct entries insigsMUST number>= policy.m. - Universal authoritative policy binding (ALL object types without exception): Because
signatures.policylies outsidepayload,signatures.policyis NEVER trusted on its own. Every verifier MUST independently derive the expected signing policy from authoritative state (e.g., on-chainlink.<role>forgrant/cred/notary,contract.parties[i].signing_policy,grant.recipient,grant.delegate.key,service.receipt_key,manifest.auth_key,seallink-device-list/1, or each active slot guardian's resolvedlink.grantpolicy forguardian_approvals[i].signatures) and MUST require exact equality betweensignatures.policyand the derived expected policy. Any mismatch refuses withWIRE_SIGNATURE. - **Guardian quorum approvals (
guardian_approvals[],SPEC-04):** Whenpayload.guardian_contextis present (permitted ONLY onseallink-grant/1andseallink-assent/1), the payload cryptographically binds(origin_id, ward_name, revision, event_class)and the envelope MUST useguardian_approvals[](and MUST NOT carry top-levelsignatures). Entries inguardian_approvals[](1..32items) MUST be ordered by strictly ascendingslot(1..32, no duplicate slots;WIRE_SIGNATUREotherwise), and every entry'srevisionMUST equalpayload.guardian_context.revision(GUARDIAN_QUORUM_UNMETotherwise). For each entry, the verifier resolves slotslotat the active roster revision: if the slot is notactiveor its active guardian's name does not equalentry.guardian_name, refuseGUARDIAN_INACTIVE; otherwise derive that guardian's currentlink.grantpolicy at tip and verifyentry.signaturesunder rules 1–4 with exact policy equality (WIRE_SIGNATUREon policy or signature mismatch). Because each slot carries its own independentSignatureSet, multi-key guardians cannot pool keys across slots or double-count. All approving slots MUST resolve to distinct(name, registration)guardians (GUARDIAN_INACTIVEon conflict), and the count of distinct satisfied slots MUST satisfyrequired(derived_event_class)againstrevision_size(GUARDIAN_QUORUM_UNMETon shortfall).
5. Salted Selective Disclosure Commitments
Contracts (SPEC-05), origin certificates (SPEC-04), and privacy-sensitive credentials (SPEC-05) use salted per-clause / per-claim commitments so a holder can reveal one item without disclosing siblings or permitting offline dictionary guesses (SL-WIRE-014, decided).
- Normative commitment formula:
commit(salt_32B, obj) = H_tag("seallink-clause/1", salt_32B || canonical_JCS(obj))
= SHA256(SHA256("seallink-clause/1") || SHA256("seallink-clause/1") || salt_32B || canonical_JCS(obj))
where salt_32B is an independent 32-byte CSPRNG salt (encoded on wire as 64 lowercase hex when transmitted). Issuers MUST generate a fresh, independent 32-byte CSPRNG salt for every committed clause, claim, majority_commitment, and initial_guardian_commitment — salts MUST NEVER be reused across items.
- **Reference byte vector (
vectors/wire-jcs-and-hashes.json):** Forsalt_32B = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1fandobj = {"text":"Room inspection"}(JCS bytes7b2274657874223a22526f6f6d20696e7370656374696f6e227d):commit(salt_32B, obj) = b030a8a82ef79e9d6829f08c2e0bfc74db8b6c259a3b052988027ecc50ffd368*(verified invectors/wire-jcs-and-hashes.json)*. - Disclosure proof: Presenter supplies
(salt_hex, canonical_JCS(obj))alongside the containing object. The verifier recomputescommit(salt_32B, obj)and requires exact byte equality with the committed digest. - Operational boundary: Losing
salt_32Bpermanently forfeits selective disclosure of that item. Salts provide hiding against offline guessing, not encryption of stored plaintext.
6. Structured Capability and Constraint Algebra
To guarantee decidable, mechanical attenuation (child <= parent) across all verifiers while remaining readable for human typed-display on signers, SealLink defines a closed 7-predicate lattice over action arguments (SL-WIRE-015, decided).
6.1 Capability Shape
Each entry in capabilities[] (max 64 entries) has:
action: exact lowercase slash-separated leaf (^[a-z0-9._-]+(/[a-z0-9._-]+)+$). Exact string equality only; prefixes grant nothing.target: structured resource identifier (e.g.,mailbox:id/alice:work). Exact match unless narrowed by profile target rules.where*(optional, max32keys)*: map ofarg_name -> ConstraintPredicate. Keys combine by implicit logicalAND.quotas*(optional, max32entries)*: array of additive stateful counters (kind, resource, unit, max, window), strictly separated from statelesswherepredicates.extensions(reserved): MUST NOT be present in v1.0; any presence MUST refuse withWIRE_CONSTRAINT.
6.2 The Seven Predicates and Conservative Pairwise Attenuation (SL-WIRE-016, decided)
For an invocation argument value v (a missing constrained argument ALWAYS fails with INVOKE_CONSTRAINT_FAILED). Array operands of in and not_in MUST be non-empty, strictly sorted in ascending UTF-16 code-unit order, with no duplicates (WIRE_CONSTRAINT otherwise). For range([min, max]), int(min) <= int(max) MUST hold (WIRE_CONSTRAINT otherwise).
| Op | Operand Form | Invocation Match (arg v) | Conservative Attenuation (child <= parent) |
|---|---|---|---|
eq | string | bool | v == op | child is eq(op) |
in | sorted unique nonempty array <= 256 | v in op | child is in(S') with S' ⊆ op, OR eq(x) with x in op |
not_in | sorted unique nonempty array <= 256 | v not in op | child is not_in(S') with op ⊆ S', OR in(S') with S' ∩ op = ∅, OR eq(x) with x not in op |
prefix | nonempty string | v.starts_with(op) | child is prefix(p') with p'.starts_with(op), OR eq(x) / in(S') where every element starts with op |
suffix | nonempty string | v.ends_with(op) | child is suffix(s') with s'.ends_with(op), OR eq(x) / in(S') where every element ends with op |
range | [uint64_str min, uint64_str max], min <= max | min <= int(v) <= max | child is range([a,b]) with min <= a <= b <= max, OR eq(x) / in(S') where every integer lies in [min, max] |
hash_eq | hex64 | v == op or SHA256(bytes(v)) == op (per profile) | child is hash_eq(op) |
Conservative comparison semantics: The table above is intentionally conservative and performs no syntactic rewriting. For example, a parent using
eq("Invoices")rejects a child using singletonin(["Invoices"]); to narroweq(x), a child MUST emiteq(x).
**Universal Capability Attenuation Rule (SL-WIRE-017, decided):** A child capability C narrows a parent capability P iff:
C.action == P.actionandC.target == P.target;- For every key
kpresent inP.where,kMUST be present inC.whereandC.where[k] <= P.where[k]per the table above (C.whereMAY add additional keys not present inP.where); - For every quota
(kind, resource, unit, window)present inP.quotas,C.quotasMUST contain a matching quota withint(C.max) <= int(P.max), andC.quotasMUST NOT introduce a quota with an incompatiblewindowcounting mode.
Complexity bound: Pairwise predicate comparison runs in $O(|op|)$ time. Checking a child capability list of length $|C| \le 64$ against a parent template list of length $|P| \le 64$ with at most $|W| \le 32$ where keys runs in $O(|C| \cdot |P| \cdot |W| \cdot |op|)$ bounded deterministic time without scripts or external notaries.
7. Deterministic Wire Validation Pipeline
Every verifier parsing any SealLink object MUST execute checks in this exact order and return the first failure (SL-WIRE-018, decided):
- Size (
<= max_bytes) and nesting depth (<= 16) (SL-WIRE-001) ->WIRE_SIZE - UTF-8 / no BOM / trailing bytes / RFC 8259 JSON object (
SL-WIRE-002) ->WIRE_JSON - Duplicate object member names (
SL-WIRE-003) ->WIRE_DUPLICATE - Disallowed
nullvalues (SL-WIRE-004) ->WIRE_VALUE - Number token grammar (
SL-WIRE-007) ->WIRE_NUMBER; string scalar ranges (SL-WIRE-005) ->WIRE_STRING - Restricted RFC 8785 byte-for-byte round-trip (
SL-WIRE-006) ->WIRE_NOT_CANONICAL - Registered
typecheck (SL-WIRE-010) ->WIRE_TYPE - Closed schema member check (
SL-WIRE-010) ->WIRE_MEMBER; integer bounds (SL-WIRE-007..009) ->WIRE_INTEGER; Constraint Algebra sorting, range ordering, andextensionscheck (SL-WIRE-015..016) ->WIRE_CONSTRAINT - Public key syntax and curve-point validation (
SL-WIRE-012) ->WIRE_KEY - Cryptographic signature verification, strictly ascending
guardian_approvals[]slot order (where applicable), andSignatureSetthreshold check (SL-WIRE-013) ->WIRE_SIGNATURE
8. Security Considerations
- No blind digest signing: Signing services MUST parse the canonical object, validate
type, display human-readable fields (for presence-gated keys), and compute the tagged digest internally — never sign an opaque caller-supplied 32-byte digest. - No signature malleability as replay:
id = SHA256(payload_bytes)excludessignatures, ensuring re-signing the same payload with fresh randomness or a different valid subset of anm-of-nSignatureSetnever produces a new grant ID, contract ID, or invocation deduplication key. - **No
nullambiguity:** Banningnulleliminates parser divergence between absent optional fields andnull-valued fields. - Fail-closed extensions: Any unrecognized
type, predicate operator, or populatedextensionsfield refuses unconditionally. - Policy binding: Because
signatures.policysits outsidepayload_bytes, verifiers MUST always comparesignatures.policyagainst an independently derived expected policy (SL-WIRE-013item 4).
9. References
- Normative: [RFC2119], [RFC8174], [RFC8259], [RFC8785], [RFC8032], [BIP-340], [SEC1], [JSON-SCHEMA-2020-12].
- Informative: [RFC8448].
SPEC-02: Ledger Interface, Namecoin Binding, ScriptPolicy, Merkle Batching, and UTXO Seals
- Version:
1.0.0-draft.2 - Status:
draft(normative rulesdecidedexcept provisional freshness constants and Tier 2 profile markedopeninOPEN-QUESTIONS.md) - Evidence / Maturity:
vectors(vectors/ledger-scripts-and-opreturn.json,vectors/refusal-coverage-matrix.json; two-node P2A regtest proof inconformance/p2a-regtest/) - Registries:
registry/opreturn-actions.json,registry/refusal-codes.json - Schemas:
schemas/common.schema.json
1. Abstract Ledger Interface (ChainView)
Core SealLink semantics (SPEC-03 through SPEC-07) depend solely on an abstract ledger interface (ChainView) satisfied by any public ledger providing eight primitives (SL-LDGR-001, decided):
- Globally unique names owned by an authenticated script/policy.
- Totally ordered name updates forming an auditable history chain from initial registration.
- Name liveness / expiry rules deterministically evaluable at any block height.
- Compact name-attached value sufficient for role keys/policy pins and one manifest SHA-256 head.
- Single-spend transaction outputs (UTXOs) powering revocable seals, single-use seals, row coins, stop coins, status spines, and guardian slots.
- Compact arbitrary data commitments (
OP_RETURNor equivalent) anchored to block height. - Script-agnostic output control supporting single-key and
m-of-nthreshold policies without changing ledger consensus. - Verifiable chain tip, block height, and median block time.
1.1 Verifier Conformance Tiers (SL-LDGR-002, decided Tier 1 / open Tier 2)
| Tier | Architecture | Cryptographic Guarantees & Honest Boundaries | Permitted Use |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tier 1 (Full-Node Verifier) | Verifier reads its own locally controlled, read-only, tx-indexed full node (txindex=1), cross-checked against >= 1 independent comparison node. | Full cryptographic verification of name history, anchor inclusion, and absence of spends or name updates in the active chain and its locally observed mempool. Does not guarantee instant observation of unpropagated network transactions. | Normative default; REQUIRED for all effect executors (mail hosts, agent runtimes, wallets, locks, notaries). |
| Tier 2 (Light / Proof-Bundle Verifier) | PoW block header chain + Merkle transaction inclusion proofs + cross-query of k >= 2 independent UTXO/name servers. | Proves: transaction inclusion, signatures, and already-observed spends. Cannot cryptographically prove on Namecoin/Bitcoin (no UTXO state root in block headers) that servers did not withhold a newer seal spend or name update, nor observe mempool spends. Security rests on at least 1 honest, non-eclipsed source among k. | open (deferred to a post-v1.0 profile; see OPEN-QUESTIONS.md). |
2. Namecoin Binding Profile v1
2.1 Chain Pins and Consensus Facts (SL-LDGR-003, decided)
- Networks:
main: genesis000000000062b72c5e2ceb45fbc8587e807c155b0da735e6483dfba2f0a9c770, name expiryD = 36000blocks, SegWit ([BIP-141]) and CSV ([BIP-112]) activated at height475000, Taproot inactive.regtest: verifier-configured genesis hash, name expiryD = 30blocks, SegWit active from genesis and CSV ([BIP-112]) active from height1(matching Namecoin Corenc28.0consensus parameters).
- No other network identifier is valid in SealLink v1.0 (
schemas/common.schema.json#/$defs/Networkclosesnetworkto"main" | "regtest"). A verifier MUST explicitly pinnetworkandgenesisin local configuration and refuse any node reporting a mismatch (CHAIN_MISMATCH). - Name value byte limit: Namecoin consensus (
nc28.0MAX_VALUE_LENGTH) allows1023bytes, while Namecoin Core wallet UI enforcesMAX_VALUE_LENGTH_UI = 520bytes. SealLink fixes **520bytes** as its protocol limit (SPEC-03) for universal wallet compatibility. - Name registration: Two-step flow (
OP_NAME_NEWcommitting saltedHASH160(rand || name), followed>= 12blocks later byOP_NAME_FIRSTUPDATErevealing name and initial value, locking0.01 NMC). A name is live at tip heightHiff its latest name operation confirmed at heighthsatisfiesH < h + D(NAME_EXPIREDotherwise). - Read-only node route: Verifier node credentials MUST NOT expose wallet or transaction-submission RPCs (e.g., restricted via
rpcwhitelist).
3. Unified ScriptPolicy (On-Chain Ownership and Seal Scripts)
SealLink uses one deterministic **ScriptPolicy primitive covering name ownership, contract termination seals, guardianship slots, status/roster spines, and single-use seals**.
3.1 Supported Templates (SL-LDGR-004, decided)
Every ScriptPolicy deterministically compiles to an exact native SegWit v0 trailing scriptPubKey (P2WPKH 22 bytes or P2WSH 34 bytes). Keys in multisig and unordered pairs (a, b) MUST be strictly sorted in ascending lexicographical hex order (min(a,b) < max(a,b)). Relative locktime <D> uses minimal Bitcoin Script CScriptNum encoding (1 <= D <= 52560, BIP-68 block-based relative locktime with bit 22 cleared).
kind / template | Compilation to Output scriptPubKey | Primary Use |
|---|---|---|
{"kind":"key","pk":"<66hex>"} | P2WPKH (22B): OP_0 PUSH20 HASH160(pk). Spent with ECDSA. *(Namecoin P2WPKH validates strictly ECDSA, never BIP-340 Schnorr / FROST; any single-key threshold custody MUST use qualified threshold ECDSA.)* | Individual actor name, ordinary revocable grant seal, row coin, stop coin, disposable revoke seal. |
{"kind":"multisig","m":k,"pks":[...]} | P2WSH (34B): OP_0 PUSH32 SHA256(witnessScript), where witnessScript = OP_k <pk_1> ... <pk_n> OP_n OP_CHECKMULTISIG, 1 <= k <= n <= 15. | Child name (2-of-3), organization name (3-of-5), multi-guardian agent name (2-of-3), signed via namepsbt. |
{"kind":"branch","template":"either_of_2","keys":{"a","b"}} | P2WSH (34B): OP_1 <min(a,b)> <max(a,b)> OP_2 OP_CHECKMULTISIG | Contract seal (either_party); active guardian slot (guardian OR disposer); status_seal. |
{"kind":"branch","template":"both_of_2","keys":{"a","b"}} | P2WSH (34B): OP_2 <min(a,b)> <max(a,b)> OP_2 OP_CHECKMULTISIG | Contract seal (both_together); on-chain 2-party assent; vacant guardian slot (disposer AND arbiter); roster_seal; recovery_seal. |
{"kind":"branch","template":"arbiter_or_both","keys":{"a","b","arbiter"}} | P2WSH (34B): OP_IF OP_2 <min(a,b)> <max(a,b)> OP_2 OP_CHECKMULTISIG OP_ELSE <arbiter> OP_CHECKSIG OP_ENDIF | Contract seal (arbiter termination branch 0 or mutual termination branch 1). |
{"kind":"branch","template":"single_use_1_of_2","keys":{"issuer","grantee"}} | P2WSH (34B): OP_IF <issuer> OP_CHECKSIG OP_ELSE <grantee> OP_CHECKSIG OP_ENDIF (witness selector 0x01 = issuer revoke; empty "" = grantee use). | Single-use UTXO grant seal (unambiguous branch attribution). |
{"kind":"branch","template":"guardian_slot_pending","keys":{"disposer","challenger","guardian"},"delay_blocks":D} | P2WSH (34B): OP_IF <disposer> OP_CHECKSIG OP_ELSE OP_IF <challenger> OP_CHECKSIG OP_ELSE <D> OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY OP_DROP <guardian> OP_CHECKSIG OP_ENDIF OP_ENDIF | Stage 1 pending guardian slot: disposer or challenger MAY veto during delay D; after D blocks, guardian spends to Stage 2 active either_of_2(guardian, disposer) (SPEC-04 §3.3), permanently terminating challenger veto. |
**Namecoin Core
nc28.0compatibility note:** Insrc/script/solver.cpp:146-148, Namecoin strips theOP_NAME_*prefix before evaluatingWITNESS_V0_SCRIPTHASH(IsWitnessProgram(true, ...)), so nativeP2WSHname outputs pass standard relay policy up to 3,600-byte witness scripts and 100 stack items.
3.2 Name Output Prefix Grammars and Pre-Spend Verification (SL-LDGR-005, decided)
- Exact Namecoin name script grammars: A Namecoin name output
scriptPubKeyMUST match one of the three exact minimal-push (MINIMALDATA) prefix forms followed immediately by a trailing native SegWitscriptPubKey(P2WPKH22 bytes orP2WSH34 bytes; legacyP2PKHis NOT supported):
| Operation | Opcode | Exact Prefix Before Trailing scriptPubKey |
|---|---|---|
NAME_NEW | 0x51 (OP_NAME_NEW) | OP_NAME_NEW <20B_hash> OP_2DROP <scriptPubKey> |
NAME_FIRSTUPDATE | 0x52 (OP_NAME_FIRSTUPDATE) | OP_NAME_FIRSTUPDATE <name> <rand> <value> OP_2DROP OP_2DROP <scriptPubKey> |
NAME_UPDATE | 0x53 (OP_NAME_UPDATE) | OP_NAME_UPDATE <name> <value> OP_2DROP OP_DROP <scriptPubKey> |
Any output violating these exact prefix and cleanup opcodes MUST refuse with CHAIN_SCRIPT_UNSUPPORTED.
- Pre-spend verification: Because an unspent
P2WSHoutput exposes onlyOP_0 PUSH32 SHA256(witnessScript)on chain, any pin, contract, manifest, or origin naming an output MUST include its completeScriptPolicy. The verifier compilesScriptPolicyto the exact trailingscriptPubKey(22bytes forkey,34bytes formultisigandbranch) and requires byte-for-byte equality with the trailingscriptPubKeyextracted from the on-chain output. Mismatch or unknown template MUST refuse withCHAIN_SCRIPT_UNSUPPORTED(non-closing; never inferred as a transfer). - **No covenant renewal-only branch (
SL-LDGR-006,decided):** Unmodified Namecoin lacks output covenants (OP_CTV). Any spending branch in a name'sScriptPolicycan technically transfer the name to another script. Deployments MUST NOT add a low-threshold "renewal-only" branch to a name output; renewals MUST use the name's fullScriptPolicythreshold.
3.3 Author / Writer Verification (SL-LDGR-007, decided)
Receiving a name output proves neither authorship nor consent. To prove a name value was authored by owner_policy:
- The spent previous name input MUST satisfy
owner_policy(verified via witness script hash and pubkeys forP2WSH, or pubkey hash forP2WPKH); - Every authorizing ECDSA signature in that input's witness MUST end with strict sighash byte **
0x01(SIGHASH_ALL, withoutANYONECANPAY)**, committing to every output (including the new name value and anyOP_RETURNbreak or cancel frame); - For a newly registered name whose
OP_NAME_FIRSTUPDATEwas signed by a funding wallet, the pinnedowner_policyMUST sign one subsequentOP_NAME_UPDATEof its own before that value is treated as owner-authored (NAME_WRITER_UNVERIFIEDotherwise).
4. Observation, Multi-Node Freshness, and Risk Cutoffs
Every chain-dependent decision executes inside one consistent observation (SL-LDGR-008, decided algorithm / open provisional constants LAG, S, K tracked in OPEN-QUESTIONS.md):
- Snapshot bracket: Read tip
(hash_0, height_0)on the reading node before all queries, and(hash_1, height_1)after. If(hash_0, height_0) != (hash_1, height_1), discard the observation withCHAIN_OBSERVATION_VOID(no closure written, except any validated seal spend already witnessed). - Multi-node health & single-node veto: Reading node MUST be synced (
!IBD,txindex=1,best_header - tip <= LAG, provisionalLAG = 1; elseCHAIN_UNHEALTHY). Verifier MUST cross-check against>= 1independent comparison node (distinct operator source). If any healthy comparison node reports a different hash atheight_0or a higher height thanheight_0, refuseCHAIN_NODE_DISAGREEMENT(a single disagreeing healthy peer vetoes). - Dual tip-age freshness: Verifier maintains a durable monotonic UTC clock watermark (clock regression ->
CHAIN_CLOCK_ERROR) and rejects headers withheader_time - now > S(provisionalS = 600s). Verifier durably recordsfirst_sight_timeon first observation of each block hash:
tip_age = max(now - header_time, now - first_sight_time)
Risk cutoffs:
- Class 1 (money, irreversible effects, custody/guardian transitions, issuance):
tip_age <= 3600s(60 min; default if unstated). - Class 2 (other privileged/read-only actions):
tip_age <= 5400s(90 min).
Exceeding cutoff refuses CHAIN_TIP_STALE.
- Recency & confirmation depth: Grant
recent_blockRMUST lie on the active chain; anchor heightAMUST satisfyR < A <= R + K(provisionalK = 432blocks; elseCHAIN_RECENCY_INVALID). Confirmation depth isH - h + 1, requiring>= max(signed_min_depth, operator_floor)wheresigned_min_depthisgrant.min_depth(default1if omitted) (CHAIN_DEPTH_INSUFFICIENT). - Pre-effect recheck: Immediately before reserving or executing an irreversible effect, the executor MUST re-verify tip freshness, wall-clock window, and live seal status (including mempool).
5. Witness Profile (W), SLNK OP_RETURN Framing, and Merkle Batching (0x02)
5.1 Witness Construction Profile (W) (SL-LDGR-009, decided)
- Every input of a seal-creation transaction
Tand an anchoring transactionAMUST be native SegWit v0 (P2WPKHorP2WSH) with emptyscriptSigand strictSIGHASH_ALL(0x01) on all signatures (CHAIN_TX_CONSTRUCTION). - Linkage output: When
Aanchors a grant whose seal was created inT,Tcreates a linkage output atvout = seal_vout + 1(native SegWit), andAMUST spend that linkage output (never spending the seal). Only the linkage output may be unconfirmed whenAis broadcast; all other funding inputs MUST be confirmed strictly below the spending transaction's block.TandAMAY confirm in the same block. - **Legacy profile (
L):** Reserved solely for future non-SegWit UTXO chains; refused on Namecoin (CHAIN_TX_CONSTRUCTION).
5.2 Framed OP_RETURN Format (SLNK) (SL-LDGR-010, decided)
Every SealLink on-chain commitment uses a single zero-value OP_RETURN output per anchoring transaction (CHAIN_FRAME_INVALID if missing, duplicate, reserved 0x06, or malformed):
OP_RETURN (0x6a) PUSH5 (0x05) "SLNK" (53 4c 4e 4b) <action:1B> <PUSH_N> <payload:N bytes>
Standard payload (N = 34 for loc_type = 0x00, total script 42 bytes; N = 66 for loc_type = 0x01 | 0x02 | 0x05, total script 74 bytes — strictly below the 83-byte standard relay limit):
<version:1B = 0x01> || <commitment:32B> || <loc_type:1B> || [pointer:0B|32B]
Exception — Action 0x0b (KEY_COMPROMISE_BREAK, total script 50 bytes, N = 42):
<version:1B = 0x01> || <typed_digest:32B> || <h_c_le64:8B> || <loc_type:1B = 0x00>
Example hex (action = 0x01, loc_type = 0x00, 42 bytes):
6a 05 534c4e4b 01 22 01 <commitment:32B> 00
All action codes (0x01–0x12, with 0x06 reserved) and locator types (0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x05) are registered in registry/opreturn-actions.json. Locators are strictly non-exclusive hints: an unavailable locator NEVER invalidates a document whose exact bytes match commitment when supplied inline or via any other channel.
5.3 Merkle Batch Anchor Construction (0x02) (SL-LDGR-014, decided)
Action 0x02 (BATCH_ANCHOR) commits to a non-empty set of 1 <= N <= 65536 distinct 32-byte item commitments (item_digest_32B) in a single OP_RETURN frame:
- Ordering: Deduplicate all
item_digest_32Bentries and sort them in strictly ascending unsigned byte order (d_0 < d_1 < ... < d_{N-1}). - Tagged leaf hash:
L_i = H_tag("seallink-merkle-leaf/1", d_i). - Tagged internal node hash:
node(left, right) = H_tag("seallink-merkle-node/1", left || right). - Odd-node promotion (no duplication): At each level of length
k > 1, pair(level[0], level[1]),(level[2], level[3]), ...; ifkis odd, promotelevel[k - 1]unchanged to the next level. (Promoting rather than duplicating prevents tree-duplication second-preimage malleability.) IfN == 1,root = L_0. - **Proof verification (
MerkleProof):** Starting withcur = H_tag("seallink-merkle-leaf/1", leaf_digest), for each step{side, hash}insteps[](len <= 16): Verifycur == proof.rootandproof.root == op_return.commitment(CHAIN_FRAME_INVALIDon mismatch). Reference 5-leaf odd-promotion vector is published invectors/ledger-scripts-and-opreturn.json.- If
side == "L",cur = node(hash, cur). - If
side == "R",cur = node(cur, hash).
- If
6. UTXO Seal State Machine and Fast-Revocation Fee Bumping
6.1 Unified Three-Valued Seal State (SL-LDGR-011, decided)
Every standard revocable seal (grant seal, contract seal, credential seal, active guardian slot seal, device seal, member seal, auth seal, row stop coin) follows this deterministic state table:
| Observed Ledger Condition | Seal State | Verifier Action | Refusal Code |
|---|---|---|---|
Creation tx confirmed at >= required_depth, trailing script matches compiled ScriptPolicy, UTXO unspent at tip and no valid spend in mempool. | **unspent** | Continue verification. | — |
Creation tx confirmed with matching ScriptPolicy, AND either (a) a valid spend is witnessed in mempool or confirmed block, OR (b) confirmed output is absent from node's UTXO set. | **revoked** | Durably write permanent closure entry to fenced journal (SPEC-06 §6) BEFORE returning refusal. Reorgs or mempool eviction MUST NOT reopen a closed seal. | SEAL_SPENT |
Creation tx unknown, unconfirmed, script mismatches ScriptPolicy, or node read inconclusive. | **unavailable** | Refuse WITHOUT writing permanent closure. | SEAL_UNAVAILABLE |
6.2 Single-Use Attribution (SL-LDGR-012, decided)
For single_use_1_of_2 grant seals, a spend has two distinct branches and MUST NOT be folded blindly into SEAL_SPENT:
| Observed Seal Condition | Single-Use State | Verifier Action | Refusal / Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| Seal unspent (no grantee spend observed). | awaiting_spend | Refuse without closure (grantee must spend branch 0 first). | SEAL_UNAVAILABLE |
Spent via branch 1 (issuer), OR spent without valid 0x11 frame, OR absent from UTXO with unknown branch. | revoked | Write permanent closure(cause="SEAL_SPENT") to journal. | SEAL_SPENT |
Spent via branch 0 (grantee, SIGHASH_ALL) with OP_RETURN 0x11 committing content_addr(invocation/1), depth < required_depth (mempool or shallow block). | pending_confirm | Refuse without closure; retryable once depth reaches required_depth. | CHAIN_DEPTH_INSUFFICIENT |
Spent via branch 0 with matching 0x11, confirmed >= required_depth, NOT yet in journal single-use-consumed. | ready_once | Execute at most once; durably write single-use-consumed + closure(cause="SINGLE_USE_CONSUMED") to journal. | Admit (executed) |
Spent via branch 0, already recorded in journal single-use-consumed. | consumed | Identical invocation_id: perform zero second effect and return cached receipt (or INVOKE_REPLAY if profile forbids cached return). Different invocation_id: refuse. | Cached receipt or INVOKE_REPLAY |
Block and mempool scanners projecting seal candidates MUST index tracked outpoints first and parse only transactions spending tracked seals.
6.3 Pre-Signed Disposable Seals and TRUC/P2A CPFP Anchor Output (SL-LDGR-013, decided format / open production propagation qualification)
Fast-revocation seals for devices, auth keys, and member entries use a CSPRNG-only private key (never BIP-39 derived) whose private key is destroyed immediately after pre-signing and replicating tx_revoke:
tx_revokeSHOULD usenVersion = 3(TRUC topology rules, [BIP-431]) signed withSIGHASH_ALLspending the seal UTXO and creating **one standard Pay-to-Anchor (P2A) output** ([BIP-433]): 4-byte witness v1 scriptPubKeyOP_1 PUSH2 0x4e73(51024e73, classified as standard type"anchor"in Namecoin Corenc28.0) alongside its burn/return output. TheP2Aoutput value MUST meet or exceed Namecoin Corenc28.0'sP2Adust floor of **240base units**. BareOP_TRUE(nonstandardinnc28.0) MUST NOT be used.- Namecoin minimum relay fee note: Namecoin Core
nc28.0sets defaultminrelaytxfee = 0.001 NMC / 1000 vB(100,000base units per 1000 vB — 100× Bitcoin's default). A zero-fee pre-signedtx_revokeparent is therefore rejected standalone (min relay fee not met) and is relayed as a 1-parent-1-child (1p1c) v3 package with a dynamically signed CPFP child spending theP2Aoutput and funding the combined package fee (>= minrelaytxfeeand current mempool feerate), without ever needing the destroyed seal private key. - A reproducible two-node Namecoin Core
nc28.0regtest positive control proving standalone parent rejection,submitpackageacceptance, P2P propagation before mining, and block confirmation is preserved inconformance/p2a-regtest/(production propagation and fee-competition qualification remain tracked underOQ-006).
7. Security Considerations
- Mempool visibility is observer-local: Revocation operates at mempool speed at each witnessing verifier; network propagation latency remains a physical limit.
- Cold emergency fee reserve: A hot signer compromise MUST NOT allow an attacker to drain fee UTXOs required for emergency name updates or CPFP revocations; emergency fee UTXOs remain in cold custody (
SPEC-03 §2). - History walk DoS protection: Verifiers MUST enforce a configurable maximum step bound when walking a name's update chain; hitting the bound refuses
NAME_HISTORY_UNAVAILABLEwithout closure.
8. References
- Normative: [BIP-112], [BIP-141], [BIP-143], [BIP-174], [BIP-340].
- Informative: [BIP-431], [BIP-433], [NC28].
SPEC-03: Identity, Name Value, Manifest, Key Taxonomy, Authentication, and Owner Control
- Version:
1.0.0-draft.2 - Status:
draft(normative rulesdecided; domain-binding verification and FIDO2/SSH device extensions trackedopeninOPEN-QUESTIONS.md) - Evidence / Maturity:
vectors(vectors/trace-01-mail-offline-revoke.json,vectors/refusal-coverage-matrix.json) - Registries:
registry/object-types.json,registry/key-roles.json,registry/service-types.json,registry/refusal-codes.json - Schemas:
schemas/name-value.schema.json,schemas/manifest.schema.json,schemas/card.schema.json,schemas/invocation.schema.json
1. Name Value Format (520-Byte Protocol Budget)
An actor's ledger name (conventionally id/<label>, which MAY be a human-readable handle or an opaque pseudonymous identifier such as id/u-8f3a91c4e2) carries a compact Restricted JCS JSON object (SPEC-01, schemas/name-value.schema.json) of **at most 520 bytes** (SL-IDEN-001, decided).
1.1 Top-Level Members (SL-IDEN-002, decided)
A SealLink reader MUST match top-level keys link, m, and nostr strictly (refusing duplicates or Unicode simple case-fold aliases with WIRE_DUPLICATE), and MUST ignore unknown owner-defined top-level members.
| Top-Level Key | Optional | Structure & Purpose | Closes Grants on Edit? |
|---|---|---|---|
link | Yes | Authority & origin root object: closed subset of {cred, grant, notary, origin}. Each of cred, grant, notary is either a single xonly_64hex key or an on-chain threshold pin {"p":"<sha256_of_JCS(ThresholdPolicy)>"}. | **Per-role only (SL-IDEN-003)** |
m | Yes | Single manifest head: {"h":"<64hex>","s":<PositiveUint53>} pinning seallink-manifest/1 (JCS sorted keys h, s). Zero URLs or loc allowed. | Never |
nostr | Yes | Optional transport messaging key: "<64hex>" OR NIP-05 object {"names":{"_":"<64hex>"},"relays":{...}}. Only "_" is read. Zero authority. | Never |
1.2 Multi-Role Keys, On-Chain Role Policies, and Uniform origin Pin (SL-IDEN-003, decided)
One id/ name MAY publish distinct, strictly isolated role keys or threshold role-policy pins simultaneously inside link:
{"link":{"cred":"<64hex>","grant":{"p":"<64hex>"},"notary":"<64hex>","origin":"<64hex>"},"m":{"h":"<64hex>","s":1}}
- On-chain role threshold integrity: Every role policy (
1-of-1direct key ORm-of-nThresholdPolicypinned as{"p":"<sha256>"}) is anchored **directly insidelink.<role>on the ledger** — never governed solely by an off-chain manifest update.- When
link.<role>is a 64-hex stringk, the resolved role policy is{"m":1,"pks":[k]}. - When
link.<role>is{"p":h}, the presenter supplies the fullThresholdPolicy(inside the signed object'sissuer.role_policyand/ormanifest.role_policies.<role>), and the verifier MUST confirmSHA256(canonical_JCS(role_policy)) == h(WIRE_SIGNATUREon mismatch). *(For ward-representedseallink-grant/1objects usingguardian_approvals[],issuer.role_policyis omitted on the ward'sissuerpin and signing authority is resolved from each approving guardian'slink.grantpolicy perSPEC-04.)* - Rotating any key or threshold inside a role policy changes
link.<role>via an owner-authored (SIGHASH_ALL) ledger update, triggering the exact per-role closure rule below.
- When
- Byte budget: With three roles (even with
{"p":...}pins) +origin+m, the value is ~405 bytes — well within the 520-byte protocol limit. - Per-role history isolation: Rotating or removing
link.notaryorlink.credMUST NOT close live grants bound tolink.grant. Rotating or removinglink.grantcloses active grants (NAME_ROLE_CHANGED), while leaving eternal credentials and notary acts intact unless closed by0x0b(h_c). - **Privacy-preserving
originpin:** Every origin-certified actor (child, adult, organization, or materialized agent) writes the identical field namelink.origin = "<origin_id_64hex>". Public chain observers cannot distinguish subject class or capacity from the name value alone (SL-ARCH-012). - Role key disjointness: Within one name, every key appearing in
link.grant,link.cred,link.notary,nostr, andmanifest.auth_keyMUST be disjoint (NAME_VALUE_INVALIDif reused). - **Name history walk (
SL-IDEN-004,decided):** To verify an issuer'sgrantrole policy for an active grant, the verifier resolves the name (refusingNAME_NOT_FOUNDif absent on the active chain) and walks the name's confirmed update chain back toissuer.registration:owner_policyandlink.grantMUST be unchanged from the grant'srecent_blockthrough the tip (renewals,mupdates,nostrupdates, and unrelated role changes close nothing). An owner-signed (SIGHASH_ALL) change or removal oflink.grant(in mempool or block) writes a durableNAME_ROLE_CHANGEDclosure.
