# SealLink Protocol Specification (v1.0.0-draft.2)

> **Single-File Release Bundle** — compiled deterministically from the modular `relux-works/seallink-spec` repository.
> **Authors:** Ivan Oparin, Alexey Grigorev  
> **License:** Prose under CC BY 4.0; registries, schemas, vectors, and tooling under MIT.

## Table of Contents

### Part I — Normative Core Specifications
- [SPEC-00: SealLink Architecture, Ontology, and Governance](#spec-00-seallink-architecture-ontology-and-governance) (`spec/SPEC-00-architecture.md`)
- [SPEC-01: Wire Format, Cryptography, Thresholds, and Constraint Algebra](#spec-01-wire-format-cryptography-thresholds-and-constraint-algebra) (`spec/SPEC-01-wire-and-crypto.md`)
- [SPEC-02: Ledger Interface, Namecoin Binding, ScriptPolicy, Merkle Batching, and UTXO Seals](#spec-02-ledger-interface-namecoin-binding-scriptpolicy-merkle-batching-and-utxo-seals) (`spec/SPEC-02-ledger-and-names.md`)
- [SPEC-03: Identity, Name Value, Manifest, Key Taxonomy, Authentication, and Owner Control](#spec-03-identity-name-value-manifest-key-taxonomy-authentication-and-owner-control) (`spec/SPEC-03-identity-and-custody.md`)
- [SPEC-04: Origin Certificates, Legal Capacity, and Multi-Guardian Quorums](#spec-04-origin-certificates-legal-capacity-and-multi-guardian-quorums) (`spec/SPEC-04-origin-and-guardianship.md`)
- [SPEC-05: Contracts, Symmetric Assent, Verifiable Credentials, and General Notary Acts](#spec-05-contracts-symmetric-assent-verifiable-credentials-and-general-notary-acts) (`spec/SPEC-05-contracts-and-credentials.md`)
- [SPEC-06: Universal Grants, Invocations, Re-Delegation, Sessions, and Anti-Rollback Journals](#spec-06-universal-grants-invocations-re-delegation-sessions-and-anti-rollback-journals) (`spec/SPEC-06-grants-and-delegation.md`)
- [SPEC-07: Grant-Gated Services, Replaceable Providers, Federated Disclosure, and Extensions](#spec-07-grant-gated-services-replaceable-providers-federated-disclosure-and-extensions) (`spec/SPEC-07-services-and-portability.md`)

### Part II — Standard Profiles
- [PROFILE-agent-v1: Bounded Autonomous Agent Tasks, Tool Execution, Isolated Sessions, and Guardian Intake](#profile-agent-v1-bounded-autonomous-agent-tasks-tool-execution-isolated-sessions-and-guardian-intake) (`profiles/PROFILE-agent-v1.md`)
- [PROFILE-mail-v1: Sovereign Email Hosting and Delegated Mailbox Access](#profile-mail-v1-sovereign-email-hosting-and-delegated-mailbox-access) (`profiles/PROFILE-mail-v1.md`)

### Part III — Conformance, Open Questions, and SLIP Governance
- [SealLink Conformance Requirements](#seallink-conformance-requirements) (`CONFORMANCE.md`)
- [SealLink Open Questions and Provisional Parameters](#seallink-open-questions-and-provisional-parameters) (`OPEN-QUESTIONS.md`)
- [SLIP-XXXX: Title of Proposal](#slip-xxxx-title-of-proposal) (`SLIP-TEMPLATE.md`)

### Part IV — Machine-Readable Registries (Normative SSOT)
- [Registry: constraints.json](#registry-constraintsjson) (`registry/constraints.json`)
- [Registry: key-roles.json](#registry-key-rolesjson) (`registry/key-roles.json`)
- [Registry: object-types.json](#registry-object-typesjson) (`registry/object-types.json`)
- [Registry: opreturn-actions.json](#registry-opreturn-actionsjson) (`registry/opreturn-actions.json`)
- [Registry: refusal-codes.json](#registry-refusal-codesjson) (`registry/refusal-codes.json`)
- [Registry: service-types.json](#registry-service-typesjson) (`registry/service-types.json`)

### Part V — Formal Wire JSON Schemas (Normative SSOT)
- [Schema: card.schema.json](#schema-cardschemajson) (`schemas/card.schema.json`)
- [Schema: common.schema.json](#schema-commonschemajson) (`schemas/common.schema.json`)
- [Schema: contract.schema.json](#schema-contractschemajson) (`schemas/contract.schema.json`)
- [Schema: credential.schema.json](#schema-credentialschemajson) (`schemas/credential.schema.json`)
- [Schema: grant.schema.json](#schema-grantschemajson) (`schemas/grant.schema.json`)
- [Schema: guardian.schema.json](#schema-guardianschemajson) (`schemas/guardian.schema.json`)
- [Schema: invocation.schema.json](#schema-invocationschemajson) (`schemas/invocation.schema.json`)
- [Schema: manifest.schema.json](#schema-manifestschemajson) (`schemas/manifest.schema.json`)
- [Schema: name-value.schema.json](#schema-name-valueschemajson) (`schemas/name-value.schema.json`)
- [Schema: origin.schema.json](#schema-originschemajson) (`schemas/origin.schema.json`)
- [Schema: profile-agent.schema.json](#schema-profile-agentschemajson) (`schemas/profile-agent.schema.json`)
- [Schema: profile-mail.schema.json](#schema-profile-mailschemajson) (`schemas/profile-mail.schema.json`)

### Part VI — Informative Implementation Guides
- [GUIDE-01: Custody, Signers, Namecoin PSBT, and Agent Runtime Integration](#guide-01-custody-signers-namecoin-psbt-and-agent-runtime-integration) (`guides/GUIDE-01-custody-and-signers.md`)

### Appendix A — Migration Traceability
- [SealLink v1.0 Rule Inventory and Migration Traceability](#seallink-v10-rule-inventory-and-migration-traceability) (`archive/rule-inventory.md`)

### Appendix B — Conformance Vector Manifest
- [Conformance Vector Manifest](#conformance-vector-manifest) (`vectors/*.json`)

---

## Part I — Normative Core Specifications

---

## SPEC-00: SealLink Architecture, Ontology, and Governance

- **Version:** `1.0.0-draft.2`
- **Status:** `draft` (normative rules tagged `decided` or `open`; open items tracked in `OPEN-QUESTIONS.md`)
- **Evidence / Maturity:** `prose`
- **Authors:** Ivan Oparin, Alexey Grigorev
- **Normative Language:** RFC 2119 and RFC 8174 (`MUST`, `MUST NOT`, `REQUIRED`, `SHALL`, `SHOULD`, `MAY`)
- **Conformance:** `CONFORMANCE.md`

---

### 1. Abstract and Positioning

SealLink is a protocol that enables intelligent actors — **people, organizations, and autonomous software agents** — to register sovereign identities, relationships, contracts, obligations, verifiable credentials, and revocable powers of attorney (grants) so that any verifier can validate them independently on its own ledger node without trusting the issuer's server, a central registry, or the message transport.

A name on a public UTXO-and-name ledger binds an actor to its cryptographic role keys and policies. A canonically encoded, cryptographically signed document expresses a relationship or capability. Every revocable relationship is bound to an unspent transaction output (a **seal**); spending that seal terminates the relationship across all observing verifiers without contacting the issuer's infrastructure.

#### 1.1 Non-Goals and Institutional Boundaries

SealLink defines exact boundaries for what cryptography can and cannot establish:

- **Does not replace legal institutions.** A civil registry, licensed notary, court, or corporate registrar is represented as an actor with a name and keys. Whether to trust a given notary or registry is strictly a local verifier policy choice.
- **Does not prove ground truth or legal validity.** SealLink proves who signed what, under which authority chain, and when it was anchored or revoked. Real-world birth, consent free of coercion, and judicial fairness remain outside the protocol.
- **Does not mandate key storage, message transport, or agent OS isolation.** Hardware enclaves, personal key services, Nostr/Matrix/XMPP transports, and agent isolation runtimes (such as Swarma Runtime) are external specifications consuming SealLink (`guides/GUIDE-01-custody-and-signers.md`).
- **Does not hard-code one blockchain.** Core semantics depend on an abstract ledger interface (`ChainView`, `SPEC-02`); Namecoin is Binding Profile v1.
- **One-way legal capacity model.** In v1.0, legal capacity transitions at most once (`ward` -> `autonomous`). Adult conservatorship or reversible capacity states are outside v1.0 scope.

---

### 2. The Eight Core Principles

Every conforming SealLink implementation and extension profile **MUST** uphold these eight invariants:

| Rule ID | State | Principle |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `SL-ARCH-001` | `decided` | **Independent Verification.** The party executing an effect or relying on a claim MUST verify every identity, chain history, anchor, and seal on its own ledger view. Pins MUST come from local verifier configuration, never from presenter-supplied input. |
| `SL-ARCH-002` | `decided` | **Three-Valued Verdict Semantics.** Every verification terminates in exactly one of three outcomes: **Admit**, **Refuse** (non-closing; transient or invalid presentation), or **Close** (permanent, durably journaled termination). Unknown, unavailable, or unsupported evidence MUST NEVER degrade to Admit. |
| `SL-ARCH-003` | `decided` | **Fast to Halt, Slow to Add or Transfer.** Revocation via seal spend acts upon first validated observation (including mempool) with durable local closure. Adding devices, appointing successor guardians, changing guardian rosters, transferring names, and recovering identities require confirmed chain state and mandatory delay where governed. |
| `SL-ARCH-004` | `decided` | **Prose Directs Work; Typed Fields and Scripts Authorize Effects.** Mechanical effect executors MUST decide solely from typed machine fields and on-chain scripts and MUST refuse grants carrying operative free-text terms (`GRANT_TEXT_FORBIDDEN`). Contract termination rules derive exclusively from the contract seal script, never from prose. |
| `SL-ARCH-005` | `decided` | **Monotonic Attenuation.** Delegated authority MUST ONLY narrow relative to its parent across capabilities, constraints, additive quotas, whole-parent pool sums, and validity windows. Every verifier checks narrowing mechanically. |
| `SL-ARCH-006` | `decided` | **Strict Key-Role Separation.** Every key role has a closed set of permitted signing domains (`registry/key-roles.json`, coherent with `registry/object-types.json`). Messaging keys NEVER grant authority; authentication keys NEVER authorize effects or contract assents; owner-control device keys NEVER authenticate to foreign verifiers. |
| `SL-ARCH-007` | `decided` | **Availability-Only Storage and Transport.** Off-chain stores, mirrors, and transports (inline, Blossom, HTTPS `.well-known`, Nostr, Matrix) are trusted for availability only. Content-addressed SHA-256 pins and cryptographic signatures establish authenticity regardless of delivery channel. |
| `SL-ARCH-008` | `decided` | **Actor-Agnostic Core with Origin-Certified Class.** Core mechanics treat all actors identically; refusing an actor solely for being human, corporate, or an agent is invalid unless required by explicit policy. Certified subject class (`person`, `agent`, `organization`) is established solely by a trusted `seallink-origin/1` certificate, never by self-declaration. |

---

### 3. Actor Ontology and Role Glossary

#### 3.1 Two Orthogonal Axes

Every SealLink actor sits along two independent axes (`SL-ARCH-009`, `decided`):

1. **Certified Class** (fixed at origin; immutable):
   - `person` — human individual certified by a birth origin certificate (`origin_class = "person"`).
   - `agent` — materialized software agent certified by a materialization origin certificate (`origin_class = "agent"`).
   - `organization` — legal entity, collective, or institution certified by an incorporation origin certificate (`origin_class = "organization"`).
   - `unverified` — any ledger name (or ephemeral key-only actor) without a verified origin certificate. Fully usable for permissionless and pseudonymous interaction.
2. **Legal Capacity / Autonomy** (transitions at most once, one-way: `ward` -> `autonomous`):
   - `ward` — non-fully-autonomous actor (minor human child, or software agent prior to recognized legal capacity). Its name UTXO is controlled by a guardian/custodian `ScriptPolicy`; autonomous commitments signed solely by the ward are rejected at the protocol layer (`SPEC-04`).
   - `autonomous` — actor controlling its own name `ScriptPolicy` and executing grants and contracts in its own right (adult person, organization, unverified actor, or emancipated agent).

#### 3.2 Canonical Role Glossary

| Normative Term (EN) | Companion Projection Term (RU) | Definition |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Actor** | Актор | Any participant (person, organization, agent, or unverified key/name). |
| **Issuer** | Доверитель / Издатель | Actor issuing a grant, credential, origin certificate, or notary act. |
| **Recipient** | Поверенный / Получатель | Actor (single key, name, or `m-of-n` group) authorized to invoke a grant. |
| **Executor** | Исполнитель | Concrete service or host verifying a grant and executing the authorized action. |
| **Guardian** | Опекун | Autonomous actor holding an active guardianship slot responsible for a ward. |
| **Ward** | Подопечный | Actor in `ward` capacity represented by one or more guardians. |
| **Notary** | Нотариус | Independent third party certifying documents, facts, contracts, or optional delegations. |
| **Arbiter** | Арбитр | Independent party named in a contract seal or origin recovery/succession rule (e.g., court or arbitration key). |
| **Seal** | Печать | Dedicated ledger UTXO whose validated spend terminates or consumes a specific right or transition. |
| **Provider** | Провайдер | Service actor bound by `NamePin` in a holder's `seallink-manifest/1` for a labeled `service_type`. |

---

### 4. Protocol Layer Architecture

The SealLink v1.0 specification is organized as eight orthogonal normative documents plus pluggable domain profiles, machine-readable registries, JSON Schemas, and executable conformance vectors:

| Spec | Layer | Owns |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **`SPEC-00`** | Foundation | Principles, actor ontology, role glossary, threat model, governance. |
| **`SPEC-01`** | Wire & Crypto | Restricted RFC 8785 JCS, dual integers, BIP-340 tagged hashes, 3 hashes, `SignatureSet` & `guardian_approvals`, universal policy binding, salted selective disclosure, 7-predicate Constraint Algebra, wire pipeline. |
| **`SPEC-02`** | Ledger Binding | Abstract `ChainView`, Namecoin Binding v1 (`NAME_NEW` / `NAME_FIRSTUPDATE` / `NAME_UPDATE` grammars, CSV/SegWit), `ScriptPolicy`, `SIGHASH_ALL` writer check, multi-node freshness, Witness construction, `SLNK` `OP_RETURN`, Merkle batch `0x02`, UTXO seals & TRUC/P2A CPFP. |
| **`SPEC-03`** | Identity & Custody | 520-byte name value (multi-role keys / on-chain role-policy pins + uniform `origin` pin + `m` head), key taxonomy & cold emergency reserve, `manifest/1` (sets, self-service, pinned labeled `providers[]`, `auth`), `card/1`, 4-channel cascade, provisional onboarding & name auth, owner control plane (`devices`, L0–L2). |
| **`SPEC-04`** | Origin & Guardianship | Eternal `origin/1` (salted privacy commitments, `status_seal`, `roster_seal`, explicit `disposer_pk`/`arbiter_pk`/`challenger_pk`), single-use `name-binding/1`, `N` equal guardian slots & 4-class verifier-derived quorums, ward non-autonomy, initial (`0x12`) & two-stage (`0x0d`/`0x0e`) activation, roster transitions (`0x0f`), consistency invariants, emancipation (`capacity/1`), `end/1`, dual-mode `name_recovery` (`0x10` cancel) & seal continuation tables. |
| **`SPEC-05`** | Contracts & Credentials | N-party salted contracts (`ward_origin_id` for ward parties, `machine_clause_indices`), framework nesting, confirmed contract seal termination, symmetric `assent/1` (`guardian_approvals[]` for wards), on-chain assent, agreed config hash, verifiable credentials (`eternal`/`revocable`, `h_c`), general notary acts, violation verdicts & salted request attribution. |
| **`SPEC-06`** | Grants & Delegation | Universal `grant/1` (unilateral base + optional contract + ward `guardian_approvals[]`), concrete `executor` vs stateless `executor_ref`, UTXO seal vs root-only `window_only`, acyclic single-use attribution (`0x11`), `invocation/1` & `receipt/1`, depth-2 re-delegation (R8.5 aggregate budget + R8.6 disjoint coin ranges), early-auth admission pipeline, crash-in-effect-window `uncertain` recovery, bearer sessions, anti-rollback fenced journals. |
| **`SPEC-07`** | Services & Portability | Grant-gated executor contract, provider authority & pinned transport mutual auth, replaceable service cut-over (`migration/1`), federated screening & progressive PII disclosure (Contour A), extension/SLIP checklists. |

---

### 5. Specification Governance, Authority, and Maturity

#### 5.1 Single Source of Truth (`SL-ARCH-010`, `decided`)

1. **Prose defines normative behavior; `registry/*.json`, `schemas/*.schema.json`, and `vectors/*.json` define exact identifiers, grammars, and required outcomes.** If prose, schemas, and test vectors disagree, the specification release is defective. An implementation is NEVER the normative oracle.
2. **Human books and whitepapers are downstream projections** of this specification. Where any guide or projection disagrees with `spec/`, `profiles/`, `registry/`, or `schemas/`, the normative specification prevails.
3. **Rule States:** Every normative rule carries one of two states: `decided` (normative requirement) or `open` (explicitly unresolved and tracked in `OPEN-QUESTIONS.md`; readers MUST fail closed on any unprofiled open construct).
4. **Evidence / Maturity Levels:** Each specification document independently tracks its empirical maturity:
   - `prose` — normative text and schemas authored and lint-checked;
   - `vectors` — deterministic positive/negative and end-to-end RFC 8448-style byte traces published and verified against schemas and reference cryptography;
   - `dual-impl` — verified byte-for-byte identical across at least two independent implementations with disjoint crypto stacks (target: Rust + Go);
   - `chain-tested` — end-to-end verified on Namecoin regtest and/or mainnet.
5. **Post-Freeze Evolution:** Once v1.0 freezes, protocol additions, new standard `service_type` entries, and new canonical object types are proposed via numbered SealLink Improvement Proposals (`SLIP-TEMPLATE.md`).

---

### 6. Global Threat Model and Privacy Default

#### 6.1 Honest Security Guarantees (`SL-ARCH-011`, `decided`)

- **Issuer-independent, observer-local mempool-speed revocation:** SealLink does not promise zero-latency global simultaneous revocation across the Internet. It guarantees that any observing verifier reading its own healthy node permanently closes an authority upon first validated observation of a seal spend (in its mempool or in a block), without depending on the issuer's server.
- **Compromised executor limit:** Cryptography bounds whom an honest executor admits and creates auditable receipts and dispute bundles; it cannot prevent a compromised executor from misusing credentials it legitimately holds or copying already-disclosed plaintext.
- **Privacy by default (`SL-ARCH-012`, `decided`):** The public ledger MUST carry only cryptographic commitments (hashes and UTXO seals) — never personal names, birth dates, family graphs, private ward lists, or plaintext contract terms. Sensitive fields inside `seallink-origin/1` (initial guardians and majority timestamps) use salted selective-disclosure commitments (`SPEC-01 §5`, `SPEC-04 §2`). Off-chain signed documents default to private delivery (`loc_type = 0x00`, inline or E2EE transport); public publication via `seallink-card/1` or public mirrors is strictly opt-in. Note that public ledger graphs (UTXO spend timing and name-update frequency) remain observable to chain analysts.

---

### 7. References

#### 7.1 Normative References
- **[RFC2119]** Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
- **[RFC8174]** Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, May 2017.
- **[RFC8259]** Bray, T., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259, December 2017.
- **[RFC8785]** Rundgren, A., Jordan, B., and S. Erdtman, "JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)", RFC 8785, June 2020.
- **[RFC8032]** Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032, January 2017.
- **[BIP-340]** Wuille, P., Nick, J., and T. Ruffing, "Schnorr Signatures for secp256k1", BIP-340.
- **[BIP-141]** Lombrozo, E., Lau, J., and P. Wuille, "Segregated Witness (Consensus layer)", BIP-141.
- **[BIP-143]** Lau, J. and P. Wuille, "Transaction Signature Verification for Version 0 Witness Program", BIP-143.
- **[BIP-112]** BtcDrak, Friedenbach, M., and E. Lombrozo, "CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY", BIP-112.
- **[BIP-174]** Chow, A., "Partially Signed Bitcoin Transaction Format", BIP-174.
- **[SEC1]** Certicom Research, "SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography", Version 2.0, May 2009.
- **[JSON-SCHEMA-2020-12]** Wright, A., Andrews, H., Hutton, B., and G. Dennis, "JSON Schema: A Media Type for Describing JSON Documents", Draft 2020-12.

#### 7.2 Informative References
- **[RFC8448]** Thomson, M., "Example Handshake Traces for TLS 1.3", RFC 8448, January 2019.
- **[BIP-431]** Sanders, G., "Topology Restrictions for Pinning (TRUC)", v3 transactions in Bitcoin Core v28 / Namecoin Core `nc28.0`.
- **[BIP-433]** Sanders, G., "Pay to Anchor (P2A)", witness v1 anchor output `51024e73` in Bitcoin Core v28 / Namecoin Core `nc28.0`.
- **[NC28]** Namecoin Core `nc28.0`, `src/script/names.cpp`, `src/script/solver.cpp`, `src/policy/policy.cpp`.

---

## SPEC-01: Wire Format, Cryptography, Thresholds, and Constraint Algebra

- **Version:** `1.0.0-draft.2`
- **Status:** `draft` (normative rules `decided`; see `OPEN-QUESTIONS.md` for deferred algorithm extensions)
- **Evidence / Maturity:** `vectors` (`vectors/wire-jcs-and-hashes.json`, `vectors/constraints-and-schemas.json`, `vectors/refusal-coverage-matrix.json`)
- **Registries:** `registry/object-types.json`, `registry/refusal-codes.json`, `registry/constraints.json`
- **Schemas:** `schemas/common.schema.json`

---

### 1. Canonical Serialization (Restricted RFC 8785 JCS)

Every canonical SealLink document — signed or unsigned, including manifests, cards, lists, contracts, origins, credentials, grants, invocations, receipts, and journal entries — **MUST** use exactly one wire encoding: **Restricted RFC 8785 JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)** ([RFC8785], [RFC8259]).

| Rule ID | State | Requirement | Refusal |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `SL-WIRE-001` | `decided` | Document octets MUST NOT exceed `max_bytes` registered for its `type` in `registry/object-types.json`. JSON object/array nesting depth MUST NOT exceed `16` (the root object is depth `1`). | `WIRE_SIZE` |
| `SL-WIRE-002` | `decided` | Input MUST be valid UTF-8 with no BOM and no leading or trailing bytes, parsing as exactly one RFC 8259 JSON object. | `WIRE_JSON` |
| `SL-WIRE-003` | `decided` | No JSON object at any nesting level MAY contain duplicate member names (compared after escape decoding). | `WIRE_DUPLICATE` |
| `SL-WIRE-004` | `decided` | Allowed JSON values are objects, arrays, strings, number-form integers (`SL-WIRE-007`), and booleans (`true`, `false`). The literal `null` is FORBIDDEN everywhere: optional fields MUST be omitted rather than set to `null`. | `WIRE_VALUE` |
| `SL-WIRE-005` | `decided` | Every string (including member names) MUST consist solely of Unicode scalar values `>= U+0020`, excluding `U+007F` (DEL), the C1 control block `U+0080..U+009F`, and unpaired surrogates. **Multiline prose exception:** `U+000A` (LF, encoded as `\n` under RFC 8785) is permitted ONLY in designated multiline prose fields (`terms_text`, contract clause `text`, `termination.reason`, `card.role`); CR (`U+000D`), TAB (`U+0009`), and all other `< U+0020` code points remain FORBIDDEN everywhere. No Unicode normalization is performed; string equality is exact code-point equality. | `WIRE_STRING` |
| `SL-WIRE-006` | `decided` | The verifier MUST re-serialize the parsed value under RFC 8785 (no insignificant whitespace; object keys sorted by UTF-16 code units; literal UTF-8 strings with ONLY `\"`, `\\`, and `\n` where permitted; canonical decimal integers) and MUST refuse unless the re-serialized octets are byte-for-byte identical to the input. A reader MUST NEVER repair non-canonical input. | `WIRE_NOT_CANONICAL` |

> **Implementation note:** Standard library JSON serializers that HTML-escape `<`, `>`, `&`, or `U+2028`, or parse numbers via IEEE 754 `float64`, violate `SL-WIRE-006` and `SL-WIRE-007`. Verifiers MUST implement a dedicated strict JCS parser and serializer.