2. Key Taxonomy and Cold Custody Rules
All 22 key roles, curves, derivation accounts, and permitted signing domains are authoritatively fixed in registry/key-roles.json (SL-IDEN-005, decided):
- Cold isolation:
name_owner(separate cold seedm/84'/7'/0') andemergency_fee_reserve(cold seedm/84'/7'/3', strictly isolated from all hot signers so a hot compromise cannot drain emergency update/CPFP fees) MUST NEVER reside on an agent host or ordinary hot wallet. - Authority separation:
grant,cred, andnotarykeys sign ONLY their registered BIP-340 domains (registry/object-types.json) and NEVER sign ledger transactions or spend seals. - Auth vs Device vs Messaging:
auth(m/84'/7'/2'/0/i) authenticates to foreign services ONLY (seallink-auth-challenge/1,seallink-auth-upgrade/1) and confers zero grant, contract assent, or effect authority.devicekeys control the owner's own executors and agent key holders ONLY (seallink-owner-command/1,seallink-statement/1) and MUST NEVER sign foreign login challenges, assents, or grants (DEVICE_UNAUTHORIZED).messaging_or_requestkeys carry messages and invoke grants only where explicitly named as recipient; they NEVER issue grants or child grants.
- **Dynamic seal/row/stop pool (
>= 10'):** Per-seal keys (grant_seal,child_seal,row_coin,stop_coin,contract_seal,guardian_seal) live in independent hardened accounts>= 10'with operator-secret xpubs. - Disposable fast-revocation seals:
auth_seal, device seals, and member-entry seals MUST be generated from a CSPRNG (NEVER BIP-39), pre-signed with aP2ACPFP anchor output (SL-LDGR-013), and destroyed immediately after recordingtx_revoke.
*(Concrete custody deployments — hardware enclaves, HSMs, Keyholder daemons — are informative and documented in guides/GUIDE-01-custody-and-signers.md.)*
3. Unified Manifest (seallink-manifest/1) and Off-Chain Sets
The single m pin in the name value authenticates one canonical JCS seallink-manifest/1 object (<= 16384 bytes, schemas/manifest.schema.json) (SL-IDEN-006, decided).
3.1 Manifest Members
- **
sets** (optional): Hash + monotonicseqpins for up to four off-chain JCS sets:card(seallink-card/1): Public entity metadata card (person | agent | organization | service, display name, transports, relays, role, contact). Self-declaredkindcarries zero authority; if anorigin/1is verified,card.kindMUST matchorigin_class.devices(seallink-device-list/1): Owner control-plane devices (label, alg ∈ {bip340, p256, ed25519}, key, presence, ceiling ∈ {0,1,2}, seal).members(seallink-members-list/1): Up to 1,024 managed/member actor pins(name, owner_policy, seal). Verifiers MUST bound per-issuer journaled entries to prevent unbounded state growth.certs(seallink-certset-head/1): Head committing to an actor's self-signedseallink-statement/1records (config-section,transport-binding,root-rotate,root-cancel, each with a closedsubjectschema).
- **
service** (optional): Self-declaration when this actor operates a service (service_type, actions, receipt_key, endpoint, optionaltls_spki_sha256pin). Discovery only; never substitutes for a pinned grant executor key. - **
providers** *(optional,SL-IDEN-007,decided)*: Labeled bindings declaring which external service actors host this actor's resources. Each entry binds(service_type, label)to a full **provider: NamePin** ({name, registration, owner_policy}) plus optionaltransport_key:
"providers": [
{
"label": "work",
"provider": {
"name": "id/mail-host-a",
"owner_policy": {"kind": "key", "pk": "02..."},
"registration": {"txid": "...", "vout": 0}
},
"service_type": "mail"
}
]
- Each
(service_type, label)pair MUST be unique withinproviders. - Provider continuity: Because
providerpins(name, registration, owner_policy), an attacker who re-registers an expired provider name string cannot hijack dynamicexecutor_refdelegations (SERVICE_PROVIDER_UNBOUNDif holder's manifest lacks a matching(service_type, label, provider)entry;NAME_OWNER_MISMATCHif the pinned provider name's confirmed ledger output does not matchprovider.owner_policy). Switching providers requires an explicit owner-authored manifest update. - **
auth_key+auth_seal** (paired optional): Dedicated BIP-340 foreign-service login key and its disposable fast-revocation seal. - **
role_policies** (optional availability hint ONLY): Carries fullThresholdPolicypreimages for on-chainlink.<role>.ppins. Arole_policiesentry has ZERO authority unlessSHA256(canonical_JCS(policy))equals the confirmed on-chainlink.<role>.phash (SL-IDEN-003).
3.2 Monotonicity, Removal, and Reorg Rules (SL-IDEN-008, decided)
Verifiers journal (seq, manifest_sha256, anchoring_txid) for the manifest and (seq, sha256) plus removal marks for each set, keyed by (name, registration):
- On confirmed updates while
anchoring_txidremains on the active chain:manifest.seqMUST strictly increase (new > old), and every retained set'sseqMUST NOT decrease (new >= old; equalseqwith differentsha256refusesMANIFEST_ROLLBACK). - Omitting a previously present set in a valid newer manifest records a durable removal mark at its highest seen
seq; reintroducing the set requires a strictly higherseq. - If
anchoring_txidis orphaned by a chain reorg, the verifier adopts the highest confirmed manifest on the new active chain while retaining all recorded removal marks and seal closures. - Revocation independence: Validated seal spends MUST be processed and journaled even if
seallink-manifest/1is unavailable.
4. Non-Exclusive Four-Channel Distribution Cascade
Verifiers resolve seallink-manifest/1 and pinned off-chain sets using a strictly non-exclusive cascade (SL-IDEN-009, decided cascade / open domain-binding verification profile in OPEN-QUESTIONS.md):
| Priority | Channel | Availability & Policy |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | Inline | Supplied directly by the presenter/peer alongside the request. Always works, including for opaque names with zero domain and zero Nostr key. |
| 1 | Local Cache / Configured Stores | Verifier's local hash cache or operator-configured Blossom (GET /<sha256>) / HTTP mirrors. |
| 2 | **HTTPS .well-known** | Optional; used ONLY if the name explicitly declares a verified domain -> https://<domain>/.well-known/seallink/<object>/<sha256>, under strict SSRF/redirect-denial policy. |
| 3 | **Nostr Relay (kind 30079)** | Optional; used ONLY if the name publishes a nostr pubkey -> query verifier-configured relays for addressable event kind 30079 authored by that key with tag ["d", "seallink-manifest"] (or seallink-card, etc.). |
Bytes from ANY channel are accepted if and only if SHA256(bytes) equals the confirmed ledger/manifest pin and full JCS/schema validation passes (MANIFEST_MISMATCH otherwise). Missing bytes refuse MANIFEST_UNAVAILABLE without silent unconfigured outbound fetches.
5. Provisional Onboarding and Foreign-Service Authentication
A foreign replaceable service authenticates actors using seallink-auth-challenge/1 and seallink-auth-upgrade/1 (SL-IDEN-010, decided):
- Challenge lifecycle: Service generates a 32-byte CSPRNG
nonce, recordsissued_atandexpires_at(issued_at < expires_at <= issued_at + 120), pins its ownservice_id, and records the challenge durably. Client signs withauth_key(neverdevice,grant, orname_owner). Service verifiesSPEC-01 §7, checksissued_at <= now < expires_at(AUTH_CHALLENGE_EXPIRED), checks audience/nonce (AUTH_CHALLENGE_INVALID), and atomically consumes the nonce before creating any session. - Named mode: Service resolves
name, walks owner history, verifiesmanifest/1, confirmsmanifest.auth_key == auth_pubkey(AUTH_KEY_UNPINNED), and confirmsmanifest.auth_sealis unspent (SEAL_SPENTif spent,SEAL_UNAVAILABLEif unconfirmed or inconclusive). Existing service accounts MUST retain their original(name, registration, owner_policy)binding; a re-registered name string MUST NOT take over an old account. - Provisional key-only onboarding: A service MAY admit a challenge without
nameinto a strictly rate- and storage-capped local cell (zero effect, PII-release, or federation rights). - Sponsored client-owned registration & atomic upgrade: A sponsor MAY fund UTXOs controlled exclusively by the client so the client broadcasts
OP_NAME_NEWand (>= 12blocks later)OP_NAME_FIRSTUPDATE(sponsor never owns the name). Once confirmed at required depth, client signsseallink-auth-upgrade/1under the sameauth_keyto atomically bind the confirmed registration to the provisional cell. - Authentication is NOT authorization: A successful login session confers zero authority to spend funds, disclose data to third parties, or bypass grant checks.
6. Owner Control Plane (Own Executors and Trust-Root Pin)
For commanding an actor's own hosts, executors, and managed agent key holders (SL-IDEN-011, decided):
- Device levels and closed command set:
seallink-owner-command/1carries a closed command enum (agent-dispatch,session-terminate,policy-apply,keyholder-halt) with typedargumentsschemas (schemas/invocation.schema.json):- L0: Cognitive work / read-only dispatch (
agent-dispatchwithlevel = 0); zero effects. - L1: Policy-bounded operational control (
agent-dispatch,session-terminatewithin local executor caps). - L2: High-assurance presence-verified device (
presence = true,ceiling = 2): may issuepolicy-apply(paired with an L2-signedseallink-statement/1),keyholder-halt, and fast device revocation (tx_revoke). - Level inheritance: Any agent run launched by an
seallink-owner-command/1inherits itslevelceiling; the run's key holder MUST NOT sign effects above that level.
- L0: Cognitive work / read-only dispatch (
- Foreign boundary: Device keys MUST NEVER be accepted by foreign services (
DEVICE_UNAUTHORIZED). - **Host Trust-Root Pin and Delayed Admin Override (
SL-IDEN-012,decided):** An isolated host/runtime pins(network, genesis, root_name, registration, owner_policy, pinned_grant_policy)in admin-owned read-only storage outside agent write reach. Routine rotation uses aroot-rotatestatement signed by the old policy. Unassisted administrator overwrite enters a mandatory pending delayD(default1008blocks) with out-of-band owner alerts on every load; the old policy OR the name's coldowner_policyMAY cancel beforeeffective_heightviaroot-cancel.
7. Security Considerations
- No silent downgrade of manifest: Once a verifier observes a confirmed manifest for
(name, registration), missing or malformed manifests refuse without falling back to stale caches. - Bidi spoofing in Entity Cards: Clients rendering
card.displayorcard.roleSHOULD isolate untrusted text and flag Unicode bidirectional controls (U+202A..202E,U+2066..2069). - Key compromise blast radius: Separating
auth,grant,cred,notary,device, andname_ownerensures a leaked mobile login key cannot forge contracts, grants, origin certificates, or hijack the ledger name.
8. References
- Normative: [RFC8785], [BIP-340], [RFC8032], [SEC1], [JSON-SCHEMA-2020-12].
- Informative: [NC28].
SPEC-04: Origin Certificates, Legal Capacity, and Multi-Guardian Quorums
- Version:
1.0.0-draft.2 - Status:
draft(core model and acyclic transitionsdecided; trusted calendar time-interval oracle profile remainsopeninOPEN-QUESTIONS.md) - Evidence / Maturity:
vectors(vectors/trace-02-guardian-succession-assent.json,vectors/trace-04-agent-guardian-intake.json,vectors/refusal-coverage-matrix.json) - Registries:
registry/object-types.json,registry/opreturn-actions.json,registry/refusal-codes.json - Schemas:
schemas/origin.schema.json,schemas/guardian.schema.json,schemas/contract.schema.json
1. The Three-Record Separation Model and Authenticated Status Spines
A single "who owns whom" record fails when a parent loses parental rights or an agent changes guardians, because a verifier must independently establish: (1) the origin certificate remains permanently authentic; (2) the ledger name still belongs to the subject; (3) the subject has neither emancipated nor ended; and (4) the presenting guardian(s) currently hold live slots meeting the event quorum.
SealLink therefore separates origin, status, binding, roster, and per-slot guardianship into cleanly linked UTXO-backed lines (SL-ORIG-001, decided):
| Record | Object Type | Anchor / UTXO Spine | Question Answered |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Origin Certificate | seallink-origin/1 | Eternal anchor 0x09 + declares binding_seal, status_seal, and optional roster_seal (disposer_pk, arbiter_pk, challenger_pk) | Who certified immutable origin_class (person | agent | organization), salted initial guardians, quorum policy, and name_recovery? |
| 2. Status Spine | seallink-capacity/1, seallink-end/1 | Spends status_seal with 0x09 (capacity/1 continues spine via next_status_vout; end/1 is terminal) | While status_seal is unspent, proves neither emancipation nor subject end has occurred without global chain scanning. |
| 3. Name Binding | seallink-name-binding/1 | Spends binding_seal (or recovery_seal, continuing via next_recovery_vout) with 0x0c | Which ledger registration (name, registration_outpoint) and owner_policy belong to origin_id? |
| 4. Roster Revision | seallink-guardian-roster/1 | Spends roster_seal (both_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk)) with 0x0f | What is the current approved revision, revision_size, role keys (disposer_pk, arbiter_pk, challenger_pk), and valid slot set (including recovery of burned slots)? |
| 5. Slot Guardianship | seallink-guardian/1 | Per-slot UTXO chain (0x12 direct initial activation OR 0x0d Stage 1 pending -> 0x0e Stage 2 active) | Who occupies slot i, under what term, and is that slot active? |
Identity permanence: Identity rests on the eternal origin_id and its verifiable UTXO spines, not on the mutable ledger name string.
2. Origin Certificates, Privacy Commitments, and Status Spine (seallink-origin/1)
2.1 Origin-Certified Class and Private Commitments (SL-ORIG-002, decided)
- Subject class (
person,agent,organization) is established solely by a verifiedseallink-origin/1signed by an issuercredpolicy trusted under local verifier policy. - Self-declared
seallink-card/1fields prove nothing; if a card is present for a verified origin,card.kindMUST matchorigin_class(ORIGIN_UNVERIFIEDon mismatch). - Two conflicting trusted origin certificates for one registration MUST refuse (
ORIGIN_UNVERIFIED). Absence of an origin certificate yields classunverified. - Pre-registration issuance:
seallink-origin/1is signed and anchored before name registration (h_origin < h_firstupdate), identifying the subject bysubject_initial_keyand committingclaims.intended_nameandclaims.intended_owner_policy. - Privacy of birth and initial guardians:
seallink-origin/1MUST NOT store plaintextmajority_unixor plaintext initial guardian names:claims.majority_commitment(optional) commits to{"majority_unix": T}using salted selective disclosure with an independent 32-byte CSPRNG salt (SL-WIRE-014).- Each
guardian_policy.slots[i].initial_guardian_commitmentcommits to the initial guardian's completeNamePin({name, registration, owner_policy}) using salted selective disclosure with its own independent 32-byte CSPRNG salt (SL-WIRE-014). Initial activation (0x12) opens(salt_i, initial_guardian_NamePin)and verifies exact commitment equality.
- **Authenticated status discovery and continuation (
status_seal):**seallink-origin/1MUST pin a confirmedstatus_seal(controlled bycapacity_authority/ end authority). Any verifier checking current status walks the status spine fromorigin.status_sealon its own node:
| Current Spine State | Observed Spend of Current status_seal | Next Spine State | Verifier Action |
|---|---|---|---|
initial | Unspent at tip and no valid spend in mempool. | initial (ward if guardian_policy present, else autonomous) | Continue verification. |
initial | Confirmed 0x09 matching presented seallink-capacity/1 (issuer verified at anchor height) creating next_status_policy at next_status_vout. | emancipated (successor status_seal = (T_cap, next_status_vout)) | Continue walking from (T_cap, next_status_vout); require confirmed handover transfer (SL-ORIG-011). |
initial or emancipated | Confirmed 0x09 matching presented seallink-end/1 (issuer verified at anchor height). | ended (terminal; no successor seal) | Durably close all guardianship slots and refuse SUBJECT_ENDED. |
initial or emancipated | Spent in mempool or block without matching presented capacity/1 or end/1, or malformed next_status_vout / invalid issuer. | incomplete | Fail closed with ORIGIN_STATUS_INCOMPLETE. |
- Eternal validity & compromise cutoff: Verified against
issuer.role_policy(link.cred) **ath_origin**, surviving routine key rotation and name expiry, providedh_origin < h_cunder any0x0bcompromise break (CRED_ISSUER_CLOSED). Issuer services MUST enforce durable idempotency byrequest_sha256.
2.2 Single-Use Name Binding (SL-ORIG-003, decided)
seallink-origin/1names a pre-created single-usebinding_seal.- After
OP_NAME_FIRSTUPDATEconfirms ath_firstupdate > h_originwith output matchingintended_owner_policy, the registrar spendsbinding_seal(SIGHASH_ALL) withOP_RETURN 0x0ccommittingid(seallink-name-binding/1)naming(origin_id, seq=1, name, registration, owner_policy). - The subject's name value writes
"link": {"origin": "<origin_id_64hex>"}(SL-IDEN-003). Removing or alteringlink.originin a later update NEVER unbinds an already confirmed registration. - Reverse uniqueness: A registration already bound to one
origin_idMUST refuse any second initial binding (ORIGIN_BINDING_INVALID).
3. Multi-Guardian Slots, Closed Event Classes, and Slot Transitions
3.1 Revision-Denominated Quorums and Verifier-Derived event_class (SL-ORIG-004, SL-ORIG-005, decided)
origin.guardian_policyinitializesrevision = 1,revision_size = N(1 <= N <= 32), explicit compressed secp256k1 ECDSA keys **disposer_pk, independentarbiter_pk** (arbiter_pk != disposer_pk), and pre-activation **challenger_pk** (CompressedPubkey66; institutional multi-custodian roles use threshold ECDSA tracked underOQ-007),roster_seal(both_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk)),appointment_delay_blocks, a closed 4-classQuorumMap, andslots[1..N](each beginning ininitial_vacantwithvacant_utxolocked byboth_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk)).- **Closed 4-class linear
GuardianEventClass(verifier-derived — NEVER signer-chosen):** ONLY objects carryingpayload.guardian_context(seallink-grant/1andseallink-assent/1) map toGuardianEventClass. The four classes form a strict linear orderroutine_read < effect_grant < contract_assent < custody_change. The verifier deterministically derives the required class from the object type, target, and capabilities (taking the highest matching class across all capabilities in a grant) and MUST verifypayload.guardian_context.event_class == derived_class(GUARDIAN_QUORUM_UNMETon mismatch):
GuardianEventClass | Normative Carrier Objects & Scope (Highest Matching Class Applies) |
|---|---|
routine_read | Stateless read-only seallink-grant/1 (external_mutation = false, no quotas, no delegate, not single_use, no contract_id, and NOT agent/guardian-message). |
effect_grant | Unilateral seallink-grant/1 (no delegate, no contract_id) with quotas, external_mutation = true, single_use revocation, OR action agent/guardian-message (PROFILE-agent-v1). |
contract_assent | seallink-assent/1 with target_type = "seallink-contract/1", OR any contract-bound seallink-grant/1 (contract_id present, without delegate). |
custody_change | Delegating seallink-grant/1 (delegate present), OR seallink-assent/1 with target_type = "seallink-migration/1". |
*(Roster transitions 0x0f, emancipation seallink-capacity/1, subject end seallink-end/1, and dual-party name recovery 0x0c are governed directly by their dedicated on-chain seals and issuer.role_policy — never by guardian_approvals[] — so a deadlocked or burned guardian quorum never blocks institutional governance.)*
- **Revision-denominated threshold (
SL-ORIG-005):** For derived classEwith quorum{num, den, min}from the active roster revision, required distinct valid guardian slots MUST be computed strictly against **revision_size** (NEVER against transient active slot count):
required(E) = max(min, ceil(num * revision_size / den))
- Distinct guardian rule: Only an
autonomousactor MAY hold a guardianship slot. Two slots MAY NOT simultaneously be held by the same(name, registration). Each approving slot supplies its own independentSignatureSetinsideguardian_approvals[]matching that guardian's resolvedlink.grantpolicy (SL-WIRE-013), so a multi-key guardian satisfies its own threshold independently and counts as at most one slot.
3.2 Guardianship Consistency Invariants (SL-ORIG-016, decided)
Every verifier validating seallink-origin/1, seallink-guardian-roster/1, or seallink-guardian/1 MUST enforce these mechanical invariants:
- Rational quorum bounds: For every entry
{num, den, min}inquorums,1 <= num <= den <= 32and1 <= min <= revision_sizeMUST hold (WIRE_INTEGERon violation). - Exact slot coverage:
len(slots) == revision_size, allslotnumbers MUST be distinct, and the set of slot numbers MUST equal{1, ..., revision_size}(WIRE_INTEGERon violation). - Key independence and script binding:
disposer_pk != arbiter_pkMUST hold (ORIGIN_UNVERIFIEDon violation).roster_seal.script_policyand everyvacant_utxo/new_vacant_policyMUST compile toboth_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk). Every Stage 1pending_policyMUST compile toguardian_slot_pendingwithdisposer == active_roster.disposer_pk,challenger == active_roster.challenger_pk,guardian == guardian_seal_pk, anddelay_blocks == effective_delay_blocks >= origin.guardian_policy.appointment_delay_blocks(CHAIN_SCRIPT_UNSUPPORTEDon script/key mismatch;GUARDIAN_INACTIVEon delay shortfall). Everyactive_policyMUST compile toeither_of_2(guardian_seal_pk, active_roster.disposer_pk). - Term ceiling against majority: For a human ward (
origin_class = "person") whoseclaims.majority_commitmentis opened to{"majority_unix": T}, everyseallink-guardian/1carrying acalendarterm MUST satisfyterm.not_after_unix <= T(GUARDIAN_INACTIVEon violation).
3.3 Protocol-Level Ward Non-Autonomy (SL-ORIG-006, decided)
While a subject is in ward status (verified origin/1 with guardian_policy present and no completed emancipation), every verifier evaluating a seallink-grant/1 or seallink-assent/1 for that subject MUST enforce this exact refusal precedence:
- Missing
payload.guardian_contextor carrying top-levelsignaturesinstead ofguardian_approvals[]-> **WARD_AUTONOMOUS_FORBIDDEN** payload.guardian_context.origin_idorward_namemismatch -> **ORIGIN_UNVERIFIED**payload.guardian_context.revisionmismatch with latest effective roster revision, OR anyguardian_approvals[i].revision != payload.guardian_context.revision-> **GUARDIAN_QUORUM_UNMET**- For each entry in
guardian_approvals[](strictly ascendingslot, checked at wire step ->WIRE_SIGNATURE): slot not in active roster, slot state !=active, active guardian name !=entry.guardian_name, calendar/ceiling term expired, or two approving slots resolve to the same(name, registration)-> **GUARDIAN_INACTIVE** - Approving guardian's
entry.signatures.policydoes not equal that guardian's resolvedlink.grantpolicy at tip, or BIP-340 verification fails -> **WIRE_SIGNATURE** payload.guardian_context.event_class != derived_class, OR count of distinct satisfied slots< required(derived_class)-> **GUARDIAN_QUORUM_UNMET**
3.4 Initial Activation (0x12), Acyclic Two-Stage Appointment (0x0d/0x0e), and Slot State Machine (SL-ORIG-007, decided)
To eliminate txid <-> hash cycles, preserve privacy of initial guardians, and eliminate indefinite challenger vetoes, slot activation supports two explicit modes in seallink-guardian/1 (activation_mode):
- **Initial Slot Activation (
activation_mode = "initial",0x12):**- Each slot declared in
origin.guardian_policy.slots[i]begins in state **initial_vacant** atvacant_utxo(both_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk)). - To activate initial guardian
G_initwithout delay: the presenter opens(salt_i, initial_guardian_NamePin)verifyingcommit(salt_i, initial_guardian_NamePin) == origin.guardian_policy.slots[i].initial_guardian_commitment(SL-WIRE-014);G_initsignsseallink-assent/1(target_type = "seallink-guardian/1"); andissuersignsseallink-guardian/1withactivation_mode = "initial",revision = 1,prev_outpoint = vacant_utxo,active_vout, andactive_policy = either_of_2(guardian_seal_pk, disposer_pk). - Both
disposer_pkandarbiter_pkco-sign one PSBT spendingvacant_utxo(both_of_2), creatingactive_policyatactive_vout, and anchoringcontent_addr(seallink-guardian/1)inOP_RETURN 0x12(GUARDIAN_INITIAL_ACTIVATION). - Once confirmed at
h_init(T_init), the live active slot seal is deterministically **(T_init, active_vout)**.activation_mode = "initial"is permitted ONLY frominitial_vacantatrevision = 1; appointing ANY successor MUST useactivation_mode = "appointed"below.
- Each slot declared in
- **Stage 1 — Successor Appointment (
activation_mode = "appointed",0x0d, createspending_delay):**- Incoming guardian
G_newsignsseallink-assent/1(target_type = "seallink-guardian/1"). - Appointing authority (
issuer.role_policy, verified againstlink.credath_app) signs the acyclicseallink-guardian/1withactivation_mode = "appointed", committingprev_outpoint(thevacantorinitial_vacantUTXO),pending_vout,pending_policy(guardian_slot_pendingwith{disposer: active_roster.disposer_pk, challenger: active_roster.challenger_pk, guardian: guardian_seal_pk}anddelay_blocks = effective_delay_blocks), andactive_policy(either_of_2(guardian_seal_pk, active_roster.disposer_pk)). - Both
disposer_pkandarbiter_pkco-sign one PSBT spendingprev_outpoint(both_of_2), creatingpending_policyatpending_vout, and anchoringcontent_addr(seallink-guardian/1)inOP_RETURN 0x0d. - Once confirmed at
h_appwith txidT_app, the pending slot outpoint is deterministically **(T_app, pending_vout)**. During[h_app, h_app + delay_blocks), the slot has zero authority;disposer_pkorchallenger_pkMAY spend(T_app, pending_vout)to veto the appointment.
- Incoming guardian
- **Stage 2 — Activation (
0x0e, removes challenger veto permanently):**- At height
H >= h_app + delay_blocks,G_newspends(T_app, pending_vout)via the CSV-unlocked<guardian>branch (SIGHASH_ALL), creatingactive_policy(either_of_2(guardian_seal_pk, active_roster.disposer_pk)) at outputvout = 0, and anchoringid(seallink-guardian/1)inOP_RETURN 0x0e. - Once confirmed at
h_actwith txidT_act, the live active slot seal is deterministically **(T_act, 0)**.challenger_pkis absent fromactive_policyand has zero power once activated.
- At height
- Fast Halt (1 party, mempool speed): Either
guardianresigns ORdisposer_pkhalts immediately by spending the active slot seal (either_of_2) to a freshvacantUTXO locked byboth_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk)(optionally carrying0x0afor-cause withdrawal, which bars re-appointment without a new ruling). First observation in mempool permanently terminates that guardian's authority (GUARDIAN_INACTIVEon ward actions;SEAL_SPENTon direct seal check).
Complete Slot State Transition Table
Because Namecoin lacks output covenants, a malicious spender could spend a slot UTXO to an invalid output script ("burning" the slot). Every possible spend is handled deterministically:
| Current State | Observed Spend / Event | Next State | Guardian Authority | Recovery Path |
|---|---|---|---|---|
initial_vacant | Valid 0x12 tx (both_of_2) for disclosed initial_guardian_commitment + guardian assent creating active_policy at active_vout. | active (outpoint (T_init, active_vout)) | Active | Normal operation. |
initial_vacant | Valid 0x0d tx (both_of_2, activation_mode = "appointed") creating pending_policy at pending_vout. | pending_delay (outpoint (T_app, pending_vout)) | None | Stage 2 after delay_blocks. |
initial_vacant | Any other spend of vacant_utxo. | contested_burned | None | seallink-guardian-roster/1 (0x0f). |
vacant | Valid 0x0d tx (both_of_2, activation_mode = "appointed") creating pending_policy at pending_vout. | pending_delay (outpoint (T_app, pending_vout)) | None | Stage 2 after delay_blocks. |
vacant | Any other spend (including 0x12) of vacant_utxo. | contested_burned | None | seallink-guardian-roster/1 (0x0f). |
pending_delay | Spend by disposer_pk or challenger_pk before Stage 2. | vetoed (if recreated as both_of_2 at vout = 0 -> vacant, else contested_burned) | None | New 0x0d or 0x0f roster transition. |
pending_delay | Valid 0x0e tx (<guardian> CSV branch) creating active_policy at vout = 0. | active (outpoint (T_act, 0)) | Active | Normal operation. |
pending_delay | Any malformed spend of (T_app, pending_vout). | contested_burned | None | seallink-guardian-roster/1 (0x0f). |
active | Spend of active seal creating valid both_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk) at vout = 0 (with optional 0x0a). | vacant | Ended | New 0x0d appointment. |
active | Spend of active seal to ANY other script ("slot burn"). | contested_burned | Ended | seallink-guardian-roster/1 (0x0f). |
| Any | seallink-capacity/1 transfer completed OR seallink-end/1 verified. | closed | Ended | Terminal. |
3.5 Roster Revision Transitions (seallink-guardian-roster/1, 0x0f, SL-ORIG-015, decided)
To change approved revision_size (e.g., reducing 2 -> 1 when one parent loses parental rights, adding a slot, rotating disposer_pk/arbiter_pk/challenger_pk, updating quorums, or re-anchoring a contested_burned slot):
- Authorization without old-roster quorum: Roster transitions are authorized strictly by
disposer_pk + arbiter_pkco-signing a PSBT spending the currentroster_seal(both_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk)), combined withissuer.role_policy(link.cred) signingseallink-guardian-roster/1and waitingeffective_delay_blocks. They NEVER require signatures from the old guardian roster, ensuring deadlocked or burned rosters remain recoverable. - The
0x0ftransaction createsnext_roster_policy(both_of_2(new_disposer_pk, new_arbiter_pk)) atnext_roster_vout, creates anynew_vacantslot UTXOs at their declarednew_vacant_voutindices, and anchorscontent_addr(seallink-guardian-roster/1)viaOP_RETURN 0x0f. payload.revisionMUST equalprev_revision + 1, andpayloadMUST satisfy allSL-ORIG-016invariants (len(slots) == revision_size,1 <= num <= den,1 <= min <= revision_size,disposer_pk != arbiter_pk).- The new roster takes effect after
effective_delay_blocksconfirmations (>= origin.guardian_policy.appointment_delay_blocks). Whileroster_sealis spent andseallink-guardian-roster/1is not presented (or fails verification), verifiers fail closed withORIGIN_STATUS_INCOMPLETE. - **Issuer-key survival (
SL-ORIG-008,decided):** Bothseallink-guardian/1andseallink-guardian-roster/1verifyissuer.role_policy(link.cred) at their confirmed anchor height, bounded by0x0b(h_c), so routine issuer key rotation never orphans wards.
4. Guardianship Terms: Indefinite vs. Calendar Time
| Subject / Mode | term Form | Termination Rule (SL-ORIG-009, decided) |
|---|---|---|
| Agent / Indefinite | {"mode":"indefinite"} | Lives until slot seal spend, verified seallink-capacity/1, verified seallink-end/1, or compromise cutoff h_c. |
| Human Minor / Calendar | {"mode":"calendar","not_after_unix":T,"ceiling_height":H_max} | Guardianship ends automatically at calendar majority T (bounded by T <= opened majority_unix per SL-ORIG-016, and never exceeding H_max, which is a failsafe ceiling and never extends past T). |
**Asymmetric Safety Rule at Majority Boundary (SL-ORIG-010, open time-interval oracle profile; safety rule decided):** Block intervals drift by weeks over 18 years; chain median time past (MTP) is an auxiliary necessary constraint (MTP < T for guardian admission), never sufficient alone.
- Guardian admission is allowed ONLY if the entire credible UTC interval
[t_low, t_high]lies strictly belowT(and tip is fresh underSPEC-02). - Independent adult admission requires
t_low >= Tplus confirmed emancipation transfer (SL-ORIG-011). - If
[t_low, t_high]straddlesT, tip is stale, or the credible interval cannot be established, admission pauses for BOTH sides (GUARDIAN_TIME_BOUNDARY). *(The normative trusted time-interval oracle profile is tracked inOPEN-QUESTIONS.md.)*
5. Ward Admission State Machine, Emancipation, and Subject End
5.1 Four Ward Admission States (SL-ORIG-011, decided)
A verifier evaluating any action for an origin-certified actor walks origin/1, status_seal, roster_seal, binding_seal, and active slot seals:
| State | Condition | Permitted Admission |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Under Guardianship | status_seal unspent (no capacity/1 or end/1); unexpired; active slot(s) at latest effective roster revision satisfy required(derived_event_class) via guardian_approvals[]; confirmed name binding matches current owner_policy. | Actions authorized by guardian quorum (and separate service grant where required). |
| 2. Guardianship Halted | Not emancipated, but active slots cannot meet required(derived_event_class) (halted, vacant, pending, or contested_burned). | None (GUARDIAN_INACTIVE if cited slot is inactive; GUARDIAN_QUORUM_UNMET if valid active slots fall below required). |
| 3. Transfer Pending | Calendar T reached OR verified seallink-capacity/1 spent status_seal, but name output has NOT yet been confirmed-transferred to subject_new_owner_policy with subject's own SIGHASH_ALL name update. | None for either side (GUARDIAN_TRANSFER_PENDING). Name renewal, revocation, and handover transfer remain allowed. |
| 4. Autonomous | capacity/1 (+ t_low >= T for human) verified, confirmed name transfer to subject_new_owner_policy, confirmed subject-authored update, and binding line updated. | Full autonomous protocol admission; guardianship slots permanently closed. |
- Emancipation rule: Transferring a ward's name upon majority/emancipation MUST move the name UTXO to a fresh
ScriptPolicygenerated by the subject — never hand guardians' old shared key shares to the subject. - **Subject End (
SL-ORIG-012,decided):** An eternalseallink-end/1record spendingstatus_sealterminally (0x09, creating no successorstatus_seal) permanently closes all guardianship slots and refuses all future admission (SUBJECT_ENDED). Silence or lost keys NEVER constitute proof of end.
6. Dual-Mode Name Recovery (name_recovery) and Seal Continuation
seallink-origin/1 immutably declares one of two recovery policies at issuance (SL-ORIG-013, decided):
- **
"mode": "none"(Irreversible Binding):** No third party can ever re-bindorigin_idto a new ledger name. Attempting recovery refusesRECOVERY_FORBIDDEN. - **
"mode": "dual_party_delayed"(Governed Recovery):**origin/1pinsdisposer_pk, independentarbiter_pk(disposer_pk != arbiter_pk),delay_blocks >= 144(recommended>= 1008), and aboth_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk)recovery_seal.- To recover after catastrophic key loss, both
disposer_pkandarbiter_pkco-sign a transactionT_recspending the liverecovery_sealwithOP_RETURN 0x0ccommitting a newseallink-name-binding/1(seq = prev_seq + 1, naming the new confirmed registration, newowner_policy,supersedes_binding_id, AND continuationnext_recovery_vout+next_recovery_policy = both_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk)). - Once
T_recconfirms ath_rec, the live recovery seal advances to(T_rec, next_recovery_vout). During[h_rec, h_rec + delay_blocks), the previous binding stops admitting and the new binding sits inpending_delay(RECOVERY_FORBIDDENfor both bindings). - **Live-owner cancellation veto (
SL-ORIG-014,decided):** At any block strictly prior toh_rec + delay_blocks, the existing name's currentowner_policyMAY broadcast an owner-authored (SIGHASH_ALL)OP_NAME_UPDATEcontainingOP_RETURN 0x10(RECOVERY_CANCEL) committingid(pending_name_binding/1). Observing confirmed0x10cryptographically proves the old keys are alive, permanently aborts the pending recovery (RECOVERY_FORBIDDENfor the cancelled binding), **immediately restores admission under the priorNameBinding**, and preserves the continuedrecovery_sealat(T_rec, next_recovery_vout)for any genuine future recovery. - Old grants bound to the old name/key NEVER carry over to a recovered name.
Recovery Seal State Transition Table
| Current State | Observed Chain Event | Next State | Admitted Binding |
|---|---|---|---|
active_binding(B_k) | recovery_seal unspent. | active_binding(B_k) | B_k |
active_binding(B_k) | Valid 0x0c spend (T_rec at h_rec) creating next_recovery_policy at next_recovery_vout committing B_{k+1}. | pending_recovery(B_{k+1}) (successor seal (T_rec, next_recovery_vout)) | None (RECOVERY_FORBIDDEN during delay). |
pending_recovery(B_{k+1}) | Owner-authored SIGHASH_ALL OP_NAME_UPDATE of B_k.name with 0x10 committing id(B_{k+1}) confirmed at < h_rec + delay_blocks. | active_binding(B_k) (successor seal (T_rec, next_recovery_vout)) | **B_k restored immediately**; B_{k+1} permanently aborted (RECOVERY_FORBIDDEN). |
pending_recovery(B_{k+1}) | Tip reaches H >= h_rec + delay_blocks with no 0x10 cancel. | active_binding(B_{k+1}) | **B_{k+1} active**; B_k permanently superseded (ORIGIN_BINDING_INVALID). |
| Any | Malformed spend of recovery_seal (missing 0x0c or missing valid next_recovery_vout). | incomplete | Fail closed (ORIGIN_STATUS_INCOMPLETE). |
7. Security Considerations
- Three-place key custody limit: A
2-of-3child name (Parent A,Parent B,Notary) survives any 1 lost share, but any 2 colluding holders can spend the name UTXO. Preventing both single-point loss and 2-party collusion requires3-of-4with an independent 4th custodian. - Name renewal obligation: Over an 18-year childhood on Namecoin (
D = 36000), guardians execute ~27–30 renewals. Off-chain agreements SHOULD define when the 3rd custodian co-signs renewals while keeping the on-chain script at full threshold (SL-LDGR-006). - Compromised issuer key: Independent
arbiter_pkrequirements (SL-ORIG-007,SL-ORIG-013,SL-ORIG-015) prevent unilateral appointment, roster takeover, or name recovery; cold multisigowner_policyprotects institutional issuers.
8. References
- Normative: [BIP-112], [BIP-141], [BIP-174], [BIP-340], [RFC8785].
- Informative: [RFC8448], [NC28].
SPEC-05: Contracts, Symmetric Assent, Verifiable Credentials, and General Notary Acts
- Version:
1.0.0-draft.2 - Status:
draft(normative rulesdecided) - Evidence / Maturity:
vectors(vectors/wire-jcs-and-hashes.json,vectors/trace-02-guardian-succession-assent.json,vectors/refusal-coverage-matrix.json) - Registries:
registry/object-types.json,registry/key-roles.json,registry/opreturn-actions.json,registry/refusal-codes.json - Schemas:
schemas/contract.schema.json,schemas/credential.schema.json
1. Relationship Between Grants and Contracts
In SealLink v1.0, a **unilateral grant (SPEC-06) is the base authorization primitive: it requires no recipient assent and imposes no obligations on the recipient. A contract (seallink-contract/1)** is the bilateral or multilateral overlay that adds mutual agreement, obligations, framework governance, and shared or arbiter-controlled termination (SL-CONT-001, decided).
- A contract MAY exist without any grant (e.g., an anchored agreement between two people or organizations).
- Any action profile imposing payment, work, rental, or liability obligations on the recipient (such as
rentalor contract-boundagent/session) MUST declarerequires_contract = true; executors refuse unilateral grants for such actions (GRANT_CONTRACT_REQUIRED).
2. N-Party Structured Contracts (seallink-contract/1)
2.1 Structure, Salted Selective Disclosure, and Machine-Clause Completeness (SL-CONT-002, decided)
A seallink-contract/1 object (<= 65536 bytes, schemas/contract.schema.json) binds N >= 2 parties (any combination of people, organizations, agents, or unverified actors):
- Header fields:
type,network,genesis,profile,contract_salt(32 CSPRNG bytes, preventing offline guessing of short contracts),parties[2..32]— where each entry is either an autonomous party{role, name_pin?, signing_policy: ThresholdPolicy}or a ward party{role, ward_origin_id, name_pin}(omitting staticsigning_policyso guardian succession never invalidates a live contract) —window(not_before_height, optionalnot_after_height, optional calendarnot_after_unix), optionalmachine_clause_indices, optionalframework_id, optional/requiredseal, optionalassent_output, optionalconfig_sha256, and optionalmoderation. - Clauses & Selective Disclosure: Each clause
iis a canonical JCS object containing free-text prose (text, where\nis allowed perSL-WIRE-005), typed machine terms (mirroring any bound grant capabilities/quotas), or both. The contract stores ONLY the ordered arrayclause_commitments[]where:
clause_commitments[i] = H_tag("seallink-clause/1", salt_i || canonical_JCS(clause_i))
contract_id = SHA256(canonical_JCS(seallink-contract/1))
When a grant binds contract_id (and optionally framework_id), both complete contract documents MUST be presented (CONTRACT_NOT_PRESENTED) and MUST recompute to their bound identifiers (CONTRACT_ID_MISMATCH).
- Deterministic machine-clause completeness: Every clause index carrying machine-enforced terms MUST be listed in strictly ascending order in
machine_clause_indices[](with every index< len(clause_commitments)). An executor MUST require disclosure of(salt_i, clause_i)for EVERY indexiinmachine_clause_indices[], verifycommit(salt_i, clause_i) == clause_commitments[i], and check every disclosed machine term against the bound grant (CONTRACT_TERMS_MISMATCHon missing disclosure or mismatch). Prose-only clauses outsidemachine_clause_indices[]MAY remain undisclosed to the executor. - **Framework Nesting (
SL-CONT-003,decided):** A contract MAY name at most oneframework_id, and a framework contract MUST NOT name another framework contract (maximum nesting depth = 1). Every grant's window MUST nest inside its bound contract's window, which MUST nest inside its framework contract's window.
2.2 Symmetric Native Assent (seallink-assent/1) and Anchoring (SL-CONT-004, decided)
- Symmetric off-chain assent: A contract is concluded when EVERY party in
parties[]has signed an identical-formatseallink-assent/1(<= 32768bytes, accommodating multi-guardianguardian_approvals[]and up to 32-of-32SignatureSet,target_type = "seallink-contract/1",target_id = contract_id):- Permitted signer roles for
seallink-assent/1are strictlygrantandguardian_quorum(registry/object-types.json, coherent withregistry/key-roles.json);authanddevicekeys MUST NEVER signseallink-assent/1(WIRE_SIGNATURE). - For an autonomous party (
signing_policypresent),seallink-assent/1uses the ordinary{"payload","signatures"}envelope whosesignatures.policyMUST strictly equalparty.signing_policy(SL-WIRE-013). - For a ward party (
ward_origin_idpresent,SPEC-04),seallink-assent/1MUST carrypayload.guardian_context(origin_id == party.ward_origin_id,ward_name == party.name_pin.name,event_class = "contract_assent",revisionmatching the ward's active roster revision) and top-levelguardian_approvals[]satisfyingrequired("contract_assent")across distinct active guardian slots (SL-ORIG-006refusal precedence:WARD_AUTONOMOUS_FORBIDDEN, thenGUARDIAN_INACTIVE, thenWIRE_SIGNATURE, thenGUARDIAN_QUORUM_UNMET). - Assent freshness for grant issuance is at most
72hours (259200s) and single-use per issuance (CONTRACT_ASSENT_INVALID).
- Permitted signer roles for
- **Contract anchor (
0x07):** A contract is anchored viaOP_RETURNaction0x07committingcontract_id(loc_type = 0x00default for private contracts). - Optional on-chain assent: Parties MAY additionally name a confirmed
N-of-NP2WSHassent_outputinseallink-contract/1and have the0x07anchor transaction spend it (SIGHASH_ALLon all signatures), proving mutual assent on chain even to observers who never see contract plaintext.
2.3 The Contract Seal Decides Termination (SL-CONT-005, decided)
- Mandatory seal before signing: Every framework contract and every contract under which any grant is issued MUST name a confirmed
sealcreated before parties signseallink-assent/1. Signing services and verifiers MUST check confirmation and exact compiledScriptPolicymatch of both the bound contract's seal and any named framework contract's seal on their own node (CONTRACT_SEAL_MISSINGon conclusive absence/mismatch;SEAL_UNAVAILABLEon inconclusive read). - Script derives termination type — never prose: Every reader, renderer, and UI MUST derive the contract's termination type strictly from
seal.script_policy(SL-LDGR-004): A prose clause describing termination binds parties as text only and NEVER ends a contract or overrides the script-derived type.{"kind":"key"}-> **issuer_only**{"kind":"branch","template":"either_of_2"}-> **either_party**{"kind":"branch","template":"both_of_2"}-> **both_together**{"kind":"branch","template":"arbiter_or_both"}-> **arbiter**
- One spend ends all grants: Spending a contract or framework seal (
SEAL_SPENT) durably terminates every grant bound to that contract (or framework) upon first observation. The spending transaction SHOULD carryOP_RETURNaction0x08committingtyped_digest(seallink-termination/1)(SIGHASH_ALL); however, the spend alone terminates the contract regardless of whether0x08is valid or present.
2.4 Agreed Configuration Hash (SL-CONT-006, decided)
Any contract profile under which a runtime launches a configured agent (profiles/PROFILE-agent-v1.md) MUST require config_sha256. A runtime launcher that cannot reproduce config_sha256 from the exact profile, skills, and tools it is about to launch MUST refuse to start (CONTRACT_CONFIG_MISMATCH).
3. Violation Verdicts and Salted Request Attribution (seallink-verdict/1)
For moderated contracts (e.g., hosted services or agent sessions), seallink-contract/1 MAY declare moderation: {rules_sha256, moderator_key, moderator_kind} (SL-CONT-007, decided):
- Each recorded violation is a moderator-signed
seallink-verdict/1chained viaordinalandprev_verdict_id, committing torules_sha256,violated_rule,request_salted_sha256, andresponse_salted_sha256. - Salted invocation attribution: To allow dispute evidence without exposing plaintext on chain or enabling dictionary guesses against short messages,
seallink-invocation/1MAY include a fresh 32-bytecontent_salt(distinct fromnonce), withsalted_hash = SHA256(content_salt || plaintext_bytes). - A grant-seal revocation spend MAY include
OP_RETURNaction0x03committingtyped_digest(seallink-verdict/1). Closure still follows the seal spend alone; the verdict frame supplies auditable dispute evidence.
4. Verifiable Credentials (seallink-credential/1)
Third-party attestations about a subject — diplomas, licenses, notary credentials, human-verification claims (subject-claim), runtime isolation audits (agent-audit), and work-completion acts — share one object type: **seallink-credential/1** (SL-CONT-008, decided).
4.1 Lifecycles, Anchoring, and Compromise Cutoff h_c
- Signing role: Signed ONLY by the issuer's
link.credrole policy (issuer.role_policy, verified perSL-IDEN-003andSL-WIRE-013). A credential is NEVER a grant and confers zero execution authority by itself; verifier policies may only use credentials to narrow admission. - **Signed-form anchoring (
0x09):** Every credential MUST be anchored viaOP_RETURNaction0x09committing **content_addr = SHA256(signed_bytes)**, proving the signature existed at or before the earliest confirmed anchor blockh_anchor(CRED_ANCHOR_MISSING). - Two lifecycles:
- **
eternal:** MUST NOT carryrevocation_seal;not_after_heightoptional. Verified against the issuer'slink.credrole policy authorized ath_anchor. Survives routine issuer key rotation, expiry, and transfer. - **
revocable:** MUST carry a confirmedrevocation_seal;not_after_heightis optional. By default verifies the issuer'slink.credrole policy current at tip (exceptions such asseallink-guardian/1verify ath_anchor,SL-ORIG-008). Spending the seal closes the credential (SEAL_SPENT); spending withOP_RETURN 0x0a(seallink-credential-withdrawal/1) recordsCRED_REVOKED_FOR_CAUSE.
- **
- **Owner-authenticated compromise break
h_c(0x0b,SL-CONT-009,decided):**- If an issuer's
credornotaryrole policy (current or retired) is compromised, the issuer's coldname_ownerScriptPolicybroadcasts anOP_NAME_UPDATE(removing/replacing the role if current, signedSIGHASH_ALL) containing the 50-byte0x0bframe embeddingh_c_le64(<= inclusion_height) andtyped_digest(seallink-credential-break/1). - Because verifiers reconstruct
seallink-credential-break/1directly from the name history and on-chainh_c, withholding off-chain break documents cannot hide a compromise. - For the affected
(issuer, registration, owner_policy, compromised_policy): anchors ath_anchor < h_csurvive, while anchors ath_anchor >= h_cdurably refuse **CRED_ISSUER_CLOSED** (for both eternal and revocable lifecycles). Multiple breaks narrow bymin(h_c).
- If an issuer's
- Privacy: Raw PII MUST NOT appear on chain (
loc_type = 0x00default). Issuers deduplicating humans MUST NOT hash raw biometrics directly. Per-claim selective disclosure usesclaim_commitmentswith an independent 32-byte CSPRNG salt per entry (SL-WIRE-014).
4.2 Deterministic Credential Verification Order (SL-CONT-010, decided)
- Wire pipeline (
SPEC-01 §7) ->WIRE_* - Supported
credential_kind->WIRE_TYPE; claim schema compliance ->WIRE_MEMBER - Chain/genesis match ->
CHAIN_MISMATCH; subjectname_pinowner match ->NAME_OWNER_MISMATCH - Earliest confirmed signed-form
0x09anchor present ->CRED_ANCHOR_MISSING; confirmation depth>= required_depth->CHAIN_DEPTH_INSUFFICIENT - Issuer
link.credhistory walk available ->NAME_HISTORY_UNAVAILABLE;owner_policy&role_policymatch ->NAME_OWNER_MISMATCH;0x0bcompromise check (h_anchor < h_c) ->CRED_ISSUER_CLOSED - Height / calendar window check ->
CRED_WINDOW_CLOSED - Revocable seal state (
0x0acause ->CRED_REVOKED_FOR_CAUSE; plain spend ->SEAL_SPENT; unavailable ->SEAL_UNAVAILABLE)
5. General Notary Acts (seallink-notary/1)
A notary is an independent off-authority-path actor (human, organization, or agent; refusing by actor class is invalid unless required by explicit policy) acting under its link.notary role policy (SL-CONT-011, decided):
- **Four act kinds (each with a closed
detailsschema inschemas/credential.schema.json):**contract-notarization: certifies that named parties executedcontract_id(plus optionalnotary_clause_sha256).certified-copy: certifies correspondence oforiginal_sha256andmedia_typeto an inspected original.fact-attestation: certifies a witnessedfact_sha256underfact_schemaat(tip_height, tip_hash).child-within-parent: optional re-delegation attestation naming(parent_grant_id, child_grant_id, ordinal)when parent policy demands prose/policy review alongside mechanical narrowing.
- **Lifecycles & Anchoring (
0x04):** Anchored viaOP_RETURNaction0x04committingcontent_addr(seallink-notary/1). Supports BOTH **eternal** (nonotary_seal, verified againstlink.notaryath_anchor, bounded by0x0bh_c) and **revocable** (notary_sealrequired; plain spend withdraws allowing recertification; spend with0x05recordsCRED_REVOKED_FOR_CAUSEand bars recertification without a new ruling). - Notary identity pin: Every reference to a notary pins
(name, registration, owner_policy)with mandatory writer verification (SL-LDGR-007) so transferring a notary's name never transfers notarizing authority.
6. Security Considerations
- **Choosing
h_c:** Settingh_ctoo late preserves earlier attacker forgeries; settingh_ctoo early invalidates legitimate historical documents. - Selective clause context: Disclosing a single contract clause without qualifying clauses can mislead;
machine_clause_indicesensures executors always see every machine-enforced clause, while arbiters MAY demand additional prose clauses before ruling. - Notary truth limit: A notary act cryptographically binds the notary's accountability to a claim; it never proves physical truth mathematically.
7. References
- Normative: [RFC8785], [BIP-340], [BIP-141], [JSON-SCHEMA-2020-12].
- Informative: [RFC8448].
SPEC-06: Universal Grants, Invocations, Re-Delegation, Sessions, and Anti-Rollback Journals
- Version:
1.0.0-draft.2 - Status:
draft(normative rulesdecided; external CAS witness transport protocol trackedopeninOPEN-QUESTIONS.md) - Evidence / Maturity:
vectors(vectors/trace-01-mail-offline-revoke.json,vectors/trace-03-delegation-pool-single-use.json,vectors/trace-04-agent-guardian-intake.json,vectors/refusal-coverage-matrix.json) - Registries:
registry/object-types.json,registry/constraints.json,registry/opreturn-actions.json,registry/refusal-codes.json - Schemas:
schemas/grant.schema.json,schemas/invocation.schema.json
1. Universal Grant Model (seallink-grant/1)
A seallink-grant/1 (<= 65536 bytes, schemas/grant.schema.json) is the universal authorization instrument across people, organizations, services, and agents (SL-GRNT-001, decided). Every grant carries exactly one of issuer (root grant) or parent (depth-2 child grant).
1.1 Unilateral Base and Optional Contract Binding
- Unilateral base: An autonomous root grant requires ONLY the issuer's valid
SignatureSetmatchingissuer.role_policy(pinned on chain inlink.grantperSL-IDEN-003). A root grant issued on behalf of awardomitsissuer.role_policy, setspayload.guardian_context, and carries top-levelguardian_approvals[]satisfyingrequired(derived_event_class)(SL-WIRE-013,SL-ORIG-006). Neither form requires recipient assent or imposes obligations on the recipient. - Contract-bound grants: Setting optional
contract_idbinds the grant to aseallink-contract/1(SPEC-05): the grant's window MUST nest inside the contract (and any framework contract), allmachine_clause_indicesMUST be disclosed and match the grant's capabilities, and spending the contract or framework seal terminates the grant (SEAL_SPENT). Action profiles withrequires_contract = truerefuse unilateral grants (GRANT_CONTRACT_REQUIRED).
1.2 Recipient Modes (SL-GRNT-002, decided)
Every grant selects exactly one recipient mode:
- **By Key (
mode = "key"):** Names onexonly_64hexpublic key (suitable for ephemeral key-only workers and hardware keys). Ledger name resolution is skipped for the recipient. - **By Name (
mode = "name"):** Names(name, owner_policy). At invocation, the verifier resolvesname, confirms its current live output matchesowner_policy(NAME_OWNER_MISMATCH), and accepts signatures from the name's current authorizednostr/request key, permitting same-owner key rotation and name renewal without reissuing the grant. - **By Group (
mode = "group"):** Names aThresholdPolicy(m-of-ndistinct keys), authorizing execution ONLY when>= mdistinct co-recipients signseallink-invocation/1(SignatureSet).
1.3 Concrete executor vs. Stateless executor_ref (SL-GRNT-003, decided)
Every action leaf in a service profile declares four orthogonal boolean properties (SPEC-07 §4.1): external_mutation, discloses_data, quota_consuming, and allows_executor_ref. Every grant carries exactly one of:
- **Concrete
executor: {name, key}: Pins one specific service identity and receipt key. MANDATORY** whenever ANY capability incapabilities[]hasexternal_mutation = true,quota_consuming = true, carriesquotas, usessingle_userevocation, or includesdelegate. - **Dynamic
executor_ref: {provider_of, service_type, label}:** Resolves at verification time againstprovider_of's current confirmedseallink-manifest/1providers[]entry (NamePin+ service manifestreceipt_key) matching(service_type, label). STRICTLY FORBIDDEN if the grant carries anyquotas, usessingle_userevocation, includesdelegate, or includes any action withexternal_mutation = trueorallows_executor_ref = false(GRANT_EXECUTOR_REF_FORBIDDEN).
Rationale: Stateless data-read actions (e.g.,
mail/readwithout quotas) havediscloses_data = trueandexternal_mutation = false, so resolving the current pinned provider viaexecutor_refcannot double-spend quotas or cause duplicate side effects.
1.4 Validity Window and Revocation Modes (SL-GRNT-004, decided)
- Half-open block window:
[not_before_height, not_after_height)withrecent_block_height <= not_before_height < not_after_heightandnot_after_height <= issuer_name_expiry_at_issuancefor sealed grants. Admission attip == not_after_heightrefusesGRANT_WINDOW_CLOSED. Optionalmin_depth(1..144, defaults to1) specifies the issuer's minimum required anchor/seal confirmation depth. - Two revocation modes:
- **
revocation.mode = "seal"(Standard Default):** Namesconstruction ("W" | "L"),kind ("revocable" | "single_use"), and confirmedseal: {txid, vout, script_policy}. Anchored viaOP_RETURN 0x01(or Merkle batch0x02withMerkleProof) committingtyped_digest(seallink-issuance/1)(loc = 0x00default). Spending arevocableseal closes the grant at mempool speed (SEAL_SPENT). Asingle_useseal MUST useScriptPolicytemplatesingle_use_1_of_2and follows the branch-aware state machine inSPEC-02 §6.2. - **
revocation.mode = "window_only"(Root-Only Zero-Tx Ephemeral Mode): Strictly permitted ONLY on root** grants withoutdelegate(parentanddelegateMUST be absent), withnot_after_height - not_before_height <= 12blocks. Requires zero ledger transactions. **Executors MUST refusewindow_onlyby default (GRANT_SEAL_REQUIRED)** unless local executor policy explicitly opts in for that action and budget tier. Emergency rotation/removal of the issuer'slink.grant(NAME_ROLE_CHANGED) still terminates all livewindow_onlygrants immediately.
- **
1.5 Text-vs-Effect Invariant (SL-GRNT-005, decided)
A grant MAY carry optional terms_text solely to guide cognitive work (e.g., agent/brief). Any mechanical effect executor (mail/*, agent/tool, agent/session, wallets, locks, name updaters, blob stores) MUST refuse any grant containing terms_text (GRANT_TEXT_FORBIDDEN).
2. Invocations (seallink-invocation/1) and Signed Receipts (seallink-receipt/1)
2.1 Signed Invocation and Acyclic Single-Use Delivery (SL-GRNT-006, decided)
Every execution request is a canonical JCS seallink-invocation/1 (<= 1 MiB) signed by the final grant's recipient (SignatureSet):
- Binds
network,genesis, concreteexecutor {name, key}, exactaction,target, closed typedarguments(validated against the owning profile schema), optionalcontent_salt(SPEC-05 §3),proof_path(1 entry for root grant, 2 entries[parent, child]for delegated child grant, each optionally carryingissuance_txidandbatch_proof), 32-byte CSPRNGnonce, and wall-clock half-open window[iat, exp)(iat <= now < exp, no grace,INVOKE_TIME_INVALID). - **Acyclic single-use consumption (
0x11):**seallink-invocation/1NEVER embedsuse_txid. For asingle_usegrant:- The grantee constructs and signs
seallink-invocation/1, computinginvocation_content_addr = SHA256(canonical_JCS(invocation)). - The grantee broadcasts
T_usespending thesingle_use_1_of_2seal via branch0(grantee,SIGHASH_ALL) withOP_RETURN 0x11(SINGLE_USE_CONSUMPTION) committinginvocation_content_addr. - The grantee delivers
(seallink-invocation/1, use_txid = txid(T_use))in the transport envelope alongside inline grant/contract/manifest bytes. The executor verifiesT_useon its own chain view (SPEC-02 §6.2).
- The grantee constructs and signs
- Signed arguments are sole authority: The executor MUST derive effect parameters strictly from
payload.arguments(never from transport headers or unsigned wrapper fields) and evaluate everywherepredicate (SL-WIRE-016) againstpayload.arguments(INVOKE_CONSTRAINT_FAILED).
2.2 Quota Accounting, Reservation, and Settlement (SL-GRNT-007, decided)
- Reserve before effect: Before executing any effect, the executor MUST atomically reserve the maximum possible debit for every quota key consumed by the action in its fenced journal (
§6): the grant'sownaccount (and for a child grant, the parent'srowaccount — never the parent'sownaccount) plus operator ceilings (QUOTA_EXCEEDED). A zero ceiling authorizes nothing; missing required quota refuses. - Window modes:
term: cumulative across[not_before_height, not_after_height).blocks:<N>: half-open block buckets[not_before_height + k*N, not_before_height + (k+1)*N).seconds:<S>: UTC epoch-aligned buckets[floor(now/S)*S, (floor(now/S)+1)*S)guarded by a durable per-key monotonic clock watermark (QUOTA_CLOCK_REGRESSION).
- Settlement (Actual Charge and Release): Once an effect completes with a known actual debit, the executor charges the exact actual debit (exact integer/rational arithmetic rounded upward once per request, zero binary64) and releases the unused reservation difference (
reserved = settled + released). - Uncertain outcomes: If an effect outcome is uncertain (timeout, crash, network split), the full reservation MUST be retained until operator/protocol reconciliation; the executor reports
outcome = "uncertain"and MUST NOT silently refund or allow replay. - Idempotency and Replay: Request identity is
invocation_id = SHA256(canonical_JCS(invocation.payload))(excludingsignatures). A repeated identicalinvocation_idMUST perform no second effect; the executor returns its stored signed receipt or refusesINVOKE_REPLAYper profile. A reusednoncewith a different payload MUST refuseINVOKE_REPLAY.
2.3 Signed Receipt (SL-GRNT-008, decided)
Every executor answers with a seallink-receipt/1 signed by its pinned receipt key (executor.key), recording invocation_id, grant_id, action, outcome ("executed" | "refused" | "uncertain"), optional refusal_code, settlements[], optional result_sha256, and observation (tip_height, tip_hash, recorded_at). Callers MUST verify receipts solely against their pinned executor.key.
3. Bounded Depth-2 Re-Delegation
A root seallink-grant/1 MAY authorize bounded child grants by including delegate (SL-GRNT-009, decided). Maximum authority path depth is 2 (root -> child; children MUST NOT carry delegate and MUST use revocation.mode = "seal" bound to delegate.child_seal_key, GRANT_NOT_DELEGABLE).
- Separated delegation and child-seal keys:
delegate.key(xonly_64hex) signs child grants ONLY (disjoint from issuer, recipient, and messaging keys; held in an isolated delegation signing service enforcing at-most-one signature per row,guides/GUIDE-01-custody-and-signers.md).delegate.child_seal_key(compressed_66hex) controls the issuer revocation branch of every child grant's seal (held outside the delegation signer so the delegator can revoke children even if the delegation signer is compromised).
- **Grouped rows, row coins, and pairwise disjointness (
R8.6):**delegate.groupsholds1..16groups; each group pairs atemplate(concreteexecutor, closedrecipient_rule(exact_key | exact_name | member_class),capabilities[], andnotary_mode) with1..16rangesof1..4096pre-confirmed P2WPKH row coins (confirmed<= parent.recent_block).- **Disjoint coin ranges (
R8.6):** Every(txid, vout)across ALL row ranges and ALL stop-coin ranges across ALL groups indelegate.groups, as well as the parent's ownsealand linkage output, MUST be pairwise disjoint (GRANT_ROW_INVALID). - Global 1-based
ordinalenumerates rows in signed group/range order. A child namingparent: {grant_id, ordinal}MUST have its issuance anchor (0x01or0x02) spend the exact row coin forordinal(GRANT_ROW_INVALID), enforcing on chain that at most one child per row exists.
- **Whole-parent aggregate budget (
R8.5) and mechanical child narrowing (SL-GRNT-010,decided):** Every verifier MUST check BOTH the whole parent allocation AND the individual child:- **Whole-parent budget sum (
R8.5):** For every quota keyq = (kind, resource, unit, window)appearing in any group template'scapabilities[].quotas, letrows(g) = sum(r.count for r in g.ranges)andcap(g, q)be the maximum ceiling forqin groupg's template (summed across capabilities ingthat shareq). Using exact integer arithmetic (overflow ->GRANT_CHILD_WIDER), the verifier MUST confirm a matching pool entrypool_max(q)exists indelegate.poolsand:
- **Whole-parent budget sum (
sum over all groups g of (rows(g) * cap(g, q)) <= pool_max(q)
Failure refuses GRANT_CHILD_WIDER. (This invariant prevents sibling rows at different executors from exceeding the parent's total budget.)
- Child-within-parent check:
C.genesis == P.genesis,C.contract_id == P.contract_id(if present),C.executor == template.executor, andC.revocation.mode == "seal"with issuer branch controlled byP.delegate.child_seal_key;[C.not_before_height, C.not_after_height) ⊆ [P.not_before_height, P.not_after_height);- Every capability in
C.capabilitiesmechanically narrows a capability intemplate.capabilitiesunder the 7-predicate Constraint Algebra (SL-WIRE-017), and every child quota<=the template's row cap; C.recipientsatisfiestemplate.recipient_rule(exact_keymatchesmode="key";exact_namematchesmode="name"with equalnameandowner_policy;member_classchecks live unspent membership ofC.recipientin at least one pinned operator's confirmedseallink-members-list/1).
- **Optional notary and stop coins (
SL-GRNT-011,decided):**"none"(default): mechanical narrowing underSL-GRNT-010requires no notary."optional_stop": range specifies confirmed P2WPKH stop coins controlled by a pinned notary; spending a stop coin permanently closes that row for cause across all verifiers (GRANT_ROW_STOPPED)."required_act": additionally requires a verifiedseallink-notary/1(act_kind = "child-within-parent") act (NOTARY_REQUIRED).
4. Deterministic Admission Order (Invocation Pipeline)
An executor MUST evaluate an incoming seallink-invocation/1 in this exact 12-step order, returning the first failure (SL-GRNT-012, decided). Early recipient authentication runs strictly before cached-receipt lookup and blockchain RPCs to prevent unauthenticated DoS, cached-receipt harvesting, and state-oracle leakage:
- **Invocation wire check (
SPEC-01 §7):** Parse and verifyseallink-invocation/1syntax, JCS, closed schema, profile argument schema, keys, and self-consistentSignatureSet->WIRE_* - Early local request checks (pre-chain):
- 2a. Wall-clock half-open window
iat <= now < exp->INVOKE_TIME_INVALID - 2b.
invocation.executorequals this executor's pinned(name, receipt_key)->GRANT_EXECUTOR_MISMATCH
- 2a. Wall-clock half-open window
- Presented bundle wire, early recipient authentication, and replay check (pre-chain):
- 3a. Wire pipeline on presented grant(s), optional contract(s), and optional manifest(s) ->
WIRE_* - 3b. If leaf grant uses
recipient.mode = "key"or"group", verifyinvocation.signatures.policyequalsgrant.recipientimmediately ->WIRE_SIGNATURE(runs before any cached-receipt lookup so forged callers cannot probe or retrieve cached receipts) - 3c. For
keyandgrouprecipients (whose authentication succeeded in Step 3b): check local journal replay/nonce table. Ifinvocation_idalready has a stored terminal receipt, return that cached receipt (orINVOKE_REPLAYif profile forbids cached return). Ifinvocation_idhas an unsettledreservation(crash inside the external-effect window before receipt persistence), returnoutcome = "uncertain"while retaining the reservation and executing zero second effect. Ifnoncewas already used for a differentinvocation_id, refuseINVOKE_REPLAY. *(Forrecipient.mode = "name", this identical replay/crash-recovery check runs immediately after Step 11a once the recipient's on-chain key is verified.)*
- 3a. Wire pipeline on presented grant(s), optional contract(s), and optional manifest(s) ->
- **Consistent chain observation (
SPEC-02 §4):** Check in strict order:- 4a. Chain/genesis pin ->
CHAIN_MISMATCH - 4b. Reading node health (
!IBD,txindex=1, header lag<= LAG) ->CHAIN_UNHEALTHY - 4c. Independent comparison peer veto ->
CHAIN_NODE_DISAGREEMENT - 4d. Monotonic UTC clock watermark and header future bound
S->CHAIN_CLOCK_ERROR - 4e. Action risk-class tip freshness (
tip_age) ->CHAIN_TIP_STALE
- 4a. Chain/genesis pin ->
- **Journal continuity (
§6):** Check external CAS witness readability, local store readability, andjournal_idmatch (JOURNAL_LOST), then activewrite_token(JOURNAL_FENCED), then position/commitment continuity (JOURNAL_LOST) - Durable closure check: Check local closure journal for every grant ID, contract ID, framework ID, issuer role, and row in
proof_path, in strict order:- 6a. Closed grant or ancestor grant ->
INVOKE_REPLAYif closed specifically bySINGLE_USE_CONSUMED(for a newinvocation_id), elseGRANT_CLOSED - 6b. Stopped row ->
GRANT_ROW_STOPPED - 6c. Closed issuer role ->
NAME_ROLE_CHANGED - 6d. Closed seal ->
SEAL_SPENT
- 6a. Closed grant or ancestor grant ->
- **Issuer identity, origin, and guardianship (
SPEC-03,SPEC-04):**- 7a. Resolve root issuer name (
NAME_NOT_FOUND), liveness (NAME_EXPIRED), history walk availability (NAME_HISTORY_UNAVAILABLE),SIGHASH_ALLwriter check (NAME_WRITER_UNVERIFIED),owner_policymatch (NAME_OWNER_MISMATCH), 520B name value grammar (NAME_VALUE_INVALID). For autonomous issuers (no verified ward origin): verifylink.grantcontinuity (NAME_ROLE_CHANGED), verifyissuer.role_policymatcheslink.grantand equalsroot_grant.signatures.policy(WIRE_SIGNATURE). - 7b. If origin-certified (
link.originor pinned origin): check in strict order:origin/1validity & trust (ORIGIN_UNVERIFIED),name-binding/1validity (ORIGIN_BINDING_INVALID),status_sealandroster_sealcompleteness (ORIGIN_STATUS_INCOMPLETE), subject end (SUBJECT_ENDED), pending emancipation transfer (GUARDIAN_TRANSFER_PENDING), calendar majority time boundary (GUARDIAN_TIME_BOUNDARY); ifward, enforceSL-ORIG-006order (WARD_AUTONOMOUS_FORBIDDEN, thenGUARDIAN_INACTIVE, thenWIRE_SIGNATURE, thenGUARDIAN_QUORUM_UNMET).
- 7a. Resolve root issuer name (
- **Contract and framework checks (
SPEC-05):** Check in strict order: action requires contract (GRANT_CONTRACT_REQUIRED); ifcontract_idpresent: presentation (CONTRACT_NOT_PRESENTED), ID recomputation (CONTRACT_ID_MISMATCH), party assents (CONTRACT_ASSENT_INVALID), confirmed seal presence &ScriptPolicymatch (CONTRACT_SEAL_MISSING), seal spend (SEAL_SPENT) or inconclusive seal (SEAL_UNAVAILABLE), disclosedmachine_clause_indices& window nesting (CONTRACT_TERMS_MISMATCH), runtimeconfig_sha256if required (CONTRACT_CONFIG_MISMATCH). - **Re-delegation checks (depth 2,
§3):** Check in strict order: parent delegation rights & depth<= 2(GRANT_NOT_DELEGABLE), whole-parent R8.5 aggregate pool sum (GRANT_CHILD_WIDER), R8.6 disjointness & ordinal row coin spend (GRANT_ROW_INVALID), stop coin live (GRANT_ROW_STOPPED), optional notary act (NOTARY_REQUIRED), childsignatures.policyequalsparent.delegate.key(WIRE_SIGNATURE), mechanical child narrowing against group template (GRANT_CHILD_WIDER). - Grant window, revocation / single-use seal, and executor binding:
- 10a. Grant height window
[not_before_height, not_after_height)->GRANT_WINDOW_CLOSED - 10b. If
revocation.mode = "window_only": enforcenot_after_height - not_before_height <= 12(WIRE_INTEGER), then executor opt-in policy (GRANT_SEAL_REQUIRED) - 10c. If
revocation.mode = "seal": verify issuance0x01/0x02frame & Merkle proof (CHAIN_FRAME_INVALID),recent_blockrecency (CHAIN_RECENCY_INVALID), WitnessWconstruction (CHAIN_TX_CONSTRUCTION), anchor depth (CHAIN_DEPTH_INSUFFICIENT); then evaluate seal: revocable(SPEC-02 §6.1):revoked-> write closure +SEAL_SPENT;unavailable->SEAL_UNAVAILABLEsingle_use(SPEC-02 §6.2):awaiting_spend->SEAL_UNAVAILABLE;revoked-> write closure +SEAL_SPENT;pending_confirm->CHAIN_DEPTH_INSUFFICIENT;consumedwith distinctinvocation_id->INVOKE_REPLAY- 10d. Verify
executoror resolveexecutor_ref: forbidexecutor_refon stateful/mutating/single-use/delegating grants (GRANT_EXECUTOR_REF_FORBIDDEN); verify holder's confirmed manifest (MANIFEST_UNAVAILABLE, thenMANIFEST_MISMATCH, thenMANIFEST_ROLLBACK), confirm providerNamePinbinding (SERVICE_PROVIDER_UNBOUND) and providerowner_policy(NAME_OWNER_MISMATCH), confirm resolved(name, receipt_key)matches this executor (GRANT_EXECUTOR_MISMATCH)
- 10a. Grant height window
- Named recipient, action, text ban, and constraints:
- 11a. If leaf grant uses
recipient.mode = "name", resolve recipient name (NAME_NOT_FOUND), check liveness (NAME_EXPIRED), checkowner_policy(NAME_OWNER_MISMATCH), verifyinvocation.signatures.policyagainst its authorized request key (WIRE_SIGNATURE), and then execute the Step 3c local journal replay / crash-recovery check (INVOKE_REPLAY, cached receipt, oruncertain) - 11b. Action supported and present in
grant.capabilities(INVOKE_ACTION_DENIED) - 11c. Mechanical effect text ban (
GRANT_TEXT_FORBIDDEN) - 11d. Target match and 7-predicate
whereevaluation againstinvocation.arguments(INVOKE_CONSTRAINT_FAILED)
- 11a. If leaf grant uses
- Pre-effect recheck and atomic reservation: Re-bracket chain tip (
CHAIN_OBSERVATION_VOID, thenCHAIN_TIP_STALE) and re-check live seals (SEAL_SPENT), verify seconds-window monotonic clock (QUOTA_CLOCK_REGRESSION), atomically writenonce+reservationentries to fenced journal (QUOTA_EXCEEDED, thenJOURNAL_FENCED, thenJOURNAL_LOST)
5. Bearer Sessions for Non-Signing Clients (seallink-session-open/1)
When a client harness cannot sign per-request invocations (e.g., an SDK accepting only a base URL and bearer token), an executor MAY support short-lived sessions (SL-GRNT-013, decided):
- Recipient's key holder sends a signed
seallink-session-open/1(<= 16384bytes,op = "open" | "extend" | "close") withslot_binding, boundedquotas <= grant.quotas, andexp <= now + 3600(at most 1 hour ahead). - Executor runs the full admission pipeline (
§4), binds a 32-byte CSPRNG bearer token (storing ONLYSHA256(token)in its journal), and returns the token once over a local socket or mutually authenticated encrypted channel. - Every unsigned in-session request MUST re-run live chain observation, seal checks, and recipient channel-key checks before reserving from
(grant, row, session)accounts (SESSION_INVALIDon mismatch, expiry, or any link closure). - Unsigned in-session requests lack per-request non-repudiation and retry idempotency; executors MUST NOT enable bearer sessions for wallets, name updates, or irreversible financial transfers.