---

### 2. Exact Integer Forms

No numeric value in SealLink may pass through IEEE 754 binary64 floating-point arithmetic.

| Rule ID | State | Requirement | Refusal |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `SL-WIRE-007` | `decided` | **Number form (`uint53`):** JSON integer token `0` or `[1-9][0-9]*` with no sign, fraction, exponent, or leading zero, value `<= 9007199254740991` (`2^53 - 1`), and within the schema's field bound. Used for heights, `vout`, sequence numbers, thresholds, and Unix seconds. | `WIRE_NUMBER` (malformed token or > `2^53 - 1`), `WIRE_INTEGER` (out of schema bound) |
| `SL-WIRE-008` | `decided` | **String form (`uint64_str`):** JSON string matching `^(0|[1-9][0-9]{0,19})$` with unsigned integer value `<= 18446744073709551615` (`2^64 - 1`). Used for monetary amounts, costs, token counts, byte sizes, quota ceilings, and range bounds. | `WIRE_INTEGER` |
| `SL-WIRE-009` | `decided` | Schema form is strictly enforced: a `uint53` where `uint64_str` is required (or vice versa) MUST refuse without coercion (`WIRE_MEMBER`). All arithmetic (sums, products, quota debits) MUST use exact integer or exact rational arithmetic without wrap; arithmetic overflow refuses before any reservation or effect (`WIRE_INTEGER` during parse/attenuation; `QUOTA_EXCEEDED` during debit reservation). | `WIRE_MEMBER`, `WIRE_INTEGER`, `QUOTA_EXCEEDED` |

---

### 3. Object Types, Three Hashes, and Domain Separation

Every registered SealLink object type in `registry/object-types.json` carries its exact string identifier in `type` (top-level for unsigned pinned objects, or `payload.type` for signed envelopes).

| Rule ID | State | Requirement | Refusal |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `SL-WIRE-010` | `decided` | **Closed schemas.** Every object type has a closed member set (`additionalProperties: false`) defined in `schemas/` (plus action profile schemas for `Invocation.arguments`). Unknown, missing, or unregistered `type` values MUST refuse immediately. | `WIRE_TYPE` (unknown type), `WIRE_MEMBER` (schema error) |
| `SL-WIRE-011` | `decided` | **Three distinct hashes.** For any object with canonical `payload_bytes` (the JCS bytes of `payload` for signed objects, or the full document for unsigned objects) and `signed_bytes` (full JCS bytes of the complete signed envelope, either `{"payload":...,"signatures":...}` or `{"guardian_approvals":...,"payload":...}`):<br>1. **Object Identifier (`id`):** `SHA256(payload_bytes)` — excludes signatures and guardian approvals; immune to signature randomness.<br>2. **Typed Signing Digest (`digest`):** BIP-340 tagged hash `H_tag(payload.type, payload_bytes)` where `H_tag(tag, msg) = SHA256(SHA256(tag) || SHA256(tag) || msg)` and `tag` is the exact ASCII bytes of `payload.type` (e.g. `"seallink-grant/1"`).<br>3. **Content Address (`content_addr`):** `SHA256(signed_bytes)` — covers the entire signed envelope; used for retrieval pins and signed-form anchoring (`0x04`, `0x09`, `0x0d`, `0x0f`, `0x11`, `0x12`). | — |

---

### 4. Keys, Signatures, and Unified `SignatureSet`

SealLink defines one off-chain multi-signature and threshold envelope used uniformly across single-key actors, multi-key organizations, joint recipient groups, guardian quorums, and notary colleges.

#### 4.1 Key Encodings (`SL-WIRE-012`, `decided`)

SealLink v1.0 specifies three exact off-chain signature algorithms plus one on-chain ledger key encoding:

| Algorithm / Role | Public Key Hex Encoding | Signature Hex Encoding | Normative Spec |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `bip340` (default for all protocol objects) | 64 lowercase hex (`xonly_64hex`): valid secp256k1 x-coordinate (even Y). | 128 lowercase hex (64B BIP-340 Schnorr over `digest`). | [BIP-340] |
| `p256` (device keys ONLY) | 66 lowercase hex (`02`/`03` + 32B X): valid compressed SEC 1 point on NIST P-256. | 128 lowercase hex (64B raw `r \|\| s`, strict low-S `s <= n/2`, over `digest`). | [SEC1] |
| `ed25519` (device keys ONLY) | 64 lowercase hex: valid compressed Ed25519 point. | 128 lowercase hex (64B RFC 8032 signature over `digest`). | [RFC8032] |
| Ledger `ScriptPolicy` keys (`SPEC-02`) | 66 lowercase hex (`compressed_66hex`, `02`/`03` + 32B X): valid secp256k1 point. | DER ECDSA + `0x01` (`SIGHASH_ALL`) inside SegWit v0 witness. | [BIP-141], [BIP-143] |

Invalid curve points, non-lowercase hex, wrong byte lengths, or high-S `p256` signatures MUST refuse with `WIRE_KEY` (key defect) or `WIRE_SIGNATURE` (signature defect).

#### 4.2 Signed Envelope, `SignatureSet`, `guardian_approvals`, and Authoritative Policy Binding (`SL-WIRE-013`, `decided`)

Every signed SealLink object has one of two exact top-level shapes:

1. **Ordinary signed envelope** (all signed objects without `payload.guardian_context`):
```json
{"payload":{...},"signatures":{"policy":{"m":1,"pks":["..."]},"sigs":[{"pk":"...","sig":"..."}]}}
```
2. **Ward guardian-quorum envelope** (permitted ONLY on `seallink-grant/1` and `seallink-assent/1` when `payload.guardian_context` is present):
```json
{"guardian_approvals":[{"guardian_name":"id/guardian-a","revision":1,"signatures":{"policy":{"m":1,"pks":["..."]},"sigs":[{"pk":"...","sig":"..."}]},"slot":1}],"payload":{...}}
```

Verification rules over `digest = H_tag(payload.type, canonical_JCS(payload))`:

1. **Structural validity (`SignatureSet`):** `policy.m` MUST satisfy `1 <= m <= len(policy.pks) <= 32`. `policy.pks` MUST be strictly sorted in ascending lexicographical hex order with no duplicates. Each entry in `sigs` carries strictly `{"pk","sig"}`.
2. **Algorithm restriction:** `policy.alg` defaults to `"bip340"` when omitted. Non-`bip340` algorithms (`p256`, `ed25519`) are permitted **ONLY** on `seallink-owner-command/1` and `seallink-statement/1` when signed by a registered `device` key (`SPEC-03 §6`). All other signed objects (including every `guardian_approvals[i].signatures`) MUST use `"bip340"`.
3. **Cryptographic verification (`SignatureSet`):** Each entry in `sigs` MUST name a `pk` present in `policy.pks`, MUST appear at most once per `pk`, and MUST verify strictly against `digest` under `policy.alg`. Verified distinct entries in `sigs` MUST number `>= policy.m`.
4. **Universal authoritative policy binding (ALL object types without exception):** Because `signatures.policy` lies outside `payload`, `signatures.policy` is NEVER trusted on its own. Every verifier MUST independently derive the **expected signing policy** from authoritative state (e.g., on-chain `link.<role>` for `grant`/`cred`/`notary`, `contract.parties[i].signing_policy`, `grant.recipient`, `grant.delegate.key`, `service.receipt_key`, `manifest.auth_key`, `seallink-device-list/1`, or each active slot guardian's resolved `link.grant` policy for `guardian_approvals[i].signatures`) and MUST require exact equality between `signatures.policy` and the derived expected policy. Any mismatch refuses with `WIRE_SIGNATURE`.
5. **Guardian quorum approvals (`guardian_approvals[]`, `SPEC-04`):** When `payload.guardian_context` is present (permitted ONLY on `seallink-grant/1` and `seallink-assent/1`), the payload cryptographically binds `(origin_id, ward_name, revision, event_class)` and the envelope MUST use `guardian_approvals[]` (and MUST NOT carry top-level `signatures`). Entries in `guardian_approvals[]` (`1..32` items) MUST be ordered by strictly ascending `slot` (`1..32`, no duplicate slots; `WIRE_SIGNATURE` otherwise), and every entry's `revision` MUST equal `payload.guardian_context.revision` (`GUARDIAN_QUORUM_UNMET` otherwise). For each entry, the verifier resolves slot `slot` at the active roster revision: if the slot is not `active` or its active guardian's name does not equal `entry.guardian_name`, refuse `GUARDIAN_INACTIVE`; otherwise derive that guardian's current `link.grant` policy at tip and verify `entry.signatures` under rules 1–4 with exact policy equality (`WIRE_SIGNATURE` on policy or signature mismatch). Because each slot carries its own independent `SignatureSet`, multi-key guardians cannot pool keys across slots or double-count. All approving slots MUST resolve to distinct `(name, registration)` guardians (`GUARDIAN_INACTIVE` on conflict), and the count of distinct satisfied slots MUST satisfy `required(derived_event_class)` against `revision_size` (`GUARDIAN_QUORUM_UNMET` on shortfall).

---

### 5. Salted Selective Disclosure Commitments

Contracts (`SPEC-05`), origin certificates (`SPEC-04`), and privacy-sensitive credentials (`SPEC-05`) use salted per-clause / per-claim commitments so a holder can reveal one item without disclosing siblings or permitting offline dictionary guesses (`SL-WIRE-014`, `decided`).

- **Normative commitment formula:**
  ```text
  commit(salt_32B, obj) = H_tag("seallink-clause/1", salt_32B || canonical_JCS(obj))
                        = SHA256(SHA256("seallink-clause/1") || SHA256("seallink-clause/1") || salt_32B || canonical_JCS(obj))
  ```
  where `salt_32B` is an **independent 32-byte CSPRNG salt** (encoded on wire as 64 lowercase hex when transmitted). Issuers MUST generate a fresh, independent 32-byte CSPRNG salt for every committed clause, claim, `majority_commitment`, and `initial_guardian_commitment` — salts MUST NEVER be reused across items.
- **Reference byte vector (`vectors/wire-jcs-and-hashes.json`):**
  For `salt_32B = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f` and `obj = {"text":"Room inspection"}` (JCS bytes `7b2274657874223a22526f6f6d20696e7370656374696f6e227d`):
  `commit(salt_32B, obj) = b030a8a82ef79e9d6829f08c2e0bfc74db8b6c259a3b052988027ecc50ffd368` *(verified in `vectors/wire-jcs-and-hashes.json`)*.
- **Disclosure proof:** Presenter supplies `(salt_hex, canonical_JCS(obj))` alongside the containing object. The verifier recomputes `commit(salt_32B, obj)` and requires exact byte equality with the committed digest.
- **Operational boundary:** Losing `salt_32B` permanently forfeits selective disclosure of that item. Salts provide hiding against offline guessing, not encryption of stored plaintext.

---

### 6. Structured Capability and Constraint Algebra

To guarantee decidable, mechanical attenuation (`child <= parent`) across all verifiers while remaining readable for human typed-display on signers, SealLink defines a closed 7-predicate lattice over action arguments (`SL-WIRE-015`, `decided`).

#### 6.1 Capability Shape

Each entry in `capabilities[]` (max `64` entries) has:
- `action`: exact lowercase slash-separated leaf (`^[a-z0-9._-]+(/[a-z0-9._-]+)+$`). Exact string equality only; prefixes grant nothing.
- `target`: structured resource identifier (e.g., `mailbox:id/alice:work`). Exact match unless narrowed by profile target rules.
- `where` *(optional, max `32` keys)*: map of `arg_name -> ConstraintPredicate`. Keys combine by implicit logical `AND`.
- `quotas` *(optional, max `32` entries)*: array of additive stateful counters (`kind, resource, unit, max, window`), strictly separated from stateless `where` predicates.
- `extensions` *(reserved)*: MUST NOT be present in v1.0; any presence MUST refuse with `WIRE_CONSTRAINT`.

#### 6.2 The Seven Predicates and Conservative Pairwise Attenuation (`SL-WIRE-016`, `decided`)

For an invocation argument value `v` (a missing constrained argument ALWAYS fails with `INVOKE_CONSTRAINT_FAILED`). Array operands of `in` and `not_in` MUST be non-empty, strictly sorted in ascending UTF-16 code-unit order, with no duplicates (`WIRE_CONSTRAINT` otherwise). For `range([min, max])`, `int(min) <= int(max)` MUST hold (`WIRE_CONSTRAINT` otherwise).

| Op | Operand Form | Invocation Match (`arg v`) | Conservative Attenuation (`child <= parent`) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `eq` | `string \| bool` | `v == op` | `child` is `eq(op)` |
| `in` | sorted unique nonempty array `<= 256` | `v in op` | `child` is `in(S')` with `S' ⊆ op`, OR `eq(x)` with `x in op` |
| `not_in` | sorted unique nonempty array `<= 256` | `v not in op` | `child` is `not_in(S')` with `op ⊆ S'`, OR `in(S')` with `S' ∩ op = ∅`, OR `eq(x)` with `x not in op` |
| `prefix` | nonempty `string` | `v.starts_with(op)` | `child` is `prefix(p')` with `p'.starts_with(op)`, OR `eq(x)` / `in(S')` where every element starts with `op` |
| `suffix` | nonempty `string` | `v.ends_with(op)` | `child` is `suffix(s')` with `s'.ends_with(op)`, OR `eq(x)` / `in(S')` where every element ends with `op` |
| `range` | `[uint64_str min, uint64_str max]`, `min <= max` | `min <= int(v) <= max` | `child` is `range([a,b])` with `min <= a <= b <= max`, OR `eq(x)` / `in(S')` where every integer lies in `[min, max]` |
| `hash_eq` | `hex64` | `v == op` or `SHA256(bytes(v)) == op` (per profile) | `child` is `hash_eq(op)` |

> **Conservative comparison semantics:** The table above is intentionally conservative and performs no syntactic rewriting. For example, a parent using `eq("Invoices")` rejects a child using singleton `in(["Invoices"])`; to narrow `eq(x)`, a child MUST emit `eq(x)`.

**Universal Capability Attenuation Rule (`SL-WIRE-017`, `decided`):**
A child capability `C` narrows a parent capability `P` iff:
1. `C.action == P.action` and `C.target == P.target`;
2. For every key `k` present in `P.where`, `k` MUST be present in `C.where` and `C.where[k] <= P.where[k]` per the table above (`C.where` MAY add additional keys not present in `P.where`);
3. For every quota `(kind, resource, unit, window)` present in `P.quotas`, `C.quotas` MUST contain a matching quota with `int(C.max) <= int(P.max)`, and `C.quotas` MUST NOT introduce a quota with an incompatible `window` counting mode.

**Complexity bound:** Pairwise predicate comparison runs in $O(|op|)$ time. Checking a child capability list of length $|C| \le 64$ against a parent template list of length $|P| \le 64$ with at most $|W| \le 32$ `where` keys runs in $O(|C| \cdot |P| \cdot |W| \cdot |op|)$ bounded deterministic time without scripts or external notaries.

---

### 7. Deterministic Wire Validation Pipeline

Every verifier parsing any SealLink object **MUST** execute checks in this exact order and return the **first** failure (`SL-WIRE-018`, `decided`):

1. Size (`<= max_bytes`) and nesting depth (`<= 16`) (`SL-WIRE-001`) -> `WIRE_SIZE`
2. UTF-8 / no BOM / trailing bytes / RFC 8259 JSON object (`SL-WIRE-002`) -> `WIRE_JSON`
3. Duplicate object member names (`SL-WIRE-003`) -> `WIRE_DUPLICATE`
4. Disallowed `null` values (`SL-WIRE-004`) -> `WIRE_VALUE`
5. Number token grammar (`SL-WIRE-007`) -> `WIRE_NUMBER`; string scalar ranges (`SL-WIRE-005`) -> `WIRE_STRING`
6. Restricted RFC 8785 byte-for-byte round-trip (`SL-WIRE-006`) -> `WIRE_NOT_CANONICAL`
7. Registered `type` check (`SL-WIRE-010`) -> `WIRE_TYPE`
8. Closed schema member check (`SL-WIRE-010`) -> `WIRE_MEMBER`; integer bounds (`SL-WIRE-007..009`) -> `WIRE_INTEGER`; Constraint Algebra sorting, range ordering, and `extensions` check (`SL-WIRE-015..016`) -> `WIRE_CONSTRAINT`
9. Public key syntax and curve-point validation (`SL-WIRE-012`) -> `WIRE_KEY`
10. Cryptographic signature verification, strictly ascending `guardian_approvals[]` slot order (where applicable), and `SignatureSet` threshold check (`SL-WIRE-013`) -> `WIRE_SIGNATURE`

---

### 8. Security Considerations

- **No blind digest signing:** Signing services MUST parse the canonical object, validate `type`, display human-readable fields (for presence-gated keys), and compute the tagged digest internally — never sign an opaque caller-supplied 32-byte digest.
- **No signature malleability as replay:** `id = SHA256(payload_bytes)` excludes `signatures`, ensuring re-signing the same payload with fresh randomness or a different valid subset of an `m-of-n` `SignatureSet` never produces a new grant ID, contract ID, or invocation deduplication key.
- **No `null` ambiguity:** Banning `null` eliminates parser divergence between absent optional fields and `null`-valued fields.
- **Fail-closed extensions:** Any unrecognized `type`, predicate operator, or populated `extensions` field refuses unconditionally.
- **Policy binding:** Because `signatures.policy` sits outside `payload_bytes`, verifiers MUST always compare `signatures.policy` against an independently derived expected policy (`SL-WIRE-013` item 4).

---

### 9. References

- **Normative:** [RFC2119], [RFC8174], [RFC8259], [RFC8785], [RFC8032], [BIP-340], [SEC1], [JSON-SCHEMA-2020-12].
- **Informative:** [RFC8448].

---

## SPEC-02: Ledger Interface, Namecoin Binding, ScriptPolicy, Merkle Batching, and UTXO Seals

- **Version:** `1.0.0-draft.2`
- **Status:** `draft` (normative rules `decided` except provisional freshness constants and Tier 2 profile marked `open` in `OPEN-QUESTIONS.md`)
- **Evidence / Maturity:** `vectors` (`vectors/ledger-scripts-and-opreturn.json`, `vectors/refusal-coverage-matrix.json`; two-node P2A regtest proof in `conformance/p2a-regtest/`)
- **Registries:** `registry/opreturn-actions.json`, `registry/refusal-codes.json`
- **Schemas:** `schemas/common.schema.json`

---

### 1. Abstract Ledger Interface (`ChainView`)

Core SealLink semantics (`SPEC-03` through `SPEC-07`) depend solely on an abstract ledger interface (`ChainView`) satisfied by any public ledger providing eight primitives (`SL-LDGR-001`, `decided`):

1. **Globally unique names** owned by an authenticated script/policy.
2. **Totally ordered name updates** forming an auditable history chain from initial registration.
3. **Name liveness / expiry rules** deterministically evaluable at any block height.
4. **Compact name-attached value** sufficient for role keys/policy pins and one manifest SHA-256 head.
5. **Single-spend transaction outputs (UTXOs)** powering revocable seals, single-use seals, row coins, stop coins, status spines, and guardian slots.
6. **Compact arbitrary data commitments** (`OP_RETURN` or equivalent) anchored to block height.
7. **Script-agnostic output control** supporting single-key and `m-of-n` threshold policies without changing ledger consensus.
8. **Verifiable chain tip, block height, and median block time.**

#### 1.1 Verifier Conformance Tiers (`SL-LDGR-002`, `decided` Tier 1 / `open` Tier 2)

| Tier | Architecture | Cryptographic Guarantees & Honest Boundaries | Permitted Use |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Tier 1 (Full-Node Verifier)** | Verifier reads its own locally controlled, read-only, tx-indexed full node (`txindex=1`), cross-checked against `>= 1` independent comparison node. | Full cryptographic verification of name history, anchor inclusion, and **absence of spends or name updates in the active chain and its locally observed mempool**. Does not guarantee instant observation of unpropagated network transactions. | **Normative default; REQUIRED** for all effect executors (mail hosts, agent runtimes, wallets, locks, notaries). |
| **Tier 2 (Light / Proof-Bundle Verifier)** | PoW block header chain + Merkle transaction inclusion proofs + cross-query of `k >= 2` independent UTXO/name servers. | **Proves:** transaction inclusion, signatures, and already-observed spends. **Cannot cryptographically prove on Namecoin/Bitcoin** (no UTXO state root in block headers) that servers did not withhold a newer seal spend or name update, nor observe mempool spends. Security rests on at least 1 honest, non-eclipsed source among `k`. | `open` (deferred to a post-v1.0 profile; see `OPEN-QUESTIONS.md`). |

---

### 2. Namecoin Binding Profile v1

#### 2.1 Chain Pins and Consensus Facts (`SL-LDGR-003`, `decided`)

- **Networks:**
  - `main`: genesis `000000000062b72c5e2ceb45fbc8587e807c155b0da735e6483dfba2f0a9c770`, name expiry `D = 36000` blocks, SegWit ([BIP-141]) and CSV ([BIP-112]) activated at height `475000`, Taproot inactive.
  - `regtest`: verifier-configured genesis hash, name expiry `D = 30` blocks, SegWit active from genesis and CSV ([BIP-112]) active from height `1` (matching Namecoin Core `nc28.0` consensus parameters).
- No other network identifier is valid in SealLink v1.0 (`schemas/common.schema.json#/$defs/Network` closes `network` to `"main" | "regtest"`). A verifier MUST explicitly pin `network` and `genesis` in local configuration and refuse any node reporting a mismatch (`CHAIN_MISMATCH`).
- **Name value byte limit:** Namecoin consensus (`nc28.0` `MAX_VALUE_LENGTH`) allows `1023` bytes, while Namecoin Core wallet UI enforces `MAX_VALUE_LENGTH_UI = 520` bytes. SealLink fixes **`520` bytes** as its protocol limit (`SPEC-03`) for universal wallet compatibility.
- **Name registration:** Two-step flow (`OP_NAME_NEW` committing salted `HASH160(rand || name)`, followed `>= 12` blocks later by `OP_NAME_FIRSTUPDATE` revealing name and initial value, locking `0.01 NMC`). A name is live at tip height `H` iff its latest name operation confirmed at height `h` satisfies `H < h + D` (`NAME_EXPIRED` otherwise).
- **Read-only node route:** Verifier node credentials MUST NOT expose wallet or transaction-submission RPCs (e.g., restricted via `rpcwhitelist`).

---

### 3. Unified `ScriptPolicy` (On-Chain Ownership and Seal Scripts)

SealLink uses one deterministic **`ScriptPolicy`** primitive covering **name ownership**, **contract termination seals**, **guardianship slots**, **status/roster spines**, and **single-use seals**.

#### 3.1 Supported Templates (`SL-LDGR-004`, `decided`)

Every `ScriptPolicy` deterministically compiles to an exact native SegWit v0 trailing `scriptPubKey` (`P2WPKH` 22 bytes or `P2WSH` 34 bytes). Keys in `multisig` and unordered pairs `(a, b)` MUST be strictly sorted in ascending lexicographical hex order (`min(a,b) < max(a,b)`). Relative locktime `<D>` uses minimal Bitcoin Script `CScriptNum` encoding (`1 <= D <= 52560`, BIP-68 block-based relative locktime with bit 22 cleared).

| `kind` / `template` | Compilation to Output `scriptPubKey` | Primary Use |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `{"kind":"key","pk":"<66hex>"}` | `P2WPKH` (22B): `OP_0 PUSH20 HASH160(pk)`. Spent with ECDSA. *(Namecoin `P2WPKH` validates strictly ECDSA, never BIP-340 Schnorr / FROST; any single-key threshold custody MUST use qualified threshold ECDSA.)* | Individual actor name, ordinary revocable grant seal, row coin, stop coin, disposable revoke seal. |
| `{"kind":"multisig","m":k,"pks":[...]}` | `P2WSH` (34B): `OP_0 PUSH32 SHA256(witnessScript)`, where `witnessScript = OP_k <pk_1> ... <pk_n> OP_n OP_CHECKMULTISIG`, `1 <= k <= n <= 15`. | Child name (`2-of-3`), organization name (`3-of-5`), multi-guardian agent name (`2-of-3`), signed via `namepsbt`. |
| `{"kind":"branch","template":"either_of_2","keys":{"a","b"}}` | `P2WSH` (34B): `OP_1 <min(a,b)> <max(a,b)> OP_2 OP_CHECKMULTISIG` | Contract seal (`either_party`); active guardian slot (`guardian OR disposer`); `status_seal`. |
| `{"kind":"branch","template":"both_of_2","keys":{"a","b"}}` | `P2WSH` (34B): `OP_2 <min(a,b)> <max(a,b)> OP_2 OP_CHECKMULTISIG` | Contract seal (`both_together`); on-chain 2-party assent; vacant guardian slot (`disposer AND arbiter`); `roster_seal`; `recovery_seal`. |
| `{"kind":"branch","template":"arbiter_or_both","keys":{"a","b","arbiter"}}` | `P2WSH` (34B): `OP_IF OP_2 <min(a,b)> <max(a,b)> OP_2 OP_CHECKMULTISIG OP_ELSE <arbiter> OP_CHECKSIG OP_ENDIF` | Contract seal (`arbiter` termination branch `0` or mutual termination branch `1`). |
| `{"kind":"branch","template":"single_use_1_of_2","keys":{"issuer","grantee"}}` | `P2WSH` (34B): `OP_IF <issuer> OP_CHECKSIG OP_ELSE <grantee> OP_CHECKSIG OP_ENDIF` (witness selector `0x01` = issuer revoke; empty `""` = grantee use). | Single-use UTXO grant seal (unambiguous branch attribution). |
| `{"kind":"branch","template":"guardian_slot_pending","keys":{"disposer","challenger","guardian"},"delay_blocks":D}` | `P2WSH` (34B): `OP_IF <disposer> OP_CHECKSIG OP_ELSE OP_IF <challenger> OP_CHECKSIG OP_ELSE <D> OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY OP_DROP <guardian> OP_CHECKSIG OP_ENDIF OP_ENDIF` | Stage 1 pending guardian slot: disposer or challenger MAY veto during delay `D`; after `D` blocks, guardian spends to Stage 2 active `either_of_2(guardian, disposer)` (`SPEC-04 §3.3`), permanently terminating challenger veto. |

> **Namecoin Core `nc28.0` compatibility note:** In `src/script/solver.cpp:146-148`, Namecoin strips the `OP_NAME_*` prefix before evaluating `WITNESS_V0_SCRIPTHASH` (`IsWitnessProgram(true, ...)`), so native `P2WSH` name outputs pass standard relay policy up to 3,600-byte witness scripts and 100 stack items.

#### 3.2 Name Output Prefix Grammars and Pre-Spend Verification (`SL-LDGR-005`, `decided`)

1. **Exact Namecoin name script grammars:** A Namecoin name output `scriptPubKey` MUST match one of the three exact minimal-push (`MINIMALDATA`) prefix forms followed immediately by a trailing native SegWit `scriptPubKey` (`P2WPKH` 22 bytes or `P2WSH` 34 bytes; legacy `P2PKH` is NOT supported):

| Operation | Opcode | Exact Prefix Before Trailing `scriptPubKey` |
| --- | :-: | --- |
| `NAME_NEW` | `0x51` (`OP_NAME_NEW`) | `OP_NAME_NEW <20B_hash> OP_2DROP <scriptPubKey>` |
| `NAME_FIRSTUPDATE` | `0x52` (`OP_NAME_FIRSTUPDATE`) | `OP_NAME_FIRSTUPDATE <name> <rand> <value> OP_2DROP OP_2DROP <scriptPubKey>` |
| `NAME_UPDATE` | `0x53` (`OP_NAME_UPDATE`) | `OP_NAME_UPDATE <name> <value> OP_2DROP OP_DROP <scriptPubKey>` |

   Any output violating these exact prefix and cleanup opcodes MUST refuse with `CHAIN_SCRIPT_UNSUPPORTED`.
2. **Pre-spend verification:** Because an unspent `P2WSH` output exposes only `OP_0 PUSH32 SHA256(witnessScript)` on chain, any pin, contract, manifest, or origin naming an output MUST include its complete `ScriptPolicy`. The verifier compiles `ScriptPolicy` to the exact trailing `scriptPubKey` (`22` bytes for `key`, `34` bytes for `multisig` and `branch`) and requires byte-for-byte equality with the trailing `scriptPubKey` extracted from the on-chain output. Mismatch or unknown template MUST refuse with `CHAIN_SCRIPT_UNSUPPORTED` (non-closing; never inferred as a transfer).
3. **No covenant renewal-only branch (`SL-LDGR-006`, `decided`):** Unmodified Namecoin lacks output covenants (`OP_CTV`). Any spending branch in a name's `ScriptPolicy` can technically transfer the name to another script. Deployments MUST NOT add a low-threshold "renewal-only" branch to a name output; renewals MUST use the name's full `ScriptPolicy` threshold.

#### 3.3 Author / Writer Verification (`SL-LDGR-007`, `decided`)

Receiving a name output proves neither authorship nor consent. To prove a name value was **authored** by `owner_policy`:
1. The spent previous name input MUST satisfy `owner_policy` (verified via witness script hash and pubkeys for `P2WSH`, or pubkey hash for `P2WPKH`);
2. Every authorizing ECDSA signature in that input's witness MUST end with strict sighash byte **`0x01` (`SIGHASH_ALL`, without `ANYONECANPAY`)**, committing to every output (including the new name value and any `OP_RETURN` break or cancel frame);
3. For a newly registered name whose `OP_NAME_FIRSTUPDATE` was signed by a funding wallet, the pinned `owner_policy` MUST sign one subsequent `OP_NAME_UPDATE` of its own before that value is treated as owner-authored (`NAME_WRITER_UNVERIFIED` otherwise).

---

### 4. Observation, Multi-Node Freshness, and Risk Cutoffs

Every chain-dependent decision executes inside one **consistent observation** (`SL-LDGR-008`, `decided` algorithm / `open` provisional constants `LAG`, `S`, `K` tracked in `OPEN-QUESTIONS.md`):

1. **Snapshot bracket:** Read tip `(hash_0, height_0)` on the reading node before all queries, and `(hash_1, height_1)` after. If `(hash_0, height_0) != (hash_1, height_1)`, discard the observation with `CHAIN_OBSERVATION_VOID` (no closure written, except any validated seal spend already witnessed).
2. **Multi-node health & single-node veto:** Reading node MUST be synced (`!IBD`, `txindex=1`, `best_header - tip <= LAG`, provisional `LAG = 1`; else `CHAIN_UNHEALTHY`). Verifier MUST cross-check against `>= 1` independent comparison node (distinct operator source). If *any* healthy comparison node reports a different hash at `height_0` or a higher height than `height_0`, refuse `CHAIN_NODE_DISAGREEMENT` (a single disagreeing healthy peer vetoes).
3. **Dual tip-age freshness:** Verifier maintains a durable monotonic UTC clock watermark (clock regression -> `CHAIN_CLOCK_ERROR`) and rejects headers with `header_time - now > S` (provisional `S = 600s`). Verifier durably records `first_sight_time` on first observation of each block hash:
   ```text
   tip_age = max(now - header_time, now - first_sight_time)
   ```
   Risk cutoffs:
   - **Class 1 (money, irreversible effects, custody/guardian transitions, issuance):** `tip_age <= 3600s` (60 min; default if unstated).
   - **Class 2 (other privileged/read-only actions):** `tip_age <= 5400s` (90 min).
   Exceeding cutoff refuses `CHAIN_TIP_STALE`.
4. **Recency & confirmation depth:** Grant `recent_block` `R` MUST lie on the active chain; anchor height `A` MUST satisfy `R < A <= R + K` (provisional `K = 432` blocks; else `CHAIN_RECENCY_INVALID`). Confirmation depth is `H - h + 1`, requiring `>= max(signed_min_depth, operator_floor)` where `signed_min_depth` is `grant.min_depth` (default `1` if omitted) (`CHAIN_DEPTH_INSUFFICIENT`).
5. **Pre-effect recheck:** Immediately before reserving or executing an irreversible effect, the executor MUST re-verify tip freshness, wall-clock window, and live seal status (including mempool).

---

### 5. Witness Profile (`W`), `SLNK` `OP_RETURN` Framing, and Merkle Batching (`0x02`)

#### 5.1 Witness Construction Profile (`W`) (`SL-LDGR-009`, `decided`)

- **Every input** of a seal-creation transaction `T` and an anchoring transaction `A` MUST be native SegWit v0 (`P2WPKH` or `P2WSH`) with empty `scriptSig` and strict `SIGHASH_ALL` (`0x01`) on all signatures (`CHAIN_TX_CONSTRUCTION`).
- **Linkage output:** When `A` anchors a grant whose seal was created in `T`, `T` creates a linkage output at `vout = seal_vout + 1` (native SegWit), and `A` MUST spend that linkage output (never spending the seal). Only the linkage output may be unconfirmed when `A` is broadcast; all other funding inputs MUST be confirmed strictly below the spending transaction's block. `T` and `A` MAY confirm in the same block.
- **Legacy profile (`L`):** Reserved solely for future non-SegWit UTXO chains; refused on Namecoin (`CHAIN_TX_CONSTRUCTION`).

#### 5.2 Framed `OP_RETURN` Format (`SLNK`) (`SL-LDGR-010`, `decided`)

Every SealLink on-chain commitment uses a single zero-value `OP_RETURN` output per anchoring transaction (`CHAIN_FRAME_INVALID` if missing, duplicate, reserved `0x06`, or malformed):

```text
OP_RETURN (0x6a)  PUSH5 (0x05)  "SLNK" (53 4c 4e 4b)  <action:1B>  <PUSH_N>  <payload:N bytes>
```

Standard payload (`N = 34` for `loc_type = 0x00`, total script **42 bytes**; `N = 66` for `loc_type = 0x01 | 0x02 | 0x05`, total script **74 bytes** — strictly below the 83-byte standard relay limit):

```text
<version:1B = 0x01> || <commitment:32B> || <loc_type:1B> || [pointer:0B|32B]
```

Exception — Action `0x0b` (`KEY_COMPROMISE_BREAK`, total script **50 bytes**, `N = 42`):

```text
<version:1B = 0x01> || <typed_digest:32B> || <h_c_le64:8B> || <loc_type:1B = 0x00>
```

Example hex (`action = 0x01`, `loc_type = 0x00`, 42 bytes):
```text
6a 05 534c4e4b 01 22 01 <commitment:32B> 00
```

All action codes (`0x01`–`0x12`, with `0x06` reserved) and locator types (`0x00`, `0x01`, `0x02`, `0x05`) are registered in `registry/opreturn-actions.json`. Locators are strictly non-exclusive hints: an unavailable locator NEVER invalidates a document whose exact bytes match `commitment` when supplied inline or via any other channel.

#### 5.3 Merkle Batch Anchor Construction (`0x02`) (`SL-LDGR-014`, `decided`)

Action `0x02` (`BATCH_ANCHOR`) commits to a non-empty set of `1 <= N <= 65536` distinct 32-byte item commitments (`item_digest_32B`) in a single `OP_RETURN` frame:

1. **Ordering:** Deduplicate all `item_digest_32B` entries and sort them in strictly ascending unsigned byte order (`d_0 < d_1 < ... < d_{N-1}`).
2. **Tagged leaf hash:** `L_i = H_tag("seallink-merkle-leaf/1", d_i)`.
3. **Tagged internal node hash:** `node(left, right) = H_tag("seallink-merkle-node/1", left || right)`.
4. **Odd-node promotion (no duplication):** At each level of length `k > 1`, pair `(level[0], level[1])`, `(level[2], level[3])`, ...; if `k` is odd, promote `level[k - 1]` unchanged to the next level. *(Promoting rather than duplicating prevents tree-duplication second-preimage malleability.)* If `N == 1`, `root = L_0`.
5. **Proof verification (`MerkleProof`):** Starting with `cur = H_tag("seallink-merkle-leaf/1", leaf_digest)`, for each step `{side, hash}` in `steps[]` (`len <= 16`):
   - If `side == "L"`, `cur = node(hash, cur)`.
   - If `side == "R"`, `cur = node(cur, hash)`.
   Verify `cur == proof.root` and `proof.root == op_return.commitment` (`CHAIN_FRAME_INVALID` on mismatch). Reference 5-leaf odd-promotion vector is published in `vectors/ledger-scripts-and-opreturn.json`.

---

### 6. UTXO Seal State Machine and Fast-Revocation Fee Bumping

#### 6.1 Unified Three-Valued Seal State (`SL-LDGR-011`, `decided`)

Every standard revocable seal (grant seal, contract seal, credential seal, active guardian slot seal, device seal, member seal, auth seal, row stop coin) follows this deterministic state table:

| Observed Ledger Condition | Seal State | Verifier Action | Refusal Code |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Creation tx confirmed at `>= required_depth`, trailing script matches compiled `ScriptPolicy`, UTXO unspent at tip and no valid spend in mempool. | **`unspent`** | Continue verification. | — |
| Creation tx confirmed with matching `ScriptPolicy`, AND either (a) a valid spend is witnessed in mempool or confirmed block, OR (b) confirmed output is absent from node's UTXO set. | **`revoked`** | Durably write permanent `closure` entry to fenced journal (`SPEC-06 §6`) BEFORE returning refusal. Reorgs or mempool eviction MUST NOT reopen a closed seal. | `SEAL_SPENT` |
| Creation tx unknown, unconfirmed, script mismatches `ScriptPolicy`, or node read inconclusive. | **`unavailable`** | Refuse WITHOUT writing permanent closure. | `SEAL_UNAVAILABLE` |

#### 6.2 Single-Use Attribution (`SL-LDGR-012`, `decided`)

For `single_use_1_of_2` grant seals, a spend has **two distinct branches** and MUST NOT be folded blindly into `SEAL_SPENT`:

| Observed Seal Condition | Single-Use State | Verifier Action | Refusal / Outcome |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Seal unspent (no grantee spend observed). | `awaiting_spend` | Refuse without closure (grantee must spend branch `0` first). | `SEAL_UNAVAILABLE` |
| Spent via branch `1` (`issuer`), OR spent without valid `0x11` frame, OR absent from UTXO with unknown branch. | `revoked` | Write permanent `closure(cause="SEAL_SPENT")` to journal. | `SEAL_SPENT` |
| Spent via branch `0` (`grantee`, `SIGHASH_ALL`) with `OP_RETURN 0x11` committing `content_addr(invocation/1)`, depth `< required_depth` (mempool or shallow block). | `pending_confirm` | Refuse without closure; retryable once depth reaches `required_depth`. | `CHAIN_DEPTH_INSUFFICIENT` |
| Spent via branch `0` with matching `0x11`, confirmed `>= required_depth`, NOT yet in journal `single-use-consumed`. | `ready_once` | Execute at most once; durably write `single-use-consumed` + `closure(cause="SINGLE_USE_CONSUMED")` to journal. | **Admit** (`executed`) |
| Spent via branch `0`, already recorded in journal `single-use-consumed`. | `consumed` | Identical `invocation_id`: perform zero second effect and return cached receipt (or `INVOKE_REPLAY` if profile forbids cached return). Different `invocation_id`: refuse. | Cached receipt or `INVOKE_REPLAY` |

Block and mempool scanners projecting seal candidates MUST index tracked outpoints first and parse only transactions spending tracked seals.

#### 6.3 Pre-Signed Disposable Seals and TRUC/P2A CPFP Anchor Output (`SL-LDGR-013`, `decided` format / `open` production propagation qualification)

Fast-revocation seals for devices, auth keys, and member entries use a **CSPRNG-only private key** (never BIP-39 derived) whose private key is **destroyed immediately** after pre-signing and replicating `tx_revoke`:
- `tx_revoke` SHOULD use `nVersion = 3` (TRUC topology rules, [BIP-431]) signed with `SIGHASH_ALL` spending the seal UTXO and creating **one standard Pay-to-Anchor (`P2A`) output** ([BIP-433]): 4-byte witness v1 scriptPubKey `OP_1 PUSH2 0x4e73` (`51024e73`, classified as standard type `"anchor"` in Namecoin Core `nc28.0`) alongside its burn/return output. The `P2A` output value MUST meet or exceed Namecoin Core `nc28.0`'s `P2A` dust floor of **`240` base units**. Bare `OP_TRUE` (`nonstandard` in `nc28.0`) MUST NOT be used.
- **Namecoin minimum relay fee note:** Namecoin Core `nc28.0` sets default `minrelaytxfee = 0.001 NMC / 1000 vB` (`100,000` base units per 1000 vB — 100× Bitcoin's default). A zero-fee pre-signed `tx_revoke` parent is therefore rejected standalone (`min relay fee not met`) and is relayed as a 1-parent-1-child (`1p1c`) v3 package with a dynamically signed CPFP child spending the `P2A` output and funding the combined package fee (`>= minrelaytxfee` and current mempool feerate), without ever needing the destroyed seal private key.
- A reproducible two-node Namecoin Core `nc28.0` regtest positive control proving standalone parent rejection, `submitpackage` acceptance, P2P propagation before mining, and block confirmation is preserved in `conformance/p2a-regtest/` (production propagation and fee-competition qualification remain tracked under `OQ-006`).

---

### 7. Security Considerations

- **Mempool visibility is observer-local:** Revocation operates at mempool speed at each witnessing verifier; network propagation latency remains a physical limit.
- **Cold emergency fee reserve:** A hot signer compromise MUST NOT allow an attacker to drain fee UTXOs required for emergency name updates or CPFP revocations; emergency fee UTXOs remain in cold custody (`SPEC-03 §2`).
- **History walk DoS protection:** Verifiers MUST enforce a configurable maximum step bound when walking a name's update chain; hitting the bound refuses `NAME_HISTORY_UNAVAILABLE` without closure.

---

### 8. References

- **Normative:** [BIP-112], [BIP-141], [BIP-143], [BIP-174], [BIP-340].
- **Informative:** [BIP-431], [BIP-433], [NC28].

---

## SPEC-03: Identity, Name Value, Manifest, Key Taxonomy, Authentication, and Owner Control

- **Version:** `1.0.0-draft.2`
- **Status:** `draft` (normative rules `decided`; domain-binding verification and FIDO2/SSH device extensions tracked `open` in `OPEN-QUESTIONS.md`)
- **Evidence / Maturity:** `vectors` (`vectors/trace-01-mail-offline-revoke.json`, `vectors/refusal-coverage-matrix.json`)
- **Registries:** `registry/object-types.json`, `registry/key-roles.json`, `registry/service-types.json`, `registry/refusal-codes.json`
- **Schemas:** `schemas/name-value.schema.json`, `schemas/manifest.schema.json`, `schemas/card.schema.json`, `schemas/invocation.schema.json`

---

### 1. Name Value Format (520-Byte Protocol Budget)

An actor's ledger name (conventionally `id/<label>`, which MAY be a human-readable handle or an opaque pseudonymous identifier such as `id/u-8f3a91c4e2`) carries a compact Restricted JCS JSON object (`SPEC-01`, `schemas/name-value.schema.json`) of **at most `520` bytes** (`SL-IDEN-001`, `decided`).

#### 1.1 Top-Level Members (`SL-IDEN-002`, `decided`)

A SealLink reader MUST match top-level keys `link`, `m`, and `nostr` strictly (refusing duplicates or Unicode simple case-fold aliases with `WIRE_DUPLICATE`), and MUST ignore unknown owner-defined top-level members.

| Top-Level Key | Optional | Structure & Purpose | Closes Grants on Edit? |
| --- | :-: | --- | :-: |
| `link` | Yes | Authority & origin root object: closed subset of `{cred, grant, notary, origin}`. Each of `cred`, `grant`, `notary` is either a single `xonly_64hex` key or an on-chain threshold pin `{"p":"<sha256_of_JCS(ThresholdPolicy)>"}`. | **Per-role only (`SL-IDEN-003`)** |
| `m` | Yes | Single manifest head: `{"h":"<64hex>","s":<PositiveUint53>}` pinning `seallink-manifest/1` (JCS sorted keys `h`, `s`). Zero URLs or `loc` allowed. | **Never** |
| `nostr` | Yes | Optional transport messaging key: `"<64hex>"` OR NIP-05 object `{"names":{"_":"<64hex>"},"relays":{...}}`. Only `"_"` is read. Zero authority. | **Never** |

#### 1.2 Multi-Role Keys, On-Chain Role Policies, and Uniform `origin` Pin (`SL-IDEN-003`, `decided`)

One `id/` name MAY publish distinct, strictly isolated role keys or threshold role-policy pins simultaneously inside `link`:

```json
{"link":{"cred":"<64hex>","grant":{"p":"<64hex>"},"notary":"<64hex>","origin":"<64hex>"},"m":{"h":"<64hex>","s":1}}
```

- **On-chain role threshold integrity:** Every role policy (`1-of-1` direct key OR `m-of-n` `ThresholdPolicy` pinned as `{"p":"<sha256>"}`) is anchored **directly inside `link.<role>` on the ledger** — never governed solely by an off-chain manifest update.
  - When `link.<role>` is a 64-hex string `k`, the resolved role policy is `{"m":1,"pks":[k]}`.
  - When `link.<role>` is `{"p":h}`, the presenter supplies the full `ThresholdPolicy` (inside the signed object's `issuer.role_policy` and/or `manifest.role_policies.<role>`), and the verifier MUST confirm `SHA256(canonical_JCS(role_policy)) == h` (`WIRE_SIGNATURE` on mismatch). *(For ward-represented `seallink-grant/1` objects using `guardian_approvals[]`, `issuer.role_policy` is omitted on the ward's `issuer` pin and signing authority is resolved from each approving guardian's `link.grant` policy per `SPEC-04`.)*
  - Rotating any key or threshold inside a role policy changes `link.<role>` via an owner-authored (`SIGHASH_ALL`) ledger update, triggering the exact per-role closure rule below.
- **Byte budget:** With three roles (even with `{"p":...}` pins) + `origin` + `m`, the value is ~405 bytes — well within the 520-byte protocol limit.
- **Per-role history isolation:** Rotating or removing `link.notary` or `link.cred` MUST NOT close live grants bound to `link.grant`. Rotating or removing `link.grant` closes active grants (`NAME_ROLE_CHANGED`), while leaving eternal credentials and notary acts intact unless closed by `0x0b` (`h_c`).
- **Privacy-preserving `origin` pin:** Every origin-certified actor (child, adult, organization, or materialized agent) writes the identical field name `link.origin = "<origin_id_64hex>"`. Public chain observers cannot distinguish subject class or capacity from the name value alone (`SL-ARCH-012`).
- **Role key disjointness:** Within one name, every key appearing in `link.grant`, `link.cred`, `link.notary`, `nostr`, and `manifest.auth_key` MUST be disjoint (`NAME_VALUE_INVALID` if reused).
- **Name history walk (`SL-IDEN-004`, `decided`):** To verify an issuer's `grant` role policy for an active grant, the verifier resolves the name (refusing `NAME_NOT_FOUND` if absent on the active chain) and walks the name's confirmed update chain back to `issuer.registration`: `owner_policy` and `link.grant` MUST be unchanged from the grant's `recent_block` through the tip (renewals, `m` updates, `nostr` updates, and unrelated role changes close nothing). An owner-signed (`SIGHASH_ALL`) change or removal of `link.grant` (in mempool or block) writes a durable `NAME_ROLE_CHANGED` closure.