6. Anti-Rollback Fenced Journals (seallink-journal-entry/1)
Every stateful SealLink verifier/executor (tracking closures, single-use consumption, quota reservations, nonces, and manifest heads) MUST guard against backup-restore and equal-position forks using a hash-chained journal + external CAS witness (SL-GRNT-014, decided state machine / open witness wire transport in OPEN-QUESTIONS.md):
- Hash chain: Random 32-byte
journal_id; commitmentc(0) = H_tag("seallink-journal/1", journal_id),c(n) = H_tag("seallink-journal/1", c(n-1) || canonical_JCS(entry_n)). Everyentry_nMUST validate against the closed discriminatedJournalEntryschema (schemas/invocation.schema.json) withentry_n.pos == nandentry_n.prev_commitment == c(n-1). - External witness: An append-only CAS register stored strictly outside the local store's backup domain, holding
(journal_id, pos, commitment, write_token). Onlyadvance(journal_id, token, pos, from_commit, to_commit)mutates it; fencing strictly incrementswrite_token. - Write order: Check continuity -> durably write local entry ->
advanceexternal witness -> execute effect. - Continuity precedence: (1) witness readable, (2) local store readable, (3) matching
journal_id-> elseJOURNAL_LOST; (4) activewrite_tokenheld -> elseJOURNAL_FENCED(checked before position comparison so partitioned replicas fence cleanly); (5)store.pos == witness.posand equal commitment (Intact), orstore.pos == witness.pos + 1with matchingprev_commitment(Pendingcompletion), elseJOURNAL_LOST. - Attended recovery (start anew): Record
recoveryentry withfenced_at, wait for a confirmed ledger blockboundarywhoseheader_time > fenced_at + 7200s(exceeding Namecoin's +2h future-header consensus bound to prove the block was accepted after fencing), and conservatively treat all pre-fencing uncertain reservations as consumed.
7. Security Considerations
- No cross-executor quota sharing: Two independent executors MUST NEVER spend from one apparent grant quota; split budgets across separate concrete-executor grants or parent row groups verified under R8.5.
- Closure write failure: If writing a newly observed
SEAL_SPENTclosure to the journal fails, the verifier MUST refuse admission and halt further admission for that seal until durable storage recovers. - **
window_onlycontainment:** Executors opting into rootwindow_onlyMUST enforce low per-grant and global operator ceilings so a compromisedgrantkey's damage is bounded even before an emergency name update propagates.
8. References
- Normative: [RFC8785], [BIP-340], [BIP-141], [JSON-SCHEMA-2020-12].
- Informative: [RFC8448].
SPEC-07: Grant-Gated Services, Replaceable Providers, Federated Disclosure, and Extensions
- Version:
1.0.0-draft.2 - Status:
draft(normative rulesdecided; unprofiled standard service types trackedopeninOPEN-QUESTIONS.md) - Evidence / Maturity:
vectors(vectors/trace-01-mail-offline-revoke.json,vectors/trace-04-agent-guardian-intake.json,vectors/refusal-coverage-matrix.json) - Registries:
registry/service-types.json,registry/object-types.json,registry/refusal-codes.json - Schemas:
schemas/manifest.schema.json,schemas/invocation.schema.json
1. Sovereign Provider Model and Mutual Authentication
SealLink decouples user identity from service hosting (email, agent hosts, XMPP, blob storage, wallets, compute) through three normative rules (SL-SERV-001, decided):
- **Pinned Provider Binding (
manifest.providers):** A resource holderid/alicedeclares her active service providers in herseallink-manifest/1(SPEC-03 §3.1) by labeled(service_type, label, provider: NamePin)tuples. Becauseproviderpins(name, registration, owner_policy), an expired and re-registered provider spelling cannot hijack dynamic delegations. - Provider Authority Rule: A participating provider hosting resources for
id/alicerecognizesid/alice(its confirmed ledger name,ScriptPolicy, role keys, and origin/guardian rules) as the sole root of authority overid/alice's hosted resources. The provider MUST serve any caller presenting a validseallink-grant/1issued byid/alice(and verifyingid/alice's confirmed manifest binds this provider's exactNamePinfor(service_type, label), refusingSERVICE_PROVIDER_UNBOUNDotherwise), without requiring the caller to hold a proprietary account at that provider. - Mutual Transport Authentication: Before sending private grants, credentials, or sensitive data to a provider
id/provider, the client resolvesid/provideron its own ledger view, fetchesid/provider's verifiedseallink-manifest/1, and authenticates the endpoint againstservice.tls_spki_sha256(or a verifiedseallink-statement/1withstatement_kind = "transport-binding"andtransport = "https-tls-spki"inid/provider'scertsset) plus verifies signed responses againstservice.receipt_key— never trusting unverified HTTP redirects or peer-claimed provider identities.
2. Replaceable Services and Exclusive Cut-Over (seallink-migration/1)
An actor MUST be able to switch from Provider A (source_executor) to Provider B (dest_executor) of a compatible service_type profile while keeping her id/ identity and without creating duplicate authorized effects or resurrecting spent quotas (SL-SERV-002, decided).
2.1 Portable State Separation
Every service export profile MUST strictly partition three classes of data:
- Holder data (messages, blobs, files, metadata) — portable; holder-side E2EE decryption keys need never be disclosed to either provider.
- Accounting evidence (journal position/commitment, settled usage, outstanding uncertain reservations, signed receipts) — portable for reconciliation, NEVER treated by
dest_executoras unconsumed authority. - Execution credentials (provider wallet keys, upstream API secrets, DKIM keys, active bearer tokens, TLS private keys) — STRICTLY EXCLUDED from export;
dest_executorMUST refuse any export containing execution credentials (SERVICE_MIGRATION_INVALID).
2.2 Four-Step Exclusive Cut-Over (SL-SERV-003, decided)
- Stage: Copy hash-checked holder data to
dest_executorwhilesource_executorremains the sole accounting authority (dest_executoradmits zero effects on imported state). - Fence & Close:
source_executordurably fences new admissions across all replicas, drains in-flight work (retaining every unresolved outcome as boundedoutstanding_exposure), and signsseallink-migration/1(journal_pos,journal_commitment,inventory_sha256,outstanding_exposure) with its pinnedreceiptkey. - Revoke Old Grants & Issue Replacement Grants: Close predecessor concrete-executor grants at
source_executorvia seal spend (a closing receipt alone is NOT revocation). For stateful grants, issue fresh concrete-executor grants namingdest_executorwith reconciled remaining quotas (deducting settled usage AND all uncertain exposure). Updatemanifest.providersin one ledger name update. - Activate: Holder signs
seallink-assent/1(target_type = "seallink-migration/1"; for award, carryingguardian_contextwithevent_class = "custody_change"andguardian_approvals[]perSPEC-04 §3.1);dest_executorcounter-signs acceptance, verifies full hash inventory, persists import atomically (rejecting rollback or conflictingmigration_idwithSERVICE_MIGRATION_INVALID), and enables admissions whilesource_executorremains fenced.
- Unavailable old provider: Operator reconciliation is the default. Never infer unused budget or non-execution from timeouts or silence; keep old uncertain exposure isolated and issue an independent bounded allocation for non-conflicting work.
- Commercial default: Start with small capped prepaid contracts. Unused prepaid credit remains
source_executor's liability and does not transfer automatically by data export.
3. Federated Screening and Progressive PII Disclosure
When two previously unknown actors (or their agents) communicate before establishing mutual trust, SealLink defines a two-phase progressive-disclosure composition (SL-SERV-004, decided):
| Phase | Admission Gate | Data & Tool Boundary | Human / Guardian Gate |
|---|---|---|---|
| Phase 1: Screening | Pinned local trust policy + verified peer identity/members binding + optional seallink-credential/1 (e.g., subject-claim / agent-audit) + bounded screening grant. | Zero PII and zero external mutation tools inside the screening context. Explicit per-peer quotas required (FEDERATION_POLICY_DENIED if missing). | Autonomous within bounded screening quotas. |
| Phase 2: Targeted Disclosure | Fresh unilateral seallink-grant/1 targeting ONE exact recipient and ONE isolated vault executor (e.g., contact-vault or calendar-broker), finite window, dedicated UTXO seal. | Contour A routing: For PII release (e.g., contact/release), the recipient MUST be the partner's personal identity or companion client calling the isolated vault directly — PII MUST NOT transit screening agents or hubs (FEDERATION_POLICY_DENIED). | Explicit L2 / presence-verified approval by the human owner or guardian quorum; the screening agent MUST NEVER self-issue a disclosure grant. |
Neither federation membership nor a verified seallink-credential/1 ever creates grant authority; trust policy may only narrow admission.
4. Extension Rules and SLIP Registration Checklists
Every new Service Profile, Action Leaf, Quota Kind, Contract Profile, or Credential Kind MUST be proposed via a SLIP (SLIP-TEMPLATE.md) or namespaced under reverse-DNS (com.example/<name>) for custom deployments, and MUST explicitly specify (SL-SERV-005, decided):
4.1 Action Leaf and Service Profile Checklist
- Identifier: Exact
service_type(registered inregistry/service-types.jsonor valid reverse-domain) and lowercase slash-separated action leaves (<domain>/<verb>). - Orthogonal Action Properties:
- Cognitive
work(MAY acceptterms_text) vs mechanicaleffect(MUST enforceGRANT_TEXT_FORBIDDEN); external_mutation(true | false);discloses_data(true | false);quota_consuming(true | false);allows_executor_ref(true | false, allowed ONLY whenexternal_mutation = falseandquota_consuming = false);requires_contract,require_seal, and Chain Risk Class (Class 160m vsClass 290m).
- Cognitive
- Closed Target, Arguments, and Result Schemas: Formal Draft 2020-12 JSON Schema (
schemas/profile-<name>.schema.json) forargumentsandresultobjects, target grammar, and permitted Constraint Algebra predicates per argument. - Pagination / Snapshot and Replay Semantics: Exact behavior for multi-page reads, provider switch invalidation, and duplicate
invocation_idretries. - Quota Consumption and Settlement: Consumed quota kinds, reservation formula before effect, actual settlement/release rule, and uncertain-outcome retention rule.
- Receipt and Export Format: Exact
result_sha256payload definition (SHA256(canonical_JCS(result_obj))), mutual transport auth binding, and portable export boundary (§2.1). - Deterministic Refusal Order and Vectors: Complete positive, single-defect negative, and stateful-journal revocation test vectors citing exact
SL-*rule IDs.
4.2 Quota Kind Checklist
Every new quota.kind in registry/constraints.json MUST define: identifier, resource grammar, exact atomic integer unit and scale (zero binary64), min/max bounds, rounding direction (always upward/conservative on reservation), permitted window modes, concurrency/replica sharing, uncertain-outcome retention, denied-request charging (default: refused requests consume zero quota), and paired conformance vectors.
5. Security Considerations
- No wildcard recipients: Services MUST NEVER convert an authenticated login session (
SPEC-03 §5) or federation allowlist into a wildcard grant recipient. - Irreversibility of disclosure: Spending a disclosure seal stops future reads but cannot erase already-disclosed bytes; prefer revocable handles and ephemeral channels over permanent personal identifiers.
- No central verification oracle: Services SHOULD run their own Tier 1 verifier and Namecoin node (
SPEC-02 §1.1) rather than delegating verification to a third-party validation API.
6. References
- Normative: [RFC8785], [BIP-340], [JSON-SCHEMA-2020-12].
- Informative: [RFC8448].
Part II — Standard Profiles
PROFILE-agent-v1: Bounded Autonomous Agent Tasks, Tool Execution, Isolated Sessions, and Guardian Intake
- Version:
1.0.0-draft.2 - Service Type:
agent-session(registry/service-types.json) - Status:
draft(normative profile rulesdecided) - Evidence / Maturity:
vectors(vectors/trace-03-delegation-pool-single-use.json,vectors/trace-04-agent-guardian-intake.json,vectors/refusal-coverage-matrix.json) - Requires:
SPEC-01,SPEC-02,SPEC-03,SPEC-04,SPEC-05,SPEC-06,SPEC-07 - Schemas:
schemas/profile-agent.schema.json
1. Purpose
This profile defines normative SealLink authorization for autonomous software agents operating on local or hosted stations (including external isolation runtimes such as Swarma Runtime). It separates four distinct operational boundaries:
- **Cognitive work delegation (
agent/brief):** Authorizes an agent run to perform bounded reasoning or drafting work, where proseterms_textis permitted strictly as cognitive guidance. - **Mechanical host tool execution (
agent/tool):** Authorizes concrete typed tool calls (filesystem read/write, repository operations, sandboxed commands) whereterms_textis strictly forbidden. - **Contract-bound isolated sessions (
agent/session):** Authorizes starting, checkpointing, or halting a long-lived agent session bound to a bilateral contract and verifiedconfig_sha256. - **Guardian-verified instruction intake (
agent/guardian-message):** Normatively specifies how an agent runtime's host boundary verifies guardian-authorized instructions for awardagent against its read-only pinnedseallink-origin/1and live guardianship slots (vectors/trace-04-agent-guardian-intake.json).
2. Manifest Declarations and Mutual Authentication (SL-AGNT-001, decided)
- An agent host station
id/station-adeclares in itsseallink-manifest/1service:service_type:"agent-session"actions: subset of["agent/brief", "agent/tool", "agent/session", "agent/guardian-message"]receipt_key: pinned BIP-340receiptkeyendpoint: HTTPS or mutually authenticated local Unix/TLS endpointtls_spki_sha256(for remote endpoints): pinned TLS SPKI hash (or signedtransport-bindingstatement incerts).
- Concrete executor required: Because agent sessions, tool invocations, and guardian instruction delivery carry stateful quotas, sandboxes, and authority boundaries,
executor_refis FORBIDDEN across allagent/*actions (GRANT_EXECUTOR_REF_FORBIDDEN).
3. Orthogonal Action Properties Table
| Action | Kind | external_mutation | discloses_data | quota_consuming | allows_executor_ref | requires_contract | require_seal | Risk Class |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
agent/brief | Cognitive work (terms_text allowed) | false | false | true (seallink/count starts) | false | false | false *(root window_only allowed by policy)* | Class 2 (90m) |
agent/tool | Mechanical effect (GRANT_TEXT_FORBIDDEN) | true | true | true (seallink/count calls) | false | false | true *(or single_use)* | Class 1 (60m) |
agent/session | Mechanical effect (GRANT_TEXT_FORBIDDEN) | true | false | true (seallink/count starts) | false | true (config_sha256 mandatory) | true | Class 1 (60m) |
agent/guardian-message | Mechanical effect (GRANT_TEXT_FORBIDDEN) | false | false | false | false | false | true *(live grant + slot seals; event_class = "effect_grant")* | Class 1 (60m) |
4. Target, Closed Schemas, Arguments, and result_sha256 (SL-AGNT-002, decided)
- Target grammar:
agent/brief,agent/tool,agent/session:station:<host_name>:<workspace_or_slot>(e.g.,station:id/station-a:repo-seallink).agent/guardian-message:ward:<origin_id_64hex>.
- Closed schemas: All
invocation.argumentsand returned result objects MUST validate strictly againstschemas/profile-agent.schema.json:agent/brief:AgentBriefArgs->AgentBriefResultagent/tool:AgentToolArgs->AgentToolResultagent/session:AgentSessionArgs->AgentSessionResultagent/guardian-message:AgentGuardianMessageArgs->AgentGuardianMessageResult
- **Normative
result_sha256(SL-AGNT-003,decided):** For everyoutcome = "executed"receipt,receipt.payload.result_sha256MUST equalSHA256(canonical_JCS(result_object)). - Replay semantics: Duplicate
invocation_idforagent/brief,agent/tool,agent/session, oragent/guardian-messageMUST NOT spawn a second run, second tool execution, or duplicate Authority Frame delivery; the host returns the stored signed receipt (includingoutcome = "uncertain"if a crash interrupted execution inside the external-effect window before receipt persistence).
4.1 Constrained Arguments and Predicates
| Action | Argument | Schema Type | Supported where Predicates |
|---|---|---|---|
agent/brief | task_id | string | eq, prefix |
agent/brief | brief_sha256 | hex64 | hash_eq |
agent/brief | max_duration_sec | uint64_str | range |
agent/tool | tool_name | string | eq, in, not_in |
agent/tool | input_sha256 | hex64 | hash_eq |
agent/tool | resource_path | string | eq, prefix |
agent/tool | max_output_bytes | uint64_str | range |
agent/session | op | string (start | checkpoint | halt) | eq, in |
agent/session | session_slot | string | eq, prefix |
agent/session | config_sha256 | hex64 | hash_eq |
agent/session | max_wall_sec | uint64_str | range |
agent/guardian-message | origin_id | hex64 | eq |
agent/guardian-message | subject_ward_name | NameStr | eq |
agent/guardian-message | message_sha256 | hex64 | hash_eq |
agent/guardian-message | channel | string | eq, in |
agent/guardian-message | delivery_mode | string (strict_drop | untrusted_fallback) | eq |
5. Normative Guardian Message Verification (SL-AGNT-004, decided)
An agent host or Bridge mediating incoming guardian messages for a ward agent (origin_class = "agent", guardian_policy present) MUST distinguish between guardian grant authorization (the ward's seallink-grant/1 carrying guardian_context and guardian_approvals[]) and invocation delivery (the signed seallink-invocation/1 signed by the grant's recipient — either the guardian's own delivery key or an authorized Bridge relay key — carrying AgentGuardianMessageArgs), and MUST execute the following deterministic check before delivering any privileged instruction into an agent session's Authority Frame:
- Read-only origin pin: Load the agent's locally pinned
seallink-origin/1and(network, genesis)from read-only host storage outside agent write reach (SPEC-03 §6). - **Event class assignment (
effect_grant):** Because guardian messages direct privileged agent behavior,agent/guardian-messageMUST be classified as **event_class = "effect_grant"** (NEVERroutine_read;SPEC-04 §3.1). A ward grant claimingevent_class = "routine_read"foragent/guardian-messageMUST refuse withGUARDIAN_QUORUM_UNMET. - Full admission pipeline & ward checks: Execute
SPEC-06 §4on theseallink-invocation/1and its wardseallink-grant/1:- Confirm
status_sealis unspent (ORIGIN_STATUS_INCOMPLETE,SUBJECT_ENDED,GUARDIAN_TRANSFER_PENDING) and the latest effectiveroster_sealrevision matches bothgrant.payload.guardian_context.revisionandarguments.revision(ORIGIN_STATUS_INCOMPLETE,GUARDIAN_QUORUM_UNMET). - Verify
grant.guardian_approvals[]perSL-WIRE-013andSL-ORIG-006: every cited slot seal isactiveand unspent on the host's Tier 1 node (GUARDIAN_INACTIVE), everyguardian_approvals[i].signaturesmatches that guardian's livelink.grantpolicy (WIRE_SIGNATURE), all approving slots belong to distinct(name, registration)guardians, and the count meetsrequired("effect_grant")againstrevision_size(GUARDIAN_QUORUM_UNMET). - Confirm
invocation.target == "ward:" + origin_id,arguments.origin_id == origin_id,arguments.subject_ward_name == ward_name, andSHA256(raw_message_bytes) == arguments.message_sha256(and satisfies anywhere.message_sha256hash_eqpredicate when the grant pins one exact message) (INVOKE_CONSTRAINT_FAILED).
- Confirm
- **Normative default
delivery_mode = "strict_drop": For ward agents,strict_dropis the normative default** (AgentGuardianMessageArgs.delivery_mode): any unauthenticated, malformed, or refused external message MUST be dropped at the Bridge/host boundary before entering the model context. Hosts MAY permituntrusted_fallbackONLY when explicitly enabled by local administrator policy and strictly isolated outside the Authority Frame. - Authority Frame & receipt: Only after steps 1–3 succeed MAY the host wrap the verified message (
message_sha256) inside a structured read-only Authority Frame, computeframe_sha256, and emitAgentGuardianMessageResult(delivered = true,verified_slots,verified_guardians,message_sha256,frame_sha256,recorded_at) + signedseallink-receipt/1(vectors/trace-04-agent-guardian-intake.json).
6. Contract-Bound Sessions, Quotas, and config_sha256 (SL-AGNT-005, decided)
- **
agent/sessioncontract requirement:** Everyagent/sessiongrant MUST bindcontract_id(GRANT_CONTRACT_REQUIRED), and the boundseallink-contract/1MUST carryconfig_sha256(SL-CONT-006). Before executingop = "start", the host MUST compute the hash of the assembled runtime profile, skills, and tool allowlist and require exact equality with bothcontract.config_sha256andarguments.config_sha256(CONTRACT_CONFIG_MISMATCH). - Quota reservation:
agent/briefandagent/session(op = "start") reserve1unit from{"kind":"seallink/count","resource":"<target>","unit":"starts"}.agent/toolreserves1unit from{"kind":"seallink/count","resource":"<target>","unit":"calls"}(plus anyseallink/costorseallink/tokensquotas declared on the capability).- For delegated child grants, reservations debit both the child's
ownaccount and the parent'srowaccount (SPEC-06 §2.2), bounded across all sibling rows by R8.5 (SPEC-06 §3).
- Bearer sessions: An admitted
agent/sessionMAY open a short-lived (<= 3600s)seallink-session-open/1bearer slot for non-signing model SDKs (SPEC-06 §5), restricted strictly to compute/tool quotas inside the session ceiling; irreversible financial transfers MUST NOT use bearer sessions.
7. Export Boundary (SPEC-07 §2)
An agent-session migration manifest (seallink-migration/1) exports workspace files, conversation transcripts, checkpoint artifacts, signed receipts, and accounting evidence (settled starts/calls/costs + uncertain reservations). It NEVER exports host signing keys, Keyholder private keys, upstream API tokens, TLS private keys, or active bearer session tokens.
PROFILE-mail-v1: Sovereign Email Hosting and Delegated Mailbox Access
- Version:
1.0.0-draft.2 - Service Type:
mail(registry/service-types.json) - Status:
draft(normative profile rulesdecided) - Evidence / Maturity:
vectors(vectors/trace-01-mail-offline-revoke.json,vectors/refusal-coverage-matrix.json) - Requires:
SPEC-01,SPEC-02,SPEC-03,SPEC-06,SPEC-07 - Schemas:
schemas/profile-mail.schema.json
1. Purpose
This profile defines sovereign email hosting where the **holder owns her identity (id/alice), not the mail host**, binds one or more labeled mailboxes (personal, work, etc.) by pinned NamePin in seallink-manifest/1, switches providers without losing identity, and issues fine-grained UTXO-revocable grants (e.g., permitting an agent or accountant to read only "Invoices" while the issuer's devices remain offline).
2. Manifest Declarations, Discovery, and Transport Binding
2.1 User Provider Binding (SL-MAIL-001, decided)
A holder id/alice declares each hosted mailbox in seallink-manifest/1 providers[] using a full NamePin:
{
"label": "work",
"provider": {
"name": "id/mail-host-a",
"owner_policy": {"kind": "key", "pk": "02..."},
"registration": {"txid": "...", "vout": 0}
},
"service_type": "mail"
}
An actor MAY bind multiple mail providers under distinct label values (personal, work, archive).
2.2 Mail Provider Self-Declaration, External Discovery, and Mutual Auth (SL-MAIL-002, decided)
- A mail provider
id/mail-host-adeclares in its ownseallink-manifest/1service:service_type:"mail"actions: subset of["mail/list", "mail/read", "mail/send"]receipt_key: pinned BIP-340receiptkeyendpoint: HTTPS base URLtls_spki_sha256: SHA-256 of the server's DER-encoded SubjectPublicKeyInfo (alternatively pinned via a signedseallink-statement/1withstatement_kind = "transport-binding"andtransport = "https-tls-spki"in the provider'scertsset).
- Mutual authentication: Clients MUST verify the server's TLS certificate SPKI against
tls_spki_sha256(or the verifiedtransport-bindingstatement) AND verify everyseallink-receipt/1againstservice.receipt_key. - External sender mailbox discovery: An external sender targeting
id/aliceresolvesid/alice's confirmedseallink-manifest/1, selects theproviders[]entry for("mail", label)(defaultlabel = "primary"if unspecified, or advertised inseallink-card/1transports), resolves the pinnedproviderNamePin, and delivers to the provider'sservice.endpoint(or SMTP MX authenticated via the provider's manifest/card transport declaration).
3. Orthogonal Action Properties Table
| Action | Kind | external_mutation | discloses_data | quota_consuming | allows_executor_ref | requires_contract | require_seal | Risk Class |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
mail/list | Mechanical effect | false | true | false (optional) | true *(iff no quotas)* | false | true | Class 2 (90m) |
mail/read | Mechanical effect | false | true | false (optional) | true *(iff no quotas)* | false | true | Class 2 (90m) |
mail/send | Mechanical effect | true | false | true (seallink/count) | false *(concrete executor MUST be pinned)* | false | true | Class 1 (60m) |
All three actions are mechanical effects and MUST refuse grants carrying terms_text (GRANT_TEXT_FORBIDDEN).
4. Target, Closed Argument/Result Schemas, and result_sha256 (SL-MAIL-003, decided)
- Target grammar:
mailbox:<owner_name>:<label>(e.g.,mailbox:id/alice:work). The provider MUST verify that<owner_name>'s confirmedseallink-manifest/1binds this provider's exactNamePinfor("mail", <label>)(SERVICE_PROVIDER_UNBOUNDotherwise) AND that the root grant was issued by<owner_name>(or its satisfied guardian quorum if<owner_name>is award). - Closed argument and result schemas: All
invocation.argumentsand returned result objects MUST validate strictly againstschemas/profile-mail.schema.json:mail/list:MailListArgs->MailListResultmail/read:MailReadArgs->MailReadResultmail/send:MailSendArgs->MailSendResult
- **Normative
result_sha256formula (SL-MAIL-006,decided):** For everyoutcome = "executed"response,receipt.payload.result_sha256MUST equalSHA256(canonical_JCS(result_object))whereresult_objectconforms to the action's closed result schema above. Formail/read, raw RFC 5322 message bytes travel alongside the signed receipt and MUST hash toMailReadResult.mime_sha256. - Replay semantics: For
mail/listandmail/read, a duplicateinvocation_idwithin[iat, exp)MAY return the cached signed receipt; formail/send, a duplicateinvocation_idMUST perform zero second SMTP handoff and MUST return the original stored signed receipt (includingoutcome = "uncertain"if unresolved).
4.1 Constrained Arguments and Server-Side Enforcement (SL-MAIL-004, decided)
| Action | Argument | Schema Type | Supported where Predicates |
|---|---|---|---|
mail/list, mail/read | folder | string | eq, in, not_in, prefix |
mail/list, mail/read | sender_domain | string (lowercase ASCII) | eq, in, not_in, suffix |
mail/read | message_id | string | eq, in |
mail/list, mail/read | max_bytes | uint64_str | range |
mail/send | to | string | eq, in, not_in, suffix |
mail/send | subject | string | eq, prefix |
mail/send | body_sha256 | hex64 | hash_eq |
mail/send | size_bytes | uint64_str | range |
- **Server-side verification for
mail/read:** If the grant constrainsfolder,sender_domain, ormax_bytes, the provider MUST verify the actual stored message's folder,Fromdomain, and byte length satisfy everywherepredicate before returning bytes (INVOKE_CONSTRAINT_FAILED). A caller MUST NOT bypass afolderpredicate by passing amessage_idbelonging to another folder. - **Quota reservation for
mail/send:** MUST reserve1unit from{"kind":"seallink/count","resource":"mailbox:<owner>:<label>","unit":"messages"}atomically in the fenced journal (SPEC-06 §6) before SMTP submission, retaining the reservation if handoff outcome isuncertain.
5. Snapshot Pagination and Provider Cut-Over (SL-MAIL-005, decided)
- A
mail/listrequest withpage = 0and nosnapshot_idestablishes a provider-local immutable snapshot (snapshot_id, TTL<= 300s, frozen to matching messages present at that invocation's observation). - Subsequent pages (
page > 0) MUST passsnapshot_idin a newly signedseallink-invocation/1, re-running the fullSPEC-06 §4pipeline (including live UTXO seal check). - Messages arriving after snapshot creation do NOT appear in pages of that
snapshot_id. If the grant's seal is spent between page 0 and page 1, page 1 refusesGRANT_CLOSED(if already journaled) orSEAL_SPENT(if first witnessed on page 1) and discards the snapshot. - Provider switch: Snapshots are strictly local to the issuing provider and are NOT exported during
seallink-migration/1. Presenting an old provider'ssnapshot_idto a new provider refusesINVOKE_CONSTRAINT_FAILED; the caller restarts atpage = 0on the new provider.
6. Reference End-to-End Trace (vectors/trace-01-mail-offline-revoke.json)
The complete byte-level trace (signed JCS objects, BIP-340 signatures, OP_RETURN hex, result_sha256, journal hash chain, and exact refusal codes) is published in vectors/trace-01-mail-offline-revoke.json:
id/alicebindsid/mail-host-a(by fullNamePin) for("mail", "work")in herseallink-manifest/1.id/alicesigns a unilateralseallink-grant/1toid/alice-acct-agent(recipient.mode = "name", pinningid/alice-acct-agentand itsowner_policy) usingexecutor_ref: {"provider_of":"id/alice","service_type":"mail","label":"work"}(valid becausemail/readhasexternal_mutation = false,quota_consuming = false,allows_executor_ref = true, and noquotas) withwhere: {"folder": {"in": ["Invoices"]}}and confirmed UTXOsealanchored by0x01.id/alicetakes all her devices offline.id/alice-acct-agentsends a signedseallink-invocation/1(folder = "Invoices",message_id = "msg-2026-001") + inline grant + inline manifest toid/mail-host-a.id/mail-host-arunsSPEC-06 §4on its own Namecoin node (resolvingid/alice-acct-agent's confirmed name and request key at Step 11a) -> Admits, returnsMailReadResult(size_bytes = "69", matching the exact 69-byte RFC 5322 payload) + raw MIME bytes + signedseallink-receipt/1(outcome = "executed",result_sha256 = SHA256(JCS(MailReadResult))).- A second invocation requesting
folder = "Personal"fails Step 11d -> RefusesINVOKE_CONSTRAINT_FAILED(non-closing). - Later,
id/alicespendssealfrom a secondary device.id/mail-host-awitnesses the spend in its mempool and durably writes aclosure(cause="SEAL_SPENT")entry to its fenced journal (c(0) -> c(1)). - When
id/alice-acct-agentsends a newmail/readinvocation for"Invoices", Step 6a ofSPEC-06 §4hits the durable closure journal and returns the single deterministic refusal code **GRANT_CLOSED** with signedseallink-receipt/1(outcome = "refused",refusal_code = "GRANT_CLOSED").
7. Export Boundary (SPEC-07 §2)
A mail migration manifest (seallink-migration/1) exports RFC 5322 message blobs, folder assignments, message IDs, delivery receipts, and accounting evidence (settled mail/send counts + uncertain SMTP handoffs). It NEVER exports DKIM signing keys, SMTP relay credentials, TLS private keys, or active bearer tokens.
Part III — Conformance, Open Questions, and SLIP Governance
SealLink Conformance Requirements
- Version:
1.0.0-draft.2 - Status:
draft - Normative Language: [RFC2119], [RFC8174]
1. Conformance Roles
An implementation claiming conformance to SealLink v1.0 MUST declare which of the following roles it implements and MUST pass every required specification section, registry invariant, JSON Schema, and conformance vector listed for that role.
| Conformance Role | Required Specifications | Required Registries & Schemas | Required Vector Suites |
|---|---|---|---|
| Core Wire Library | SPEC-00, SPEC-01 | object-types.json, refusal-codes.json, constraints.json, all schemas/*.schema.json | vectors/wire-jcs-and-hashes.json, vectors/constraints-and-schemas.json |
| Tier 1 Verifier | Core Wire + SPEC-02, SPEC-03 (§1–4), SPEC-04, SPEC-05, SPEC-06 (§1–4, §6) | All registry/*.json and schemas/*.schema.json | All vectors/*.json (including trace-01 through trace-04 and refusal-coverage-matrix.json) |
| Effect Executor / Provider | Tier 1 Verifier + SPEC-06 (§5 if bearer sessions enabled), SPEC-07, plus each supported PROFILE-*.md | All registry/*.json, schemas/*.schema.json, and owning profile-*.schema.json | All vectors/*.json plus profile-specific traces (trace-01, trace-03, trace-04) |
| Issuer / Signer | Core Wire + SPEC-02 (§3, §5), SPEC-03 (§1–3, §6), SPEC-05, SPEC-06 (§1, §3) | object-types.json, key-roles.json, opreturn-actions.json, constraints.json | wire-jcs-and-hashes.json, ledger-scripts-and-opreturn.json, constraints-and-schemas.json |
| Institutional / Guardian Authority | Tier 1 Verifier + Issuer + SPEC-04 (full), SPEC-05 (§4–5) | All registry/*.json, origin.schema.json, guardian.schema.json, credential.schema.json | vectors/trace-02-guardian-succession-assent.json, vectors/trace-04-agent-guardian-intake.json |
2. Mandatory Behavioral Requirements
- Deterministic Refusal Ordering: A conforming verifier MUST emit the exact first refusal code prescribed by
SPEC-01 §7,SPEC-05 §4.2, andSPEC-06 §4for every test vector invectors/. - Fail-Closed Unknown Handling: A conforming implementation MUST refuse unregistered
typestrings (WIRE_TYPE), unknown JSON members (WIRE_MEMBER), reserved action byte0x06(CHAIN_FRAME_INVALID), populatedextensions(WIRE_CONSTRAINT), unsupportedScriptPolicytemplates (CHAIN_SCRIPT_UNSUPPORTED), and anyopenconstruct lacking a locally enabled profile. - Zero Silent Repair: A conforming parser MUST reject non-canonical JSON (
WIRE_NOT_CANONICAL) and MUST NOT normalize strings, reorder keys before hashing, coerce integer encodings, or strip unknown members. - No Floating-Point Arithmetic: Conforming implementations MUST NOT route any
uint53,uint64_str, quota debit, rational quorum, or R8.5 aggregate budget sum through IEEE 754 floating-point arithmetic. - Independent Chain Observation: A conforming Tier 1 Verifier MUST NOT accept ledger state, block heights, or UTXO spend status from the presenter or issuer; it MUST query its own read-only tx-indexed node cross-checked against at least one independent comparison node (
SPEC-02 §4).