---

### 2. Key Taxonomy and Cold Custody Rules

All 22 key roles, curves, derivation accounts, and permitted signing domains are authoritatively fixed in `registry/key-roles.json` (`SL-IDEN-005`, `decided`):

1. **Cold isolation:** `name_owner` (separate cold seed `m/84'/7'/0'`) and `emergency_fee_reserve` (cold seed `m/84'/7'/3'`, strictly isolated from all hot signers so a hot compromise cannot drain emergency update/CPFP fees) MUST NEVER reside on an agent host or ordinary hot wallet.
2. **Authority separation:** `grant`, `cred`, and `notary` keys sign ONLY their registered BIP-340 domains (`registry/object-types.json`) and NEVER sign ledger transactions or spend seals.
3. **Auth vs Device vs Messaging:**
   - `auth` (`m/84'/7'/2'/0/i`) authenticates to foreign services ONLY (`seallink-auth-challenge/1`, `seallink-auth-upgrade/1`) and confers zero grant, contract assent, or effect authority.
   - `device` keys control the owner's own executors and agent key holders ONLY (`seallink-owner-command/1`, `seallink-statement/1`) and MUST NEVER sign foreign login challenges, assents, or grants (`DEVICE_UNAUTHORIZED`).
   - `messaging_or_request` keys carry messages and invoke grants only where explicitly named as recipient; they NEVER issue grants or child grants.
4. **Dynamic seal/row/stop pool (`>= 10'`):** Per-seal keys (`grant_seal`, `child_seal`, `row_coin`, `stop_coin`, `contract_seal`, `guardian_seal`) live in independent hardened accounts `>= 10'` with operator-secret xpubs.
5. **Disposable fast-revocation seals:** `auth_seal`, device seals, and member-entry seals MUST be generated from a CSPRNG (NEVER BIP-39), pre-signed with a `P2A` CPFP anchor output (`SL-LDGR-013`), and destroyed immediately after recording `tx_revoke`.

*(Concrete custody deployments — hardware enclaves, HSMs, Keyholder daemons — are informative and documented in `guides/GUIDE-01-custody-and-signers.md`.)*

---

### 3. Unified Manifest (`seallink-manifest/1`) and Off-Chain Sets

The single `m` pin in the name value authenticates one canonical JCS `seallink-manifest/1` object (`<= 16384` bytes, `schemas/manifest.schema.json`) (`SL-IDEN-006`, `decided`).

#### 3.1 Manifest Members

1. **`sets`** *(optional)*: Hash + monotonic `seq` pins for up to four off-chain JCS sets:
   - `card` (`seallink-card/1`): Public entity metadata card (`person | agent | organization | service`, display name, transports, relays, role, contact). Self-declared `kind` carries zero authority; if an `origin/1` is verified, `card.kind` MUST match `origin_class`.
   - `devices` (`seallink-device-list/1`): Owner control-plane devices (`label, alg ∈ {bip340, p256, ed25519}, key, presence, ceiling ∈ {0,1,2}, seal`).
   - `members` (`seallink-members-list/1`): Up to 1,024 managed/member actor pins `(name, owner_policy, seal)`. Verifiers MUST bound per-issuer journaled entries to prevent unbounded state growth.
   - `certs` (`seallink-certset-head/1`): Head committing to an actor's self-signed `seallink-statement/1` records (`config-section`, `transport-binding`, `root-rotate`, `root-cancel`, each with a closed `subject` schema).
2. **`service`** *(optional)*: Self-declaration when this actor operates a service (`service_type, actions, receipt_key, endpoint`, optional `tls_spki_sha256` pin). Discovery only; never substitutes for a pinned grant executor key.
3. **`providers`** *(optional, `SL-IDEN-007`, `decided`)*: Labeled bindings declaring which external service actors host this actor's resources. Each entry binds `(service_type, label)` to a full **`provider: NamePin`** (`{name, registration, owner_policy}`) plus optional `transport_key`:
   ```json
   "providers": [
     {
       "label": "work",
       "provider": {
         "name": "id/mail-host-a",
         "owner_policy": {"kind": "key", "pk": "02..."},
         "registration": {"txid": "...", "vout": 0}
       },
       "service_type": "mail"
     }
   ]
   ```
   - Each `(service_type, label)` pair MUST be unique within `providers`.
   - **Provider continuity:** Because `provider` pins `(name, registration, owner_policy)`, an attacker who re-registers an expired provider name string cannot hijack dynamic `executor_ref` delegations (`SERVICE_PROVIDER_UNBOUND` if holder's manifest lacks a matching `(service_type, label, provider)` entry; `NAME_OWNER_MISMATCH` if the pinned provider name's confirmed ledger output does not match `provider.owner_policy`). Switching providers requires an explicit owner-authored manifest update.
4. **`auth_key` + `auth_seal`** *(paired optional)*: Dedicated BIP-340 foreign-service login key and its disposable fast-revocation seal.
5. **`role_policies`** *(optional availability hint ONLY)*: Carries full `ThresholdPolicy` preimages for on-chain `link.<role>.p` pins. A `role_policies` entry has ZERO authority unless `SHA256(canonical_JCS(policy))` equals the confirmed on-chain `link.<role>.p` hash (`SL-IDEN-003`).

#### 3.2 Monotonicity, Removal, and Reorg Rules (`SL-IDEN-008`, `decided`)

Verifiers journal `(seq, manifest_sha256, anchoring_txid)` for the manifest and `(seq, sha256)` plus removal marks for each set, keyed by `(name, registration)`:
- On confirmed updates while `anchoring_txid` remains on the active chain: `manifest.seq` MUST strictly increase (`new > old`), and every retained set's `seq` MUST NOT decrease (`new >= old`; equal `seq` with different `sha256` refuses `MANIFEST_ROLLBACK`).
- Omitting a previously present set in a valid newer manifest records a durable removal mark at its highest seen `seq`; reintroducing the set requires a strictly higher `seq`.
- If `anchoring_txid` is orphaned by a chain reorg, the verifier adopts the highest confirmed manifest on the new active chain while retaining all recorded removal marks and seal closures.
- **Revocation independence:** Validated seal spends MUST be processed and journaled even if `seallink-manifest/1` is unavailable.

---

### 4. Non-Exclusive Four-Channel Distribution Cascade

Verifiers resolve `seallink-manifest/1` and pinned off-chain sets using a strictly non-exclusive cascade (`SL-IDEN-009`, `decided` cascade / `open` domain-binding verification profile in `OPEN-QUESTIONS.md`):

| Priority | Channel | Availability & Policy |
| :-: | --- | --- |
| **0** | **Inline** | Supplied directly by the presenter/peer alongside the request. Always works, including for opaque names with zero domain and zero Nostr key. |
| **1** | **Local Cache / Configured Stores** | Verifier's local hash cache or operator-configured Blossom (`GET /<sha256>`) / HTTP mirrors. |
| **2** | **HTTPS `.well-known`** | Optional; used ONLY if the name explicitly declares a verified domain -> `https://<domain>/.well-known/seallink/<object>/<sha256>`, under strict SSRF/redirect-denial policy. |
| **3** | **Nostr Relay (`kind 30079`)** | Optional; used ONLY if the name publishes a `nostr` pubkey -> query verifier-configured relays for addressable event `kind 30079` authored by that key with tag `["d", "seallink-manifest"]` (or `seallink-card`, etc.). |

Bytes from ANY channel are accepted **if and only if** `SHA256(bytes)` equals the confirmed ledger/manifest pin and full JCS/schema validation passes (`MANIFEST_MISMATCH` otherwise). Missing bytes refuse `MANIFEST_UNAVAILABLE` without silent unconfigured outbound fetches.

---

### 5. Provisional Onboarding and Foreign-Service Authentication

A foreign replaceable service authenticates actors using `seallink-auth-challenge/1` and `seallink-auth-upgrade/1` (`SL-IDEN-010`, `decided`):

1. **Challenge lifecycle:** Service generates a 32-byte CSPRNG `nonce`, records `issued_at` and `expires_at` (`issued_at < expires_at <= issued_at + 120`), pins its own `service_id`, and records the challenge durably. Client signs with `auth_key` (never `device`, `grant`, or `name_owner`). Service verifies `SPEC-01 §7`, checks `issued_at <= now < expires_at` (`AUTH_CHALLENGE_EXPIRED`), checks audience/nonce (`AUTH_CHALLENGE_INVALID`), and **atomically consumes the nonce** before creating any session.
2. **Named mode:** Service resolves `name`, walks owner history, verifies `manifest/1`, confirms `manifest.auth_key == auth_pubkey` (`AUTH_KEY_UNPINNED`), and confirms `manifest.auth_seal` is unspent (`SEAL_SPENT` if spent, `SEAL_UNAVAILABLE` if unconfirmed or inconclusive). Existing service accounts MUST retain their original `(name, registration, owner_policy)` binding; a re-registered name string MUST NOT take over an old account.
3. **Provisional key-only onboarding:** A service MAY admit a challenge without `name` into a strictly rate- and storage-capped local cell (zero effect, PII-release, or federation rights).
4. **Sponsored client-owned registration & atomic upgrade:** A sponsor MAY fund UTXOs controlled exclusively by the client so the client broadcasts `OP_NAME_NEW` and (`>= 12` blocks later) `OP_NAME_FIRSTUPDATE` (sponsor never owns the name). Once confirmed at required depth, client signs `seallink-auth-upgrade/1` under the same `auth_key` to atomically bind the confirmed registration to the provisional cell.
5. **Authentication is NOT authorization:** A successful login session confers zero authority to spend funds, disclose data to third parties, or bypass grant checks.

---

### 6. Owner Control Plane (Own Executors and Trust-Root Pin)

For commanding an actor's **own** hosts, executors, and managed agent key holders (`SL-IDEN-011`, `decided`):

1. **Device levels and closed command set:** `seallink-owner-command/1` carries a closed command enum (`agent-dispatch`, `session-terminate`, `policy-apply`, `keyholder-halt`) with typed `arguments` schemas (`schemas/invocation.schema.json`):
   - **L0:** Cognitive work / read-only dispatch (`agent-dispatch` with `level = 0`); zero effects.
   - **L1:** Policy-bounded operational control (`agent-dispatch`, `session-terminate` within local executor caps).
   - **L2:** High-assurance presence-verified device (`presence = true`, `ceiling = 2`): may issue `policy-apply` (paired with an L2-signed `seallink-statement/1`), `keyholder-halt`, and fast device revocation (`tx_revoke`).
   - **Level inheritance:** Any agent run launched by an `seallink-owner-command/1` inherits its `level` ceiling; the run's key holder MUST NOT sign effects above that level.
2. **Foreign boundary:** Device keys MUST NEVER be accepted by foreign services (`DEVICE_UNAUTHORIZED`).
3. **Host Trust-Root Pin and Delayed Admin Override (`SL-IDEN-012`, `decided`):** An isolated host/runtime pins `(network, genesis, root_name, registration, owner_policy, pinned_grant_policy)` in admin-owned read-only storage outside agent write reach. Routine rotation uses a `root-rotate` statement signed by the old policy. Unassisted administrator overwrite enters a mandatory pending delay `D` (default `1008` blocks) with out-of-band owner alerts on every load; the old policy OR the name's cold `owner_policy` MAY cancel before `effective_height` via `root-cancel`.

---

### 7. Security Considerations

- **No silent downgrade of manifest:** Once a verifier observes a confirmed manifest for `(name, registration)`, missing or malformed manifests refuse without falling back to stale caches.
- **Bidi spoofing in Entity Cards:** Clients rendering `card.display` or `card.role` SHOULD isolate untrusted text and flag Unicode bidirectional controls (`U+202A..202E`, `U+2066..2069`).
- **Key compromise blast radius:** Separating `auth`, `grant`, `cred`, `notary`, `device`, and `name_owner` ensures a leaked mobile login key cannot forge contracts, grants, origin certificates, or hijack the ledger name.

---

### 8. References

- **Normative:** [RFC8785], [BIP-340], [RFC8032], [SEC1], [JSON-SCHEMA-2020-12].
- **Informative:** [NC28].

---

## SPEC-04: Origin Certificates, Legal Capacity, and Multi-Guardian Quorums

- **Version:** `1.0.0-draft.2`
- **Status:** `draft` (core model and acyclic transitions `decided`; trusted calendar time-interval oracle profile remains `open` in `OPEN-QUESTIONS.md`)
- **Evidence / Maturity:** `vectors` (`vectors/trace-02-guardian-succession-assent.json`, `vectors/trace-04-agent-guardian-intake.json`, `vectors/refusal-coverage-matrix.json`)
- **Registries:** `registry/object-types.json`, `registry/opreturn-actions.json`, `registry/refusal-codes.json`
- **Schemas:** `schemas/origin.schema.json`, `schemas/guardian.schema.json`, `schemas/contract.schema.json`

---

### 1. The Three-Record Separation Model and Authenticated Status Spines

A single "who owns whom" record fails when a parent loses parental rights or an agent changes guardians, because a verifier must independently establish: (1) the origin certificate remains permanently authentic; (2) the ledger name still belongs to the subject; (3) the subject has neither emancipated nor ended; and (4) the presenting guardian(s) currently hold live slots meeting the event quorum.

SealLink therefore separates origin, status, binding, roster, and per-slot guardianship into cleanly linked UTXO-backed lines (`SL-ORIG-001`, `decided`):

| Record | Object Type | Anchor / UTXO Spine | Question Answered |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **1. Origin Certificate** | `seallink-origin/1` | Eternal anchor `0x09` + declares `binding_seal`, `status_seal`, and optional `roster_seal` (`disposer_pk`, `arbiter_pk`, `challenger_pk`) | Who certified immutable `origin_class` (`person \| agent \| organization`), salted initial guardians, quorum policy, and `name_recovery`? |
| **2. Status Spine** | `seallink-capacity/1`, `seallink-end/1` | Spends `status_seal` with `0x09` (`capacity/1` continues spine via `next_status_vout`; `end/1` is terminal) | While `status_seal` is unspent, proves **neither emancipation nor subject end has occurred** without global chain scanning. |
| **3. Name Binding** | `seallink-name-binding/1` | Spends `binding_seal` (or `recovery_seal`, continuing via `next_recovery_vout`) with `0x0c` | Which ledger registration `(name, registration_outpoint)` and `owner_policy` belong to `origin_id`? |
| **4. Roster Revision** | `seallink-guardian-roster/1` | Spends `roster_seal` (`both_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk)`) with `0x0f` | What is the current approved `revision`, `revision_size`, role keys (`disposer_pk`, `arbiter_pk`, `challenger_pk`), and valid slot set (including recovery of burned slots)? |
| **5. Slot Guardianship** | `seallink-guardian/1` | Per-slot UTXO chain (`0x12` direct initial activation OR `0x0d` Stage 1 pending -> `0x0e` Stage 2 active) | Who occupies slot `i`, under what term, and is that slot active? |

**Identity permanence:** Identity rests on the eternal `origin_id` and its verifiable UTXO spines, not on the mutable ledger name string.

---

### 2. Origin Certificates, Privacy Commitments, and Status Spine (`seallink-origin/1`)

#### 2.1 Origin-Certified Class and Private Commitments (`SL-ORIG-002`, `decided`)

1. Subject class (`person`, `agent`, `organization`) is established **solely** by a verified `seallink-origin/1` signed by an issuer `cred` policy trusted under local verifier policy.
2. Self-declared `seallink-card/1` fields prove nothing; if a card is present for a verified origin, `card.kind` MUST match `origin_class` (`ORIGIN_UNVERIFIED` on mismatch).
3. Two conflicting trusted origin certificates for one registration MUST refuse (`ORIGIN_UNVERIFIED`). Absence of an origin certificate yields class `unverified`.
4. **Pre-registration issuance:** `seallink-origin/1` is signed and anchored *before* name registration (`h_origin < h_firstupdate`), identifying the subject by `subject_initial_key` and committing `claims.intended_name` and `claims.intended_owner_policy`.
5. **Privacy of birth and initial guardians:** `seallink-origin/1` MUST NOT store plaintext `majority_unix` or plaintext initial guardian names:
   - `claims.majority_commitment` *(optional)* commits to `{"majority_unix": T}` using salted selective disclosure with an independent 32-byte CSPRNG salt (`SL-WIRE-014`).
   - Each `guardian_policy.slots[i].initial_guardian_commitment` commits to the initial guardian's complete `NamePin` (`{name, registration, owner_policy}`) using salted selective disclosure with its own independent 32-byte CSPRNG salt (`SL-WIRE-014`). Initial activation (`0x12`) opens `(salt_i, initial_guardian_NamePin)` and verifies exact commitment equality.
6. **Authenticated status discovery and continuation (`status_seal`):** `seallink-origin/1` MUST pin a confirmed `status_seal` (controlled by `capacity_authority` / end authority). Any verifier checking current status walks the status spine from `origin.status_seal` on its own node:

| Current Spine State | Observed Spend of Current `status_seal` | Next Spine State | Verifier Action |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `initial` | Unspent at tip and no valid spend in mempool. | `initial` (`ward` if `guardian_policy` present, else `autonomous`) | Continue verification. |
| `initial` | Confirmed `0x09` matching presented `seallink-capacity/1` (`issuer` verified at anchor height) creating `next_status_policy` at `next_status_vout`. | `emancipated` (successor `status_seal = (T_cap, next_status_vout)`) | Continue walking from `(T_cap, next_status_vout)`; require confirmed handover transfer (`SL-ORIG-011`). |
| `initial` or `emancipated` | Confirmed `0x09` matching presented `seallink-end/1` (`issuer` verified at anchor height). | `ended` (terminal; no successor seal) | Durably close all guardianship slots and refuse `SUBJECT_ENDED`. |
| `initial` or `emancipated` | Spent in mempool or block without matching presented `capacity/1` or `end/1`, or malformed `next_status_vout` / invalid issuer. | `incomplete` | Fail closed with `ORIGIN_STATUS_INCOMPLETE`. |

7. **Eternal validity & compromise cutoff:** Verified against `issuer.role_policy` (`link.cred`) **at `h_origin`**, surviving routine key rotation and name expiry, provided `h_origin < h_c` under any `0x0b` compromise break (`CRED_ISSUER_CLOSED`). Issuer services MUST enforce durable idempotency by `request_sha256`.

#### 2.2 Single-Use Name Binding (`SL-ORIG-003`, `decided`)

1. `seallink-origin/1` names a pre-created single-use `binding_seal`.
2. After `OP_NAME_FIRSTUPDATE` confirms at `h_firstupdate > h_origin` with output matching `intended_owner_policy`, the registrar spends `binding_seal` (`SIGHASH_ALL`) with `OP_RETURN 0x0c` committing `id(seallink-name-binding/1)` naming `(origin_id, seq=1, name, registration, owner_policy)`.
3. The subject's name value writes `"link": {"origin": "<origin_id_64hex>"}` (`SL-IDEN-003`). Removing or altering `link.origin` in a later update NEVER unbinds an already confirmed registration.
4. **Reverse uniqueness:** A registration already bound to one `origin_id` MUST refuse any second initial binding (`ORIGIN_BINDING_INVALID`).

---

### 3. Multi-Guardian Slots, Closed Event Classes, and Slot Transitions

#### 3.1 Revision-Denominated Quorums and Verifier-Derived `event_class` (`SL-ORIG-004`, `SL-ORIG-005`, `decided`)

1. `origin.guardian_policy` initializes `revision = 1`, `revision_size = N` (`1 <= N <= 32`), explicit compressed secp256k1 ECDSA keys **`disposer_pk`**, independent **`arbiter_pk`** (`arbiter_pk != disposer_pk`), and pre-activation **`challenger_pk`** (`CompressedPubkey66`; institutional multi-custodian roles use threshold ECDSA tracked under `OQ-007`), `roster_seal` (`both_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk)`), `appointment_delay_blocks`, a closed 4-class `QuorumMap`, and `slots[1..N]` (each beginning in `initial_vacant` with `vacant_utxo` locked by `both_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk)`).
2. **Closed 4-class linear `GuardianEventClass` (verifier-derived — NEVER signer-chosen):** ONLY objects carrying `payload.guardian_context` (`seallink-grant/1` and `seallink-assent/1`) map to `GuardianEventClass`. The four classes form a strict linear order `routine_read < effect_grant < contract_assent < custody_change`. The verifier deterministically derives the required class from the object type, target, and capabilities (taking the highest matching class across all capabilities in a grant) and MUST verify `payload.guardian_context.event_class == derived_class` (`GUARDIAN_QUORUM_UNMET` on mismatch):

| `GuardianEventClass` | Normative Carrier Objects & Scope (Highest Matching Class Applies) |
| --- | --- |
| `routine_read` | Stateless read-only `seallink-grant/1` (`external_mutation = false`, no `quotas`, no `delegate`, not `single_use`, no `contract_id`, and NOT `agent/guardian-message`). |
| `effect_grant` | Unilateral `seallink-grant/1` (no `delegate`, no `contract_id`) with `quotas`, `external_mutation = true`, `single_use` revocation, OR action `agent/guardian-message` (`PROFILE-agent-v1`). |
| `contract_assent` | `seallink-assent/1` with `target_type = "seallink-contract/1"`, OR any contract-bound `seallink-grant/1` (`contract_id` present, without `delegate`). |
| `custody_change` | Delegating `seallink-grant/1` (`delegate` present), OR `seallink-assent/1` with `target_type = "seallink-migration/1"`. |

   *(Roster transitions `0x0f`, emancipation `seallink-capacity/1`, subject end `seallink-end/1`, and dual-party name recovery `0x0c` are governed directly by their dedicated on-chain seals and `issuer.role_policy` — never by `guardian_approvals[]` — so a deadlocked or burned guardian quorum never blocks institutional governance.)*
3. **Revision-denominated threshold (`SL-ORIG-005`):** For derived class `E` with quorum `{num, den, min}` from the active roster revision, required distinct valid guardian slots MUST be computed strictly against **`revision_size`** (NEVER against transient active slot count):
   ```text
   required(E) = max(min, ceil(num * revision_size / den))
   ```
4. **Distinct guardian rule:** Only an `autonomous` actor MAY hold a guardianship slot. Two slots MAY NOT simultaneously be held by the same `(name, registration)`. Each approving slot supplies its own independent `SignatureSet` inside `guardian_approvals[]` matching that guardian's resolved `link.grant` policy (`SL-WIRE-013`), so a multi-key guardian satisfies its own threshold independently and counts as at most one slot.

#### 3.2 Guardianship Consistency Invariants (`SL-ORIG-016`, `decided`)

Every verifier validating `seallink-origin/1`, `seallink-guardian-roster/1`, or `seallink-guardian/1` MUST enforce these mechanical invariants:

1. **Rational quorum bounds:** For every entry `{num, den, min}` in `quorums`, `1 <= num <= den <= 32` and `1 <= min <= revision_size` MUST hold (`WIRE_INTEGER` on violation).
2. **Exact slot coverage:** `len(slots) == revision_size`, all `slot` numbers MUST be distinct, and the set of slot numbers MUST equal `{1, ..., revision_size}` (`WIRE_INTEGER` on violation).
3. **Key independence and script binding:** `disposer_pk != arbiter_pk` MUST hold (`ORIGIN_UNVERIFIED` on violation). `roster_seal.script_policy` and every `vacant_utxo` / `new_vacant_policy` MUST compile to `both_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk)`. Every Stage 1 `pending_policy` MUST compile to `guardian_slot_pending` with `disposer == active_roster.disposer_pk`, `challenger == active_roster.challenger_pk`, `guardian == guardian_seal_pk`, and `delay_blocks == effective_delay_blocks >= origin.guardian_policy.appointment_delay_blocks` (`CHAIN_SCRIPT_UNSUPPORTED` on script/key mismatch; `GUARDIAN_INACTIVE` on delay shortfall). Every `active_policy` MUST compile to `either_of_2(guardian_seal_pk, active_roster.disposer_pk)`.
4. **Term ceiling against majority:** For a human ward (`origin_class = "person"`) whose `claims.majority_commitment` is opened to `{"majority_unix": T}`, every `seallink-guardian/1` carrying a `calendar` term MUST satisfy `term.not_after_unix <= T` (`GUARDIAN_INACTIVE` on violation).

#### 3.3 Protocol-Level Ward Non-Autonomy (`SL-ORIG-006`, `decided`)

While a subject is in `ward` status (verified `origin/1` with `guardian_policy` present and no completed emancipation), every verifier evaluating a `seallink-grant/1` or `seallink-assent/1` for that subject MUST enforce this exact refusal precedence:

1. Missing `payload.guardian_context` or carrying top-level `signatures` instead of `guardian_approvals[]` -> **`WARD_AUTONOMOUS_FORBIDDEN`**
2. `payload.guardian_context.origin_id` or `ward_name` mismatch -> **`ORIGIN_UNVERIFIED`**
3. `payload.guardian_context.revision` mismatch with latest effective roster revision, OR any `guardian_approvals[i].revision != payload.guardian_context.revision` -> **`GUARDIAN_QUORUM_UNMET`**
4. For each entry in `guardian_approvals[]` (strictly ascending `slot`, checked at wire step -> `WIRE_SIGNATURE`): slot not in active roster, slot state != `active`, active guardian name != `entry.guardian_name`, calendar/ceiling term expired, or two approving slots resolve to the same `(name, registration)` -> **`GUARDIAN_INACTIVE`**
5. Approving guardian's `entry.signatures.policy` does not equal that guardian's resolved `link.grant` policy at tip, or BIP-340 verification fails -> **`WIRE_SIGNATURE`**
6. `payload.guardian_context.event_class != derived_class`, OR count of distinct satisfied slots `< required(derived_class)` -> **`GUARDIAN_QUORUM_UNMET`**

#### 3.4 Initial Activation (`0x12`), Acyclic Two-Stage Appointment (`0x0d`/`0x0e`), and Slot State Machine (`SL-ORIG-007`, `decided`)

To eliminate `txid <-> hash` cycles, preserve privacy of initial guardians, and eliminate indefinite challenger vetoes, slot activation supports two explicit modes in `seallink-guardian/1` (`activation_mode`):

1. **Initial Slot Activation (`activation_mode = "initial"`, `0x12`):**
   - Each slot declared in `origin.guardian_policy.slots[i]` begins in state **`initial_vacant`** at `vacant_utxo` (`both_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk)`).
   - To activate initial guardian `G_init` without delay: the presenter opens `(salt_i, initial_guardian_NamePin)` verifying `commit(salt_i, initial_guardian_NamePin) == origin.guardian_policy.slots[i].initial_guardian_commitment` (`SL-WIRE-014`); `G_init` signs `seallink-assent/1` (`target_type = "seallink-guardian/1"`); and `issuer` signs `seallink-guardian/1` with `activation_mode = "initial"`, `revision = 1`, `prev_outpoint = vacant_utxo`, `active_vout`, and `active_policy = either_of_2(guardian_seal_pk, disposer_pk)`.
   - Both `disposer_pk` and `arbiter_pk` co-sign one PSBT spending `vacant_utxo` (`both_of_2`), creating `active_policy` at `active_vout`, and anchoring `content_addr(seallink-guardian/1)` in `OP_RETURN 0x12` (`GUARDIAN_INITIAL_ACTIVATION`).
   - Once confirmed at `h_init` (`T_init`), the live active slot seal is deterministically **`(T_init, active_vout)`**. `activation_mode = "initial"` is permitted ONLY from `initial_vacant` at `revision = 1`; appointing ANY successor MUST use `activation_mode = "appointed"` below.
2. **Stage 1 — Successor Appointment (`activation_mode = "appointed"`, `0x0d`, creates `pending_delay`):**
   - Incoming guardian `G_new` signs `seallink-assent/1` (`target_type = "seallink-guardian/1"`).
   - Appointing authority (`issuer.role_policy`, verified against `link.cred` at `h_app`) signs the **acyclic** `seallink-guardian/1` with `activation_mode = "appointed"`, committing `prev_outpoint` (the `vacant` or `initial_vacant` UTXO), `pending_vout`, `pending_policy` (`guardian_slot_pending` with `{disposer: active_roster.disposer_pk, challenger: active_roster.challenger_pk, guardian: guardian_seal_pk}` and `delay_blocks = effective_delay_blocks`), and `active_policy` (`either_of_2(guardian_seal_pk, active_roster.disposer_pk)`).
   - Both `disposer_pk` and `arbiter_pk` co-sign one PSBT spending `prev_outpoint` (`both_of_2`), creating `pending_policy` at `pending_vout`, and anchoring `content_addr(seallink-guardian/1)` in `OP_RETURN 0x0d`.
   - Once confirmed at `h_app` with txid `T_app`, the pending slot outpoint is deterministically **`(T_app, pending_vout)`**. During `[h_app, h_app + delay_blocks)`, the slot has zero authority; `disposer_pk` or `challenger_pk` MAY spend `(T_app, pending_vout)` to veto the appointment.
3. **Stage 2 — Activation (`0x0e`, removes challenger veto permanently):**
   - At height `H >= h_app + delay_blocks`, `G_new` spends `(T_app, pending_vout)` via the CSV-unlocked `<guardian>` branch (`SIGHASH_ALL`), creating `active_policy` (`either_of_2(guardian_seal_pk, active_roster.disposer_pk)`) at output `vout = 0`, and anchoring `id(seallink-guardian/1)` in `OP_RETURN 0x0e`.
   - Once confirmed at `h_act` with txid `T_act`, the live active slot seal is deterministically **`(T_act, 0)`**. `challenger_pk` is absent from `active_policy` and has zero power once activated.
4. **Fast Halt (1 party, mempool speed):** Either `guardian` resigns OR `disposer_pk` halts immediately by spending the active slot seal (`either_of_2`) to a fresh `vacant` UTXO locked by `both_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk)` (optionally carrying `0x0a` for-cause withdrawal, which bars re-appointment without a new ruling). First observation in mempool permanently terminates that guardian's authority (`GUARDIAN_INACTIVE` on ward actions; `SEAL_SPENT` on direct seal check).

##### Complete Slot State Transition Table

Because Namecoin lacks output covenants, a malicious spender could spend a slot UTXO to an invalid output script ("burning" the slot). Every possible spend is handled deterministically:

| Current State | Observed Spend / Event | Next State | Guardian Authority | Recovery Path |
| --- | --- | --- | :-: | --- |
| `initial_vacant` | Valid `0x12` tx (`both_of_2`) for disclosed `initial_guardian_commitment` + guardian assent creating `active_policy` at `active_vout`. | `active` (outpoint `(T_init, active_vout)`) | **Active** | Normal operation. |
| `initial_vacant` | Valid `0x0d` tx (`both_of_2`, `activation_mode = "appointed"`) creating `pending_policy` at `pending_vout`. | `pending_delay` (outpoint `(T_app, pending_vout)`) | None | Stage 2 after `delay_blocks`. |
| `initial_vacant` | Any other spend of `vacant_utxo`. | `contested_burned` | None | `seallink-guardian-roster/1` (`0x0f`). |
| `vacant` | Valid `0x0d` tx (`both_of_2`, `activation_mode = "appointed"`) creating `pending_policy` at `pending_vout`. | `pending_delay` (outpoint `(T_app, pending_vout)`) | None | Stage 2 after `delay_blocks`. |
| `vacant` | Any other spend (including `0x12`) of `vacant_utxo`. | `contested_burned` | None | `seallink-guardian-roster/1` (`0x0f`). |
| `pending_delay` | Spend by `disposer_pk` or `challenger_pk` before Stage 2. | `vetoed` (if recreated as `both_of_2` at `vout = 0` -> `vacant`, else `contested_burned`) | None | New `0x0d` or `0x0f` roster transition. |
| `pending_delay` | Valid `0x0e` tx (`<guardian>` CSV branch) creating `active_policy` at `vout = 0`. | `active` (outpoint `(T_act, 0)`) | **Active** | Normal operation. |
| `pending_delay` | Any malformed spend of `(T_app, pending_vout)`. | `contested_burned` | None | `seallink-guardian-roster/1` (`0x0f`). |
| `active` | Spend of active seal creating valid `both_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk)` at `vout = 0` (with optional `0x0a`). | `vacant` | **Ended** | New `0x0d` appointment. |
| `active` | Spend of active seal to ANY other script ("slot burn"). | `contested_burned` | **Ended** | `seallink-guardian-roster/1` (`0x0f`). |
| Any | `seallink-capacity/1` transfer completed OR `seallink-end/1` verified. | `closed` | **Ended** | Terminal. |

#### 3.5 Roster Revision Transitions (`seallink-guardian-roster/1`, `0x0f`, `SL-ORIG-015`, `decided`)

To change approved `revision_size` (e.g., reducing `2 -> 1` when one parent loses parental rights, adding a slot, rotating `disposer_pk`/`arbiter_pk`/`challenger_pk`, updating `quorums`, or re-anchoring a `contested_burned` slot):

1. **Authorization without old-roster quorum:** Roster transitions are authorized strictly by `disposer_pk + arbiter_pk` co-signing a PSBT spending the current `roster_seal` (`both_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk)`), combined with `issuer.role_policy` (`link.cred`) signing `seallink-guardian-roster/1` and waiting `effective_delay_blocks`. They NEVER require signatures from the old guardian roster, ensuring deadlocked or burned rosters remain recoverable.
2. The `0x0f` transaction creates `next_roster_policy` (`both_of_2(new_disposer_pk, new_arbiter_pk)`) at `next_roster_vout`, creates any `new_vacant` slot UTXOs at their declared `new_vacant_vout` indices, and anchors `content_addr(seallink-guardian-roster/1)` via `OP_RETURN 0x0f`.
3. `payload.revision` MUST equal `prev_revision + 1`, and `payload` MUST satisfy all `SL-ORIG-016` invariants (`len(slots) == revision_size`, `1 <= num <= den`, `1 <= min <= revision_size`, `disposer_pk != arbiter_pk`).
4. The new roster takes effect after `effective_delay_blocks` confirmations (`>= origin.guardian_policy.appointment_delay_blocks`). While `roster_seal` is spent and `seallink-guardian-roster/1` is not presented (or fails verification), verifiers fail closed with `ORIGIN_STATUS_INCOMPLETE`.
5. **Issuer-key survival (`SL-ORIG-008`, `decided`):** Both `seallink-guardian/1` and `seallink-guardian-roster/1` verify `issuer.role_policy` (`link.cred`) **at their confirmed anchor height**, bounded by `0x0b` (`h_c`), so routine issuer key rotation never orphans wards.

---

### 4. Guardianship Terms: Indefinite vs. Calendar Time

| Subject / Mode | `term` Form | Termination Rule (`SL-ORIG-009`, `decided`) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Agent / Indefinite** | `{"mode":"indefinite"}` | Lives until slot seal spend, verified `seallink-capacity/1`, verified `seallink-end/1`, or compromise cutoff `h_c`. |
| **Human Minor / Calendar** | `{"mode":"calendar","not_after_unix":T,"ceiling_height":H_max}` | Guardianship ends automatically at calendar majority `T` (bounded by `T <= opened majority_unix` per `SL-ORIG-016`, and never exceeding `H_max`, which is a failsafe ceiling and never extends past `T`). |

**Asymmetric Safety Rule at Majority Boundary (`SL-ORIG-010`, `open` time-interval oracle profile; safety rule `decided`):**
Block intervals drift by weeks over 18 years; chain median time past (MTP) is an auxiliary necessary constraint (`MTP < T` for guardian admission), never sufficient alone.
- Guardian admission is allowed ONLY if the entire credible UTC interval `[t_low, t_high]` lies strictly below `T` (and tip is fresh under `SPEC-02`).
- Independent adult admission requires `t_low >= T` plus confirmed emancipation transfer (`SL-ORIG-011`).
- If `[t_low, t_high]` straddles `T`, tip is stale, or the credible interval cannot be established, admission pauses for BOTH sides (`GUARDIAN_TIME_BOUNDARY`). *(The normative trusted time-interval oracle profile is tracked in `OPEN-QUESTIONS.md`.)*

---

### 5. Ward Admission State Machine, Emancipation, and Subject End

#### 5.1 Four Ward Admission States (`SL-ORIG-011`, `decided`)

A verifier evaluating any action for an origin-certified actor walks `origin/1`, `status_seal`, `roster_seal`, `binding_seal`, and active slot seals:

| State | Condition | Permitted Admission |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **1. Under Guardianship** | `status_seal` unspent (no `capacity/1` or `end/1`); unexpired; active slot(s) at latest effective roster `revision` satisfy `required(derived_event_class)` via `guardian_approvals[]`; confirmed name binding matches current `owner_policy`. | Actions authorized by guardian quorum (and separate service grant where required). |
| **2. Guardianship Halted** | Not emancipated, but active slots cannot meet `required(derived_event_class)` (halted, vacant, pending, or `contested_burned`). | None (`GUARDIAN_INACTIVE` if cited slot is inactive; `GUARDIAN_QUORUM_UNMET` if valid active slots fall below `required`). |
| **3. Transfer Pending** | Calendar `T` reached OR verified `seallink-capacity/1` spent `status_seal`, but name output has NOT yet been confirmed-transferred to `subject_new_owner_policy` with subject's own `SIGHASH_ALL` name update. | None for either side (`GUARDIAN_TRANSFER_PENDING`). Name renewal, revocation, and handover transfer remain allowed. |
| **4. Autonomous** | `capacity/1` (+ `t_low >= T` for human) verified, confirmed name transfer to `subject_new_owner_policy`, confirmed subject-authored update, and binding line updated. | Full autonomous protocol admission; guardianship slots permanently `closed`. |

- **Emancipation rule:** Transferring a ward's name upon majority/emancipation MUST move the name UTXO to a fresh `ScriptPolicy` generated by the subject — never hand guardians' old shared key shares to the subject.
- **Subject End (`SL-ORIG-012`, `decided`):** An eternal `seallink-end/1` record spending `status_seal` terminally (`0x09`, creating no successor `status_seal`) permanently closes all guardianship slots and refuses all future admission (`SUBJECT_ENDED`). Silence or lost keys NEVER constitute proof of end.

---

### 6. Dual-Mode Name Recovery (`name_recovery`) and Seal Continuation

`seallink-origin/1` immutably declares one of two recovery policies at issuance (`SL-ORIG-013`, `decided`):

1. **`"mode": "none"` (Irreversible Binding):** No third party can ever re-bind `origin_id` to a new ledger name. Attempting recovery refuses `RECOVERY_FORBIDDEN`.
2. **`"mode": "dual_party_delayed"` (Governed Recovery):**
   - `origin/1` pins `disposer_pk`, independent `arbiter_pk` (`disposer_pk != arbiter_pk`), `delay_blocks >= 144` (recommended `>= 1008`), and a `both_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk)` `recovery_seal`.
   - To recover after catastrophic key loss, both `disposer_pk` and `arbiter_pk` co-sign a transaction `T_rec` spending the live `recovery_seal` with `OP_RETURN 0x0c` committing a new `seallink-name-binding/1` (`seq = prev_seq + 1`, naming the new confirmed registration, new `owner_policy`, `supersedes_binding_id`, AND continuation `next_recovery_vout` + `next_recovery_policy = both_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk)`).
   - Once `T_rec` confirms at `h_rec`, the live recovery seal advances to `(T_rec, next_recovery_vout)`. During `[h_rec, h_rec + delay_blocks)`, the previous binding stops admitting and the new binding sits in `pending_delay` (`RECOVERY_FORBIDDEN` for both bindings).
   - **Live-owner cancellation veto (`SL-ORIG-014`, `decided`):** At any block strictly prior to `h_rec + delay_blocks`, the existing name's current `owner_policy` MAY broadcast an owner-authored (`SIGHASH_ALL`) `OP_NAME_UPDATE` containing `OP_RETURN 0x10` (`RECOVERY_CANCEL`) committing `id(pending_name_binding/1)`. Observing confirmed `0x10` cryptographically proves the old keys are alive, permanently aborts the pending recovery (`RECOVERY_FORBIDDEN` for the cancelled binding), **immediately restores admission under the prior `NameBinding`**, and preserves the continued `recovery_seal` at `(T_rec, next_recovery_vout)` for any genuine future recovery.
   - Old grants bound to the old name/key NEVER carry over to a recovered name.

##### Recovery Seal State Transition Table

| Current State | Observed Chain Event | Next State | Admitted Binding |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `active_binding(B_k)` | `recovery_seal` unspent. | `active_binding(B_k)` | `B_k` |
| `active_binding(B_k)` | Valid `0x0c` spend (`T_rec` at `h_rec`) creating `next_recovery_policy` at `next_recovery_vout` committing `B_{k+1}`. | `pending_recovery(B_{k+1})` (successor seal `(T_rec, next_recovery_vout)`) | None (`RECOVERY_FORBIDDEN` during delay). |
| `pending_recovery(B_{k+1})` | Owner-authored `SIGHASH_ALL` `OP_NAME_UPDATE` of `B_k.name` with `0x10` committing `id(B_{k+1})` confirmed at `< h_rec + delay_blocks`. | `active_binding(B_k)` (successor seal `(T_rec, next_recovery_vout)`) | **`B_k` restored immediately**; `B_{k+1}` permanently aborted (`RECOVERY_FORBIDDEN`). |
| `pending_recovery(B_{k+1})` | Tip reaches `H >= h_rec + delay_blocks` with no `0x10` cancel. | `active_binding(B_{k+1})` | **`B_{k+1}` active**; `B_k` permanently superseded (`ORIGIN_BINDING_INVALID`). |
| Any | Malformed spend of `recovery_seal` (missing `0x0c` or missing valid `next_recovery_vout`). | `incomplete` | Fail closed (`ORIGIN_STATUS_INCOMPLETE`). |

---

### 7. Security Considerations

- **Three-place key custody limit:** A `2-of-3` child name (`Parent A`, `Parent B`, `Notary`) survives any 1 lost share, but any 2 colluding holders can spend the name UTXO. Preventing both single-point loss and 2-party collusion requires `3-of-4` with an independent 4th custodian.
- **Name renewal obligation:** Over an 18-year childhood on Namecoin (`D = 36000`), guardians execute ~27–30 renewals. Off-chain agreements SHOULD define when the 3rd custodian co-signs renewals while keeping the on-chain script at full threshold (`SL-LDGR-006`).
- **Compromised issuer key:** Independent `arbiter_pk` requirements (`SL-ORIG-007`, `SL-ORIG-013`, `SL-ORIG-015`) prevent unilateral appointment, roster takeover, or name recovery; cold multisig `owner_policy` protects institutional issuers.

---

### 8. References

- **Normative:** [BIP-112], [BIP-141], [BIP-174], [BIP-340], [RFC8785].
- **Informative:** [RFC8448], [NC28].

---

## SPEC-05: Contracts, Symmetric Assent, Verifiable Credentials, and General Notary Acts

- **Version:** `1.0.0-draft.2`
- **Status:** `draft` (normative rules `decided`)
- **Evidence / Maturity:** `vectors` (`vectors/wire-jcs-and-hashes.json`, `vectors/trace-02-guardian-succession-assent.json`, `vectors/refusal-coverage-matrix.json`)
- **Registries:** `registry/object-types.json`, `registry/key-roles.json`, `registry/opreturn-actions.json`, `registry/refusal-codes.json`
- **Schemas:** `schemas/contract.schema.json`, `schemas/credential.schema.json`

---

### 1. Relationship Between Grants and Contracts

In SealLink v1.0, a **unilateral grant (`SPEC-06`) is the base authorization primitive**: it requires no recipient assent and imposes no obligations on the recipient. A **contract (`seallink-contract/1`)** is the bilateral or multilateral overlay that adds mutual agreement, obligations, framework governance, and shared or arbiter-controlled termination (`SL-CONT-001`, `decided`).

- A contract MAY exist without any grant (e.g., an anchored agreement between two people or organizations).
- Any action profile imposing payment, work, rental, or liability obligations on the recipient (such as `rental` or contract-bound `agent/session`) MUST declare `requires_contract = true`; executors refuse unilateral grants for such actions (`GRANT_CONTRACT_REQUIRED`).

---

### 2. N-Party Structured Contracts (`seallink-contract/1`)

#### 2.1 Structure, Salted Selective Disclosure, and Machine-Clause Completeness (`SL-CONT-002`, `decided`)

A `seallink-contract/1` object (`<= 65536` bytes, `schemas/contract.schema.json`) binds `N >= 2` parties (any combination of people, organizations, agents, or unverified actors):

1. **Header fields:** `type`, `network`, `genesis`, `profile`, `contract_salt` (32 CSPRNG bytes, preventing offline guessing of short contracts), `parties[2..32]` — where each entry is either an **autonomous party** `{role, name_pin?, signing_policy: ThresholdPolicy}` or a **ward party** `{role, ward_origin_id, name_pin}` (omitting static `signing_policy` so guardian succession never invalidates a live contract) — `window` (`not_before_height`, optional `not_after_height`, optional calendar `not_after_unix`), optional `machine_clause_indices`, optional `framework_id`, optional/required `seal`, optional `assent_output`, optional `config_sha256`, and optional `moderation`.
2. **Clauses & Selective Disclosure:** Each clause `i` is a canonical JCS object containing free-text prose (`text`, where `\n` is allowed per `SL-WIRE-005`), typed machine terms (mirroring any bound grant capabilities/quotas), or both. The contract stores ONLY the ordered array `clause_commitments[]` where:
   ```text
   clause_commitments[i] = H_tag("seallink-clause/1", salt_i || canonical_JCS(clause_i))
   contract_id           = SHA256(canonical_JCS(seallink-contract/1))
   ```
   When a grant binds `contract_id` (and optionally `framework_id`), both complete contract documents MUST be presented (`CONTRACT_NOT_PRESENTED`) and MUST recompute to their bound identifiers (`CONTRACT_ID_MISMATCH`).
3. **Deterministic machine-clause completeness:** Every clause index carrying machine-enforced terms MUST be listed in strictly ascending order in `machine_clause_indices[]` (with every index `< len(clause_commitments)`). An executor MUST require disclosure of `(salt_i, clause_i)` for EVERY index `i` in `machine_clause_indices[]`, verify `commit(salt_i, clause_i) == clause_commitments[i]`, and check every disclosed machine term against the bound grant (`CONTRACT_TERMS_MISMATCH` on missing disclosure or mismatch). Prose-only clauses outside `machine_clause_indices[]` MAY remain undisclosed to the executor.
4. **Framework Nesting (`SL-CONT-003`, `decided`):** A contract MAY name at most one `framework_id`, and a framework contract MUST NOT name another framework contract (maximum nesting depth = 1). Every grant's window MUST nest inside its bound contract's window, which MUST nest inside its framework contract's window.