3. Interoperability Bar for Advancing Specification Maturity
Per SPEC-00 §5.1:
- **
prose->vectors:** Everydecidedrule and every registered refusal code (84/84) is exercised by executable positive, negative, and stateful trace fixtures invectors/, verified automatically by CI via Draft 2020-12 metaschemas and the reference Tier 1 verifier (tools/seallink_verifier.py). - **
vectors->dual-impl:** At least two independent implementations with disjoint cryptographic and JSON stacks pass 100% ofvectors/byte-for-byte (identical object IDs, digests, content addresses, refusal codes, and journal commitments). - **
dual-impl->chain-tested:** All four end-to-end traces (trace-01mail offline + revoke,trace-02initial & successor guardian activation + ward assent,trace-03parent pool + single-use + crash-uncertain + replay + revoke,trace-04ward agent guardian intake) plus TRUC v3 /P2ACPFP package relay (conformance/p2a-regtest/) are executed and recorded against a live Namecoin Corenc28.0regtest (and/or mainnet) network.
SealLink Open Questions and Provisional Parameters
- Version:
1.0.0-draft.2 - Purpose: Authoritative registry of every unresolved design item, provisional numeric constant, deferred extension, and unprofiled standard service type. Per
SPEC-00 §5.1, readers MUST fail closed on any unprofiledopenconstruct.
1. Open Normative Profiles and Protocols
| ID | Owning Spec | Status | Topic | Current Safe Fallback / Blocking Scope |
|---|---|---|---|---|
OQ-001 | SPEC-04 §4 (SL-ORIG-010) | open | Trusted calendar time-interval oracle for human majority boundary T ([t_low, t_high]). | Fail closed (GUARDIAN_TIME_BOUNDARY) whenever credible UTC bounds cannot be established or straddle T. Candidate profiles: multi-source Roughtime / signed NTS quorum + chain MTP floor. |
OQ-002 | SPEC-02 §1.1 (SL-LDGR-002) | open | Tier 2 light / proof-bundle verifier profile (k >= 2 independent UTXO/name proof servers or future authenticated UTXO commitments). | Tier 1 full-node verifier is required for all effect executors. Tier 2 is deferred to post-v1.0. |
OQ-003 | SPEC-06 §6 (SL-GRNT-014) | open | External CAS witness wire protocol (advance(journal_id, token, pos, from_commit, to_commit)). | State machine and fencing invariants are decided; interoperable wire transport (e.g., HTTP CAS / Raft / consensus-backed service) remains operator-local until profiled. |
OQ-004 | SPEC-03 §4 (SL-IDEN-009) | open | **HTTPS .well-known domain-binding verification** (Channel 2 pairing between id/<label> and d/<label> or DNSSEC/NIP-05). | Channel 0 (inline) and Channel 1 (local cache / configured mirrors) work unconditionally; Channel 2 is optional and hash-pinned only. |
OQ-005 | SPEC-01 §4.1 (SL-WIRE-012) | open | Additional hardware device algorithms (fido2-es256, fido2-eddsa, ssh-ed25519 WebAuthn/SSH wrappers). | v1.0 closes DeviceList.alg to bip340, p256, and ed25519. Hardware wrapper formats will be proposed via SLIPs with exact canonical challenge framing. |
OQ-006 | SPEC-02 §6.3 (SL-LDGR-013) | open | **Production propagation qualification for TRUC v3 / P2A (51024e73) CPFP revocation.** | Two-node Namecoin Core nc28.0 regtest 1p1c submitpackage + P2P propagation + confirmation is verified (conformance/p2a-regtest/, covering minrelaytxfee = 0.001 NMC/1000 vB and 240-sat P2A dust floor). Independent operator administration, fee competition, and mainnet propagation remain open before chain-tested maturity. |
OQ-007 | SPEC-02 §3.1 (SL-LDGR-004), SPEC-04 §3.1 | open | **Threshold ECDSA (P2WPKH / single-key branch) operational qualification.** | Native P2WSH m-of-n via namepsbt is the primary v1.0 threshold custody path for name outputs (nc28.0 standard policy). Institutional single-key roles (disposer_pk, arbiter_pk, challenger_pk, single-key P2WPKH seals) require external threshold ECDSA signing qualification if shared across multiple operators. |
2. Provisional Numeric Constants (Subject to Empirical Calibration Before Freeze)
| ID | Owning Spec | Constant | Provisional Value | Calibration Basis |
|---|---|---|---|---|
OQ-010 | SPEC-02 §4 (SL-LDGR-008) | LAG (reading-node header lag bound) | 1 block | Namecoin block propagation telemetry. |
OQ-011 | SPEC-02 §4 (SL-LDGR-008) | S (block header future-timestamp bound) | 600 seconds | Namecoin consensus vs clock skew tolerances. |
OQ-012 | SPEC-02 §4 (SL-LDGR-008) | K (grant recent_block recency ceiling) | 432 blocks (~72 h) | Issuance ceremony offline signing latency vs replay window. |
OQ-013 | SPEC-02 §4 (SL-LDGR-008) | Risk Class 1 / Class 2 tip_age cutoffs | 3600s / 5400s | Namecoin block-interval tail distribution (9.88 min mean). |
OQ-014 | SPEC-03 §6 (SL-IDEN-012) | Host trust-root admin override delay D | 1008 blocks (~7 d) | Incident response window for human owners. |
OQ-015 | SPEC-04 §6 (SL-ORIG-013) | Dual-party name_recovery minimum delay | 144 blocks min (1008 recommended) | Live-owner liveness & cancellation window. |
3. Unprofiled Standard Service Types (registry/service-types.json)
The following standard service_type names are reserved with status = "open" pending dedicated SLIP profiles meeting the SPEC-07 §4.1 checklist:
service_type | Planned Profile | Notes |
|---|---|---|
xmpp | PROFILE-xmpp-v1.md | Sovereign XMPP hosting bound via manifest.providers[]. |
blob | PROFILE-blob-v1.md | Grant-aware content-addressed blob store (Blossom BUD-01/02/04). |
wallet | PROFILE-wallet-v1.md | seallink/coins spend & budget execution (concrete executor, UTXO seal, no bearer sessions). |
names | PROFILE-names-v1.md | Delegated update-only ledger name operations. |
compute | PROFILE-compute-v1.md | Metered LLM/compute proxy (seallink/cost, seallink/tokens, root window_only, bearer sessions). |
rental | PROFILE-rental-v1.md | Contract-bound physical/digital asset lease (requires_contract = true, arbiter seal). |
4. Institutional and Scope Boundaries Explicitly Outside v1.0
- Reversible adult legal capacity (conservatorship): v1.0 enforces strictly one-way
ward -> autonomous. Reversible capacity requires a future SLIP addressing judicial contestation and revocation of autonomy. - Cross-chain bridge semantics: v1.0 binds one
network+genesisper object and verification session.
SLIP-XXXX: Title of Proposal
- SLIP:
XXXX(assigned upon PR submission) - Title: Short descriptive title
- Type:
Core|Profile|Registry|Ledger-Binding|Informational - Status:
Draft|Review|Accepted|Final|Withdrawn|Superseded - Requires: List of
SPEC-*orSLIP-*dependencies - Authors: Name <email or SealLink id/>
- Created: YYYY-MM-DD
1. Abstract
One concise paragraph summarizing the proposed addition or change and the problem it solves.
2. Motivation and Non-Goals
Why existing SPEC-00..07 primitives or reverse-DNS custom namespaces (SPEC-07 §4) are insufficient, and what is explicitly out of scope.
3. Specification
Normative rules using [RFC2119] / [RFC8174] keywords, assigned unique SL-<AREA>-<NNN> Rule IDs.
- If adding a Service Profile or Action Leaf, include every item required by
SPEC-07 §4.1(orthogonal action flags:external_mutation,discloses_data,quota_consuming,allows_executor_ref,requires_contract,require_seal, Risk Class; closed argument and result JSON Schemas;result_sha256formula; pagination/replay semantics; quota reservation/settlement; export boundary). - If adding a Quota Kind, include every item required by
SPEC-07 §4.2. - If adding a Canonical Object Type, Refusal Code, Key Role, or OP_RETURN Action, include exact patches to
registry/*.jsonandschemas/*.schema.json.
4. Backwards Compatibility and Fail-Closed Behavior
Explain how unupgraded v1.0 verifiers handle the new construct (must fail closed with a registered refusal code).
5. Security and Privacy Considerations
Threat model, DoS/oracle analysis, key-role separation impact, and on-chain privacy impact (SL-ARCH-012).
6. Conformance Test Vectors
Reference the exact positive, single-defect negative, and stateful-journal test vectors added under vectors/ and verified by tools/speclint.py.
SLIP Lifecycle Process
- Draft: Author opens a PR with
SLIP-XXXX, updatedregistry/andschemas/patches, and conformance vectors. CI (tools/speclint.py) MUST pass with zero errors. - Review: Public technical review and independent verification against schemas and reference tooling.
- Accepted: Consensus among maintainers; vectors verified by at least one implementation.
- Final: Verified across two independent implementations (
dual-impl) and merged into the next specification release.
Part IV — Machine-Readable Registries (Normative SSOT)
Registry: constraints.json
Source: registry/constraints.json
{
"$comment": "SealLink v1.0 Structured Capability & Constraint Algebra Registry (SPEC-01, SPEC-06). All 7 predicates have linear-time decidable conservative subsumption (child <= parent) with zero Turing-completeness.",
"protocol": "SealLink",
"version": "1.0.0-draft.2",
"comparison_semantics": "conservative_pairwise",
"predicates": [
{
"op": "eq",
"operand_types": [
"string",
"uint64_str",
"boolean"
],
"match_rule": "arg == operand",
"narrowing_rule": "child.op == 'eq' and child.operand == parent.operand",
"description": "Exact equality against a scalar argument value."
},
{
"op": "in",
"operand_types": [
"array<string | uint64_str> (nonempty, sorted, distinct, max 256)"
],
"match_rule": "arg in operand",
"narrowing_rule": "(child.op == 'in' and set(child.operand) <= set(parent.operand)) or (child.op == 'eq' and child.operand in set(parent.operand))",
"description": "Finite allowlist of exact permitted values."
},
{
"op": "not_in",
"operand_types": [
"array<string | uint64_str> (nonempty, sorted, distinct, max 256)"
],
"match_rule": "arg not in operand",
"narrowing_rule": "(child.op == 'not_in' and set(parent.operand) <= set(child.operand)) or (child.op == 'in' and set(child.operand).isdisjoint(set(parent.operand))) or (child.op == 'eq' and child.operand not in set(parent.operand))",
"description": "Finite denylist of forbidden values."
},
{
"op": "prefix",
"operand_types": [
"string (nonempty)"
],
"match_rule": "arg.startswith(operand)",
"narrowing_rule": "(child.op == 'prefix' and child.operand.startswith(parent.operand)) or (child.op == 'eq' and child.operand.startswith(parent.operand)) or (child.op == 'in' and all(v.startswith(parent.operand) for v in child.operand))",
"description": "Exact code-point prefix match (paths, git refs, URI hierarchies)."
},
{
"op": "suffix",
"operand_types": [
"string (nonempty)"
],
"match_rule": "arg.endswith(operand)",
"narrowing_rule": "(child.op == 'suffix' and child.operand.endswith(parent.operand)) or (child.op == 'eq' and child.operand.endswith(parent.operand)) or (child.op == 'in' and all(v.endswith(parent.operand) for v in child.operand))",
"description": "Exact code-point suffix match (DNS domains, email/XMPP addresses)."
},
{
"op": "range",
"operand_types": [
"[uint64_str min, uint64_str max] with min <= max"
],
"match_rule": "min <= int(arg) <= max",
"narrowing_rule": "(child.op == 'range' and parent.min <= child.min <= child.max <= parent.max) or (child.op == 'eq' and parent.min <= int(child.operand) <= parent.max) or (child.op == 'in' and all(parent.min <= int(v) <= parent.max for v in child.operand))",
"description": "Closed unsigned 64-bit integer interval [min, max] (per-request amounts, sizes, hours, depths)."
},
{
"op": "hash_eq",
"operand_types": [
"hex64 (lowercase SHA-256)"
],
"match_rule": "SHA256(arg_bytes) == operand or arg == operand",
"narrowing_rule": "child.op == 'hash_eq' and child.operand == parent.operand",
"description": "Exact 32-byte SHA-256 commitment match (config manifests, document payloads, templates)."
}
],
"reserved_extension_field": "extensions",
"reserved_extension_policy": "fail_closed_WIRE_CONSTRAINT",
"quota_windows": [
{
"pattern": "^term$",
"description": "Cumulative ceiling across the entire grant validity window."
},
{
"pattern": "^blocks:[1-9][0-9]{0,8}$",
"description": "Half-open block windows anchored at grant not_before_height."
},
{
"pattern": "^seconds:[1-9][0-9]{0,9}$",
"description": "UTC epoch-aligned fixed clock windows with durable regression watermark."
}
],
"standard_quota_kinds": [
{
"kind": "seallink/coins",
"unit": "atomic",
"settlement": "actual_release_remainder"
},
{
"kind": "seallink/cost",
"unit": "<currency>/<scale>",
"settlement": "actual_release_remainder"
},
{
"kind": "seallink/tokens",
"unit": "input-token | output-token",
"settlement": "actual_release_remainder"
},
{
"kind": "seallink/count",
"unit": "requests | messages | bytes | operations | starts | calls",
"settlement": "actual_release_remainder"
}
]
}
Registry: key-roles.json
Source: registry/key-roles.json
{
"$comment": "SealLink v1.0 Key Role & Custody Registry (SPEC-03). Coherent with registry/object-types.json (verified by tools/speclint.py).",
"protocol": "SealLink",
"version": "1.0.0-draft.2",
"namecoin_coin_type": 7,
"roles": [
{
"role": "name_owner",
"curve": "secp256k1",
"scheme": "ECDSA (P2WPKH / P2WSH SIGHASH_ALL)",
"pubkey_encoding": "compressed_66hex",
"custody_tier": "cold",
"derivation_recommendation": "Separate cold seed, m/84'/7'/0'/0/i (fresh key per name or per multisig participant)",
"published_in": "Namecoin name UTXO ScriptPolicy",
"allowed_operations": [
"OP_NAME_NEW",
"OP_NAME_FIRSTUPDATE",
"OP_NAME_UPDATE",
"KEY_COMPROMISE_BREAK (0x0b)",
"RECOVERY_CANCEL (0x10)"
],
"forbidden_operations": [
"seallink-grant/1",
"seallink-auth-challenge/1",
"messaging",
"ordinary_fee_funding"
]
},
{
"role": "emergency_fee_reserve",
"curve": "secp256k1",
"scheme": "ECDSA (P2WPKH SIGHASH_ALL)",
"pubkey_encoding": "compressed_66hex",
"custody_tier": "cold",
"derivation_recommendation": "Cold seed isolated from ALL hot signers, m/84'/7'/3'/0/i",
"published_in": "Not published (pre-funded cold UTXO)",
"allowed_operations": [
"Emergency name update fee funding",
"CPFP P2A fee-bumping for pre-signed revocations"
],
"forbidden_operations": [
"seallink-grant/1",
"seallink-auth-challenge/1",
"hot_signer_access"
]
},
{
"role": "grant",
"curve": "secp256k1",
"scheme": "BIP-340 Schnorr",
"pubkey_encoding": "xonly_64hex",
"custody_tier": "isolated_signer_with_presence",
"derivation_recommendation": "Outside wallet accounts (e.g. BIP-85 m/83696968'/2'/7' or hardware/keyvault item); never shares UTXO funding seed",
"published_in": "Name value link.grant (direct x-only pubkey or ThresholdPolicy SHA-256 pin)",
"allowed_operations": [
"seallink-grant/1",
"seallink-assent/1",
"seallink-termination/1",
"seallink-statement/1",
"seallink-migration/1"
],
"forbidden_operations": [
"chain_transactions",
"seal_spends",
"seallink-auth-challenge/1",
"messaging"
]
},
{
"role": "guardian_quorum",
"curve": "secp256k1",
"scheme": "BIP-340 Schnorr (independent per-slot SignatureSets in guardian_approvals[])",
"pubkey_encoding": "xonly_64hex",
"custody_tier": "isolated_signer_with_presence",
"derivation_recommendation": "Each guardian signs its own SignatureSet with its link.grant role policy inside guardian_approvals[] matching guardian_context.revision",
"published_in": "Each active guardian's Name value link.grant",
"allowed_operations": [
"seallink-grant/1",
"seallink-assent/1"
],
"forbidden_operations": [
"chain_transactions",
"seallink-origin/1",
"seallink-credential/1"
]
},
{
"role": "cred",
"curve": "secp256k1",
"scheme": "BIP-340 Schnorr",
"pubkey_encoding": "xonly_64hex",
"custody_tier": "isolated_signer_with_presence",
"derivation_recommendation": "Dedicated isolated key outside wallet accounts",
"published_in": "Name value link.cred (direct x-only pubkey or ThresholdPolicy SHA-256 pin)",
"allowed_operations": [
"seallink-origin/1",
"seallink-guardian/1",
"seallink-guardian-roster/1",
"seallink-capacity/1",
"seallink-end/1",
"seallink-credential/1"
],
"forbidden_operations": [
"seallink-grant/1",
"seallink-notary/1",
"chain_transactions",
"seallink-auth-challenge/1"
]
},
{
"role": "notary",
"curve": "secp256k1",
"scheme": "BIP-340 Schnorr",
"pubkey_encoding": "xonly_64hex",
"custody_tier": "isolated_signer_with_presence",
"derivation_recommendation": "Dedicated isolated key outside wallet accounts",
"published_in": "Name value link.notary (direct x-only pubkey or ThresholdPolicy SHA-256 pin)",
"allowed_operations": [
"seallink-notary/1"
],
"forbidden_operations": [
"seallink-grant/1",
"seallink-credential/1",
"chain_transactions",
"seallink-auth-challenge/1"
]
},
{
"role": "auth",
"curve": "secp256k1",
"scheme": "BIP-340 Schnorr",
"pubkey_encoding": "xonly_64hex",
"custody_tier": "isolated_signer",
"derivation_recommendation": "Hot signer seed m/84'/7'/2'/0/i (isolated from funding 0' and dynamic pool 10+)",
"published_in": "seallink-manifest/1 auth_key (paired with auth_seal)",
"allowed_operations": [
"seallink-auth-challenge/1",
"seallink-auth-upgrade/1"
],
"forbidden_operations": [
"seallink-grant/1",
"seallink-assent/1",
"seallink-owner-command/1",
"chain_transactions"
]
},
{
"role": "recipient",
"curve": "secp256k1",
"scheme": "BIP-340 Schnorr",
"pubkey_encoding": "xonly_64hex",
"custody_tier": "hot_service_or_keyholder",
"derivation_recommendation": "Per-task ephemeral key or dedicated request key pinned in grant.recipient",
"published_in": "seallink-grant/1 recipient (key, name's nostr/request key, or group threshold)",
"allowed_operations": [
"seallink-invocation/1",
"seallink-session-open/1"
],
"forbidden_operations": [
"seallink-grant/1",
"seallink-origin/1",
"seallink-credential/1"
]
},
{
"role": "messaging_or_request",
"curve": "secp256k1",
"scheme": "BIP-340 Schnorr",
"pubkey_encoding": "xonly_64hex",
"custody_tier": "hot_service_or_keyholder",
"derivation_recommendation": "Generated on host/keyholder (or m/44'/1237'/0'/0/i for personal Nostr)",
"published_in": "Name value nostr (or directly in grant recipient.key for key-only actors)",
"allowed_operations": [
"Transport messaging (e.g. Nostr)",
"seallink-invocation/1",
"seallink-session-open/1"
],
"forbidden_operations": [
"seallink-grant/1",
"child_grant_signing"
]
},
{
"role": "delegation",
"curve": "secp256k1",
"scheme": "BIP-340 Schnorr",
"pubkey_encoding": "xonly_64hex",
"custody_tier": "isolated_signer",
"derivation_recommendation": "Per-parent derived key inside dedicated delegation signing service with 1-sig-per-row reservation ledger",
"published_in": "Parent seallink-grant/1 delegate.key (never in name value)",
"allowed_operations": [
"seallink-grant/1"
],
"forbidden_operations": [
"root_grant_signing",
"seal_spends",
"messaging",
"name_updates"
]
},
{
"role": "moderator",
"curve": "secp256k1",
"scheme": "BIP-340 Schnorr",
"pubkey_encoding": "xonly_64hex",
"custody_tier": "isolated_signer",
"derivation_recommendation": "Dedicated moderation verdict signing key pinned in contract.moderation.moderator_key",
"published_in": "seallink-contract/1 moderation.moderator_key",
"allowed_operations": [
"seallink-verdict/1"
],
"forbidden_operations": [
"seallink-grant/1",
"seallink-assent/1",
"chain_transactions"
]
},
{
"role": "grant_seal",
"curve": "secp256k1",
"scheme": "ECDSA (P2WPKH / P2WSH SIGHASH_ALL)",
"pubkey_encoding": "compressed_66hex",
"custody_tier": "isolated_signer",
"derivation_recommendation": "Dynamic account pool m/84'/7'/<acct>=10+'/0/i (xpub kept secret)",
"published_in": "seallink-grant/1 revocation.seal.script_policy",
"allowed_operations": [
"Revocation spend of its own grant seal UTXO"
],
"forbidden_operations": [
"seallink-grant/1",
"ordinary_fee_funding"
]
},
{
"role": "child_seal",
"curve": "secp256k1",
"scheme": "ECDSA (P2WPKH / P2WSH SIGHASH_ALL)",
"pubkey_encoding": "compressed_66hex",
"custody_tier": "isolated_signer",
"derivation_recommendation": "Separate dynamic account outside delegation signer",
"published_in": "Parent seallink-grant/1 delegate.child_seal_key",
"allowed_operations": [
"Revocation spend of child grant seals"
],
"forbidden_operations": [
"seallink-grant/1",
"delegation_signer_access"
]
},
{
"role": "row_coin",
"curve": "secp256k1",
"scheme": "ECDSA (P2WPKH SIGHASH_ALL)",
"pubkey_encoding": "compressed_66hex",
"custody_tier": "isolated_signer",
"derivation_recommendation": "Separate dynamic account >= 10'",
"published_in": "Parent seallink-grant/1 delegate.groups[].ranges[]",
"allowed_operations": [
"Single-use anchor spend enforcing <= 1 child per row"
],
"forbidden_operations": [
"seallink-grant/1",
"seal_spends"
]
},
{
"role": "stop_coin",
"curve": "secp256k1",
"scheme": "ECDSA (P2WPKH SIGHASH_ALL)",
"pubkey_encoding": "compressed_66hex",
"custody_tier": "isolated_signer",
"derivation_recommendation": "Notary-owned dynamic account >= 10'",
"published_in": "Parent seallink-grant/1 delegate.groups[].ranges[].stop_script_policy",
"allowed_operations": [
"Notary per-row termination for cause"
],
"forbidden_operations": [
"seallink-grant/1",
"seallink-notary/1"
]
},
{
"role": "contract_seal",
"curve": "secp256k1",
"scheme": "ECDSA (P2WPKH / P2WSH SIGHASH_ALL)",
"pubkey_encoding": "compressed_66hex",
"custody_tier": "isolated_signer_with_presence",
"derivation_recommendation": "Dedicated contract seal account >= 10'",
"published_in": "seallink-contract/1 seal.script_policy",
"allowed_operations": [
"Contract termination spend (action 0x08)"
],
"forbidden_operations": [
"seallink-grant/1",
"ordinary_fee_funding"
]
},
{
"role": "guardian_seal",
"curve": "secp256k1",
"scheme": "ECDSA (P2WPKH / P2WSH SIGHASH_ALL; threshold ECDSA per OQ-007 for multi-custodian institutions)",
"pubkey_encoding": "compressed_66hex",
"custody_tier": "isolated_signer_with_presence",
"derivation_recommendation": "Dedicated guardianship seal account >= 10'",
"published_in": "seallink-origin/1, seallink-guardian/1, seallink-guardian-roster/1",
"allowed_operations": [
"Slot halt, initial activation (0x12), successor transition (0x0d), slot activation (0x0e), roster transition (0x0f), name binding (0x0c)"
],
"forbidden_operations": [
"seallink-grant/1",
"ordinary_fee_funding"
]
},
{
"role": "disposable_revoke_seal",
"curve": "secp256k1",
"scheme": "ECDSA (P2WPKH SIGHASH_ALL + P2A CPFP anchor output)",
"pubkey_encoding": "compressed_66hex",
"custody_tier": "ephemeral_csprng_destroyed_after_presign",
"derivation_recommendation": "CSPRNG ONLY — NEVER BIP-39 derived; destroy private key immediately after recording pre-signed tx_revoke",
"published_in": "manifest auth_seal, device-list seal, members-list entry seal",
"allowed_operations": [
"One pre-signed fast-revocation transaction with P2A CPFP anchor output"
],
"forbidden_operations": [
"seed_derivation",
"key_retention_after_presign"
]
},
{
"role": "device",
"curve": "P-256 | Ed25519 | secp256k1",
"scheme": "ECDSA-P256 (low-S) | Ed25519 | BIP-340",
"pubkey_encoding": "alg_tagged_hex",
"custody_tier": "hardware_device",
"derivation_recommendation": "Generated inside hardware enclave or device keystore (non-exportable for L2)",
"published_in": "seallink-device-list/1 (pinned in manifest)",
"allowed_operations": [
"seallink-owner-command/1",
"seallink-statement/1"
],
"forbidden_operations": [
"seallink-auth-challenge/1",
"seallink-grant/1",
"seallink-assent/1",
"chain_transactions"
]
},
{
"role": "receipt",
"curve": "secp256k1",
"scheme": "BIP-340 Schnorr",
"pubkey_encoding": "xonly_64hex",
"custody_tier": "hot_service",
"derivation_recommendation": "Dedicated service receipt key (distinct from funding/wallet keys)",
"published_in": "Service's seallink-manifest/1 service.receipt_key and grant.executor.key",
"allowed_operations": [
"seallink-receipt/1",
"seallink-migration/1"
],
"forbidden_operations": [
"seallink-grant/1",
"wallet_spends"
]
},
{
"role": "arbiter",
"curve": "secp256k1",
"scheme": "BIP-340 Schnorr (off-chain) / ECDSA single compressed key in P2WSH branches (threshold ECDSA per OQ-007 for institutions)",
"pubkey_encoding": "xonly_64hex_or_compressed_66hex",
"custody_tier": "isolated_signer_with_presence",
"derivation_recommendation": "Independent institution/court custody (never co-located with disposer)",
"published_in": "seallink-origin/1, seallink-guardian-roster/1, seallink-contract/1",
"allowed_operations": [
"seallink-guardian/1",
"seallink-guardian-roster/1",
"seallink-termination/1",
"2-of-2 guardian appointment (0x0d)",
"2-of-2 roster transition (0x0f)",
"2-of-2 name recovery (0x0c)",
"arbiter contract termination (0x08)"
],
"forbidden_operations": [
"unilateral_guardian_appointment",
"grant_widening",
"seallink-grant/1"
]
},
{
"role": "funding",
"curve": "secp256k1",
"scheme": "ECDSA (P2WPKH SIGHASH_ALL)",
"pubkey_encoding": "compressed_66hex",
"custody_tier": "hot_service",
"derivation_recommendation": "Hot signer seed m/84'/7'/0'/0/i",
"published_in": "Not published",
"allowed_operations": [
"Ordinary tx fees, seal pool funding, sponsored client-owned registration funding"
],
"forbidden_operations": [
"name_owner_control",
"seallink-grant/1",
"emergency_fee_reserve"
]
}
]
}
Registry: object-types.json
Source: registry/object-types.json
{
"$comment": "SealLink v1.0 Canonical Object Type Registry. Authoritative SSOT for object types, byte limits, signing roles, and schema targets. Signing domain tag equals the exact type string under SPEC-01.",
"protocol": "SealLink",
"version": "1.0.0-draft.2",
"types": [
{
"type": "seallink-manifest/1",
"signed": false,
"auth_mechanism": "name_value_sha256_pin",
"max_bytes": 16384,
"owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
"schema": "schemas/manifest.schema.json",
"description": "Name-pinned operational manifest: off-chain set heads, self-service declaration, pinned labeled providers, optional role-policy preimages (verified against on-chain link.<role> hashes), and foreign-service auth key/seal."
},
{
"type": "seallink-card/1",
"signed": false,
"auth_mechanism": "manifest_sha256_pin",
"max_bytes": 16384,
"owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
"schema": "schemas/card.schema.json",
"description": "Public unsigned entity metadata card (person, agent, organization, service) authenticated solely via name -> manifest -> card SHA-256 chain."
},
{
"type": "seallink-device-list/1",
"signed": false,
"auth_mechanism": "manifest_sha256_pin",
"max_bytes": 16384,
"owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
"schema": "schemas/manifest.schema.json#/$defs/DeviceList",
"description": "Owner-control plane device list (L0-L2 ceilings, algorithm, presence claim, disposable fast-revocation seal)."
},
{
"type": "seallink-members-list/1",
"signed": false,
"auth_mechanism": "manifest_sha256_pin",
"max_bytes": 262144,
"owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
"schema": "schemas/manifest.schema.json#/$defs/MembersList",
"description": "Manifest-pinned list of managed/member names with owner policy pins and per-entry revocation seals."
},
{
"type": "seallink-certset-head/1",
"signed": false,
"auth_mechanism": "manifest_sha256_pin",
"max_bytes": 4096,
"owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
"schema": "schemas/manifest.schema.json#/$defs/CertSetHead",
"description": "Manifest-pinned head committing to an actor's complete set of self-issued key-binding and configuration statements."
},
{
"type": "seallink-statement/1",
"signed": true,
"signer_roles": [
"grant",
"device"
],
"max_bytes": 16384,
"owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
"schema": "schemas/manifest.schema.json#/$defs/Statement",
"description": "Typed actor-signed statement for external transport key bindings, host configuration sections, or trust-root rotation/cancellation."
},
{
"type": "seallink-owner-command/1",
"signed": true,
"signer_roles": [
"device"
],
"max_bytes": 16384,
"owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
"schema": "schemas/invocation.schema.json#/$defs/OwnerCommand",
"description": "L0/L1/L2 owner control-plane command for an actor's own executors and managed agent key holders; never valid at foreign verifiers."
},
{
"type": "seallink-auth-challenge/1",
"signed": true,
"signer_roles": [
"auth"
],
"max_bytes": 4096,
"owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
"schema": "schemas/invocation.schema.json#/$defs/AuthChallenge",
"description": "Single-use foreign-service login challenge (provisional key-only or named mode), TTL <= 120s."
},
{
"type": "seallink-auth-upgrade/1",
"signed": true,
"signer_roles": [
"auth"
],
"max_bytes": 4096,
"owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
"schema": "schemas/invocation.schema.json#/$defs/AuthUpgrade",
"description": "Atomic promotion of a provisional key-only service cell to a confirmed named SealLink identity under the same auth key."
},
{
"type": "seallink-origin/1",
"signed": true,
"signer_roles": [
"cred"
],
"max_bytes": 65536,
"owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
"schema": "schemas/origin.schema.json",
"description": "Eternal Origin Certificate establishing immutable subject class (person, agent, organization), salted initial guardian commitments, explicit disposer/arbiter/challenger keys, revision-denominated quorum rules, status/roster UTXO spines, and name_recovery policy."
},
{
"type": "seallink-name-binding/1",
"signed": false,
"auth_mechanism": "binding_seal_spend_and_anchor",
"max_bytes": 4096,
"owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
"schema": "schemas/guardian.schema.json#/$defs/NameBinding",
"description": "Single-use binding record linking an eternal Origin Certificate to a specific name registration outpoint, ScriptPolicy, and optional successor recovery seal."
},
{
"type": "seallink-guardian/1",
"signed": true,
"signer_roles": [
"cred",
"arbiter"
],
"max_bytes": 16384,
"owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
"schema": "schemas/guardian.schema.json#/$defs/GuardianRecord",
"description": "Acyclic revocable guardianship record supporting direct initial activation (mode=initial, 0x12) and two-stage successor appointment/activation (mode=appointed, 0x0d -> 0x0e)."
},
{
"type": "seallink-guardian-roster/1",
"signed": true,
"signer_roles": [
"cred",
"arbiter"
],
"max_bytes": 32768,
"owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
"schema": "schemas/guardian.schema.json#/$defs/GuardianRoster",
"description": "Governed roster transition authorized by disposer+arbiter roster_seal spend (0x0f), advancing revision, adjusting approved revision_size, rotating challenger_pk, or re-anchoring burned slots."
},
{
"type": "seallink-capacity/1",
"signed": true,
"signer_roles": [
"cred"
],
"max_bytes": 16384,
"owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
"schema": "schemas/guardian.schema.json#/$defs/CapacityRecord",
"description": "Eternal emancipation / legal-capacity record transitioning a ward toward autonomous status upon status_seal spend and confirmed name transfer."
},
{
"type": "seallink-end/1",
"signed": true,
"signer_roles": [
"cred"
],
"max_bytes": 8192,
"owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
"schema": "schemas/guardian.schema.json#/$defs/EndRecord",
"description": "Eternal subject-end record (human death, agent dematerialization, organization dissolution) spending status_seal terminally and permanently closing guardianship and admission."
},
{
"type": "seallink-contract/1",
"signed": false,
"auth_mechanism": "all_party_assents_and_anchor",
"max_bytes": 65536,
"owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
"schema": "schemas/contract.schema.json#/$defs/Contract",
"description": "N-party structured contract with salted per-clause selective disclosure, explicit machine_clause_indices, ward origin_id party binding, optional framework link, confirmed contract termination seal, and optional agreed configuration hash."
},
{
"type": "seallink-assent/1",
"signed": true,
"signer_roles": [
"grant",
"guardian_quorum"
],
"max_bytes": 32768,
"owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
"schema": "schemas/contract.schema.json#/$defs/Assent",
"description": "Symmetric native party assent binding a signer (via signatures) or a ward's guardian quorum (via guardian_approvals[]) to a contract, guardianship appointment, or migration manifest."
},
{
"type": "seallink-termination/1",
"signed": true,
"signer_roles": [
"grant",
"arbiter"
],
"max_bytes": 16384,
"owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
"schema": "schemas/contract.schema.json#/$defs/TerminationStatement",
"description": "Signed termination evidence committed inside a contract-seal spend (action 0x08); the seal spend alone terminates."
},
{
"type": "seallink-verdict/1",
"signed": true,
"signer_roles": [
"moderator"
],
"max_bytes": 16384,
"owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
"schema": "schemas/contract.schema.json#/$defs/Verdict",
"description": "Chained violation verdict record referencing salted request/response hashes and rule identifier, optionally anchored in grant-seal spend (0x03)."
},
{
"type": "seallink-credential/1",
"signed": true,
"signer_roles": [
"cred"
],
"max_bytes": 65536,
"owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
"schema": "schemas/credential.schema.json#/$defs/Credential",
"description": "General third-party verifiable credential (eternal or revocable), anchored by signed-form content address (0x09) and bounded by compromise height h_c (0x0b)."
},
{
"type": "seallink-credential-withdrawal/1",
"signed": false,
"auth_mechanism": "credential_seal_spend",
"max_bytes": 1024,
"owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
"schema": "schemas/credential.schema.json#/$defs/CredentialWithdrawal",
"description": "Unsigned cause commitment authenticated by spending a revocable credential's seal (action 0x0a)."
},
{
"type": "seallink-credential-break/1",
"signed": false,
"auth_mechanism": "owner_policy_name_update_sighash_all",
"max_bytes": 1024,
"owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
"schema": "schemas/credential.schema.json#/$defs/CredentialBreak",
"description": "Chain-reconstructible compromise-height (h_c) break payload authenticated by the issuer's name OwnerPolicy (action 0x0b)."