#### 2.2 Symmetric Native Assent (`seallink-assent/1`) and Anchoring (`SL-CONT-004`, `decided`)

1. **Symmetric off-chain assent:** A contract is concluded when EVERY party in `parties[]` has signed an identical-format `seallink-assent/1` (`<= 32768` bytes, accommodating multi-guardian `guardian_approvals[]` and up to 32-of-32 `SignatureSet`, `target_type = "seallink-contract/1"`, `target_id = contract_id`):
   - Permitted signer roles for `seallink-assent/1` are strictly `grant` and `guardian_quorum` (`registry/object-types.json`, coherent with `registry/key-roles.json`); `auth` and `device` keys MUST NEVER sign `seallink-assent/1` (`WIRE_SIGNATURE`).
   - For an **autonomous party** (`signing_policy` present), `seallink-assent/1` uses the ordinary `{"payload","signatures"}` envelope whose `signatures.policy` MUST strictly equal `party.signing_policy` (`SL-WIRE-013`).
   - For a **ward party** (`ward_origin_id` present, `SPEC-04`), `seallink-assent/1` MUST carry `payload.guardian_context` (`origin_id == party.ward_origin_id`, `ward_name == party.name_pin.name`, `event_class = "contract_assent"`, `revision` matching the ward's active roster revision) and top-level `guardian_approvals[]` satisfying `required("contract_assent")` across distinct active guardian slots (`SL-ORIG-006` refusal precedence: `WARD_AUTONOMOUS_FORBIDDEN`, then `GUARDIAN_INACTIVE`, then `WIRE_SIGNATURE`, then `GUARDIAN_QUORUM_UNMET`).
   - Assent freshness for grant issuance is at most `72` hours (`259200s`) and single-use per issuance (`CONTRACT_ASSENT_INVALID`).
2. **Contract anchor (`0x07`):** A contract is anchored via `OP_RETURN` action `0x07` committing `contract_id` (`loc_type = 0x00` default for private contracts).
3. **Optional on-chain assent:** Parties MAY additionally name a confirmed `N-of-N` `P2WSH` `assent_output` in `seallink-contract/1` and have the `0x07` anchor transaction spend it (`SIGHASH_ALL` on all signatures), proving mutual assent on chain even to observers who never see contract plaintext.

#### 2.3 The Contract Seal Decides Termination (`SL-CONT-005`, `decided`)

1. **Mandatory seal before signing:** Every framework contract and every contract under which any grant is issued MUST name a confirmed `seal` created **before** parties sign `seallink-assent/1`. Signing services and verifiers MUST check confirmation and exact compiled `ScriptPolicy` match of both the bound contract's seal and any named framework contract's seal on their own node (`CONTRACT_SEAL_MISSING` on conclusive absence/mismatch; `SEAL_UNAVAILABLE` on inconclusive read).
2. **Script derives termination type — never prose:** Every reader, renderer, and UI MUST derive the contract's termination type strictly from `seal.script_policy` (`SL-LDGR-004`):
   - `{"kind":"key"}` -> **`issuer_only`**
   - `{"kind":"branch","template":"either_of_2"}` -> **`either_party`**
   - `{"kind":"branch","template":"both_of_2"}` -> **`both_together`**
   - `{"kind":"branch","template":"arbiter_or_both"}` -> **`arbiter`**
   A prose clause describing termination binds parties as text only and NEVER ends a contract or overrides the script-derived type.
3. **One spend ends all grants:** Spending a contract or framework seal (`SEAL_SPENT`) durably terminates every grant bound to that contract (or framework) upon first observation. The spending transaction SHOULD carry `OP_RETURN` action `0x08` committing `typed_digest(seallink-termination/1)` (`SIGHASH_ALL`); however, the spend alone terminates the contract regardless of whether `0x08` is valid or present.

#### 2.4 Agreed Configuration Hash (`SL-CONT-006`, `decided`)

Any contract profile under which a runtime launches a configured agent (`profiles/PROFILE-agent-v1.md`) MUST require `config_sha256`. A runtime launcher that cannot reproduce `config_sha256` from the exact profile, skills, and tools it is about to launch MUST refuse to start (`CONTRACT_CONFIG_MISMATCH`).

---

### 3. Violation Verdicts and Salted Request Attribution (`seallink-verdict/1`)

For moderated contracts (e.g., hosted services or agent sessions), `seallink-contract/1` MAY declare `moderation: {rules_sha256, moderator_key, moderator_kind}` (`SL-CONT-007`, `decided`):

1. Each recorded violation is a moderator-signed `seallink-verdict/1` chained via `ordinal` and `prev_verdict_id`, committing to `rules_sha256`, `violated_rule`, `request_salted_sha256`, and `response_salted_sha256`.
2. **Salted invocation attribution:** To allow dispute evidence without exposing plaintext on chain or enabling dictionary guesses against short messages, `seallink-invocation/1` MAY include a fresh 32-byte `content_salt` (distinct from `nonce`), with `salted_hash = SHA256(content_salt || plaintext_bytes)`.
3. A grant-seal revocation spend MAY include `OP_RETURN` action `0x03` committing `typed_digest(seallink-verdict/1)`. Closure still follows the seal spend alone; the verdict frame supplies auditable dispute evidence.

---

### 4. Verifiable Credentials (`seallink-credential/1`)

Third-party attestations about a subject — diplomas, licenses, notary credentials, human-verification claims (`subject-claim`), runtime isolation audits (`agent-audit`), and work-completion acts — share one object type: **`seallink-credential/1`** (`SL-CONT-008`, `decided`).

#### 4.1 Lifecycles, Anchoring, and Compromise Cutoff `h_c`

1. **Signing role:** Signed ONLY by the issuer's `link.cred` role policy (`issuer.role_policy`, verified per `SL-IDEN-003` and `SL-WIRE-013`). A credential is NEVER a grant and confers zero execution authority by itself; verifier policies may only use credentials to narrow admission.
2. **Signed-form anchoring (`0x09`):** Every credential MUST be anchored via `OP_RETURN` action `0x09` committing **`content_addr = SHA256(signed_bytes)`**, proving the signature existed at or before the earliest confirmed anchor block `h_anchor` (`CRED_ANCHOR_MISSING`).
3. **Two lifecycles:**
   - **`eternal`:** MUST NOT carry `revocation_seal`; `not_after_height` optional. Verified against the issuer's `link.cred` role policy authorized at `h_anchor`. Survives routine issuer key rotation, expiry, and transfer.
   - **`revocable`:** MUST carry a confirmed `revocation_seal`; `not_after_height` is optional. By default verifies the issuer's `link.cred` role policy current at tip (exceptions such as `seallink-guardian/1` verify at `h_anchor`, `SL-ORIG-008`). Spending the seal closes the credential (`SEAL_SPENT`); spending with `OP_RETURN 0x0a` (`seallink-credential-withdrawal/1`) records `CRED_REVOKED_FOR_CAUSE`.
4. **Owner-authenticated compromise break `h_c` (`0x0b`, `SL-CONT-009`, `decided`):**
   - If an issuer's `cred` or `notary` role policy (current or retired) is compromised, the issuer's cold `name_owner` `ScriptPolicy` broadcasts an `OP_NAME_UPDATE` (removing/replacing the role if current, signed `SIGHASH_ALL`) containing the 50-byte `0x0b` frame embedding `h_c_le64` (`<= inclusion_height`) and `typed_digest(seallink-credential-break/1)`.
   - Because verifiers reconstruct `seallink-credential-break/1` directly from the name history and on-chain `h_c`, withholding off-chain break documents cannot hide a compromise.
   - For the affected `(issuer, registration, owner_policy, compromised_policy)`: anchors at `h_anchor < h_c` survive, while anchors at `h_anchor >= h_c` durably refuse **`CRED_ISSUER_CLOSED`** (for both eternal and revocable lifecycles). Multiple breaks narrow by `min(h_c)`.
5. **Privacy:** Raw PII MUST NOT appear on chain (`loc_type = 0x00` default). Issuers deduplicating humans MUST NOT hash raw biometrics directly. Per-claim selective disclosure uses `claim_commitments` with an independent 32-byte CSPRNG salt per entry (`SL-WIRE-014`).

#### 4.2 Deterministic Credential Verification Order (`SL-CONT-010`, `decided`)

1. Wire pipeline (`SPEC-01 §7`) -> `WIRE_*`
2. Supported `credential_kind` -> `WIRE_TYPE`; claim schema compliance -> `WIRE_MEMBER`
3. Chain/genesis match -> `CHAIN_MISMATCH`; subject `name_pin` owner match -> `NAME_OWNER_MISMATCH`
4. Earliest confirmed signed-form `0x09` anchor present -> `CRED_ANCHOR_MISSING`; confirmation depth `>= required_depth` -> `CHAIN_DEPTH_INSUFFICIENT`
5. Issuer `link.cred` history walk available -> `NAME_HISTORY_UNAVAILABLE`; `owner_policy` & `role_policy` match -> `NAME_OWNER_MISMATCH`; `0x0b` compromise check (`h_anchor < h_c`) -> `CRED_ISSUER_CLOSED`
6. Height / calendar window check -> `CRED_WINDOW_CLOSED`
7. Revocable seal state (`0x0a` cause -> `CRED_REVOKED_FOR_CAUSE`; plain spend -> `SEAL_SPENT`; unavailable -> `SEAL_UNAVAILABLE`)

---

### 5. General Notary Acts (`seallink-notary/1`)

A notary is an independent off-authority-path actor (human, organization, or agent; refusing by actor class is invalid unless required by explicit policy) acting under its `link.notary` role policy (`SL-CONT-011`, `decided`):

1. **Four act kinds (each with a closed `details` schema in `schemas/credential.schema.json`):**
   - `contract-notarization`: certifies that named parties executed `contract_id` (plus optional `notary_clause_sha256`).
   - `certified-copy`: certifies correspondence of `original_sha256` and `media_type` to an inspected original.
   - `fact-attestation`: certifies a witnessed `fact_sha256` under `fact_schema` at `(tip_height, tip_hash)`.
   - `child-within-parent`: optional re-delegation attestation naming `(parent_grant_id, child_grant_id, ordinal)` when parent policy demands prose/policy review alongside mechanical narrowing.
2. **Lifecycles & Anchoring (`0x04`):** Anchored via `OP_RETURN` action `0x04` committing `content_addr(seallink-notary/1)`. Supports BOTH **`eternal`** (no `notary_seal`, verified against `link.notary` at `h_anchor`, bounded by `0x0b` `h_c`) and **`revocable`** (`notary_seal` required; plain spend withdraws allowing recertification; spend with `0x05` records `CRED_REVOKED_FOR_CAUSE` and bars recertification without a new ruling).
3. **Notary identity pin:** Every reference to a notary pins `(name, registration, owner_policy)` with mandatory writer verification (`SL-LDGR-007`) so transferring a notary's name never transfers notarizing authority.

---

### 6. Security Considerations

- **Choosing `h_c`:** Setting `h_c` too late preserves earlier attacker forgeries; setting `h_c` too early invalidates legitimate historical documents.
- **Selective clause context:** Disclosing a single contract clause without qualifying clauses can mislead; `machine_clause_indices` ensures executors always see every machine-enforced clause, while arbiters MAY demand additional prose clauses before ruling.
- **Notary truth limit:** A notary act cryptographically binds the notary's accountability to a claim; it never proves physical truth mathematically.

---

### 7. References

- **Normative:** [RFC8785], [BIP-340], [BIP-141], [JSON-SCHEMA-2020-12].
- **Informative:** [RFC8448].

---

## SPEC-06: Universal Grants, Invocations, Re-Delegation, Sessions, and Anti-Rollback Journals

- **Version:** `1.0.0-draft.2`
- **Status:** `draft` (normative rules `decided`; external CAS witness transport protocol tracked `open` in `OPEN-QUESTIONS.md`)
- **Evidence / Maturity:** `vectors` (`vectors/trace-01-mail-offline-revoke.json`, `vectors/trace-03-delegation-pool-single-use.json`, `vectors/trace-04-agent-guardian-intake.json`, `vectors/refusal-coverage-matrix.json`)
- **Registries:** `registry/object-types.json`, `registry/constraints.json`, `registry/opreturn-actions.json`, `registry/refusal-codes.json`
- **Schemas:** `schemas/grant.schema.json`, `schemas/invocation.schema.json`

---

### 1. Universal Grant Model (`seallink-grant/1`)

A `seallink-grant/1` (`<= 65536` bytes, `schemas/grant.schema.json`) is the universal authorization instrument across people, organizations, services, and agents (`SL-GRNT-001`, `decided`). Every grant carries **exactly one** of `issuer` (root grant) or `parent` (depth-2 child grant).

#### 1.1 Unilateral Base and Optional Contract Binding

- **Unilateral base:** An autonomous root grant requires ONLY the issuer's valid `SignatureSet` matching `issuer.role_policy` (pinned on chain in `link.grant` per `SL-IDEN-003`). A root grant issued on behalf of a `ward` omits `issuer.role_policy`, sets `payload.guardian_context`, and carries top-level `guardian_approvals[]` satisfying `required(derived_event_class)` (`SL-WIRE-013`, `SL-ORIG-006`). Neither form requires recipient assent or imposes obligations on the recipient.
- **Contract-bound grants:** Setting optional `contract_id` binds the grant to a `seallink-contract/1` (`SPEC-05`): the grant's window MUST nest inside the contract (and any framework contract), all `machine_clause_indices` MUST be disclosed and match the grant's capabilities, and spending the contract or framework seal terminates the grant (`SEAL_SPENT`). Action profiles with `requires_contract = true` refuse unilateral grants (`GRANT_CONTRACT_REQUIRED`).

#### 1.2 Recipient Modes (`SL-GRNT-002`, `decided`)

Every grant selects **exactly one** recipient mode:
1. **By Key (`mode = "key"`):** Names one `xonly_64hex` public key (suitable for ephemeral key-only workers and hardware keys). Ledger name resolution is skipped for the recipient.
2. **By Name (`mode = "name"`):** Names `(name, owner_policy)`. At invocation, the verifier resolves `name`, confirms its current live output matches `owner_policy` (`NAME_OWNER_MISMATCH`), and accepts signatures from the name's current authorized `nostr`/request key, permitting same-owner key rotation and name renewal without reissuing the grant.
3. **By Group (`mode = "group"`):** Names a `ThresholdPolicy` (`m-of-n` distinct keys), authorizing execution ONLY when `>= m` distinct co-recipients sign `seallink-invocation/1` (`SignatureSet`).

#### 1.3 Concrete `executor` vs. Stateless `executor_ref` (`SL-GRNT-003`, `decided`)

Every action leaf in a service profile declares four orthogonal boolean properties (`SPEC-07 §4.1`): `external_mutation`, `discloses_data`, `quota_consuming`, and `allows_executor_ref`. Every grant carries **exactly one** of:
- **Concrete `executor: {name, key}`:** Pins one specific service identity and receipt key. **MANDATORY** whenever ANY capability in `capabilities[]` has `external_mutation = true`, `quota_consuming = true`, carries `quotas`, uses `single_use` revocation, or includes `delegate`.
- **Dynamic `executor_ref: {provider_of, service_type, label}`:** Resolves at verification time against `provider_of`'s current confirmed `seallink-manifest/1` `providers[]` entry (`NamePin` + service manifest `receipt_key`) matching `(service_type, label)`. **STRICTLY FORBIDDEN** if the grant carries any `quotas`, uses `single_use` revocation, includes `delegate`, or includes any action with `external_mutation = true` or `allows_executor_ref = false` (`GRANT_EXECUTOR_REF_FORBIDDEN`).

> **Rationale:** Stateless data-read actions (e.g., `mail/read` without quotas) have `discloses_data = true` and `external_mutation = false`, so resolving the current pinned provider via `executor_ref` cannot double-spend quotas or cause duplicate side effects.

#### 1.4 Validity Window and Revocation Modes (`SL-GRNT-004`, `decided`)

- **Half-open block window:** `[not_before_height, not_after_height)` with `recent_block_height <= not_before_height < not_after_height` and `not_after_height <= issuer_name_expiry_at_issuance` for sealed grants. Admission at `tip == not_after_height` refuses `GRANT_WINDOW_CLOSED`. Optional `min_depth` (`1..144`, defaults to `1`) specifies the issuer's minimum required anchor/seal confirmation depth.
- **Two revocation modes:**
  1. **`revocation.mode = "seal"` (Standard Default):** Names `construction ("W" | "L")`, `kind ("revocable" | "single_use")`, and confirmed `seal: {txid, vout, script_policy}`. Anchored via `OP_RETURN 0x01` (or Merkle batch `0x02` with `MerkleProof`) committing `typed_digest(seallink-issuance/1)` (`loc = 0x00` default). Spending a `revocable` seal closes the grant at mempool speed (`SEAL_SPENT`). A `single_use` seal MUST use `ScriptPolicy` template `single_use_1_of_2` and follows the branch-aware state machine in `SPEC-02 §6.2`.
  2. **`revocation.mode = "window_only"` (Root-Only Zero-Tx Ephemeral Mode):** Strictly permitted ONLY on **root** grants without `delegate` (`parent` and `delegate` MUST be absent), with `not_after_height - not_before_height <= 12` blocks. Requires zero ledger transactions. **Executors MUST refuse `window_only` by default (`GRANT_SEAL_REQUIRED`)** unless local executor policy explicitly opts in for that action and budget tier. Emergency rotation/removal of the issuer's `link.grant` (`NAME_ROLE_CHANGED`) still terminates all live `window_only` grants immediately.

#### 1.5 Text-vs-Effect Invariant (`SL-GRNT-005`, `decided`)

A grant MAY carry optional `terms_text` solely to guide cognitive work (e.g., `agent/brief`). Any mechanical effect executor (`mail/*`, `agent/tool`, `agent/session`, wallets, locks, name updaters, blob stores) **MUST** refuse any grant containing `terms_text` (`GRANT_TEXT_FORBIDDEN`).

---

### 2. Invocations (`seallink-invocation/1`) and Signed Receipts (`seallink-receipt/1`)

#### 2.1 Signed Invocation and Acyclic Single-Use Delivery (`SL-GRNT-006`, `decided`)

Every execution request is a canonical JCS `seallink-invocation/1` (`<= 1 MiB`) signed by the final grant's recipient (`SignatureSet`):

- Binds `network`, `genesis`, concrete `executor {name, key}`, exact `action`, `target`, closed typed `arguments` (validated against the owning profile schema), optional `content_salt` (`SPEC-05 §3`), `proof_path` (1 entry for root grant, 2 entries `[parent, child]` for delegated child grant, each optionally carrying `issuance_txid` and `batch_proof`), 32-byte CSPRNG `nonce`, and wall-clock half-open window `[iat, exp)` (`iat <= now < exp`, no grace, `INVOKE_TIME_INVALID`).
- **Acyclic single-use consumption (`0x11`):** `seallink-invocation/1` NEVER embeds `use_txid`. For a `single_use` grant:
  1. The grantee constructs and signs `seallink-invocation/1`, computing `invocation_content_addr = SHA256(canonical_JCS(invocation))`.
  2. The grantee broadcasts `T_use` spending the `single_use_1_of_2` seal via branch `0` (`grantee`, `SIGHASH_ALL`) with `OP_RETURN 0x11` (`SINGLE_USE_CONSUMPTION`) committing `invocation_content_addr`.
  3. The grantee delivers `(seallink-invocation/1, use_txid = txid(T_use))` in the transport envelope alongside inline grant/contract/manifest bytes. The executor verifies `T_use` on its own chain view (`SPEC-02 §6.2`).
- **Signed arguments are sole authority:** The executor MUST derive effect parameters strictly from `payload.arguments` (never from transport headers or unsigned wrapper fields) and evaluate every `where` predicate (`SL-WIRE-016`) against `payload.arguments` (`INVOKE_CONSTRAINT_FAILED`).

#### 2.2 Quota Accounting, Reservation, and Settlement (`SL-GRNT-007`, `decided`)

1. **Reserve before effect:** Before executing any effect, the executor MUST atomically reserve the maximum possible debit for every quota key consumed by the action in its fenced journal (`§6`): the grant's `own` account (and for a child grant, the parent's `row` account — never the parent's `own` account) plus operator ceilings (`QUOTA_EXCEEDED`). A zero ceiling authorizes nothing; missing required quota refuses.
2. **Window modes:**
   - `term`: cumulative across `[not_before_height, not_after_height)`.
   - `blocks:<N>`: half-open block buckets `[not_before_height + k*N, not_before_height + (k+1)*N)`.
   - `seconds:<S>`: UTC epoch-aligned buckets `[floor(now/S)*S, (floor(now/S)+1)*S)` guarded by a durable per-key monotonic clock watermark (`QUOTA_CLOCK_REGRESSION`).
3. **Settlement (Actual Charge and Release):** Once an effect completes with a known actual debit, the executor charges the exact actual debit (exact integer/rational arithmetic rounded upward once per request, zero binary64) and releases the unused reservation difference (`reserved = settled + released`).
4. **Uncertain outcomes:** If an effect outcome is uncertain (timeout, crash, network split), the full reservation MUST be retained until operator/protocol reconciliation; the executor reports `outcome = "uncertain"` and MUST NOT silently refund or allow replay.
5. **Idempotency and Replay:** Request identity is `invocation_id = SHA256(canonical_JCS(invocation.payload))` (excluding `signatures`). A repeated identical `invocation_id` MUST perform no second effect; the executor returns its stored signed receipt or refuses `INVOKE_REPLAY` per profile. A reused `nonce` with a different payload MUST refuse `INVOKE_REPLAY`.

#### 2.3 Signed Receipt (`SL-GRNT-008`, `decided`)

Every executor answers with a `seallink-receipt/1` signed by its pinned `receipt` key (`executor.key`), recording `invocation_id`, `grant_id`, `action`, `outcome ("executed" | "refused" | "uncertain")`, optional `refusal_code`, `settlements[]`, optional `result_sha256`, and observation `(tip_height, tip_hash, recorded_at)`. Callers MUST verify receipts solely against their pinned `executor.key`.

---

### 3. Bounded Depth-2 Re-Delegation

A root `seallink-grant/1` MAY authorize bounded child grants by including `delegate` (`SL-GRNT-009`, `decided`). Maximum authority path depth is **2** (root -> child; children MUST NOT carry `delegate` and MUST use `revocation.mode = "seal"` bound to `delegate.child_seal_key`, `GRANT_NOT_DELEGABLE`).

1. **Separated delegation and child-seal keys:**
   - `delegate.key` (`xonly_64hex`) signs child grants ONLY (disjoint from issuer, recipient, and messaging keys; held in an isolated delegation signing service enforcing at-most-one signature per row, `guides/GUIDE-01-custody-and-signers.md`).
   - `delegate.child_seal_key` (`compressed_66hex`) controls the issuer revocation branch of every child grant's seal (held outside the delegation signer so the delegator can revoke children even if the delegation signer is compromised).
2. **Grouped rows, row coins, and pairwise disjointness (`R8.6`):**
   - `delegate.groups` holds `1..16` groups; each group pairs a `template` (concrete `executor`, closed `recipient_rule` (`exact_key | exact_name | member_class`), `capabilities[]`, and `notary_mode`) with `1..16` `ranges` of `1..4096` pre-confirmed P2WPKH row coins (confirmed `<= parent.recent_block`).
   - **Disjoint coin ranges (`R8.6`):** Every `(txid, vout)` across ALL row ranges and ALL stop-coin ranges across ALL groups in `delegate.groups`, as well as the parent's own `seal` and linkage output, MUST be pairwise disjoint (`GRANT_ROW_INVALID`).
   - Global 1-based `ordinal` enumerates rows in signed group/range order. A child naming `parent: {grant_id, ordinal}` MUST have its issuance anchor (`0x01` or `0x02`) spend the exact row coin for `ordinal` (`GRANT_ROW_INVALID`), enforcing on chain that at most one child per row exists.
3. **Whole-parent aggregate budget (`R8.5`) and mechanical child narrowing (`SL-GRNT-010`, `decided`):**
   Every verifier MUST check BOTH the whole parent allocation AND the individual child:
   - **Whole-parent budget sum (`R8.5`):** For every quota key `q = (kind, resource, unit, window)` appearing in any group template's `capabilities[].quotas`, let `rows(g) = sum(r.count for r in g.ranges)` and `cap(g, q)` be the maximum ceiling for `q` in group `g`'s template (summed across capabilities in `g` that share `q`). Using exact integer arithmetic (overflow -> `GRANT_CHILD_WIDER`), the verifier MUST confirm a matching pool entry `pool_max(q)` exists in `delegate.pools` and:
     ```text
     sum over all groups g of (rows(g) * cap(g, q)) <= pool_max(q)
     ```
     Failure refuses `GRANT_CHILD_WIDER`. *(This invariant prevents sibling rows at different executors from exceeding the parent's total budget.)*
   - **Child-within-parent check:**
     - `C.genesis == P.genesis`, `C.contract_id == P.contract_id` (if present), `C.executor == template.executor`, and `C.revocation.mode == "seal"` with issuer branch controlled by `P.delegate.child_seal_key`;
     - `[C.not_before_height, C.not_after_height) ⊆ [P.not_before_height, P.not_after_height)`;
     - Every capability in `C.capabilities` mechanically narrows a capability in `template.capabilities` under the 7-predicate Constraint Algebra (`SL-WIRE-017`), and every child quota `<=` the template's row cap;
     - `C.recipient` satisfies `template.recipient_rule` (`exact_key` matches `mode="key"`; `exact_name` matches `mode="name"` with equal `name` and `owner_policy`; `member_class` checks live unspent membership of `C.recipient` in at least one pinned operator's confirmed `seallink-members-list/1`).
4. **Optional notary and stop coins (`SL-GRNT-011`, `decided`):**
   - `"none"` (default): mechanical narrowing under `SL-GRNT-010` requires no notary.
   - `"optional_stop"`: range specifies confirmed P2WPKH stop coins controlled by a pinned notary; spending a stop coin permanently closes that row for cause across all verifiers (`GRANT_ROW_STOPPED`).
   - `"required_act"`: additionally requires a verified `seallink-notary/1` (`act_kind = "child-within-parent"`) act (`NOTARY_REQUIRED`).

---

### 4. Deterministic Admission Order (Invocation Pipeline)

An executor MUST evaluate an incoming `seallink-invocation/1` in this exact 12-step order, returning the **first** failure (`SL-GRNT-012`, `decided`). Early recipient authentication runs strictly **before** cached-receipt lookup and blockchain RPCs to prevent unauthenticated DoS, cached-receipt harvesting, and state-oracle leakage:

1. **Invocation wire check (`SPEC-01 §7`):** Parse and verify `seallink-invocation/1` syntax, JCS, closed schema, profile argument schema, keys, and self-consistent `SignatureSet` -> `WIRE_*`
2. **Early local request checks (pre-chain):**
   - 2a. Wall-clock half-open window `iat <= now < exp` -> `INVOKE_TIME_INVALID`
   - 2b. `invocation.executor` equals this executor's pinned `(name, receipt_key)` -> `GRANT_EXECUTOR_MISMATCH`
3. **Presented bundle wire, early recipient authentication, and replay check (pre-chain):**
   - 3a. Wire pipeline on presented grant(s), optional contract(s), and optional manifest(s) -> `WIRE_*`
   - 3b. If leaf grant uses `recipient.mode = "key"` or `"group"`, verify `invocation.signatures.policy` equals `grant.recipient` immediately -> `WIRE_SIGNATURE` *(runs before any cached-receipt lookup so forged callers cannot probe or retrieve cached receipts)*
   - 3c. For `key` and `group` recipients (whose authentication succeeded in Step 3b): check local journal replay/nonce table. If `invocation_id` already has a stored terminal receipt, return that cached receipt (or `INVOKE_REPLAY` if profile forbids cached return). If `invocation_id` has an unsettled `reservation` (crash inside the external-effect window before receipt persistence), return `outcome = "uncertain"` while retaining the reservation and executing zero second effect. If `nonce` was already used for a different `invocation_id`, refuse `INVOKE_REPLAY`. *(For `recipient.mode = "name"`, this identical replay/crash-recovery check runs immediately after Step 11a once the recipient's on-chain key is verified.)*
4. **Consistent chain observation (`SPEC-02 §4`):** Check in strict order:
   - 4a. Chain/genesis pin -> `CHAIN_MISMATCH`
   - 4b. Reading node health (`!IBD`, `txindex=1`, header lag `<= LAG`) -> `CHAIN_UNHEALTHY`
   - 4c. Independent comparison peer veto -> `CHAIN_NODE_DISAGREEMENT`
   - 4d. Monotonic UTC clock watermark and header future bound `S` -> `CHAIN_CLOCK_ERROR`
   - 4e. Action risk-class tip freshness (`tip_age`) -> `CHAIN_TIP_STALE`
5. **Journal continuity (`§6`):** Check external CAS witness readability, local store readability, and `journal_id` match (`JOURNAL_LOST`), then active `write_token` (`JOURNAL_FENCED`), then position/commitment continuity (`JOURNAL_LOST`)
6. **Durable closure check:** Check local closure journal for every grant ID, contract ID, framework ID, issuer role, and row in `proof_path`, in strict order:
   - 6a. Closed grant or ancestor grant -> `INVOKE_REPLAY` if closed specifically by `SINGLE_USE_CONSUMED` (for a new `invocation_id`), else `GRANT_CLOSED`
   - 6b. Stopped row -> `GRANT_ROW_STOPPED`
   - 6c. Closed issuer role -> `NAME_ROLE_CHANGED`
   - 6d. Closed seal -> `SEAL_SPENT`
7. **Issuer identity, origin, and guardianship (`SPEC-03`, `SPEC-04`):**
   - 7a. Resolve root issuer name (`NAME_NOT_FOUND`), liveness (`NAME_EXPIRED`), history walk availability (`NAME_HISTORY_UNAVAILABLE`), `SIGHASH_ALL` writer check (`NAME_WRITER_UNVERIFIED`), `owner_policy` match (`NAME_OWNER_MISMATCH`), 520B name value grammar (`NAME_VALUE_INVALID`). For autonomous issuers (no verified ward origin): verify `link.grant` continuity (`NAME_ROLE_CHANGED`), verify `issuer.role_policy` matches `link.grant` and equals `root_grant.signatures.policy` (`WIRE_SIGNATURE`).
   - 7b. If origin-certified (`link.origin` or pinned origin): check in strict order: `origin/1` validity & trust (`ORIGIN_UNVERIFIED`), `name-binding/1` validity (`ORIGIN_BINDING_INVALID`), `status_seal` and `roster_seal` completeness (`ORIGIN_STATUS_INCOMPLETE`), subject end (`SUBJECT_ENDED`), pending emancipation transfer (`GUARDIAN_TRANSFER_PENDING`), calendar majority time boundary (`GUARDIAN_TIME_BOUNDARY`); if `ward`, enforce `SL-ORIG-006` order (`WARD_AUTONOMOUS_FORBIDDEN`, then `GUARDIAN_INACTIVE`, then `WIRE_SIGNATURE`, then `GUARDIAN_QUORUM_UNMET`).
8. **Contract and framework checks (`SPEC-05`):** Check in strict order: action requires contract (`GRANT_CONTRACT_REQUIRED`); if `contract_id` present: presentation (`CONTRACT_NOT_PRESENTED`), ID recomputation (`CONTRACT_ID_MISMATCH`), party assents (`CONTRACT_ASSENT_INVALID`), confirmed seal presence & `ScriptPolicy` match (`CONTRACT_SEAL_MISSING`), seal spend (`SEAL_SPENT`) or inconclusive seal (`SEAL_UNAVAILABLE`), disclosed `machine_clause_indices` & window nesting (`CONTRACT_TERMS_MISMATCH`), runtime `config_sha256` if required (`CONTRACT_CONFIG_MISMATCH`).
9. **Re-delegation checks (depth 2, `§3`):** Check in strict order: parent delegation rights & depth `<= 2` (`GRANT_NOT_DELEGABLE`), whole-parent R8.5 aggregate pool sum (`GRANT_CHILD_WIDER`), R8.6 disjointness & ordinal row coin spend (`GRANT_ROW_INVALID`), stop coin live (`GRANT_ROW_STOPPED`), optional notary act (`NOTARY_REQUIRED`), child `signatures.policy` equals `parent.delegate.key` (`WIRE_SIGNATURE`), mechanical child narrowing against group template (`GRANT_CHILD_WIDER`).
10. **Grant window, revocation / single-use seal, and executor binding:**
    - 10a. Grant height window `[not_before_height, not_after_height)` -> `GRANT_WINDOW_CLOSED`
    - 10b. If `revocation.mode = "window_only"`: enforce `not_after_height - not_before_height <= 12` (`WIRE_INTEGER`), then executor opt-in policy (`GRANT_SEAL_REQUIRED`)
    - 10c. If `revocation.mode = "seal"`: verify issuance `0x01`/`0x02` frame & Merkle proof (`CHAIN_FRAME_INVALID`), `recent_block` recency (`CHAIN_RECENCY_INVALID`), Witness `W` construction (`CHAIN_TX_CONSTRUCTION`), anchor depth (`CHAIN_DEPTH_INSUFFICIENT`); then evaluate seal:
      - `revocable` (`SPEC-02 §6.1`): `revoked` -> write closure + `SEAL_SPENT`; `unavailable` -> `SEAL_UNAVAILABLE`
      - `single_use` (`SPEC-02 §6.2`): `awaiting_spend` -> `SEAL_UNAVAILABLE`; `revoked` -> write closure + `SEAL_SPENT`; `pending_confirm` -> `CHAIN_DEPTH_INSUFFICIENT`; `consumed` with distinct `invocation_id` -> `INVOKE_REPLAY`
    - 10d. Verify `executor` or resolve `executor_ref`: forbid `executor_ref` on stateful/mutating/single-use/delegating grants (`GRANT_EXECUTOR_REF_FORBIDDEN`); verify holder's confirmed manifest (`MANIFEST_UNAVAILABLE`, then `MANIFEST_MISMATCH`, then `MANIFEST_ROLLBACK`), confirm provider `NamePin` binding (`SERVICE_PROVIDER_UNBOUND`) and provider `owner_policy` (`NAME_OWNER_MISMATCH`), confirm resolved `(name, receipt_key)` matches this executor (`GRANT_EXECUTOR_MISMATCH`)
11. **Named recipient, action, text ban, and constraints:**
    - 11a. If leaf grant uses `recipient.mode = "name"`, resolve recipient name (`NAME_NOT_FOUND`), check liveness (`NAME_EXPIRED`), check `owner_policy` (`NAME_OWNER_MISMATCH`), verify `invocation.signatures.policy` against its authorized request key (`WIRE_SIGNATURE`), and then execute the Step 3c local journal replay / crash-recovery check (`INVOKE_REPLAY`, cached receipt, or `uncertain`)
    - 11b. Action supported and present in `grant.capabilities` (`INVOKE_ACTION_DENIED`)
    - 11c. Mechanical effect text ban (`GRANT_TEXT_FORBIDDEN`)
    - 11d. Target match and 7-predicate `where` evaluation against `invocation.arguments` (`INVOKE_CONSTRAINT_FAILED`)
12. **Pre-effect recheck and atomic reservation:** Re-bracket chain tip (`CHAIN_OBSERVATION_VOID`, then `CHAIN_TIP_STALE`) and re-check live seals (`SEAL_SPENT`), verify seconds-window monotonic clock (`QUOTA_CLOCK_REGRESSION`), atomically write `nonce` + `reservation` entries to fenced journal (`QUOTA_EXCEEDED`, then `JOURNAL_FENCED`, then `JOURNAL_LOST`)

---

### 5. Bearer Sessions for Non-Signing Clients (`seallink-session-open/1`)

When a client harness cannot sign per-request invocations (e.g., an SDK accepting only a base URL and bearer token), an executor MAY support short-lived sessions (`SL-GRNT-013`, `decided`):

1. Recipient's key holder sends a signed `seallink-session-open/1` (`<= 16384` bytes, `op = "open" | "extend" | "close"`) with `slot_binding`, bounded `quotas <= grant.quotas`, and `exp <= now + 3600` (at most 1 hour ahead).
2. Executor runs the full admission pipeline (`§4`), binds a 32-byte CSPRNG bearer token (storing ONLY `SHA256(token)` in its journal), and returns the token once over a local socket or mutually authenticated encrypted channel.
3. **Every unsigned in-session request** MUST re-run live chain observation, seal checks, and recipient channel-key checks before reserving from `(grant, row, session)` accounts (`SESSION_INVALID` on mismatch, expiry, or any link closure).
4. Unsigned in-session requests lack per-request non-repudiation and retry idempotency; executors MUST NOT enable bearer sessions for wallets, name updates, or irreversible financial transfers.

---

### 6. Anti-Rollback Fenced Journals (`seallink-journal-entry/1`)

Every stateful SealLink verifier/executor (tracking closures, single-use consumption, quota reservations, nonces, and manifest heads) MUST guard against backup-restore and equal-position forks using a hash-chained journal + external CAS witness (`SL-GRNT-014`, `decided` state machine / `open` witness wire transport in `OPEN-QUESTIONS.md`):

1. **Hash chain:** Random 32-byte `journal_id`; commitment `c(0) = H_tag("seallink-journal/1", journal_id)`, `c(n) = H_tag("seallink-journal/1", c(n-1) || canonical_JCS(entry_n))`. Every `entry_n` MUST validate against the closed discriminated `JournalEntry` schema (`schemas/invocation.schema.json`) with `entry_n.pos == n` and `entry_n.prev_commitment == c(n-1)`.
2. **External witness:** An append-only CAS register stored strictly outside the local store's backup domain, holding `(journal_id, pos, commitment, write_token)`. Only `advance(journal_id, token, pos, from_commit, to_commit)` mutates it; fencing strictly increments `write_token`.
3. **Write order:** Check continuity -> durably write local entry -> `advance` external witness -> execute effect.
4. **Continuity precedence:** (1) witness readable, (2) local store readable, (3) matching `journal_id` -> else `JOURNAL_LOST`; (4) active `write_token` held -> else `JOURNAL_FENCED` (checked before position comparison so partitioned replicas fence cleanly); (5) `store.pos == witness.pos` and equal commitment (`Intact`), or `store.pos == witness.pos + 1` with matching `prev_commitment` (`Pending` completion), else `JOURNAL_LOST`.
5. **Attended recovery (start anew):** Record `recovery` entry with `fenced_at`, wait for a confirmed ledger block `boundary` whose `header_time > fenced_at + 7200s` (exceeding Namecoin's +2h future-header consensus bound to prove the block was accepted after fencing), and conservatively treat all pre-fencing uncertain reservations as consumed.

---

### 7. Security Considerations

- **No cross-executor quota sharing:** Two independent executors MUST NEVER spend from one apparent grant quota; split budgets across separate concrete-executor grants or parent row groups verified under R8.5.
- **Closure write failure:** If writing a newly observed `SEAL_SPENT` closure to the journal fails, the verifier MUST refuse admission and halt further admission for that seal until durable storage recovers.
- **`window_only` containment:** Executors opting into root `window_only` MUST enforce low per-grant and global operator ceilings so a compromised `grant` key's damage is bounded even before an emergency name update propagates.

---

### 8. References

- **Normative:** [RFC8785], [BIP-340], [BIP-141], [JSON-SCHEMA-2020-12].
- **Informative:** [RFC8448].

---

## SPEC-07: Grant-Gated Services, Replaceable Providers, Federated Disclosure, and Extensions

- **Version:** `1.0.0-draft.2`
- **Status:** `draft` (normative rules `decided`; unprofiled standard service types tracked `open` in `OPEN-QUESTIONS.md`)
- **Evidence / Maturity:** `vectors` (`vectors/trace-01-mail-offline-revoke.json`, `vectors/trace-04-agent-guardian-intake.json`, `vectors/refusal-coverage-matrix.json`)
- **Registries:** `registry/service-types.json`, `registry/object-types.json`, `registry/refusal-codes.json`
- **Schemas:** `schemas/manifest.schema.json`, `schemas/invocation.schema.json`

---

### 1. Sovereign Provider Model and Mutual Authentication

SealLink decouples user identity from service hosting (email, agent hosts, XMPP, blob storage, wallets, compute) through three normative rules (`SL-SERV-001`, `decided`):

1. **Pinned Provider Binding (`manifest.providers`):** A resource holder `id/alice` declares her active service providers in her `seallink-manifest/1` (`SPEC-03 §3.1`) by labeled `(service_type, label, provider: NamePin)` tuples. Because `provider` pins `(name, registration, owner_policy)`, an expired and re-registered provider spelling cannot hijack dynamic delegations.
2. **Provider Authority Rule:** A participating provider hosting resources for `id/alice` recognizes `id/alice` (its confirmed ledger name, `ScriptPolicy`, role keys, and origin/guardian rules) as the sole root of authority over `id/alice`'s hosted resources. The provider MUST serve any caller presenting a valid `seallink-grant/1` issued by `id/alice` (and verifying `id/alice`'s confirmed manifest binds this provider's exact `NamePin` for `(service_type, label)`, refusing `SERVICE_PROVIDER_UNBOUND` otherwise), without requiring the caller to hold a proprietary account at that provider.
3. **Mutual Transport Authentication:** Before sending private grants, credentials, or sensitive data to a provider `id/provider`, the client resolves `id/provider` on its own ledger view, fetches `id/provider`'s verified `seallink-manifest/1`, and authenticates the endpoint against `service.tls_spki_sha256` (or a verified `seallink-statement/1` with `statement_kind = "transport-binding"` and `transport = "https-tls-spki"` in `id/provider`'s `certs` set) plus verifies signed responses against `service.receipt_key` — never trusting unverified HTTP redirects or peer-claimed provider identities.

---

### 2. Replaceable Services and Exclusive Cut-Over (`seallink-migration/1`)

An actor MUST be able to switch from Provider A (`source_executor`) to Provider B (`dest_executor`) of a compatible `service_type` profile while keeping her `id/` identity and without creating duplicate authorized effects or resurrecting spent quotas (`SL-SERV-002`, `decided`).

#### 2.1 Portable State Separation

Every service export profile MUST strictly partition three classes of data:
1. **Holder data** (messages, blobs, files, metadata) — portable; holder-side E2EE decryption keys need never be disclosed to either provider.
2. **Accounting evidence** (journal position/commitment, settled usage, outstanding uncertain reservations, signed receipts) — portable for reconciliation, NEVER treated by `dest_executor` as unconsumed authority.
3. **Execution credentials** (provider wallet keys, upstream API secrets, DKIM keys, active bearer tokens, TLS private keys) — **STRICTLY EXCLUDED** from export; `dest_executor` MUST refuse any export containing execution credentials (`SERVICE_MIGRATION_INVALID`).

#### 2.2 Four-Step Exclusive Cut-Over (`SL-SERV-003`, `decided`)

1. **Stage:** Copy hash-checked holder data to `dest_executor` while `source_executor` remains the sole accounting authority (`dest_executor` admits zero effects on imported state).
2. **Fence & Close:** `source_executor` durably fences new admissions across all replicas, drains in-flight work (retaining every unresolved outcome as bounded `outstanding_exposure`), and signs `seallink-migration/1` (`journal_pos`, `journal_commitment`, `inventory_sha256`, `outstanding_exposure`) with its pinned `receipt` key.
3. **Revoke Old Grants & Issue Replacement Grants:** Close predecessor concrete-executor grants at `source_executor` via seal spend (a closing receipt alone is NOT revocation). For stateful grants, issue fresh concrete-executor grants naming `dest_executor` with reconciled remaining quotas (deducting settled usage AND all uncertain exposure). Update `manifest.providers` in one ledger name update.
4. **Activate:** Holder signs `seallink-assent/1` (`target_type = "seallink-migration/1"`; for a `ward`, carrying `guardian_context` with `event_class = "custody_change"` and `guardian_approvals[]` per `SPEC-04 §3.1`); `dest_executor` counter-signs acceptance, verifies full hash inventory, persists import atomically (rejecting rollback or conflicting `migration_id` with `SERVICE_MIGRATION_INVALID`), and enables admissions while `source_executor` remains fenced.

- **Unavailable old provider:** Operator reconciliation is the default. Never infer unused budget or non-execution from timeouts or silence; keep old uncertain exposure isolated and issue an independent bounded allocation for non-conflicting work.
- **Commercial default:** Start with small capped prepaid contracts. Unused prepaid credit remains `source_executor`'s liability and does not transfer automatically by data export.

---

### 3. Federated Screening and Progressive PII Disclosure

When two previously unknown actors (or their agents) communicate before establishing mutual trust, SealLink defines a two-phase progressive-disclosure composition (`SL-SERV-004`, `decided`):

| Phase | Admission Gate | Data & Tool Boundary | Human / Guardian Gate |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Phase 1: Screening** | Pinned local trust policy + verified peer identity/members binding + optional `seallink-credential/1` (e.g., `subject-claim` / `agent-audit`) + bounded screening grant. | Zero PII and zero external mutation tools inside the screening context. Explicit per-peer quotas required (`FEDERATION_POLICY_DENIED` if missing). | Autonomous within bounded screening quotas. |
| **Phase 2: Targeted Disclosure** | Fresh unilateral `seallink-grant/1` targeting ONE exact recipient and ONE isolated vault executor (e.g., `contact-vault` or `calendar-broker`), finite window, dedicated UTXO seal. | **Contour A routing:** For PII release (e.g., `contact/release`), the recipient MUST be the partner's personal identity or companion client calling the isolated vault directly — PII MUST NOT transit screening agents or hubs (`FEDERATION_POLICY_DENIED`). | Explicit L2 / presence-verified approval by the human owner or guardian quorum; the screening agent MUST NEVER self-issue a disclosure grant. |

Neither federation membership nor a verified `seallink-credential/1` ever creates grant authority; trust policy may only narrow admission.