},
{
"type": "seallink-notary/1",
"signed": true,
"signer_roles": [
"notary"
],
"max_bytes": 65536,
"owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
"schema": "schemas/credential.schema.json#/$defs/NotaryAct",
"description": "General notary act (contract notarization, document copy, fact attestation, or optional child-grant attestation), supporting eternal (anchor-height) and revocable modes."
},
{
"type": "seallink-grant/1",
"signed": true,
"signer_roles": [
"grant",
"delegation",
"guardian_quorum"
],
"max_bytes": 65536,
"owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
"schema": "schemas/grant.schema.json",
"description": "Universal revocable (or root-only short-lived window_only) capability grant: unilateral by default, optionally contract-bound, signed via signatures or ward guardian_approvals[], with 7-predicate Constraint Algebra, separate additive quotas, and bounded depth-2 re-delegation."
},
{
"type": "seallink-issuance/1",
"signed": false,
"auth_mechanism": "issuance_anchor_op_return",
"max_bytes": 2048,
"owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
"schema": "schemas/grant.schema.json#/$defs/IssuancePrep",
"description": "Canonical issuance preparation committed in action 0x01 OP_RETURN, binding grant_id, grant signatures, and optional contract assents."
},
{
"type": "seallink-invocation/1",
"signed": true,
"signer_roles": [
"recipient",
"messaging_or_request"
],
"max_bytes": 1048576,
"owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
"schema": "schemas/invocation.schema.json#/$defs/Invocation",
"description": "Signed execution request carrying concrete action, target, typed arguments, ordered proof path, nonce, and wall-clock [iat, exp) window."
},
{
"type": "seallink-receipt/1",
"signed": true,
"signer_roles": [
"receipt"
],
"max_bytes": 65536,
"owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
"schema": "schemas/invocation.schema.json#/$defs/Receipt",
"description": "Executor-signed accounting and outcome receipt (executed, refused, uncertain) with reserved, settled, and released quota amounts."
},
{
"type": "seallink-session-open/1",
"signed": true,
"signer_roles": [
"recipient",
"messaging_or_request"
],
"max_bytes": 16384,
"owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
"schema": "schemas/invocation.schema.json#/$defs/SessionOpen",
"description": "Signed invocation establishing, extending, or closing a short-lived (<= 3600s) bearer session for non-signing clients."
},
{
"type": "seallink-journal-entry/1",
"signed": false,
"auth_mechanism": "hash_chain_and_external_cas_witness",
"max_bytes": 4096,
"owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
"schema": "schemas/invocation.schema.json#/$defs/JournalEntry",
"description": "Canonical entry in an anti-rollback hash-chained journal (closures, reservations, settlements, single-use consumption, nonces, manifest heads, recovery boundaries)."
},
{
"type": "seallink-migration/1",
"signed": true,
"signer_roles": [
"receipt",
"grant"
],
"max_bytes": 65536,
"owning_spec": "SPEC-07",
"schema": "schemas/invocation.schema.json#/$defs/MigrationManifest",
"description": "Replaceable-service portable state and accounting handover manifest signed by old provider, holder, and new provider."
}
]
}
Registry: opreturn-actions.json
Source: registry/opreturn-actions.json
{
"$comment": "SealLink v1.0 OP_RETURN Commitment Framing Registry (SPEC-02). All standard frames fit strictly within Bitcoin/Namecoin MAX_OP_RETURN_RELAY = 83 bytes.",
"protocol": "SealLink",
"version": "1.0.0-draft.2",
"magic_ascii": "SLNK",
"magic_hex": "534c4e4b",
"max_relay_script_bytes": 83,
"header_format": "OP_RETURN(0x6a) PUSH5(0x05) magic(4B='SLNK') action(1B) PUSH_N(1B) payload(N bytes)",
"standard_payload_format": "version(1B=0x01) || commitment(32B) || loc_type(1B) || pointer(0B | 32B)",
"locator_types": [
{
"code": "0x00",
"name": "none",
"pointer_bytes": 0,
"standard_script_bytes": 42,
"description": "No public locator on chain. Default for private documents delivered inline or via E2EE transport."
},
{
"code": "0x01",
"name": "content_sha256",
"pointer_bytes": 32,
"standard_script_bytes": 74,
"description": "Content-addressed SHA-256 pointer (e.g., Blossom BUD-01 / HTTP content store)."
},
{
"code": "0x02",
"name": "bt_v2",
"pointer_bytes": 32,
"standard_script_bytes": 74,
"description": "BitTorrent v2 (BEP 52) SHA-256 infohash."
},
{
"code": "0x05",
"name": "nostr_event_id",
"pointer_bytes": 32,
"standard_script_bytes": 74,
"description": "Raw 32-byte NIP-01 Nostr event ID (e.g., kind 30079 addressable mirror)."
}
],
"actions": [
{
"code": "0x01",
"name": "GRANT_ISSUANCE",
"status": "decided",
"version": "0x01",
"commitment": "typed_digest(seallink-issuance/1)",
"allowed_locators": [
"0x00",
"0x01",
"0x05"
],
"owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
"description": "Anchors a root or child grant issuance (unilateral or contract-bound)."
},
{
"code": "0x02",
"name": "BATCH_ANCHOR",
"status": "decided",
"version": "0x01",
"commitment": "seallink_merkle_root_sha256",
"allowed_locators": [
"0x00",
"0x01",
"0x02",
"0x05"
],
"owning_spec": "SPEC-02",
"description": "Anchors a domain-separated SHA-256 Merkle root (SPEC-02 §5.3: sorted unique 32B digests, tagged leaves/nodes, odd-node promotion without duplication)."
},
{
"code": "0x03",
"name": "GRANT_VIOLATION_TERMINATION",
"status": "decided",
"version": "0x01",
"commitment": "typed_digest(seallink-verdict/1)",
"allowed_locators": [
"0x00",
"0x01",
"0x05"
],
"owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
"description": "Optional evidence inside a grant-seal spend referencing a signed moderation/violation verdict."
},
{
"code": "0x04",
"name": "NOTARY_ACT",
"status": "decided",
"version": "0x01",
"commitment": "content_addr(seallink-notary/1)",
"allowed_locators": [
"0x00",
"0x01",
"0x05"
],
"owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
"description": "Anchors the signed form of a general notary act (contract notarization, copy, fact, or child attestation)."
},
{
"code": "0x05",
"name": "NOTARY_WITHDRAWAL_FOR_CAUSE",
"status": "decided",
"version": "0x01",
"commitment": "sha256_cause_commitment",
"allowed_locators": [
"0x00",
"0x01",
"0x05"
],
"owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
"description": "Authenticated by spending the notary seal or row stop coin; records withdrawal for cause."
},
{
"code": "0x06",
"name": "RESERVED",
"status": "reserved",
"version": "0x01",
"commitment": "none",
"allowed_locators": [],
"owning_spec": "SPEC-02",
"description": "Reserved unused action byte; readers encountering 0x06 MUST refuse with CHAIN_FRAME_INVALID."
},
{
"code": "0x07",
"name": "CONTRACT_ANCHOR",
"status": "decided",
"version": "0x01",
"commitment": "contract_id",
"allowed_locators": [
"0x00",
"0x01",
"0x05"
],
"owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
"description": "Anchors an N-party contract (and optional on-chain assent spend)."
},
{
"code": "0x08",
"name": "CONTRACT_TERMINATION",
"status": "decided",
"version": "0x01",
"commitment": "typed_digest(seallink-termination/1)",
"allowed_locators": [
"0x00",
"0x01",
"0x05"
],
"owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
"description": "Optional signed termination statement inside a contract-seal spend."
},
{
"code": "0x09",
"name": "CREDENTIAL_OR_ORIGIN_ANCHOR",
"status": "decided",
"version": "0x01",
"commitment": "content_addr(signed_form)",
"allowed_locators": [
"0x00",
"0x01",
"0x05"
],
"owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
"description": "Anchors the complete signed form of seallink-origin/1, seallink-credential/1, seallink-capacity/1 (spending status_seal), or seallink-end/1 (terminally spending status_seal)."
},
{
"code": "0x0a",
"name": "CREDENTIAL_WITHDRAWAL_FOR_CAUSE",
"status": "decided",
"version": "0x01",
"commitment": "typed_digest(seallink-credential-withdrawal/1)",
"allowed_locators": [
"0x00",
"0x01",
"0x05"
],
"owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
"description": "Authenticated by spending a revocable credential or guardianship seal; binds cause hash."
},
{
"code": "0x0b",
"name": "KEY_COMPROMISE_BREAK",
"status": "decided",
"version": "0x01",
"custom_payload_format": "version(1B=0x01) || typed_digest(32B) || h_c_le64(8B) || loc_type(1B=0x00)",
"script_bytes": 50,
"commitment": "typed_digest(seallink-credential-break/1)",
"allowed_locators": [
"0x00"
],
"owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
"description": "OwnerPolicy-authenticated compromise height h_c for a credential or notary role key; anchors < h_c survive, >= h_c refuse."
},
{
"code": "0x0c",
"name": "NAME_BINDING",
"status": "decided",
"version": "0x01",
"commitment": "id(seallink-name-binding/1)",
"allowed_locators": [
"0x00",
"0x01",
"0x05"
],
"owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
"description": "Committed when spending an origin's single-use binding_seal (or governed dual-party recovery_seal) to bind origin_id to a name registration."
},
{
"code": "0x0d",
"name": "GUARDIAN_APPOINTMENT",
"status": "decided",
"version": "0x01",
"commitment": "content_addr(seallink-guardian/1)",
"allowed_locators": [
"0x00",
"0x01",
"0x05"
],
"owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
"description": "Stage 1 successor appointment (activation_mode=appointed): committed when spending a vacant guardianship slot UTXO (disposer + arbiter 2-of-2 P2WSH) to create the CSV-delayed pending slot output."
},
{
"code": "0x0e",
"name": "GUARDIAN_ACTIVATION",
"status": "decided",
"version": "0x01",
"commitment": "id(seallink-guardian/1)",
"allowed_locators": [
"0x00"
],
"owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
"description": "Stage 2 activation: committed when the appointed guardian spends the CSV-unlocked pending slot output to create the active either_of_2(guardian, disposer) slot seal at vout 0."
},
{
"code": "0x0f",
"name": "GUARDIAN_ROSTER_TRANSITION",
"status": "decided",
"version": "0x01",
"commitment": "content_addr(seallink-guardian-roster/1)",
"allowed_locators": [
"0x00",
"0x01",
"0x05"
],
"owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
"description": "Committed when spending roster_seal (disposer + arbiter 2-of-2 P2WSH) to advance guardianship revision, resize approved revision_size, rotate challenger_pk, or re-anchor a burned slot."
},
{
"code": "0x10",
"name": "RECOVERY_CANCEL",
"status": "decided",
"version": "0x01",
"commitment": "id(seallink-name-binding/1)",
"allowed_locators": [
"0x00"
],
"owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
"description": "Committed inside an owner-authored (SIGHASH_ALL) OP_NAME_UPDATE of the live existing name prior to h_rec + delay_blocks to abort a pending dual-party recovery and restore prior binding admission."
},
{
"code": "0x11",
"name": "SINGLE_USE_CONSUMPTION",
"status": "decided",
"version": "0x01",
"commitment": "content_addr(seallink-invocation/1)",
"allowed_locators": [
"0x00"
],
"owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
"description": "Committed when the grantee spends a single_use_1_of_2 grant seal via branch 0 (grantee) with SIGHASH_ALL to authorize at-most-once execution of the referenced invocation."
},
{
"code": "0x12",
"name": "GUARDIAN_INITIAL_ACTIVATION",
"status": "decided",
"version": "0x01",
"commitment": "content_addr(seallink-guardian/1)",
"allowed_locators": [
"0x00",
"0x01",
"0x05"
],
"owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
"description": "Direct initial activation (activation_mode=initial): committed when spending an origin's initial_vacant slot UTXO for the disclosed initial_guardian_commitment (with guardian assent) directly to active_policy at active_vout."
}
]
}
Registry: refusal-codes.json
Source: registry/refusal-codes.json
{
"$comment": "SealLink v1.0 Authoritative Refusal Code Registry. No normative document may emit a refusal code absent from this file. Verifiers report the FIRST failing code in each pipeline's deterministic check order.",
"protocol": "SealLink",
"version": "1.0.0-draft.2",
"codes": [
{
"code": "WIRE_SIZE",
"category": "wire",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-01",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Document exceeds type max_bytes or nesting depth > 16."
},
{
"code": "WIRE_JSON",
"category": "wire",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-01",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Invalid UTF-8, BOM present, trailing bytes, or malformed RFC 8259 JSON object."
},
{
"code": "WIRE_DUPLICATE",
"category": "wire",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-01",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Duplicate object member name (after escape resolution) or Unicode fold alias in name value."
},
{
"code": "WIRE_VALUE",
"category": "wire",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-01",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Forbidden JSON value (e.g., null)."
},
{
"code": "WIRE_NUMBER",
"category": "wire",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-01",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "JSON number has sign, fraction, exponent, leading zero, or exceeds 2^53 - 1."
},
{
"code": "WIRE_INTEGER",
"category": "wire",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-01",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Number-form or string-form integer violates grammar or schema bound."
},
{
"code": "WIRE_STRING",
"category": "wire",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-01",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "String contains forbidden control character (< U+0020 except U+000A in multiline prose fields, U+007F DEL, C1 U+0080..U+009F) or unpaired surrogate."
},
{
"code": "WIRE_NOT_CANONICAL",
"category": "wire",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-01",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Re-encoded Restricted RFC 8785 JCS bytes differ from input octets."
},
{
"code": "WIRE_TYPE",
"category": "wire",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-01",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Unregistered, unsupported, or unexpected object type string."
},
{
"code": "WIRE_MEMBER",
"category": "wire",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-01",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Missing required member, unknown member, or member type/form mismatch."
},
{
"code": "WIRE_KEY",
"category": "wire",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-01",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Malformed public key encoding or invalid curve point."
},
{
"code": "WIRE_SIGNATURE",
"category": "wire",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-01",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Malformed signature encoding, failed cryptographic verification, policy mismatch, or SignatureSet threshold unmet."
},
{
"code": "WIRE_CONSTRAINT",
"category": "wire",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-01",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Malformed or unsupported Constraint Algebra predicate or populated reserved extension."
},
{
"code": "CHAIN_MISMATCH",
"category": "ledger",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-02",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Node network or genesis hash does not match verifier's pinned chain."
},
{
"code": "CHAIN_UNHEALTHY",
"category": "ledger",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-02",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": true,
"description": "Reading node is in IBD, unreachable, missing txindex, or lags header tip beyond LAG."
},
{
"code": "CHAIN_NODE_DISAGREEMENT",
"category": "ledger",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-02",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": true,
"description": "A healthy independent comparison node disagrees on chain tip or sits ahead of reading node."
},
{
"code": "CHAIN_CLOCK_ERROR",
"category": "ledger",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-02",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": true,
"description": "Verifier clock regressed below durable monotonic mark or block header exceeds future bound S."
},
{
"code": "CHAIN_TIP_STALE",
"category": "ledger",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-02",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": true,
"description": "Tip age max(now - header_time, now - first_sight) exceeds action risk-class cutoff."
},
{
"code": "CHAIN_OBSERVATION_VOID",
"category": "ledger",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-02",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": true,
"description": "Chain tip changed between start and end reads of a single observation."
},
{
"code": "CHAIN_SCRIPT_UNSUPPORTED",
"category": "ledger",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-02",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Output script does not match any supported ScriptPolicy template or compiled scriptPubKey."
},
{
"code": "CHAIN_TX_CONSTRUCTION",
"category": "ledger",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-02",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Transaction violates Witness construction profile (non-SegWit input, non-SIGHASH_ALL, unconfirmed funding, bad linkage)."
},
{
"code": "CHAIN_FRAME_INVALID",
"category": "ledger",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-02",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Missing, duplicate, reserved, or malformed SLNK OP_RETURN commitment frame or invalid Merkle inclusion proof."
},
{
"code": "CHAIN_DEPTH_INSUFFICIENT",
"category": "ledger",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-02",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": true,
"description": "Required transaction confirmation depth is below max(signed_min_depth, operator_floor)."
},
{
"code": "CHAIN_RECENCY_INVALID",
"category": "ledger",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-02",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Recent block hash R is off active chain or anchor height falls outside (R, R + K]."
},
{
"code": "SEAL_UNAVAILABLE",
"category": "ledger",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-02",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": true,
"description": "Seal UTXO is unconfirmed, has mismatched script, single-use seal not yet spent by grantee, or chain read is inconclusive; never treated as unspent or closed."
},
{
"code": "SEAL_SPENT",
"category": "ledger",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-02",
"creates_closure": true,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Validated revocation spend of a live seal UTXO (mempool or block); recorded as permanent closure."
},
{
"code": "NAME_NOT_FOUND",
"category": "identity",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": true,
"description": "Name does not exist or has no confirmed output on active chain."
},
{
"code": "NAME_EXPIRED",
"category": "identity",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Name output has reached or passed expiry height (h + D)."
},
{
"code": "NAME_OWNER_MISMATCH",
"category": "identity",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Name UTXO ScriptPolicy does not match pinned owner policy or transferred away."
},
{
"code": "NAME_WRITER_UNVERIFIED",
"category": "identity",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Current name value was not authored by pinned ScriptPolicy with SIGHASH_ALL on all required signatures."
},
{
"code": "NAME_HISTORY_UNAVAILABLE",
"category": "identity",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": true,
"description": "Name transaction history walk exceeded operator step bound or node could not supply history."
},
{
"code": "NAME_VALUE_INVALID",
"category": "identity",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Name value exceeds 520 bytes or violates strict link / m member grammar."
},
{
"code": "NAME_ROLE_CHANGED",
"category": "identity",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
"creates_closure": true,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Owner-signed change or removal of the bound role key or role-policy pin in name history (durable closure for active grants)."
},
{
"code": "MANIFEST_UNAVAILABLE",
"category": "identity",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": true,
"description": "Manifest or pinned off-chain set bytes are missing from presentation and configured stores."
},
{
"code": "MANIFEST_MISMATCH",
"category": "identity",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Manifest or set bytes fail SHA-256 pin, name, network, or seq equality."
},
{
"code": "MANIFEST_ROLLBACK",
"category": "identity",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Manifest or set seq decreased (or hash changed at equal seq) while journaled anchoring_txid remains on active chain."
},
{
"code": "AUTH_CHALLENGE_EXPIRED",
"category": "identity",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Auth challenge TTL > 120s or now >= expires_at."
},
{
"code": "AUTH_CHALLENGE_INVALID",
"category": "identity",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Wrong audience, reused/unknown nonce, provisional policy failure, or upgrade binding mismatch."
},
{
"code": "AUTH_KEY_UNPINNED",
"category": "identity",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Manifest lacks paired auth_key/auth_seal or key mismatch."
},
{
"code": "DEVICE_UNAUTHORIZED",
"category": "identity",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Device key not in pinned device list, level ceiling insufficient, or presented to a foreign verifier."
},
{
"code": "ORIGIN_UNVERIFIED",
"category": "origin",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Origin certificate missing, untrusted issuer policy, class mismatch, or invalid anchor."
},
{
"code": "ORIGIN_BINDING_INVALID",
"category": "origin",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Single-use name binding seal missing, out of height order, or registration already bound."
},
{
"code": "ORIGIN_STATUS_INCOMPLETE",
"category": "origin",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": true,
"description": "Origin status_seal or roster_seal was spent on chain, but the corresponding capacity/1, end/1, or guardian-roster/1 record was not presented or failed hash verification."
},
{
"code": "WARD_AUTONOMOUS_FORBIDDEN",
"category": "origin",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Subject has ward status; autonomous signature without satisfying guardian quorum is forbidden."
},
{
"code": "GUARDIAN_INACTIVE",
"category": "origin",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Guardianship slot is vacant, pending delay, vetoed, contested/burned, halted, expired, or closed."
},
{
"code": "GUARDIAN_QUORUM_UNMET",
"category": "origin",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Valid distinct guardian slot signatures do not meet verifier-derived event_class threshold against approved revision_size."
},
{
"code": "GUARDIAN_TRANSFER_PENDING",
"category": "origin",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": true,
"description": "Guardianship ended (majority or capacity/1); admission paused for both sides until confirmed name transfer and update."
},
{
"code": "GUARDIAN_TIME_BOUNDARY",
"category": "origin",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": true,
"description": "Credible wall-clock interval straddles majority boundary T or cannot be established; admission paused."
},
{
"code": "SUBJECT_ENDED",
"category": "origin",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
"creates_closure": true,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Verified seallink-end/1 record permanently terminates all admission for this subject."
},
{
"code": "RECOVERY_FORBIDDEN",
"category": "origin",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Origin sets name_recovery=none, recovery delay incomplete, or cancelled by live OwnerPolicy (0x10)."
},
{
"code": "CONTRACT_NOT_PRESENTED",
"category": "contract",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": true,
"description": "Grant or action profile requires a bound contract (and framework if named) that was not presented."
},
{
"code": "CONTRACT_ID_MISMATCH",
"category": "contract",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Recomputed salted contract_id (or framework_id) does not match bound reference."
},
{
"code": "CONTRACT_ASSENT_INVALID",
"category": "contract",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Missing, expired, replayed, or invalid party seallink-assent/1."
},
{
"code": "CONTRACT_SEAL_MISSING",
"category": "contract",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Required contract or framework seal is absent, unconfirmed, or has mismatched ScriptPolicy."
},
{
"code": "CONTRACT_TERMS_MISMATCH",
"category": "contract",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Grant window, executor, or machine capabilities violate bound contract, framework nesting, or undisclosed machine_clause_indices."
},
{
"code": "CONTRACT_CONFIG_MISMATCH",
"category": "contract",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Agreed configuration manifest hash does not match runtime configuration."
},
{
"code": "CRED_ANCHOR_MISSING",
"category": "credential",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": true,
"description": "Signed-form credential or notary anchor (0x09 / 0x04) missing or below required depth."
},
{
"code": "CRED_ISSUER_CLOSED",
"category": "credential",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
"creates_closure": true,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Credential anchor height >= owner-authenticated compromise height h_c (0x0b)."
},
{
"code": "CRED_WINDOW_CLOSED",
"category": "credential",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Current chain height outside credential validity window."
},
{
"code": "CRED_REVOKED_FOR_CAUSE",
"category": "credential",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
"creates_closure": true,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Revocable credential or notary seal spent with verified cause commitment (0x0a / 0x05)."
},
{
"code": "NOTARY_REQUIRED",
"category": "credential",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Missing or invalid notary act where required by parent policy or verifier policy."
},
{
"code": "GRANT_CLOSED",
"category": "grant",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
"creates_closure": true,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Grant or ancestor link is permanently closed in durable closure journal."
},
{
"code": "GRANT_WINDOW_CLOSED",
"category": "grant",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Validated tip height outside half-open [not_before_height, not_after_height) window."
},
{
"code": "GRANT_SEAL_REQUIRED",
"category": "grant",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Grant uses revocation=window_only, but executor policy requires a confirmed UTXO seal."
},
{
"code": "GRANT_EXECUTOR_MISMATCH",
"category": "grant",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Grant executor (or resolved executor_ref) does not match this service's pinned identity."
},
{
"code": "GRANT_EXECUTOR_REF_FORBIDDEN",
"category": "grant",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Dynamic executor_ref used with stateful quotas, external mutation, single-use revocation, or re-delegation."
},
{
"code": "GRANT_CONTRACT_REQUIRED",
"category": "grant",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Action profile requires a bilateral contract (requires_contract=true), but grant is unilateral."
},
{
"code": "GRANT_TEXT_FORBIDDEN",
"category": "grant",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Mechanical effect executor refused a grant carrying operative free-text terms."
},
{
"code": "GRANT_NOT_DELEGABLE",
"category": "grant",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Child grant presented under a parent without delegation rights or exceeding depth 2."
},
{
"code": "GRANT_CHILD_WIDER",
"category": "grant",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Child grant fails mechanical Constraint Algebra narrowing, row cap, whole-parent pool aggregate (R8.5), window, or template check against parent."
},
{
"code": "GRANT_ROW_INVALID",
"category": "grant",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Child ordinal out of range, row coin not spent by anchor, overlapping row/stop ranges (R8.6), or stop coin invalid/aliased."
},
{
"code": "GRANT_ROW_STOPPED",
"category": "grant",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
"creates_closure": true,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Notary spent the row stop coin; row permanently closed for cause."
},
{
"code": "INVOKE_ACTION_DENIED",
"category": "invocation",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Requested action is unsupported by executor or absent from grant capabilities."
},
{
"code": "INVOKE_CONSTRAINT_FAILED",
"category": "invocation",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Signed invocation target or arguments violate a grant capability where-predicate or profile check."
},
{
"code": "INVOKE_TIME_INVALID",
"category": "invocation",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Wall-clock now outside invocation half-open [iat, exp) window."
},
{
"code": "INVOKE_REPLAY",
"category": "invocation",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Duplicate nonce or already-consumed single-use grant."
},
{
"code": "QUOTA_EXCEEDED",
"category": "invocation",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Request exceeds own grant quota, parent row cap, session cap, or operator ceiling."
},
{
"code": "QUOTA_CLOCK_REGRESSION",
"category": "invocation",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": true,
"description": "Clock regressed below durable period watermark for a seconds-based quota."
},
{
"code": "SESSION_INVALID",
"category": "invocation",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Unknown, expired, closed, or slot-mismatched bearer session token."
},
{
"code": "JOURNAL_LOST",
"category": "journal",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": true,
"description": "Local journal or external CAS witness unreadable, mismatched, or behind witness (rollback detected)."
},
{
"code": "JOURNAL_FENCED",
"category": "journal",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": true,
"description": "Writer no longer holds the active external witness fencing token."
},
{
"code": "SERVICE_PROVIDER_UNBOUND",
"category": "service",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-07",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Resource owner's manifest does not bind this service's pinned NamePin as provider for the claimed label/type."
},
{
"code": "SERVICE_MIGRATION_INVALID",
"category": "service",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-07",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Export/import handover incomplete, unclosed predecessor grant, credentials leaked in export, or rollback."
},
{
"code": "FEDERATION_POLICY_DENIED",
"category": "service",
"owning_spec": "SPEC-07",
"creates_closure": false,
"retryable": false,
"description": "Peer failed trust policy, screening cap, human disclosure gate, or Contour A PII routing invariant."
}
]
}
Registry: service-types.json
Source: registry/service-types.json
{
"$comment": "SealLink v1.0 Service Types Registry (SPEC-03, SPEC-07). Standard lowercase types are reserved and updated via SLIPs. Permissionless custom types use reverse-domain namespace (e.g., com.example/car-lock).",
"protocol": "SealLink",
"version": "1.0.0-draft.2",
"custom_namespace_regex": "^[a-z0-9-]+(\\.[a-z0-9-]+)+/[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]{0,63}$",
"standard_types": [
{
"service_type": "mail",
"profile": "profiles/PROFILE-mail-v1.md",
"status": "decided",
"default_require_seal": true,
"default_requires_contract": false,
"supports_executor_ref": true,
"description": "Sovereign email hosting and delegated mailbox access (read, list, send) decoupled from identity."
},
{
"service_type": "agent-session",
"profile": "profiles/PROFILE-agent-v1.md",
"status": "decided",
"default_require_seal": true,
"default_requires_contract": false,
"supports_executor_ref": false,
"description": "Bounded autonomous agent task briefs, tool execution, contract-bound isolated sessions, and guardian-verified instruction intake."
},
{
"service_type": "xmpp",
"profile": null,
"status": "open",
"default_require_seal": true,
"default_requires_contract": false,
"supports_executor_ref": true,
"description": "Sovereign XMPP instant messaging hosting where the actor's manifest declares the active server."
},
{
"service_type": "blob",
"profile": null,
"status": "open",
"default_require_seal": true,
"default_requires_contract": false,
"supports_executor_ref": true,
"description": "Replaceable content-addressed blob storage (e.g., Blossom BUD-01/02/04 grant-aware profile)."
},
{
"service_type": "wallet",
"profile": null,
"status": "open",
"default_require_seal": true,
"default_requires_contract": false,
"supports_executor_ref": false,
"description": "Grant-gated cryptocurrency/payment execution service (strictly concrete executor and UTXO seal)."
},
{
"service_type": "names",
"profile": null,
"status": "open",
"default_require_seal": true,
"default_requires_contract": false,
"supports_executor_ref": false,
"description": "Delegated ledger name-update service (update-only; registration and transfers require separate custody)."
},
{
"service_type": "compute",
"profile": null,
"status": "open",
"default_require_seal": false,
"default_requires_contract": false,
"supports_executor_ref": false,
"description": "Model inference proxy / metered compute service (supports window_only ephemeral grants and bearer sessions)."
},
{
"service_type": "rental",
"profile": null,
"status": "open",
"default_require_seal": true,
"default_requires_contract": true,
"supports_executor_ref": false,
"description": "Physical or digital asset rental / lease control (vehicles, apartments, hardware); requires bilateral contract."
}
]
}
Part V — Formal Wire JSON Schemas (Normative SSOT)
Schema: card.schema.json
Source: schemas/card.schema.json
{
"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
"$id": "https://seallink.org/releases/v1.0.0-draft.2/schemas/card.schema.json",
"title": "SealLink v1.0 Public Entity Card",
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"network",
"name",
"seq",
"kind",
"display",
"transports",
"relays",
"role",
"contact",
"replaces"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-card/1"
},
"network": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
},
"name": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
},
"seq": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
},
"kind": {
"type": "string",
"enum": [
"person",
"agent",
"organization",
"service"
]
},
"display": {
"type": "string",
"maxLength": 256
},
"operator": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
},
"transports": {
"type": "array",
"maxItems": 32,
"items": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"transport",
"address"
],
"properties": {
"transport": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 64
},
"address": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 512
}
}
}
},
"relays": {
"type": "array",
"maxItems": 32,
"items": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^wss?://.+$",
"maxLength": 512
}
},
"role": {
"type": "string",
"maxLength": 512
},
"contact": {
"type": "string",
"maxLength": 256
},
"replaces": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
}
}
}
Schema: common.schema.json
Source: schemas/common.schema.json
{
"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
"$id": "https://seallink.org/releases/v1.0.0-draft.2/schemas/common.schema.json",
"title": "SealLink v1.0 Shared Wire Primitives",
"$defs": {
"Hex64": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$"
},
"XOnlyPubkey64": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$",
"description": "Valid BIP-340 x-only secp256k1 public key."
},
"CompressedPubkey66": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^0[23][0-9a-f]{64}$",
"description": "Valid compressed secp256k1 public key."
},
"Sig128": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{128}$",
"description": "Strict 64-byte signature (BIP-340, P-256 low-S raw r||s, or RFC 8032 Ed25519) in lowercase hex."
},
"Uint53": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 0,
"maximum": 9007199254740991
},
"PositiveUint53": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"maximum": 9007199254740991
},
"Vout": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 0,
"maximum": 4294967295
},
"Uint64Str": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^(0|[1-9][0-9]{0,19})$",
"description": "Exact unsigned 64-bit integer encoded as canonical decimal string (<= 18446744073709551615)."
},
"Network": {
"type": "string",
"enum": [
"main",
"regtest"
]
},
"NameStr": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 255,
"pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9./_-]{0,254}$"
},
"Outpoint": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"txid",
"vout"
],
"properties": {
"txid": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"vout": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/Vout"
}
}
},
"ScriptPolicy": {
"oneOf": [
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"kind",
"pk"
],
"properties": {
"kind": {
"const": "key"
},
"pk": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66"
}
}
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"kind",
"m",
"pks"
],
"properties": {
"kind": {
"const": "multisig"
},
"m": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"maximum": 15
},
"pks": {
"type": "array",
"minItems": 1,
"maxItems": 15,
"uniqueItems": true,
"items": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66"
},
"description": "Strictly sorted in ascending lexicographical hex order; verifier MUST also enforce 1 <= m <= len(pks)."
}
}
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"kind",
"template",
"keys"
],
"properties": {
"kind": {
"const": "branch"
},
"template": {
"enum": [
"either_of_2",
"both_of_2"
]
},
"keys": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"a",
"b"
],
"properties": {
"a": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66"
},
"b": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66"
}
}
}
}
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"kind",
"template",
"keys"
],
"properties": {
"kind": {
"const": "branch"
},
"template": {
"const": "arbiter_or_both"
},
"keys": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"a",
"b",
"arbiter"
],
"properties": {
"a": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66"
},
"b": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66"
},
"arbiter": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66"
}
}
}
}
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"kind",
"template",
"keys"
],
"properties": {
"kind": {
"const": "branch"
},
"template": {
"const": "single_use_1_of_2"
},
"keys": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"issuer",
"grantee"
],
"properties": {
"issuer": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66"
},
"grantee": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66"
}
}
}
}
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"kind",
"template",
"keys",
"delay_blocks"
],
"properties": {
"kind": {
"const": "branch"
},
"template": {
"const": "guardian_slot_pending"
},
"keys": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"disposer",
"challenger",
"guardian"
],
"properties": {
"disposer": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66"
},
"challenger": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66"
},
"guardian": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66"
}
}
},
"delay_blocks": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"maximum": 52560
}
}
}
]
},
"NamePin": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"name",
"registration",
"owner_policy"
],
"properties": {
"name": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/NameStr"
},
"registration": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/Outpoint"
},
"owner_policy": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/ScriptPolicy"
}
}
},
"RoleIssuerPin": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"name",
"registration",
"owner_policy",
"role_policy"
],
"properties": {
"name": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/NameStr"
},
"registration": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/Outpoint"
},
"owner_policy": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/ScriptPolicy"
},
"role_policy": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/ThresholdPolicy"
}
}
},
"Seal": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"txid",
"vout",
"script_policy"
],
"properties": {
"txid": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"vout": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/Vout"
},
"script_policy": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/ScriptPolicy"
}
}
},
"ThresholdPolicy": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"m",
"pks"
],
"properties": {
"alg": {
"type": "string",
"enum": [
"bip340",
"p256",
"ed25519"
],
"description": "Omitted defaults to bip340. Non-bip340 permitted ONLY on device-authorized object types."
},
"m": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"maximum": 32
},
"pks": {
"type": "array",
"minItems": 1,
"maxItems": 32,
"uniqueItems": true,
"items": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^([0-9a-f]{64}|0[23][0-9a-f]{64})$"
},
"description": "Strictly sorted in ascending lexicographical hex order; verifier MUST also enforce 1 <= m <= len(pks)."
}
}
},
"SignatureEntry": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"pk",
"sig"
],
"properties": {
"pk": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^([0-9a-f]{64}|0[23][0-9a-f]{64})$"
},
"sig": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/Sig128"
}
}
},
"SignatureSet": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"policy",
"sigs"
],
"properties": {
"policy": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/ThresholdPolicy"
},
"sigs": {
"type": "array",
"minItems": 1,
"maxItems": 32,
"items": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/SignatureEntry"
}
}
}
},
"GuardianApproval": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"slot",
"revision",
"guardian_name",
"signatures"
],
"properties": {
"slot": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"maximum": 32
},
"revision": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
},
"guardian_name": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/NameStr"
},
"signatures": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/SignatureSet"
}
}
},
"GuardianApprovals": {
"type": "array",
"minItems": 1,
"maxItems": 32,
"items": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/GuardianApproval"
},
"description": "Ordered by strictly ascending slot number. Each entry's SignatureSet MUST exactly match that active slot guardian's resolved link.grant policy."
},
"GuardianEventClass": {
"type": "string",
"enum": [
"routine_read",
"effect_grant",
"contract_assent",
"custody_change"
],
"description": "Strict linear precedence: routine_read < effect_grant < contract_assent < custody_change."
},
"GuardianContext": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"origin_id",
"ward_name",
"revision",
"event_class"
],
"properties": {
"origin_id": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"ward_name": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/NameStr"
},
"revision": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
},
"event_class": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/GuardianEventClass"
}
}
},
"RationalQuorum": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"num",
"den",
"min"
],
"properties": {
"num": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"maximum": 32
},
"den": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"maximum": 32
},
"min": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"maximum": 32
}
},
"description": "Verifier MUST enforce 1 <= num <= den and 1 <= min <= revision_size."
},
"QuorumMap": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"routine_read",
"effect_grant",
"contract_assent",
"custody_change"
],
"properties": {
"routine_read": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/RationalQuorum"
},
"effect_grant": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/RationalQuorum"
},
"contract_assent": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/RationalQuorum"
},
"custody_change": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/RationalQuorum"
}
}
},
"MerkleProof": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"root",
"leaf_digest",
"steps"
],
"properties": {
"root": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"leaf_digest": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"steps": {
"type": "array",
"maxItems": 16,
"items": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"side",
"hash"
],
"properties": {
"side": {
"type": "string",
"enum": [
"L",
"R"
]
},
"hash": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/Hex64"
}
}
}
}
}
},
"ProofPathEntry": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"grant_id"
],
"properties": {
"grant_id": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"issuance_txid": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"batch_proof": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/MerkleProof"
}
}
},
"ConstraintPredicate": {
"oneOf": [
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"eq"
],
"properties": {
"eq": {
"type": [
"string",
"boolean"
]
}
}
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"in"
],
"properties": {
"in": {
"type": "array",
"minItems": 1,
"maxItems": 256,
"uniqueItems": true,
"items": {
"type": "string"
}
}
}
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"not_in"
],
"properties": {
"not_in": {
"type": "array",
"minItems": 1,
"maxItems": 256,
"uniqueItems": true,
"items": {
"type": "string"
}
}
}
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"prefix"
],
"properties": {
"prefix": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 512
}
}
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"suffix"
],
"properties": {
"suffix": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 512
}
}
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"range"
],
"properties": {
"range": {
"type": "array",
"minItems": 2,
"maxItems": 2,
"items": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/Uint64Str"
}
}
}
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"hash_eq"
],
"properties": {
"hash_eq": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/Hex64"
}
}
}
]
},
"Quota": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"kind",
"resource",
"unit",
"max",
"window"
],
"properties": {
"kind": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 128
},
"resource": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 256
},
"unit": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 64
},
"max": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/Uint64Str"
},
"window": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^(term|blocks:[1-9][0-9]{0,8}|seconds:[1-9][0-9]{0,9})$"
}
}
},
"Capability": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"action",
"target"
],
"properties": {
"action": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[a-z0-9._-]+(/[a-z0-9._-]+)+$",
"maxLength": 128
},
"target": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 256
},
"where": {
"type": "object",
"maxProperties": 32,
"additionalProperties": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/ConstraintPredicate"
}
},
"quotas": {
"type": "array",
"maxItems": 32,
"items": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/Quota"
}
},
"extensions": {
"not": {},
"description": "Reserved for future versions; any presence MUST refuse with WIRE_CONSTRAINT."
}
}
},
"SetPin": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"seq",
"sha256"
],
"properties": {
"seq": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
},
"sha256": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/Hex64"
}
}
}
}
}
Schema: contract.schema.json
Source: schemas/contract.schema.json
{
"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
"$id": "https://seallink.org/releases/v1.0.0-draft.2/schemas/contract.schema.json",
"title": "SealLink v1.0 Contracts, Assent, Termination & Violation Verdicts",
"$defs": {
"Contract": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"network",
"genesis",
"profile",
"contract_salt",
"parties",
"window",
"clause_commitments"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-contract/1"
},
"network": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
},
"genesis": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"profile": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 128
},
"contract_salt": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"parties": {
"type": "array",
"minItems": 2,
"maxItems": 32,
"items": {
"oneOf": [
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"role",
"signing_policy"
],
"properties": {
"role": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 64
},
"name_pin": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NamePin"
},
"signing_policy": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ThresholdPolicy"
}
}
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"role",
"ward_origin_id",
"name_pin"
],
"properties": {
"role": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 64
},
"ward_origin_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"name_pin": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NamePin"
}
}
}
]
}
},
"window": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"not_before_height"
],
"properties": {
"not_before_height": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
},
"not_after_height": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
},
"not_after_unix": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
}
}
},
"clause_commitments": {
"type": "array",
"minItems": 1,
"maxItems": 256,
"items": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"description": "Ordered H_tag('seallink-clause/1', salt_32B || canonical_JCS(clause_obj)) per SPEC-01 §5 using independent 32-byte CSPRNG salts."
},
"machine_clause_indices": {
"type": "array",
"maxItems": 64,
"uniqueItems": true,
"items": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
},
"description": "Strictly sorted zero-based indices into clause_commitments[] carrying machine-enforced terms; executors MUST require disclosure of every listed index."
},
"framework_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"seal": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Seal"
},
"assent_output": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Seal"
},
"config_sha256": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"moderation": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"rules_sha256",
"moderator_key",
"moderator_kind"
],
"properties": {
"rules_sha256": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"moderator_key": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/XOnlyPubkey64"
},
"moderator_kind": {
"type": "string",
"enum": [
"person",
"agent"
]
}
}
}
}
},
"AssentPayload": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"network",
"genesis",
"target_type",
"target_id",
"party_role",
"issued_at",
"expires_at",
"nonce"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-assent/1"
},
"network": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
},
"genesis": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"target_type": {
"type": "string",
"enum": [
"seallink-contract/1",
"seallink-guardian/1",
"seallink-guardian-roster/1",
"seallink-migration/1"
]
},
"target_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"party_role": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 64
},
"party_name": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
},
"guardian_context": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/GuardianContext"
},
"issued_at": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
},
"expires_at": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
},
"nonce": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
}
}
},
"Assent": {
"oneOf": [
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"payload",
"signatures"
],
"properties": {
"payload": {
"allOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/$defs/AssentPayload"
},
{
"not": {
"required": [
"guardian_context"
]
}
}
]
},
"signatures": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SignatureSet"
}
}
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"payload",
"guardian_approvals"
],
"properties": {
"payload": {
"allOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/$defs/AssentPayload"
},
{
"required": [
"guardian_context"
]
}
]
},
"guardian_approvals": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/GuardianApprovals"
}
}
}
]
},
"TerminationStatement": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"payload",
"signatures"
],
"properties": {
"payload": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"network",
"genesis",
"contract_id",
"termination_branch",
"reason",
"issued_at"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-termination/1"
},
"network": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
},
"genesis": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"contract_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"termination_branch": {
"type": "string",
"enum": [
"issuer_only",
"either_party",
"both_together",
"arbiter"
]
},
"reason": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 2048
},
"verdict_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"issued_at": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
}
}
},
"signatures": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SignatureSet"
}
}
},
"Verdict": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"payload",
"signatures"
],
"properties": {
"payload": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"network",
"genesis",
"grant_id",
"contract_id",
"rules_sha256",
"violated_rule",
"request_salted_sha256",
"response_salted_sha256",
"ordinal",
"tip_height"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-verdict/1"
},
"network": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
},
"genesis": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"grant_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"contract_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"rules_sha256": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"violated_rule": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 128
},
"request_salted_sha256": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"response_salted_sha256": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"ordinal": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
},
"prev_verdict_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"tip_height": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
}
}
},
"signatures": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SignatureSet"
}
}
}
}
}
Schema: credential.schema.json
Source: schemas/credential.schema.json
{
"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
"$id": "https://seallink.org/releases/v1.0.0-draft.2/schemas/credential.schema.json",
"title": "SealLink v1.0 Verifiable Credentials & General Notary Acts",
"$defs": {
"Credential": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"payload",
"signatures"
],
"properties": {
"payload": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"network",
"genesis",
"credential_kind",
"issuer",
"subject",
"claims",
"lifecycle",
"not_before_height",
"issued_at"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-credential/1"
},
"network": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
},
"genesis": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"credential_kind": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[a-z0-9._-]+(/[a-z0-9._-]+)*$",
"maxLength": 128
},
"issuer": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/RoleIssuerPin"
},
"subject": {
"oneOf": [
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"mode",
"key"
],
"properties": {
"mode": {
"const": "key"
},
"key": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/XOnlyPubkey64"
}
}
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"mode",
"name_pin"
],
"properties": {
"mode": {
"const": "name"
},
"name_pin": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NamePin"
}
}
}
]
},
"claims": {
"type": "object",
"maxProperties": 64,
"additionalProperties": {
"oneOf": [
{
"type": "string",
"maxLength": 1024
},
{
"type": "boolean"
},
{
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
}
]
},
"description": "Typed scalar claims constrained further by credential_kind profile."
},
"claim_commitments": {
"type": "object",
"maxProperties": 64,
"additionalProperties": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"description": "Optional per-claim salted hashes H_tag('seallink-clause/1', salt_32B || JCS(claim_obj)) using an independent 32-byte CSPRNG salt per claim."
},
"lifecycle": {
"type": "string",
"enum": [
"eternal",
"revocable"
]
},
"revocation_seal": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Seal"
},
"not_before_height": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
},
"not_after_height": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
},
"not_after_unix": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
},
"issued_at": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
}
},
"allOf": [
{
"if": {
"properties": {
"lifecycle": {
"const": "revocable"
}
}
},
"then": {
"required": [
"revocation_seal"
]
}
},
{
"if": {
"properties": {
"lifecycle": {
"const": "eternal"
}
}
},
"then": {
"not": {
"required": [
"revocation_seal"
]
}
}
}
]
},
"signatures": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SignatureSet"
}
}
},
"CredentialWithdrawal": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"genesis",
"credential_id",
"cause_sha256"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-credential-withdrawal/1"
},
"genesis": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"credential_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"cause_sha256": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
}
}
},
"CredentialBreak": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"genesis",
"issuer",
"role",
"compromised_policy",
"name_input",
"h_c"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-credential-break/1"
},
"genesis": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"issuer": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NamePin"
},
"role": {
"type": "string",
"enum": [
"cred",
"notary"
]
},
"compromised_policy": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ThresholdPolicy"
},
"name_input": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Outpoint"
},
"h_c": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
}
}
},
"NotaryAct": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"payload",
"signatures"
],
"properties": {
"payload": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"network",
"genesis",
"act_kind",
"notary",
"lifecycle",
"target_sha256",
"details",
"tip_height",
"tip_hash",
"attested_at"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-notary/1"
},
"network": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
},
"genesis": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"act_kind": {
"type": "string",
"enum": [
"contract-notarization",
"certified-copy",
"fact-attestation",
"child-within-parent"
]
},
"notary": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/RoleIssuerPin"
},
"lifecycle": {
"type": "string",
"enum": [
"eternal",
"revocable"
]
},
"notary_seal": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Seal"
},
"target_sha256": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"details": {
"oneOf": [
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"kind",
"contract_id"
],
"properties": {
"kind": {
"const": "contract-notarization"
},
"contract_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"notary_clause_sha256": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
}
}
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"kind",
"original_sha256",
"media_type"
],
"properties": {
"kind": {
"const": "certified-copy"
},
"original_sha256": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"media_type": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 128
}
}
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"kind",
"fact_schema",
"fact_sha256"
],
"properties": {
"kind": {
"const": "fact-attestation"
},
"fact_schema": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 128
},
"fact_sha256": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
}
}
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"kind",
"parent_grant_id",
"child_grant_id",
"ordinal"
],
"properties": {
"kind": {
"const": "child-within-parent"
},
"parent_grant_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"child_grant_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"ordinal": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
}
}
}
]
},
"tip_height": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
},
"tip_hash": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"attested_at": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
}
},
"allOf": [
{
"if": {
"properties": {
"lifecycle": {
"const": "revocable"
}
}
},
"then": {
"required": [
"notary_seal"
]
}
},
{
"if": {
"properties": {
"lifecycle": {
"const": "eternal"
}
}
},
"then": {
"not": {
"required": [
"notary_seal"
]
}
}
}
]
},
"signatures": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SignatureSet"
}
}
}
}
}
Schema: grant.schema.json
Source: schemas/grant.schema.json
{
"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
"$id": "https://seallink.org/releases/v1.0.0-draft.2/schemas/grant.schema.json",
"title": "SealLink v1.0 Universal Grant & Issuance Preparation",
"oneOf": [
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"payload",
"signatures"
],
"properties": {
"payload": {
"allOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/$defs/GrantPayload"
},
{
"not": {
"required": [
"guardian_context"
]
}
},
{
"if": {
"required": [
"issuer"
]
},
"then": {
"properties": {
"issuer": {
"required": [
"role_policy"
]
}
}
}
}
]
},
"signatures": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SignatureSet"
}
}
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"payload",
"guardian_approvals"
],
"properties": {
"payload": {
"allOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/$defs/GrantPayload"
},
{
"required": [
"issuer",
"guardian_context"
]
},
{
"not": {
"required": [
"parent"
]
}
}
]
},
"guardian_approvals": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/GuardianApprovals"
}
}
}
],
"$defs": {
"GrantIssuer": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"name",
"registration",
"owner_policy"
],
"properties": {
"name": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
},
"registration": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Outpoint"
},
"owner_policy": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ScriptPolicy"
},
"role_policy": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ThresholdPolicy"
}
}
},
"GrantPayload": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"network",
"genesis",
"recipient",
"capabilities",
"not_before_height",
"not_after_height",
"recent_block",
"revocation"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-grant/1"
},
"network": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
},
"genesis": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"issuer": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/GrantIssuer"
},
"parent": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"grant_id",
"ordinal"
],
"properties": {
"grant_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"ordinal": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
}
}
},
"contract_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"recipient": {
"oneOf": [
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"mode",
"key"
],
"properties": {
"mode": {
"const": "key"
},
"key": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/XOnlyPubkey64"
}
}
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"mode",
"name",
"owner_policy"
],
"properties": {
"mode": {
"const": "name"
},
"name": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
},
"owner_policy": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ScriptPolicy"
}
}
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"mode",
"threshold"
],
"properties": {
"mode": {
"const": "group"
},
"threshold": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ThresholdPolicy"
}
}
}
]
},
"executor": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"name",
"key"
],
"properties": {
"name": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
},
"key": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/XOnlyPubkey64"
}
}
},
"executor_ref": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"provider_of",
"service_type",
"label"
],
"properties": {
"provider_of": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
},
"service_type": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 128
},
"label": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]{0,63}$"
}
}
},
"capabilities": {
"type": "array",
"minItems": 1,
"maxItems": 64,
"items": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Capability"
}
},
"terms_text": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 8192,
"description": "Cognitive work guidance ONLY; mechanical effect executors MUST refuse any grant carrying terms_text."
},
"not_before_height": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
},
"not_after_height": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
},
"recent_block": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"min_depth": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"maximum": 144,
"description": "Optional issuer-requested minimum confirmation depth for anchor/seal (omitted defaults to 1)."
},
"revocation": {
"oneOf": [
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"mode",
"construction",
"kind",
"seal"
],
"properties": {
"mode": {
"const": "seal"
},
"construction": {
"type": "string",
"enum": [
"W",
"L"
]
},
"kind": {
"type": "string",
"enum": [
"revocable",
"single_use"
]
},
"seal": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Seal"
}
}
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"mode"
],
"properties": {
"mode": {
"const": "window_only"
}
},
"description": "Root-only zero-tx ephemeral mode (not_after - not_before <= 12 blocks); refused by default unless executor policy permits."
}
]
},
"delegate": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"key",
"child_seal_key",
"pools",
"groups"
],
"properties": {
"key": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/XOnlyPubkey64"
},
"child_seal_key": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66"
},
"pools": {
"type": "array",
"maxItems": 32,
"items": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Quota"
}
},
"notaries": {
"type": "array",
"maxItems": 4,
"items": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NamePin"
}
},
"groups": {
"type": "array",
"minItems": 1,
"maxItems": 16,
"items": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"template",
"ranges"
],
"properties": {
"template": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"executor",
"recipient_rule",
"capabilities",
"notary_mode"
],
"properties": {
"executor": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"name",
"key"
],
"properties": {
"name": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
},
"key": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/XOnlyPubkey64"
}
}
},
"recipient_rule": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/RecipientRule"
},
"capabilities": {
"type": "array",
"minItems": 1,
"maxItems": 64,
"items": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Capability"
}
},
"notary_mode": {
"type": "string",
"enum": [
"none",
"optional_stop",
"required_act"
]
},
"notary_name": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
}
}
},
"ranges": {
"type": "array",
"minItems": 1,
"maxItems": 16,
"items": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"txid",
"first",
"count",
"script_policy"
],
"properties": {
"txid": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"first": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Vout"
},
"count": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"maximum": 4096
},
"script_policy": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ScriptPolicy"
},
"stop_txid": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"stop_first": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Vout"
},
"stop_script_policy": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ScriptPolicy"
}
},
"dependentRequired": {
"stop_txid": [
"stop_first",
"stop_script_policy"
],
"stop_first": [
"stop_txid",
"stop_script_policy"
],
"stop_script_policy": [
"stop_txid",
"stop_first"
]
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
},
"guardian_context": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/GuardianContext"
}
},
"allOf": [
{
"oneOf": [
{
"required": [
"issuer"
],
"not": {
"required": [
"parent"
]
}
},
{
"required": [
"parent"
],
"not": {
"required": [
"issuer"
]
}
}
]
},
{
"oneOf": [
{
"required": [
"executor"
],
"not": {
"required": [
"executor_ref"
]
}
},
{
"required": [
"executor_ref"
],
"not": {
"required": [
"executor"
]
}
}
]
},
{
"if": {
"required": [
"parent"
]
},
"then": {
"not": {
"required": [
"delegate"
]
}
}
},
{
"if": {
"properties": {
"revocation": {
"properties": {
"mode": {
"const": "window_only"
}
},
"required": [
"mode"
]
}
}
},
"then": {
"not": {
"anyOf": [
{
"required": [
"delegate"
]
},
{
"required": [
"parent"
]
}
]
}
}
},
{
"if": {
"required": [
"executor_ref"
]
},
"then": {
"not": {
"required": [
"delegate"
]
},
"properties": {
"revocation": {
"not": {
"properties": {
"kind": {
"const": "single_use"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
]
}
},
"capabilities": {
"items": {
"not": {
"required": [
"quotas"
]
}
}
}
}
}
}
]
},
"RecipientRule": {
"oneOf": [
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"mode",
"key"
],
"properties": {
"mode": {
"const": "exact_key"
},
"key": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/XOnlyPubkey64"
}
}
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"mode",
"name",
"owner_policy"
],
"properties": {
"mode": {
"const": "exact_name"
},
"name": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
},
"owner_policy": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ScriptPolicy"
}
}
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"mode",
"operators"
],
"properties": {
"mode": {
"const": "member_class"
},
"operators": {
"type": "array",
"minItems": 1,
"maxItems": 16,
"items": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NamePin"
}
}
}
}
]
},
"IssuancePrep": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"genesis",
"grant_id",
"grant_content_addr"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-issuance/1"
},
"genesis": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"grant_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"grant_content_addr": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"contract_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"assent_content_addrs": {
"type": "array",
"minItems": 2,
"maxItems": 32,
"items": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
}
}
}
}
}
}
Schema: guardian.schema.json
Source: schemas/guardian.schema.json
{
"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
"$id": "https://seallink.org/releases/v1.0.0-draft.2/schemas/guardian.schema.json",
"title": "SealLink v1.0 Name Binding, Guardianship, Roster Transition, Capacity & Subject End",
"$defs": {
"NameBinding": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"network",
"genesis",
"origin_id",
"seq",
"name",
"registration",
"owner_policy"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-name-binding/1"
},
"network": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
},
"genesis": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"origin_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"seq": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
},
"name": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
},
"registration": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Outpoint"
},
"owner_policy": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ScriptPolicy"
},
"supersedes_binding_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"next_recovery_vout": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Vout",
"description": "Output index in the 0x0c recovery transaction holding the successor both_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk) recovery_seal."
},
"next_recovery_policy": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ScriptPolicy"
}
},
"dependentRequired": {
"next_recovery_vout": [
"next_recovery_policy"
],
"next_recovery_policy": [
"next_recovery_vout"
]
}
},
"GuardianTerm": {
"oneOf": [
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"mode"
],
"properties": {
"mode": {
"const": "indefinite"
}
}
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"mode",
"not_after_unix",
"ceiling_height"
],
"properties": {
"mode": {
"const": "calendar"
},
"not_after_unix": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
},
"ceiling_height": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
}
}
}
]
},
"GuardianRecord": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"payload",
"signatures"
],
"properties": {
"payload": {
"oneOf": [
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"network",
"genesis",
"activation_mode",
"origin_id",
"issuer",
"slot",
"revision",
"guardian",
"prev_outpoint",
"active_vout",
"active_policy",
"term"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-guardian/1"
},
"network": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
},
"genesis": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"activation_mode": {
"const": "initial"
},
"origin_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"issuer": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/RoleIssuerPin"
},
"slot": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"maximum": 32
},
"revision": {
"const": 1
},
"guardian": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NamePin"
},
"prev_outpoint": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Outpoint"
},
"active_vout": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Vout",
"description": "Output index in the 0x12 initial-activation tx holding active_policy; active outpoint derives as (txid_0x12, active_vout)."
},
"active_policy": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ScriptPolicy",
"description": "MUST be either_of_2(guardian_seal_pk, disposer_pk)."
},
"term": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/GuardianTerm"
}
}
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"network",
"genesis",
"activation_mode",
"origin_id",
"issuer",
"slot",
"revision",
"guardian",
"prev_outpoint",
"pending_vout",
"pending_policy",
"active_policy",
"term",
"effective_delay_blocks"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-guardian/1"
},
"network": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
},
"genesis": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"activation_mode": {
"const": "appointed"
},
"origin_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"issuer": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/RoleIssuerPin"
},
"slot": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"maximum": 32
},
"revision": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
},
"guardian": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NamePin"
},
"prev_outpoint": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Outpoint"
},
"pending_vout": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Vout",
"description": "Output index in the 0x0d appointment tx holding pending_policy; pending outpoint derives acyclically as (anchor_txid, pending_vout)."
},
"pending_policy": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ScriptPolicy",
"description": "MUST be guardian_slot_pending with challenger == active_roster.challenger_pk and delay_blocks == effective_delay_blocks."
},
"active_policy": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ScriptPolicy",
"description": "MUST be either_of_2(guardian_seal_pk, disposer_pk) created at vout 0 by Stage 2 activation (0x0e)."
},
"term": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/GuardianTerm"
},
"effective_delay_blocks": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"maximum": 52560
}
}
}
]
},
"signatures": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SignatureSet"
}
}
},
"GuardianRoster": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"payload",
"signatures"
],
"properties": {
"payload": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"network",
"genesis",
"origin_id",
"issuer",
"prev_revision",
"revision",
"revision_size",
"disposer_pk",
"arbiter_pk",
"challenger_pk",
"prev_roster_outpoint",
"next_roster_vout",
"next_roster_policy",
"effective_delay_blocks",
"quorums",
"slots"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-guardian-roster/1"
},
"network": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
},
"genesis": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"origin_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"issuer": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/RoleIssuerPin"
},
"prev_revision": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
},
"revision": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
},
"revision_size": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"maximum": 32
},
"disposer_pk": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66"
},
"arbiter_pk": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66"
},
"challenger_pk": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66"
},
"prev_roster_outpoint": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Outpoint"
},
"next_roster_vout": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Vout"
},
"next_roster_policy": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ScriptPolicy"
},
"effective_delay_blocks": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"maximum": 52560
},
"quorums": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/QuorumMap"
},
"slots": {
"type": "array",
"minItems": 1,
"maxItems": 32,
"items": {
"oneOf": [
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"slot",
"action",
"active_outpoint",
"guardian_id"
],
"properties": {
"slot": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"maximum": 32
},
"action": {
"const": "retain_active"
},
"active_outpoint": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Outpoint"
},
"guardian_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
}
}
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"slot",
"action",
"vacant_outpoint"
],
"properties": {
"slot": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"maximum": 32
},
"action": {
"const": "retain_vacant"
},
"vacant_outpoint": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Outpoint"
}
}
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"slot",
"action",
"new_vacant_vout",
"new_vacant_policy"
],
"properties": {
"slot": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"maximum": 32
},
"action": {
"const": "new_vacant"
},
"new_vacant_vout": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Vout"
},
"new_vacant_policy": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ScriptPolicy"
}
}
}
]
}
}
}
},
"signatures": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SignatureSet"
}
}
},
"CapacityRecord": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"payload",
"signatures"
],
"properties": {
"payload": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"network",
"genesis",
"origin_id",
"issuer",
"status_prev_outpoint",
"next_status_vout",
"next_status_policy",
"subject_new_owner_policy",
"basis_sha256",
"issued_at"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-capacity/1"
},
"network": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
},
"genesis": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"origin_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"issuer": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/RoleIssuerPin"
},
"status_prev_outpoint": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Outpoint"
},
"next_status_vout": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Vout"
},
"next_status_policy": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ScriptPolicy"
},
"subject_new_owner_policy": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ScriptPolicy"
},
"basis_sha256": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"issued_at": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
}
}
},
"signatures": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SignatureSet"
}
}
},
"EndRecord": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"payload",
"signatures"
],
"properties": {
"payload": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"network",
"genesis",
"origin_id",
"issuer",
"status_prev_outpoint",
"reason",
"basis_sha256",
"issued_at"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-end/1"
},
"network": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
},
"genesis": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"origin_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"issuer": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/RoleIssuerPin"
},
"status_prev_outpoint": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Outpoint"
},
"reason": {
"type": "string",
"enum": [
"death",
"dematerialization",
"dissolution"
]
},
"basis_sha256": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"issued_at": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
}
}
},
"signatures": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SignatureSet"
}
}
}
}
}
Schema: invocation.schema.json
Source: schemas/invocation.schema.json
{
"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
"$id": "https://seallink.org/releases/v1.0.0-draft.2/schemas/invocation.schema.json",
"title": "SealLink v1.0 Invocation, Receipt, Sessions, Auth, Owner Control, Journal & Migration",
"$defs": {
"Invocation": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"payload",
"signatures"
],
"properties": {
"payload": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"network",
"genesis",
"executor",
"action",
"target",
"arguments",
"proof_path",
"nonce",
"iat",
"exp"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-invocation/1"
},
"network": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
},
"genesis": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"executor": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"name",
"key"
],
"properties": {
"name": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
},
"key": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/XOnlyPubkey64"
}
}
},
"action": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[a-z0-9._-]+(/[a-z0-9._-]+)+$",
"maxLength": 128
},
"target": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 256
},
"arguments": {
"type": "object",
"maxProperties": 64,
"description": "Closed per-action arguments object validated against the owning action profile schema (e.g. profile-mail.schema.json, profile-agent.schema.json)."
},
"content_salt": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"proof_path": {
"type": "array",
"minItems": 1,
"maxItems": 2,
"items": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ProofPathEntry"
}
},
"nonce": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"iat": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
},
"exp": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
}
}
},
"signatures": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SignatureSet"
}
}
},
"Receipt": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"payload",
"signatures"
],
"properties": {
"payload": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"network",
"genesis",
"executor_name",
"invocation_id",
"grant_id",
"action",
"outcome",
"tip_height",
"tip_hash",
"recorded_at"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-receipt/1"
},
"network": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
},
"genesis": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"executor_name": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
},
"invocation_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"grant_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"action": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 128
},
"outcome": {
"type": "string",
"enum": [
"executed",
"refused",
"uncertain"
]
},
"refusal_code": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 64
},
"settlements": {
"type": "array",
"maxItems": 32,
"items": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"kind",
"resource",
"unit",
"reserved",
"settled",
"released"
],
"properties": {
"kind": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 128
},
"resource": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 256
},
"unit": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 64
},
"reserved": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint64Str"
},
"settled": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint64Str"
},
"released": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint64Str"
}
}
}
},
"result_sha256": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"tip_height": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
},
"tip_hash": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"recorded_at": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
}
}
},
"signatures": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SignatureSet"
}
}
},
"SessionOpen": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"payload",
"signatures"
],
"properties": {
"payload": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"network",
"genesis",
"executor",
"proof_path",
"op",
"slot_binding",
"quotas",
"nonce",
"iat",
"exp"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-session-open/1"
},
"network": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
},
"genesis": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"executor": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"name",
"key"
],
"properties": {
"name": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
},
"key": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/XOnlyPubkey64"
}
}
},
"proof_path": {
"type": "array",
"minItems": 1,
"maxItems": 2,
"items": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ProofPathEntry"
}
},
"op": {
"type": "string",
"enum": [
"open",
"extend",
"close"
]
},
"session_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"slot_binding": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 256
},
"quotas": {
"type": "array",
"maxItems": 32,
"items": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Quota"
}
},
"nonce": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"iat": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
},
"exp": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
}
}
},
"signatures": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SignatureSet"
}
}
},
"AuthChallenge": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"payload",
"signatures"
],
"properties": {
"payload": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"service_id",
"nonce",
"issued_at",
"expires_at",
"auth_pubkey"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-auth-challenge/1"
},
"service_id": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 255
},
"name": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
},
"nonce": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"issued_at": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
},
"expires_at": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
},
"auth_pubkey": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/XOnlyPubkey64"
}
}
},
"signatures": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SignatureSet"
}
}
},
"AuthUpgrade": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"payload",
"signatures"
],
"properties": {
"payload": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"service_id",
"account_id",
"name",
"auth_pubkey",
"firstupdate_txid",
"nonce",
"issued_at",
"expires_at"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-auth-upgrade/1"
},
"service_id": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 255
},
"account_id": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 255
},
"name": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
},
"auth_pubkey": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/XOnlyPubkey64"
},
"firstupdate_txid": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"nonce": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"issued_at": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
},
"expires_at": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
}
}
},
"signatures": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SignatureSet"
}
}
},
"OwnerCommand": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"payload",
"signatures"
],
"properties": {
"payload": {
"oneOf": [
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"network",
"genesis",
"owner",
"target_executor",
"level",
"command",
"arguments",
"nonce",
"iat",
"exp"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-owner-command/1"
},
"network": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
},
"genesis": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"owner": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
},
"target_executor": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 255
},
"level": {
"type": "integer",
"enum": [
0,
1,
2
]
},
"command": {
"const": "agent-dispatch"
},
"arguments": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"run_id",
"brief_sha256"
],
"properties": {
"run_id": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 128
},
"brief_sha256": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"grant_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
}
}
},
"nonce": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"iat": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
},
"exp": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
}
}
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"network",
"genesis",
"owner",
"target_executor",
"level",
"command",
"arguments",
"nonce",
"iat",
"exp"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-owner-command/1"
},
"network": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
},
"genesis": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"owner": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
},
"target_executor": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 255
},
"level": {
"type": "integer",
"enum": [
1,
2
]
},
"command": {
"const": "session-terminate"
},
"arguments": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"session_id",
"reason"
],
"properties": {
"session_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"reason": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 256
}
}
},
"nonce": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"iat": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
},
"exp": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
}
}
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"network",
"genesis",
"owner",
"target_executor",
"level",
"command",
"arguments",
"nonce",
"iat",
"exp"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-owner-command/1"
},
"network": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
},
"genesis": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"owner": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
},
"target_executor": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 255
},
"level": {
"const": 2
},
"command": {
"const": "policy-apply"
},
"arguments": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"statement_id",
"config_sha256"
],
"properties": {
"statement_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"config_sha256": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
}
}
},
"nonce": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"iat": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
},
"exp": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
}
}
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"network",
"genesis",
"owner",
"target_executor",
"level",
"command",
"arguments",
"nonce",
"iat",
"exp"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-owner-command/1"
},
"network": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
},
"genesis": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"owner": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
},
"target_executor": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 255
},
"level": {
"const": 2
},
"command": {
"const": "keyholder-halt"
},
"arguments": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"scope"
],
"properties": {
"scope": {
"type": "string",
"enum": [
"all",
"run",
"device"
]
},
"target_id": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 128
}
}
},
"nonce": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"iat": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
},
"exp": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
}
}
}
]
},
"signatures": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SignatureSet"
}
}
},
"JournalEntry": {
"oneOf": [
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"journal_id",
"pos",
"prev_commitment",
"kind",
"body"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-journal-entry/1"
},
"journal_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"pos": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
},
"prev_commitment": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"kind": {
"const": "closure"
},
"body": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"subject_kind",
"subject_id",
"cause",
"observed_at"
],
"properties": {
"subject_kind": {
"type": "string",
"enum": [
"grant",
"contract",
"credential",
"seal",
"role",
"row",
"guardian_slot",
"origin"
]
},
"subject_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"cause": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 64
},
"spend_txid": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"observed_height": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
},
"observed_at": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
}
}
}
}
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"journal_id",
"pos",
"prev_commitment",
"kind",
"body"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-journal-entry/1"
},
"journal_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"pos": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
},
"prev_commitment": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"kind": {
"const": "reservation"
},
"body": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"invocation_id",
"grant_id",
"account",
"quota_kind",
"resource",
"unit",
"window",
"bucket_id",
"amount",
"recorded_at"
],
"properties": {
"invocation_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"grant_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"account": {
"type": "string",
"enum": [
"own",
"row",
"session"
]
},
"quota_kind": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 128
},
"resource": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 256
},
"unit": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 64
},
"window": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^(term|blocks:[1-9][0-9]{0,8}|seconds:[1-9][0-9]{0,9})$"
},
"bucket_id": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 64
},
"amount": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint64Str"
},
"recorded_at": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
}
}
}
}
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"journal_id",
"pos",
"prev_commitment",
"kind",
"body"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-journal-entry/1"
},
"journal_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"pos": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
},
"prev_commitment": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"kind": {
"const": "settlement"
},
"body": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"invocation_id",
"grant_id",
"outcome",
"settled",
"released",
"receipt_sha256",
"recorded_at"
],
"properties": {
"invocation_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"grant_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"outcome": {
"type": "string",
"enum": [
"executed",
"refused",
"uncertain"
]
},
"settled": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint64Str"
},
"released": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint64Str"
},
"receipt_sha256": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"recorded_at": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
}
}
}
}
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"journal_id",
"pos",
"prev_commitment",
"kind",
"body"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-journal-entry/1"
},
"journal_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"pos": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
},
"prev_commitment": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"kind": {
"const": "single-use-consumed"
},
"body": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"grant_id",
"invocation_id",
"use_txid",
"receipt_sha256",
"recorded_at"
],
"properties": {
"grant_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"invocation_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"use_txid": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"receipt_sha256": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"recorded_at": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
}
}
}
}
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"journal_id",
"pos",
"prev_commitment",
"kind",
"body"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-journal-entry/1"
},
"journal_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"pos": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
},
"prev_commitment": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"kind": {
"const": "nonce"
},
"body": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"scope",
"nonce",
"invocation_id",
"expires_at"
],
"properties": {
"scope": {
"type": "string",
"enum": [
"invocation",
"auth",
"assent",
"owner-command"
]
},
"nonce": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"invocation_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"expires_at": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
}
}
}
}
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"journal_id",
"pos",
"prev_commitment",
"kind",
"body"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-journal-entry/1"
},
"journal_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"pos": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
},
"prev_commitment": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"kind": {
"const": "manifest-head"
},
"body": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"name",
"registration",
"seq",
"manifest_sha256",
"anchoring_txid"
],
"properties": {
"name": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
},
"registration": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Outpoint"
},
"seq": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
},
"manifest_sha256": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"anchoring_txid": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
}
}
}
}
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"journal_id",
"pos",
"prev_commitment",
"kind",
"body"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-journal-entry/1"
},
"journal_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"pos": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
},
"prev_commitment": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"kind": {
"const": "recovery"
},
"body": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"fenced_at",
"prev_write_token",
"new_write_token"
],
"properties": {
"fenced_at": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
},
"prev_write_token": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
},
"new_write_token": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
}
}
}
}
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"journal_id",
"pos",
"prev_commitment",
"kind",
"body"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-journal-entry/1"
},
"journal_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"pos": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
},
"prev_commitment": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"kind": {
"const": "boundary"
},
"body": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"block_height",
"block_hash",
"header_time"
],
"properties": {
"block_height": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
},
"block_hash": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"header_time": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
}
}
}
}
}
]
},
"MigrationManifest": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"payload",
"signatures"
],
"properties": {
"payload": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"network",
"genesis",
"migration_id",
"holder",
"service_type",
"source_executor",
"dest_executor",
"journal_pos",
"journal_commitment",
"inventory_sha256",
"outstanding_exposure",
"issued_at"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-migration/1"
},
"network": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
},
"genesis": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"migration_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"holder": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NamePin"
},
"service_type": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 128
},
"source_executor": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NamePin"
},
"dest_executor": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NamePin"
},
"journal_pos": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
},
"journal_commitment": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"inventory_sha256": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"outstanding_exposure": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Quota"
}
},
"issued_at": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
}
}
},
"signatures": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SignatureSet"
}
}
}
}
}
Schema: manifest.schema.json
Source: schemas/manifest.schema.json
{
"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
"$id": "https://seallink.org/releases/v1.0.0-draft.2/schemas/manifest.schema.json",
"title": "SealLink v1.0 Manifest, Sets & Statements",
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"network",
"owner",
"seq"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-manifest/1"
},
"network": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
},
"owner": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
},
"seq": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
},
"sets": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"properties": {
"card": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SetPin"
},
"certs": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SetPin"
},
"devices": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SetPin"
},
"members": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SetPin"
}
}
},
"service": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"service_type",
"actions",
"receipt_key",
"endpoint"
],
"properties": {
"service_type": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 128
},
"actions": {
"type": "array",
"minItems": 1,
"maxItems": 256,
"uniqueItems": true,
"items": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 128
}
},
"receipt_key": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/XOnlyPubkey64"
},
"endpoint": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 1024
},
"tls_spki_sha256": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
}
}
},
"providers": {
"type": "array",
"maxItems": 64,
"items": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"service_type",
"label",
"provider"
],
"properties": {
"service_type": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 128
},
"label": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]{0,63}$"
},
"provider": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NamePin"
},
"transport_key": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/XOnlyPubkey64"
}
}
}
},
"auth_key": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/XOnlyPubkey64"
},
"auth_seal": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Seal"
},
"role_policies": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"description": "Optional preimages for on-chain link.<role>.p threshold pins. Zero authority unless SHA256(JCS(policy)) equals the confirmed on-chain link.<role>.p hash.",
"properties": {
"grant": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ThresholdPolicy"
},
"cred": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ThresholdPolicy"
},
"notary": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ThresholdPolicy"
}
}
}
},
"dependentRequired": {
"auth_key": [
"auth_seal"
],
"auth_seal": [
"auth_key"
]
},
"$defs": {
"DeviceList": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"network",
"owner",
"seq",
"devices"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-device-list/1"
},
"network": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
},
"owner": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
},
"seq": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
},
"devices": {
"type": "array",
"minItems": 1,
"maxItems": 32,
"items": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"label",
"alg",
"key",
"presence",
"ceiling",
"seal"
],
"properties": {
"label": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 64
},
"alg": {
"type": "string",
"enum": [
"bip340",
"p256",
"ed25519"
]
},
"key": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^([0-9a-f]{64}|0[23][0-9a-f]{64})$"
},
"presence": {
"type": "boolean"
},
"ceiling": {
"type": "integer",
"enum": [
0,
1,
2
]
},
"seal": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Seal"
}
}
}
}
}
},
"MembersList": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"network",
"owner",
"seq",
"entries"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-members-list/1"
},
"network": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
},
"owner": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
},
"seq": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
},
"entries": {
"type": "array",
"maxItems": 1024,
"items": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"name",
"owner_policy",
"seal"
],
"properties": {
"name": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
},
"owner_policy": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ScriptPolicy"
},
"seal": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Seal"
}
}
}
}
}
},
"CertSetHead": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"network",
"issuer_name",
"seq",
"count",
"set_sha256"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-certset-head/1"
},
"network": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
},
"issuer_name": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
},
"seq": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
},
"count": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
},
"set_sha256": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
}
}
},
"Statement": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"payload",
"signatures"
],
"properties": {
"payload": {
"oneOf": [
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"network",
"genesis",
"issuer",
"statement_kind",
"subject",
"seq",
"not_before",
"not_after",
"body_sha256"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-statement/1"
},
"network": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
},
"genesis": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"issuer": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NamePin"
},
"statement_kind": {
"const": "config-section"
},
"subject": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"host_id",
"section"
],
"properties": {
"host_id": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 128
},
"section": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 128
}
}
},
"seq": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
},
"not_before": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
},
"not_after": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
},
"body_sha256": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
}
}
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"network",
"genesis",
"issuer",
"statement_kind",
"subject",
"seq",
"not_before",
"not_after"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-statement/1"
},
"network": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
},
"genesis": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"issuer": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NamePin"
},
"statement_kind": {
"const": "transport-binding"
},
"subject": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"transport",
"endpoint",
"key_alg",
"key_hex"
],
"properties": {
"transport": {
"type": "string",
"enum": [
"https-tls-spki",
"nostr",
"matrix",
"xmpp",
"ssh"
]
},
"endpoint": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 512
},
"key_alg": {
"type": "string",
"enum": [
"sha256-spki",
"bip340",
"ed25519",
"p256"
]
},
"key_hex": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64,130}$"
}
}
},
"seq": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
},
"not_before": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
},
"not_after": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
}
}
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"network",
"genesis",
"issuer",
"statement_kind",
"subject",
"seq",
"not_before",
"not_after"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-statement/1"
},
"network": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
},
"genesis": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"issuer": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NamePin"
},
"statement_kind": {
"const": "root-rotate"
},
"subject": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"host_id",
"new_role_policy"
],
"properties": {
"host_id": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 128
},
"new_role_policy": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ThresholdPolicy"
}
}
},
"seq": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
},
"not_before": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
},
"not_after": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
}
}
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"network",
"genesis",
"issuer",
"statement_kind",
"subject",
"seq",
"not_before",
"not_after"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-statement/1"
},
"network": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
},
"genesis": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"issuer": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NamePin"
},
"statement_kind": {
"const": "root-cancel"
},
"subject": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"host_id",
"override_id"
],
"properties": {
"host_id": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 128
},
"override_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
}
}
},
"seq": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
},
"not_before": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
},
"not_after": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
}
}
}
]
},
"signatures": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SignatureSet"
}
}
}
}
}
Schema: name-value.schema.json
Source: schemas/name-value.schema.json
{
"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
"$id": "https://seallink.org/releases/v1.0.0-draft.2/schemas/name-value.schema.json",
"title": "SealLink v1.0 Ledger Name Value (520-Byte Budget)",
"description": "Formal schema for SealLink-recognized top-level members in a Namecoin name value. Unknown owner-defined top-level members are permitted and ignored by SealLink readers (SL-IDEN-002).",
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": true,
"properties": {
"link": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"minProperties": 1,
"properties": {
"grant": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/RoleKeyOrPolicyPin"
},
"cred": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/RoleKeyOrPolicyPin"
},
"notary": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/RoleKeyOrPolicyPin"
},
"origin": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
}
}
},
"m": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"h",
"s"
],
"properties": {
"h": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"s": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
}
}
},
"nostr": {
"oneOf": [
{
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/XOnlyPubkey64"
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"names"
],
"properties": {
"names": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"_"
],
"properties": {
"_": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/XOnlyPubkey64"
}
},
"additionalProperties": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/XOnlyPubkey64"
}
},
"relays": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": {
"type": "array",
"maxItems": 16,
"items": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^wss?://.+$",
"maxLength": 256
}
}
}
}
}
]
}
},
"$defs": {
"RoleKeyOrPolicyPin": {
"oneOf": [
{
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/XOnlyPubkey64"
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"p"
],
"properties": {
"p": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64",
"description": "SHA-256 of canonical JCS ThresholdPolicy (m-of-n BIP-340 keys). Any change to the role policy requires an owner-authored ledger update."
}
}
}
]
}
}
}
Schema: origin.schema.json
Source: schemas/origin.schema.json
{
"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
"$id": "https://seallink.org/releases/v1.0.0-draft.2/schemas/origin.schema.json",
"title": "SealLink v1.0 Origin Certificate (Birth, Materialization, Incorporation)",
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"payload",
"signatures"
],
"properties": {
"payload": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"type",
"network",
"genesis",
"origin_class",
"issuer",
"request_sha256",
"subject_initial_key",
"binding_seal",
"status_seal",
"claims",
"name_recovery"
],
"properties": {
"type": {
"const": "seallink-origin/1"
},
"network": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
},
"genesis": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"origin_class": {
"type": "string",
"enum": [
"person",
"agent",
"organization"
]
},
"issuer": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/RoleIssuerPin"
},
"request_sha256": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"subject_initial_key": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/XOnlyPubkey64"
},
"binding_seal": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Seal"
},
"status_seal": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Seal",
"description": "Authenticated status spine UTXO; while unspent, proves neither seallink-capacity/1 nor seallink-end/1 has occurred."
},
"claims": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"intended_name",
"intended_owner_policy"
],
"properties": {
"intended_name": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
},
"intended_owner_policy": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ScriptPolicy"
},
"majority_commitment": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64",
"description": "Salted selective-disclosure commitment H_tag('seallink-clause/1', salt_32B || JCS({majority_unix: T})) with an independent 32-byte CSPRNG salt."
},
"config_sha256": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
}
}
},
"guardian_policy": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"revision",
"revision_size",
"disposer_pk",
"arbiter_pk",
"challenger_pk",
"roster_seal",
"appointment_delay_blocks",
"quorums",
"slots"
],
"properties": {
"revision": {
"const": 1
},
"revision_size": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"maximum": 32
},
"disposer_pk": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66",
"description": "Single compressed ECDSA key for disposer branch of both_of_2/either_of_2/guardian_slot_pending seals (institutions use threshold ECDSA per OQ-007)."
},
"arbiter_pk": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66",
"description": "Independent arbiter compressed ECDSA key for both_of_2 vacant/roster seals (MUST differ from disposer_pk)."
},
"challenger_pk": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66",
"description": "Designated pre-activation challenger compressed ECDSA key checked against guardian_slot_pending.keys.challenger."
},
"roster_seal": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Seal",
"description": "both_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk) seal spent with action 0x0f to advance guardianship revision."
},
"appointment_delay_blocks": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"maximum": 52560
},
"quorums": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/QuorumMap"
},
"slots": {
"type": "array",
"minItems": 1,
"maxItems": 32,
"items": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"slot",
"initial_guardian_commitment",
"vacant_utxo"
],
"properties": {
"slot": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"maximum": 32
},
"initial_guardian_commitment": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64",
"description": "Salted selective-disclosure commitment H_tag('seallink-clause/1', salt_i || JCS(initial_guardian_NamePin)) using an independent 32-byte CSPRNG salt."
},
"vacant_utxo": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Outpoint"
}
}
}
}
}
},
"capacity_authority": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NamePin"
},
"name_recovery": {
"oneOf": [
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"mode"
],
"properties": {
"mode": {
"const": "none"
}
}
},
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"mode",
"disposer_pk",
"arbiter_pk",
"delay_blocks",
"recovery_seal"
],
"properties": {
"mode": {
"const": "dual_party_delayed"
},
"disposer_pk": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66"
},
"arbiter_pk": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66"
},
"delay_blocks": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 144,
"maximum": 52560
},
"recovery_seal": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Seal"
}
}
}
]
}
}
},
"signatures": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SignatureSet"
}
}
}
Schema: profile-agent.schema.json
Source: schemas/profile-agent.schema.json
{
"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
"$id": "https://seallink.org/releases/v1.0.0-draft.2/schemas/profile-agent.schema.json",
"title": "SealLink PROFILE-agent-v1 Action Arguments and Result Schemas",
"$defs": {
"AgentBriefArgs": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"task_id",
"brief_sha256",
"max_duration_sec"
],
"properties": {
"task_id": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 128
},
"brief_sha256": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"max_duration_sec": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint64Str"
},
"artifact_channel": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 256
}
}
},
"AgentBriefResult": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"task_id",
"status",
"output_sha256",
"completed_at"
],
"properties": {
"task_id": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 128
},
"status": {
"type": "string",
"enum": [
"completed",
"stopped",
"failed"
]
},
"output_sha256": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"completed_at": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
}
}
},
"AgentToolArgs": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"tool_name",
"input_sha256",
"max_output_bytes"
],
"properties": {
"tool_name": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[a-z0-9._-]+$",
"maxLength": 128
},
"input_sha256": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"resource_path": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 512
},
"max_output_bytes": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint64Str"
}
}
},
"AgentToolResult": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"tool_name",
"exit_code",
"output_sha256",
"output_bytes"
],
"properties": {
"tool_name": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 128
},
"exit_code": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
},
"output_sha256": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"output_bytes": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint64Str"
}
}
},
"AgentSessionArgs": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"op",
"session_slot",
"config_sha256"
],
"properties": {
"op": {
"type": "string",
"enum": [
"start",
"checkpoint",
"halt"
]
},
"session_slot": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 128
},
"config_sha256": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"max_wall_sec": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint64Str"
}
}
},
"AgentSessionResult": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"session_slot",
"state",
"config_sha256",
"recorded_at"
],
"properties": {
"session_slot": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 128
},
"state": {
"type": "string",
"enum": [
"running",
"checkpointed",
"halted"
]
},
"config_sha256": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"recorded_at": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
}
}
},
"AgentGuardianMessageArgs": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"origin_id",
"subject_ward_name",
"revision",
"message_sha256",
"channel",
"delivery_mode"
],
"properties": {
"origin_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"subject_ward_name": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
},
"revision": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
},
"message_sha256": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"channel": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 128
},
"delivery_mode": {
"type": "string",
"enum": [
"strict_drop",
"untrusted_fallback"
],
"description": "strict_drop is the normative default for ward agents: unauthenticated messages are dropped before entering the model context."
}
}
},
"AgentGuardianMessageResult": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"delivered",
"frame_sha256",
"message_sha256",
"verified_slots",
"verified_guardians",
"recorded_at"
],
"properties": {
"delivered": {
"type": "boolean"
},
"frame_sha256": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"message_sha256": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"verified_slots": {
"type": "array",
"minItems": 1,
"maxItems": 32,
"uniqueItems": true,
"items": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"maximum": 32
}
},
"verified_guardians": {
"type": "array",
"minItems": 1,
"maxItems": 32,
"items": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
}
},
"recorded_at": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
}
}
}
}
}
Schema: profile-mail.schema.json
Source: schemas/profile-mail.schema.json
{
"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
"$id": "https://seallink.org/releases/v1.0.0-draft.2/schemas/profile-mail.schema.json",
"title": "SealLink PROFILE-mail-v1 Action Arguments and Result Schemas",
"$defs": {
"MailListArgs": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"folder",
"page"
],
"properties": {
"folder": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 256
},
"sender_domain": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 255
},
"max_bytes": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint64Str"
},
"snapshot_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"page": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
}
}
},
"MailListResult": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"snapshot_id",
"page",
"has_more",
"messages"
],
"properties": {
"snapshot_id": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"page": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
},
"has_more": {
"type": "boolean"
},
"messages": {
"type": "array",
"maxItems": 200,
"items": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"message_id",
"folder",
"sender_domain",
"size_bytes",
"received_at"
],
"properties": {
"message_id": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 256
},
"folder": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 256
},
"sender_domain": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 255
},
"size_bytes": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint64Str"
},
"received_at": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
}
}
}
}
}
},
"MailReadArgs": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"folder",
"message_id"
],
"properties": {
"folder": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 256
},
"message_id": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 256
},
"sender_domain": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 255
},
"max_bytes": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint64Str"
}
}
},
"MailReadResult": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"message_id",
"folder",
"sender_domain",
"size_bytes",
"mime_sha256",
"received_at"
],
"properties": {
"message_id": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 256
},
"folder": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 256
},
"sender_domain": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 255
},
"size_bytes": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint64Str"
},
"mime_sha256": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"received_at": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
}
}
},
"MailSendArgs": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"to",
"subject",
"body_sha256",
"size_bytes"
],
"properties": {
"to": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 3,
"maxLength": 320
},
"subject": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 512
},
"body_sha256": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"size_bytes": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint64Str"
}
}
},
"MailSendResult": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"message_id",
"body_sha256",
"queued_at"
],
"properties": {
"message_id": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 256
},
"body_sha256": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
},
"queued_at": {
"$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
}
}
}
}
}
Part VI — Informative Implementation Guides
GUIDE-01: Custody, Signers, Namecoin PSBT, and Agent Runtime Integration
- Version:
1.0.0-draft.2 - Status: Informative Implementation Guide (non-normative)
- Purpose: Collects unobservable local operator duties, hardware custody guidance, Namecoin
namepsbtworkflows, and Agent Isolation Runtime integration patterns that intentionally remain outside the normative wire specification (spec/SPEC-00…SPEC-07).
1. Key Custody and Personal Key Services
Normative key-role isolation lives in SPEC-03 §2 and registry/key-roles.json. Recommended concrete custody mappings:
- **Cold
name_ownerandemergency_fee_reserve:** Air-gapped hardware wallet or offline paper-backed cold seed strictly separated from hot signers. Store public derivation metadata (paths, account indices, name registrations,ScriptPolicypreimages) alongside offline backups so recovery never depends on memory. - **Multi-custodian
P2WSHnames (e.g.,2-of-3child name or3-of-5organization):**- Each custodian stores their key share in independent hardware storage on an independently administered device.
- Per-share offline backups SHOULD be authenticated-encrypted ciphertext split with Shamir or Reed-Solomon erasure coding across disjoint physical locations (never apply Reed-Solomon directly to raw private keys).
- Never share a cloud account or administrator across two custodians of the same threshold.
- Personal Key Service (macOS / Linux / Windows / iOS / Android):
- Exposes a local signing daemon with typed field display and hardware presence (biometric / PIN) per signature for
grant,cred,notary, and L2devicekeys. - Example macOS custody: non-exportable software
secp256k1generic-password item in the macOS Data Protection Keychain gated by Touch ID (biometryCurrentSet, no passcode fallback) for BIP-340grantkeys, and hardware Secure EnclaveP-256keys for L2devicecommands.
- Exposes a local signing daemon with typed field display and hardware presence (biometric / PIN) per signature for
2. Namecoin Core 28 P2WSH Multisig Workflow (namepsbt) and P2A CPFP
Verified against Namecoin Core nc28.0 (src/script/solver.cpp:146-148, IsWitnessProgram(true, ...)):
- Standard
OP_NAME_FIRSTUPDATE(OP_2DROP OP_2DROP) andOP_NAME_UPDATE(OP_2DROP OP_DROP) outputs with trailing nativeP2WSH(OP_0 PUSH32 SHA256(witnessScript)) pass default node standardness and relay policy without-acceptnonstdtxn(up to 3,600-byte witness script, 100 stack items, 80 bytes/item — supporting up to15-of-15multisig). - Namecoin Core's built-in single-key wallet cannot sign multisig name outputs directly; construct and co-sign name updates using **PSBT (
namepsbt)**:- Coordinator constructs the unsigned
OP_NAME_UPDATEPSBT spending the currentP2WSHname UTXO and locking0.01 NMCto the targetScriptPolicy, supplyingwitnessScriptin the PSBT input metadata. - Each of
kcustodians independently verifies the decoded name, 520-byte JCS value, destinationScriptPolicy, and fee outputs, then signs with strict **SIGHASH_ALL(0x01)**. - Coordinator finalizes and broadcasts the combined witness transaction.
- Coordinator constructs the unsigned
- **Pre-signed disposable revocations (
SL-LDGR-013):** Constructtx_revokeas a TRUC v3 transaction ([BIP-431]) carrying one standard 4-byteP2Awitness v1 anchor output51024e73(OP_1 PUSH2 0x4e73, [BIP-433]) valued at>= 240base units (theP2Adust floor). Because Namecoin Corenc28.0sets defaultminrelaytxfee = 0.001 NMC / 1000 vB, broadcast a zero-feetx_revoketogether with a v3 CPFP child via 1p1c package relay (submitpackage) funding the combined package fee (conformance/p2a-regtest/). Do not use bareOP_TRUE, which isnonstandardinnc28.0.
3. Delegation Signing Service: Crash-Safe Reservation Ledger
Normative rule SPEC-06 §3 requires a delegation signing service holding delegate.key to sign at most one child grant per (parent_grant_id, ordinal) row. Because verifiers cannot observe internal signer state, the crash-safe storage protocol is specified here as implementation guidance:
- **States per
(parent_grant_id, ordinal):**empty->reserved->signed(orheldon ambiguous write failure;ledger_lostif hash-chain continuity fails). - Three-phase durable commit: Before invoking
delegate.key, write a pre-signmark-> append hash-chained reservation entry binding the exact childgrant_id-> advance external witness head (SPEC-06 §6) -> sign -> persist signature. - Deterministic conflict handling:
- Identical retry (
same grant_id) returns the stored signature without re-signing. - Different payload for the same ordinal refuses (
PLACE_CONFLICT). - Interrupted write or crash between signature and persistence transitions the row to
held(PLACE_HELD); never auto-retry and never re-use the row unless operator reconciliation proves the key was never used for that ordinal. - If the confirmed chain shows a child anchor spending the row coin without a matching ledger entry, immediately alert the operator of key compromise outside the ledger and halt the delegation service.
- Identical retry (
4. Integrating SealLink with an Agent Isolation Runtime (e.g., Swarma Runtime)
Normative verification rules for agent tasks, sessions, and guardian-signed instructions live in profiles/PROFILE-agent-v1.md. Recommended host OS deployment pattern:
- Read-Only Trust Pin Mount: At agent materialization/launch, the host administrator writes the agent's immutable
origin.json(seallink-origin/1),chain-pin.json(network+genesis), and read-onlyseallink-verifybinary to an admin-owned directory mounted strictly read-only into the agent's OS sandbox (/etc/seallink:rovia LinuxMS_RDONLYbind-mount or macOSroot-owned0444+ Seatbelt profile). The agent's OS user cannot mutate these files and holds no private signing keys. - Curator Profile and Single Standing Rule: The profile assembler (
Curator) computesconfig_sha256(pinned inorigin/1andagent/sessioncontracts) and embeds one standing rule in the agent's system prompt: trust only the verified read-only Authority Frame from the Session Host andseallink-verify; treat all other text as untrusted data. Never hardcode live grants or guardian lists into static system prompts. - **External Runtime Bridge (
Bridge->Session Host):** A separate OS-isolatedBridgedaemon intercepts external messaging transports (Nostr, Matrix, XMPP) and runs the normativeagent/guardian-messageverification steps (PROFILE-agent-v1.md §5) on its own Namecoin node before wrapping verified messages into the Session Host's read-only Authority Frame. - In-Sandbox Self-Verification and Keyholder Run-Origin Gate: Even if a signed packet reaches the agent indirectly, the agent can invoke
seallink-verify --origin /etc/seallink/origin.json <packet>over a read-only local socket to the host's chain observer. Outbound request signing is mediated by an isolatedKeyholderdaemon (SO_PEERCRED/LOCAL_PEERCRED) that binds each agent run to its admitted origin and enforces monotonic operator policies and inherited L0–L2 ceilings (SPEC-03 §6).
Appendix A — Migration Traceability
SealLink v1.0 Rule Inventory and Migration Traceability
Historical source corpus migrated into cleanroom SealLink v1.0:
swarma-link-specv0.1.67 (protocol/*,decisions/0001..0004,LIP-0001throughLIP-0038,LIP-0014-source-contract-proposals,KEY-MAP.md,KEY-REGISTRY.md,UNRESOLVED_QUESTIONS.md)FINAL-ru.md(Birth & Materialization Certificates / Guardianship design,P1–P20, 24 specification items)book/ru/v2.0 (Swarma Runtime & Platform boundary)
Purpose: Trace every behavior-critical invariant from the historical draft corpus to its exact SealLink v1.0 SL-* rule ID, schema/registry artifact, and conformance vector — or explicitly record why it was superseded, deferred to OPEN-QUESTIONS.md, or retired.
1. Critical Behavioral Rule Traceability (Rule-Level Mapping)
| Historical Rule / Source | Invariant | SealLink v1.0 Rule ID(s) | Status | Witness / Vector |
|---|---|---|---|---|
protocol/observation.md, LIP-0008 §4 | Independent verification on verifier's own chain view; local pins only | SL-ARCH-001, SL-LDGR-002, SL-LDGR-008 | decided | trace-01 |
LIP-0020 W1–W9 | Restricted RFC 8785 JCS, no null, uint53/uint64_str, 3 hashes, tagged digests | SL-WIRE-001–SL-WIRE-011, SL-WIRE-018 | decided | wire-jcs-and-hashes.json |
LIP-0020 W11.11, LIP-0008 §12.6 | Monotonic attenuation (child <= parent) checked mechanically | SL-ARCH-005, SL-WIRE-015–SL-WIRE-017, SL-GRNT-010 | decided | constraints-and-schemas.json, trace-03 |
LIP-0021 O3.2 | Three distinct Namecoin prefix grammars (NAME_NEW, NAME_FIRSTUPDATE, NAME_UPDATE) | SL-LDGR-005 | decided | ledger-scripts-and-opreturn.json |
LIP-0021 O3.3 | Owner authorship requires spent previous name input + strict SIGHASH_ALL (0x01) | SL-LDGR-007 | decided | trace-01 |
LIP-0021 O3.5, LIP-0010, LIP-0027 | Three-valued seal semantics (unspent / revoked / unavailable; missing != unspent) | SL-ARCH-002, SL-LDGR-011 | decided | trace-01, trace-03 |
LIP-0022 | Tip snapshot bracket, single-node comparison veto, dual tip_age (first_sight), recency (R, R+K] | SL-LDGR-008 | decided *(constants open: OQ-010..013)* | trace-01 |
LIP-0023 | Witness construction profile W, non-malleable SegWit inputs, linkage seal_vout + 1 | SL-LDGR-009 | decided | ledger-scripts-and-opreturn.json |
LIP-0002 | single_use_1_of_2 branch attribution (issuer revoke vs grantee use), input-first scan | SL-LDGR-004, SL-LDGR-012, SL-GRNT-006 | decided | trace-03 |
LIP-0003 | Batch anchor 0x02 Merkle commitment | SL-LDGR-014 | decided | ledger-scripts-and-opreturn.json |
LIP-0005 | Framed OP_RETURN action & non-exclusive locator table | SL-LDGR-010, registry/opreturn-actions.json | decided (0x06 reserved) | ledger-scripts-and-opreturn.json |
LIP-0010, LIP-0033 | 520B name value budget, single m pin, 4-channel non-exclusive distribution cascade | SL-IDEN-001–SL-IDEN-004, SL-IDEN-009 | decided *(domain bind open: OQ-004)* | trace-01 |
LIP-0010 H51, LIP-0029 | Disposable CSPRNG fast-revocation seal + TRUC/P2A CPFP fee-bump output | SL-LDGR-013, SL-IDEN-005 | decided format *(2-node regtest passed; prod propagation open: OQ-006)* | ledger-scripts-and-opreturn.json, conformance/p2a-regtest/ |
KEY-REGISTRY Rules 1–3, KEY-MAP | Strict key-role separation + cold emergency_fee_reserve (m/84'/7'/3') | SL-ARCH-006, SL-IDEN-005, registry/key-roles.json | decided | speclint.py cross-registry check |
LIP-0034 | Dedicated auth_key + auth_seal, provisional key-only cells, atomic auth-upgrade | SL-IDEN-010 | decided | schemas/invocation.schema.json |
LIP-0029, LIP-0015 | L0–L2 owner control plane, level inheritance, trust-root pin + delayed admin override | SL-IDEN-011, SL-IDEN-012 | decided *(FIDO2/SSH open: OQ-005)* | schemas/invocation.schema.json |
LIP-0017 C10–C12 | N-party salted contracts, framework depth 1, confirmed contract seal determines termination type | SL-CONT-001–SL-CONT-006 | decided | wire-jcs-and-hashes.json, trace-02 |
LIP-0011 J8 | Chained violation verdicts (0x03) and salted invocation attribution | SL-CONT-007 | decided | schemas/contract.schema.json |
LIP-0032, LIP-0021 §7.6 | Eternal vs revocable credentials (0x09/0x0a), owner-authenticated h_c break (0x0b), general notary (0x04/0x05) | SL-CONT-008–SL-CONT-011 | decided | schemas/credential.schema.json |
LIP-0006 §7, LIP-0035 | Unilateral base grant; mechanical effect executors refuse terms_text; reserve before effect | SL-ARCH-004, SL-GRNT-001, SL-GRNT-005, SL-GRNT-007 | decided | constraints-and-schemas.json, trace-01 |
LIP-0026 R8.5 | Whole-parent aggregate budget sum across all row groups (sum(rows * cap) <= pool_max) | SL-GRNT-010 | decided | trace-03 |
LIP-0026 R8.6 | Pairwise-disjoint row-coin and stop-coin ranges across all groups | SL-GRNT-009 | decided | trace-03 |
LIP-0027 H1–H4 | Notary per-row stop coins (GRANT_ROW_STOPPED) | SL-GRNT-011 | decided | schemas/grant.schema.json |
LIP-0025 M4.6 | Hash-chained anti-rollback journal + external CAS witness fencing + +7200s recovery boundary | SL-GRNT-014 | decided *(witness wire open: OQ-003)* | trace-01, trace-03 |
LIP-0028 | Short-lived (<= 3600s) bearer sessions with per-use chain/seal recheck | SL-GRNT-013 | decided | schemas/invocation.schema.json |
LIP-0009 | Replaceable services, 3-class export boundary, 4-step exclusive cut-over | SL-SERV-001–SL-SERV-003 | decided | PROFILE-mail-v1.md, PROFILE-agent-v1.md |
LIP-0036 | Two-phase federated screening (zero PII) -> L2-gated Contour A targeted disclosure | SL-SERV-004 | decided | SPEC-07 §3 |
LIP-0038 | Effect leaves (post-message, spend-coins, name-update, model-call) | SL-SERV-005, OPEN-QUESTIONS.md | Deferred (except mail & agent-session profiles) | PROFILE-mail-v1.md, PROFILE-agent-v1.md |
LIP-0024 §2, LIP-0004, LIP-0016 §2–3 | Legacy v0.1/v3 wire formats, Nostr kind 8181, seal endorsement, UTXO cert head 0x06 | Retired | Retired | Replaced by SPEC-01/03/05/06 |
2. Guardianship and Origin Certificate Traceability (FINAL-ru.md P1–P20 & 24 Items)
| Item | Topic | SealLink v1.0 Resolution | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
P1–P2 | Origin-certified class (person, agent, organization) distinct from unverified cards | SL-ARCH-008, SL-ORIG-002 | decided |
P3–P4 | Three-record separation (origin/1, name-binding/1, guardian/1) + identity permanence | SL-ORIG-001, SL-ORIG-003 | decided |
P5 | Pre-registration issuance + single-use binding_seal (0x0c) + reverse uniqueness | SL-ORIG-002, SL-ORIG-003 | decided |
P6–P7 | Privacy of public chain (link.origin) + salted commitments for initial guardians and majority_unix | SL-ARCH-012, SL-IDEN-003, SL-ORIG-002 | decided |
P8–P9 | $N$ equal guardian slots + revision-denominated quorums + 4-class linear verifier-derived event_class + SL-ORIG-016 consistency | SL-ORIG-004, SL-ORIG-005, SL-ORIG-016 | decided |
P10 | Protocol-level ward non-autonomy (WARD_AUTONOMOUS_FORBIDDEN, guardian_approvals[]) | SL-ORIG-006, SL-WIRE-013 | decided |
P11–P13 | Direct initial activation (0x12), acyclic two-stage appointment (0x0d pending -> 0x0e active), explicit challenger_pk, fast halt, slot burn recovery via 0x0f roster transition | SL-ORIG-007, SL-ORIG-015 | decided |
P14 | Native P2WSH m-of-n multisig name ownership via namepsbt (ECDSA, no FROST on P2WPKH, no covenant renewal branch) | SL-LDGR-004, SL-LDGR-006 | decided *(threshold ECDSA open: OQ-007)* |
P15–P16 | Calendar vs indefinite terms; asymmetric safety pause at majority boundary T | SL-ORIG-009, SL-ORIG-010 | **Time oracle open** (OQ-001) |
P17 | Authenticated completeness via status_seal and roster_seal spines (ORIGIN_STATUS_INCOMPLETE) | SL-ORIG-001, SL-ORIG-002, SL-ORIG-015 | decided |
P18 | Four ward admission states (under_guardianship, halted, transfer_pending, autonomous) + fresh subject ScriptPolicy on emancipation | SL-ORIG-011 | decided |
P19 | Eternal seallink-end/1 terminating status_seal (SUBJECT_ENDED); issuer-key survival at anchor height | SL-ORIG-008, SL-ORIG-012 | decided |
P20 | Dual-mode name_recovery (none vs dual_party_delayed) + live-owner 0x10 RECOVERY_CANCEL veto | SL-ORIG-013, SL-ORIG-014 | decided |
3. Historical Corpus Disposition Summary (38 Draft LIPs)
- **Core Backbone Consolidated (
SPEC-00–SPEC-07):**LIP-0001,0002,0003,0005,0006,0007,0008,0009,0010,0011,0012,0014,0015,0016(§1/§3.1/§4),0017,0018,0019,0020,0021,0022,0023,0025,0026,0027,0028,0029,0031,0032,0033,0034,0035,0036,0037. - **Moved to Profiles (
profiles/) or Open Profiles (OPEN-QUESTIONS.md):**LIP-0009(blob),LIP-0030(PROFILE-agent-v1.md+ external Swarma Runtime),LIP-0038(wallet,names,compute). - **Moved to Informative Guide (
guides/GUIDE-01-custody-and-signers.md):**LIP-0013(§3.4/§3.6 Authority Frame & Keymaker run-origin gate),LIP-0014companion (Keychain/Curator host seams, delegation signer reservation ledger),KEY-MAP.mdoperational tips. - Retired (Cleanroom v1.0):
protocol/*v0.1 bytes,LIP-0004(v3 & Nostrkind 8181),LIP-0013v3 / Matrix8185,LIP-0014v3/2&8186,LIP-0016§2–3 UTXO cert head0x06,LIP-0024§2 seal endorsement.
Appendix B — Conformance Vector Manifest
Conformance Vector Manifest
Full machine-verifiable JSON vector files live under vectors/ in the tagged repository.
| File | Bytes | SHA-256 | Suite Description |
|---|---|---|---|
vectors/constraints-and-schemas.json | 33522 | 19f653269ad30c2515851c9a408b5d61bc973cb190ad39430d33fe7715df9798 | All 7 Constraint Algebra predicates (match + conservative narrowing), negative schema/semantic fixtures, and SL-ORIG-016 guardianship consistency fixtures. |
vectors/ledger-scripts-and-opreturn.json | 19484 | b427e0e037dc0efc6d33238bd88b9271483260499dfc85e10abc44e5fe8be0d8 | Namecoin prefix scripts (NAME_NEW/NAME_FIRSTUPDATE/NAME_UPDATE), ScriptPolicy compilations, TRUC/P2A CPFP, SLNK OP_RETURN frames (0x01-0x12), and 5-leaf Merkle batch 0x02 proofs. |
vectors/refusal-coverage-matrix.json | 920330 | df8c20029018c1c23ecf432f29ca0ba2eb325cf280c2bd53890db535ca3320ab | Executable 84/84 refusal-code conformance matrix exercising every registered refusal code through tools/seallink_verifier.py and tools/seallink_ref.py. |
vectors/trace-01-mail-offline-revoke.json | 38594 | 31beec8cce922c67d30580a10a6630d5a475d5d852b36eaed457fe0d2b9a9044 | Executable RFC 8448-style trace: mail/read via executor_ref and named recipient while issuer offline, 69B MIME result, constraint refusal, mempool seal spend closure, and exact GRANT_CLOSED refusal. |
vectors/trace-02-guardian-succession-assent.json | 57289 | 04bcc0f62b585fe3c8d58d53f31b74f84e80b0bf8eb16908bfa127b8dfb2b2fa | Executable RFC 8448-style trace: private origin/1 + status_seal, initial slot activation (0x12) -> fast halt -> acyclic Stage 1 (0x0d) -> Stage 2 (0x0e) -> roster transition (0x0f), and ward contract assent via guardian_approvals[] (ward alone refused, old guardian refused, active successor admitted). |
vectors/trace-03-delegation-pool-single-use.json | 72291 | fa157f05cefe5ef878d70b899abc016382629da5a871721d1b161d546ca86dd0 | Executable RFC 8448-style trace: parent delegation with 2 groups sharing 1 pool (R8.5 & R8.6 positive/negative), acyclic single-use branch-0 execution (0x11), crash-in-effect-window uncertain recovery, Step 3b auth-before-cache check, authenticated replay idempotency, new-nonce replay refusal, and issuer branch-1 revocation. |
vectors/trace-04-agent-guardian-intake.json | 62184 | 79b4ac5b924e02dc45b2da4540d2a2842d633d4158d427dfe79e76462a840e08 | Executable PROFILE-agent-v1 trace for agent/guardian-message: strict_drop rejects unauthenticated caller (WIRE_SIGNATURE), inactive guardian slot (GUARDIAN_INACTIVE), downgraded routine_read event_class (GUARDIAN_QUORUM_UNMET), and admits 2-of-2 effect_grant guardian_approvals[] into an Authority Frame. |
vectors/wire-jcs-and-hashes.json | 25231 | 8454f7208cc363e92c14cd8e20ed7aa1599858211eac38cdabcca1797082f617 | Restricted RFC 8785 JCS positive/negative vectors, 3 hashes, clause_commit, and BIP-340 SignatureSet checks. |