---

### 4. Extension Rules and SLIP Registration Checklists

Every new **Service Profile**, **Action Leaf**, **Quota Kind**, **Contract Profile**, or **Credential Kind** MUST be proposed via a SLIP (`SLIP-TEMPLATE.md`) or namespaced under reverse-DNS (`com.example/<name>`) for custom deployments, and MUST explicitly specify (`SL-SERV-005`, `decided`):

#### 4.1 Action Leaf and Service Profile Checklist
1. **Identifier:** Exact `service_type` (registered in `registry/service-types.json` or valid reverse-domain) and lowercase slash-separated action leaves (`<domain>/<verb>`).
2. **Orthogonal Action Properties:**
   - Cognitive `work` (MAY accept `terms_text`) vs mechanical `effect` (MUST enforce `GRANT_TEXT_FORBIDDEN`);
   - `external_mutation` (`true | false`);
   - `discloses_data` (`true | false`);
   - `quota_consuming` (`true | false`);
   - `allows_executor_ref` (`true | false`, allowed ONLY when `external_mutation = false` and `quota_consuming = false`);
   - `requires_contract`, `require_seal`, and Chain Risk Class (`Class 1` 60m vs `Class 2` 90m).
3. **Closed Target, Arguments, and Result Schemas:** Formal Draft 2020-12 JSON Schema (`schemas/profile-<name>.schema.json`) for `arguments` and `result` objects, target grammar, and permitted Constraint Algebra predicates per argument.
4. **Pagination / Snapshot and Replay Semantics:** Exact behavior for multi-page reads, provider switch invalidation, and duplicate `invocation_id` retries.
5. **Quota Consumption and Settlement:** Consumed quota kinds, reservation formula before effect, actual settlement/release rule, and uncertain-outcome retention rule.
6. **Receipt and Export Format:** Exact `result_sha256` payload definition (`SHA256(canonical_JCS(result_obj))`), mutual transport auth binding, and portable export boundary (`§2.1`).
7. **Deterministic Refusal Order and Vectors:** Complete positive, single-defect negative, and stateful-journal revocation test vectors citing exact `SL-*` rule IDs.

#### 4.2 Quota Kind Checklist
Every new `quota.kind` in `registry/constraints.json` MUST define: identifier, resource grammar, exact atomic integer unit and scale (zero binary64), min/max bounds, rounding direction (always upward/conservative on reservation), permitted `window` modes, concurrency/replica sharing, uncertain-outcome retention, denied-request charging (default: refused requests consume zero quota), and paired conformance vectors.

---

### 5. Security Considerations

- **No wildcard recipients:** Services MUST NEVER convert an authenticated login session (`SPEC-03 §5`) or federation allowlist into a wildcard grant recipient.
- **Irreversibility of disclosure:** Spending a disclosure seal stops future reads but cannot erase already-disclosed bytes; prefer revocable handles and ephemeral channels over permanent personal identifiers.
- **No central verification oracle:** Services SHOULD run their own Tier 1 verifier and Namecoin node (`SPEC-02 §1.1`) rather than delegating verification to a third-party validation API.

---

### 6. References

- **Normative:** [RFC8785], [BIP-340], [JSON-SCHEMA-2020-12].
- **Informative:** [RFC8448].

---

## Part II — Standard Profiles

---

## PROFILE-agent-v1: Bounded Autonomous Agent Tasks, Tool Execution, Isolated Sessions, and Guardian Intake

- **Version:** `1.0.0-draft.2`
- **Service Type:** `agent-session` (`registry/service-types.json`)
- **Status:** `draft` (normative profile rules `decided`)
- **Evidence / Maturity:** `vectors` (`vectors/trace-03-delegation-pool-single-use.json`, `vectors/trace-04-agent-guardian-intake.json`, `vectors/refusal-coverage-matrix.json`)
- **Requires:** `SPEC-01`, `SPEC-02`, `SPEC-03`, `SPEC-04`, `SPEC-05`, `SPEC-06`, `SPEC-07`
- **Schemas:** `schemas/profile-agent.schema.json`

---

### 1. Purpose

This profile defines normative SealLink authorization for autonomous software agents operating on local or hosted stations (including external isolation runtimes such as Swarma Runtime). It separates four distinct operational boundaries:

1. **Cognitive work delegation (`agent/brief`):** Authorizes an agent run to perform bounded reasoning or drafting work, where prose `terms_text` is permitted strictly as cognitive guidance.
2. **Mechanical host tool execution (`agent/tool`):** Authorizes concrete typed tool calls (filesystem read/write, repository operations, sandboxed commands) where `terms_text` is strictly forbidden.
3. **Contract-bound isolated sessions (`agent/session`):** Authorizes starting, checkpointing, or halting a long-lived agent session bound to a bilateral contract and verified `config_sha256`.
4. **Guardian-verified instruction intake (`agent/guardian-message`):** Normatively specifies how an agent runtime's host boundary verifies guardian-authorized instructions for a `ward` agent against its read-only pinned `seallink-origin/1` and live guardianship slots (`vectors/trace-04-agent-guardian-intake.json`).

---

### 2. Manifest Declarations and Mutual Authentication (`SL-AGNT-001`, `decided`)

1. An agent host station `id/station-a` declares in its `seallink-manifest/1` `service`:
   - `service_type`: `"agent-session"`
   - `actions`: subset of `["agent/brief", "agent/tool", "agent/session", "agent/guardian-message"]`
   - `receipt_key`: pinned BIP-340 `receipt` key
   - `endpoint`: HTTPS or mutually authenticated local Unix/TLS endpoint
   - `tls_spki_sha256` (for remote endpoints): pinned TLS SPKI hash (or signed `transport-binding` statement in `certs`).
2. **Concrete executor required:** Because agent sessions, tool invocations, and guardian instruction delivery carry stateful quotas, sandboxes, and authority boundaries, `executor_ref` is FORBIDDEN across all `agent/*` actions (`GRANT_EXECUTOR_REF_FORBIDDEN`).

---

### 3. Orthogonal Action Properties Table

| Action | Kind | `external_mutation` | `discloses_data` | `quota_consuming` | `allows_executor_ref` | `requires_contract` | `require_seal` | Risk Class |
| --- | --- | :-: | :-: | :-: | :-: | :-: | :-: | --- |
| `agent/brief` | Cognitive work (`terms_text` allowed) | `false` | `false` | `true` (`seallink/count` `starts`) | `false` | `false` | `false` *(root `window_only` allowed by policy)* | Class 2 (90m) |
| `agent/tool` | Mechanical effect (`GRANT_TEXT_FORBIDDEN`) | `true` | `true` | `true` (`seallink/count` `calls`) | `false` | `false` | `true` *(or `single_use`)* | Class 1 (60m) |
| `agent/session` | Mechanical effect (`GRANT_TEXT_FORBIDDEN`) | `true` | `false` | `true` (`seallink/count` `starts`) | `false` | `true` (`config_sha256` mandatory) | `true` | Class 1 (60m) |
| `agent/guardian-message` | Mechanical effect (`GRANT_TEXT_FORBIDDEN`) | `false` | `false` | `false` | `false` | `false` | `true` *(live grant + slot seals; `event_class = "effect_grant"`)* | Class 1 (60m) |

---

### 4. Target, Closed Schemas, Arguments, and `result_sha256` (`SL-AGNT-002`, `decided`)

- **Target grammar:**
  - `agent/brief`, `agent/tool`, `agent/session`: `station:<host_name>:<workspace_or_slot>` (e.g., `station:id/station-a:repo-seallink`).
  - `agent/guardian-message`: `ward:<origin_id_64hex>`.
- **Closed schemas:** All `invocation.arguments` and returned result objects MUST validate strictly against `schemas/profile-agent.schema.json`:
  - `agent/brief`: `AgentBriefArgs` -> `AgentBriefResult`
  - `agent/tool`: `AgentToolArgs` -> `AgentToolResult`
  - `agent/session`: `AgentSessionArgs` -> `AgentSessionResult`
  - `agent/guardian-message`: `AgentGuardianMessageArgs` -> `AgentGuardianMessageResult`
- **Normative `result_sha256` (`SL-AGNT-003`, `decided`):** For every `outcome = "executed"` receipt, `receipt.payload.result_sha256` MUST equal `SHA256(canonical_JCS(result_object))`.
- **Replay semantics:** Duplicate `invocation_id` for `agent/brief`, `agent/tool`, `agent/session`, or `agent/guardian-message` MUST NOT spawn a second run, second tool execution, or duplicate Authority Frame delivery; the host returns the stored signed receipt (including `outcome = "uncertain"` if a crash interrupted execution inside the external-effect window before receipt persistence).

#### 4.1 Constrained Arguments and Predicates

| Action | Argument | Schema Type | Supported `where` Predicates |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `agent/brief` | `task_id` | `string` | `eq`, `prefix` |
| `agent/brief` | `brief_sha256` | `hex64` | `hash_eq` |
| `agent/brief` | `max_duration_sec` | `uint64_str` | `range` |
| `agent/tool` | `tool_name` | `string` | `eq`, `in`, `not_in` |
| `agent/tool` | `input_sha256` | `hex64` | `hash_eq` |
| `agent/tool` | `resource_path` | `string` | `eq`, `prefix` |
| `agent/tool` | `max_output_bytes` | `uint64_str` | `range` |
| `agent/session` | `op` | `string` (`start \| checkpoint \| halt`) | `eq`, `in` |
| `agent/session` | `session_slot` | `string` | `eq`, `prefix` |
| `agent/session` | `config_sha256` | `hex64` | `hash_eq` |
| `agent/session` | `max_wall_sec` | `uint64_str` | `range` |
| `agent/guardian-message` | `origin_id` | `hex64` | `eq` |
| `agent/guardian-message` | `subject_ward_name` | `NameStr` | `eq` |
| `agent/guardian-message` | `message_sha256` | `hex64` | `hash_eq` |
| `agent/guardian-message` | `channel` | `string` | `eq`, `in` |
| `agent/guardian-message` | `delivery_mode` | `string` (`strict_drop \| untrusted_fallback`) | `eq` |

---

### 5. Normative Guardian Message Verification (`SL-AGNT-004`, `decided`)

An agent host or Bridge mediating incoming guardian messages for a `ward` agent (`origin_class = "agent"`, `guardian_policy` present) MUST distinguish between **guardian grant authorization** (the ward's `seallink-grant/1` carrying `guardian_context` and `guardian_approvals[]`) and **invocation delivery** (the signed `seallink-invocation/1` signed by the grant's recipient — either the guardian's own delivery key or an authorized Bridge relay key — carrying `AgentGuardianMessageArgs`), and MUST execute the following deterministic check before delivering any privileged instruction into an agent session's Authority Frame:

1. **Read-only origin pin:** Load the agent's locally pinned `seallink-origin/1` and `(network, genesis)` from read-only host storage outside agent write reach (`SPEC-03 §6`).
2. **Event class assignment (`effect_grant`):** Because guardian messages direct privileged agent behavior, `agent/guardian-message` MUST be classified as **`event_class = "effect_grant"`** (NEVER `routine_read`; `SPEC-04 §3.1`). A ward grant claiming `event_class = "routine_read"` for `agent/guardian-message` MUST refuse with `GUARDIAN_QUORUM_UNMET`.
3. **Full admission pipeline & ward checks:** Execute `SPEC-06 §4` on the `seallink-invocation/1` and its ward `seallink-grant/1`:
   - Confirm `status_seal` is unspent (`ORIGIN_STATUS_INCOMPLETE`, `SUBJECT_ENDED`, `GUARDIAN_TRANSFER_PENDING`) and the latest effective `roster_seal` revision matches both `grant.payload.guardian_context.revision` and `arguments.revision` (`ORIGIN_STATUS_INCOMPLETE`, `GUARDIAN_QUORUM_UNMET`).
   - Verify `grant.guardian_approvals[]` per `SL-WIRE-013` and `SL-ORIG-006`: every cited slot seal is `active` and unspent on the host's Tier 1 node (`GUARDIAN_INACTIVE`), every `guardian_approvals[i].signatures` matches that guardian's live `link.grant` policy (`WIRE_SIGNATURE`), all approving slots belong to distinct `(name, registration)` guardians, and the count meets `required("effect_grant")` against `revision_size` (`GUARDIAN_QUORUM_UNMET`).
   - Confirm `invocation.target == "ward:" + origin_id`, `arguments.origin_id == origin_id`, `arguments.subject_ward_name == ward_name`, and `SHA256(raw_message_bytes) == arguments.message_sha256` (and satisfies any `where.message_sha256` `hash_eq` predicate when the grant pins one exact message) (`INVOKE_CONSTRAINT_FAILED`).
4. **Normative default `delivery_mode = "strict_drop"`:** For ward agents, **`strict_drop` is the normative default** (`AgentGuardianMessageArgs.delivery_mode`): any unauthenticated, malformed, or refused external message MUST be dropped at the Bridge/host boundary before entering the model context. Hosts MAY permit `untrusted_fallback` ONLY when explicitly enabled by local administrator policy and strictly isolated outside the Authority Frame.
5. **Authority Frame & receipt:** Only after steps 1–3 succeed MAY the host wrap the verified message (`message_sha256`) inside a structured read-only Authority Frame, compute `frame_sha256`, and emit `AgentGuardianMessageResult` (`delivered = true`, `verified_slots`, `verified_guardians`, `message_sha256`, `frame_sha256`, `recorded_at`) + signed `seallink-receipt/1` (`vectors/trace-04-agent-guardian-intake.json`).

---

### 6. Contract-Bound Sessions, Quotas, and `config_sha256` (`SL-AGNT-005`, `decided`)

1. **`agent/session` contract requirement:** Every `agent/session` grant MUST bind `contract_id` (`GRANT_CONTRACT_REQUIRED`), and the bound `seallink-contract/1` MUST carry `config_sha256` (`SL-CONT-006`). Before executing `op = "start"`, the host MUST compute the hash of the assembled runtime profile, skills, and tool allowlist and require exact equality with both `contract.config_sha256` and `arguments.config_sha256` (`CONTRACT_CONFIG_MISMATCH`).
2. **Quota reservation:**
   - `agent/brief` and `agent/session` (`op = "start"`) reserve `1` unit from `{"kind":"seallink/count","resource":"<target>","unit":"starts"}`.
   - `agent/tool` reserves `1` unit from `{"kind":"seallink/count","resource":"<target>","unit":"calls"}` (plus any `seallink/cost` or `seallink/tokens` quotas declared on the capability).
   - For delegated child grants, reservations debit both the child's `own` account and the parent's `row` account (`SPEC-06 §2.2`), bounded across all sibling rows by R8.5 (`SPEC-06 §3`).
3. **Bearer sessions:** An admitted `agent/session` MAY open a short-lived (`<= 3600s`) `seallink-session-open/1` bearer slot for non-signing model SDKs (`SPEC-06 §5`), restricted strictly to compute/tool quotas inside the session ceiling; irreversible financial transfers MUST NOT use bearer sessions.

---

### 7. Export Boundary (`SPEC-07 §2`)

An `agent-session` migration manifest (`seallink-migration/1`) exports workspace files, conversation transcripts, checkpoint artifacts, signed receipts, and accounting evidence (settled starts/calls/costs + uncertain reservations). It NEVER exports host signing keys, Keyholder private keys, upstream API tokens, TLS private keys, or active bearer session tokens.

---

## PROFILE-mail-v1: Sovereign Email Hosting and Delegated Mailbox Access

- **Version:** `1.0.0-draft.2`
- **Service Type:** `mail` (`registry/service-types.json`)
- **Status:** `draft` (normative profile rules `decided`)
- **Evidence / Maturity:** `vectors` (`vectors/trace-01-mail-offline-revoke.json`, `vectors/refusal-coverage-matrix.json`)
- **Requires:** `SPEC-01`, `SPEC-02`, `SPEC-03`, `SPEC-06`, `SPEC-07`
- **Schemas:** `schemas/profile-mail.schema.json`

---

### 1. Purpose

This profile defines sovereign email hosting where the **holder owns her identity (`id/alice`), not the mail host**, binds one or more labeled mailboxes (`personal`, `work`, etc.) by pinned `NamePin` in `seallink-manifest/1`, switches providers without losing identity, and issues fine-grained UTXO-revocable grants (e.g., permitting an agent or accountant to read only `"Invoices"` while the issuer's devices remain offline).

---

### 2. Manifest Declarations, Discovery, and Transport Binding

#### 2.1 User Provider Binding (`SL-MAIL-001`, `decided`)
A holder `id/alice` declares each hosted mailbox in `seallink-manifest/1` `providers[]` using a full `NamePin`:
```json
{
  "label": "work",
  "provider": {
    "name": "id/mail-host-a",
    "owner_policy": {"kind": "key", "pk": "02..."},
    "registration": {"txid": "...", "vout": 0}
  },
  "service_type": "mail"
}
```
An actor MAY bind multiple `mail` providers under distinct `label` values (`personal`, `work`, `archive`).

#### 2.2 Mail Provider Self-Declaration, External Discovery, and Mutual Auth (`SL-MAIL-002`, `decided`)
1. A mail provider `id/mail-host-a` declares in its own `seallink-manifest/1` `service`:
   - `service_type`: `"mail"`
   - `actions`: subset of `["mail/list", "mail/read", "mail/send"]`
   - `receipt_key`: pinned BIP-340 `receipt` key
   - `endpoint`: HTTPS base URL
   - `tls_spki_sha256`: SHA-256 of the server's DER-encoded SubjectPublicKeyInfo (alternatively pinned via a signed `seallink-statement/1` with `statement_kind = "transport-binding"` and `transport = "https-tls-spki"` in the provider's `certs` set).
2. **Mutual authentication:** Clients MUST verify the server's TLS certificate SPKI against `tls_spki_sha256` (or the verified `transport-binding` statement) AND verify every `seallink-receipt/1` against `service.receipt_key`.
3. **External sender mailbox discovery:** An external sender targeting `id/alice` resolves `id/alice`'s confirmed `seallink-manifest/1`, selects the `providers[]` entry for `("mail", label)` (default `label = "primary"` if unspecified, or advertised in `seallink-card/1` `transports`), resolves the pinned `provider` `NamePin`, and delivers to the provider's `service.endpoint` (or SMTP MX authenticated via the provider's manifest/card transport declaration).

---

### 3. Orthogonal Action Properties Table

| Action | Kind | `external_mutation` | `discloses_data` | `quota_consuming` | `allows_executor_ref` | `requires_contract` | `require_seal` | Risk Class |
| --- | --- | :-: | :-: | :-: | :-: | :-: | :-: | --- |
| `mail/list` | Mechanical effect | `false` | `true` | `false` *(optional)* | `true` *(iff no `quotas`)* | `false` | `true` | Class 2 (90m) |
| `mail/read` | Mechanical effect | `false` | `true` | `false` *(optional)* | `true` *(iff no `quotas`)* | `false` | `true` | Class 2 (90m) |
| `mail/send` | Mechanical effect | `true` | `false` | `true` (`seallink/count`) | `false` *(concrete `executor` MUST be pinned)* | `false` | `true` | Class 1 (60m) |

All three actions are mechanical effects and MUST refuse grants carrying `terms_text` (`GRANT_TEXT_FORBIDDEN`).

---

### 4. Target, Closed Argument/Result Schemas, and `result_sha256` (`SL-MAIL-003`, `decided`)

- **Target grammar:** `mailbox:<owner_name>:<label>` (e.g., `mailbox:id/alice:work`).
  The provider MUST verify that `<owner_name>`'s confirmed `seallink-manifest/1` binds this provider's exact `NamePin` for `("mail", <label>)` (`SERVICE_PROVIDER_UNBOUND` otherwise) AND that the root grant was issued by `<owner_name>` (or its satisfied guardian quorum if `<owner_name>` is a `ward`).
- **Closed argument and result schemas:** All `invocation.arguments` and returned result objects MUST validate strictly against `schemas/profile-mail.schema.json`:
  - `mail/list`: `MailListArgs` -> `MailListResult`
  - `mail/read`: `MailReadArgs` -> `MailReadResult`
  - `mail/send`: `MailSendArgs` -> `MailSendResult`
- **Normative `result_sha256` formula (`SL-MAIL-006`, `decided`):** For every `outcome = "executed"` response, `receipt.payload.result_sha256` MUST equal `SHA256(canonical_JCS(result_object))` where `result_object` conforms to the action's closed result schema above. For `mail/read`, raw RFC 5322 message bytes travel alongside the signed receipt and MUST hash to `MailReadResult.mime_sha256`.
- **Replay semantics:** For `mail/list` and `mail/read`, a duplicate `invocation_id` within `[iat, exp)` MAY return the cached signed receipt; for `mail/send`, a duplicate `invocation_id` MUST perform zero second SMTP handoff and MUST return the original stored signed receipt (including `outcome = "uncertain"` if unresolved).

#### 4.1 Constrained Arguments and Server-Side Enforcement (`SL-MAIL-004`, `decided`)

| Action | Argument | Schema Type | Supported `where` Predicates |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `mail/list`, `mail/read` | `folder` | `string` | `eq`, `in`, `not_in`, `prefix` |
| `mail/list`, `mail/read` | `sender_domain` | `string` (lowercase ASCII) | `eq`, `in`, `not_in`, `suffix` |
| `mail/read` | `message_id` | `string` | `eq`, `in` |
| `mail/list`, `mail/read` | `max_bytes` | `uint64_str` | `range` |
| `mail/send` | `to` | `string` | `eq`, `in`, `not_in`, `suffix` |
| `mail/send` | `subject` | `string` | `eq`, `prefix` |
| `mail/send` | `body_sha256` | `hex64` | `hash_eq` |
| `mail/send` | `size_bytes` | `uint64_str` | `range` |

- **Server-side verification for `mail/read`:** If the grant constrains `folder`, `sender_domain`, or `max_bytes`, the provider MUST verify the actual stored message's folder, `From` domain, and byte length satisfy every `where` predicate before returning bytes (`INVOKE_CONSTRAINT_FAILED`). A caller MUST NOT bypass a `folder` predicate by passing a `message_id` belonging to another folder.
- **Quota reservation for `mail/send`:** MUST reserve `1` unit from `{"kind":"seallink/count","resource":"mailbox:<owner>:<label>","unit":"messages"}` atomically in the fenced journal (`SPEC-06 §6`) before SMTP submission, retaining the reservation if handoff outcome is `uncertain`.

---

### 5. Snapshot Pagination and Provider Cut-Over (`SL-MAIL-005`, `decided`)

1. A `mail/list` request with `page = 0` and no `snapshot_id` establishes a provider-local immutable snapshot (`snapshot_id`, TTL `<= 300s`, frozen to matching messages present at that invocation's observation).
2. Subsequent pages (`page > 0`) MUST pass `snapshot_id` in a newly signed `seallink-invocation/1`, re-running the full `SPEC-06 §4` pipeline (including live UTXO seal check).
3. Messages arriving after snapshot creation do NOT appear in pages of that `snapshot_id`. If the grant's seal is spent between page 0 and page 1, page 1 refuses `GRANT_CLOSED` (if already journaled) or `SEAL_SPENT` (if first witnessed on page 1) and discards the snapshot.
4. **Provider switch:** Snapshots are strictly local to the issuing provider and are NOT exported during `seallink-migration/1`. Presenting an old provider's `snapshot_id` to a new provider refuses `INVOKE_CONSTRAINT_FAILED`; the caller restarts at `page = 0` on the new provider.

---

### 6. Reference End-to-End Trace (`vectors/trace-01-mail-offline-revoke.json`)

The complete byte-level trace (signed JCS objects, BIP-340 signatures, `OP_RETURN` hex, `result_sha256`, journal hash chain, and exact refusal codes) is published in `vectors/trace-01-mail-offline-revoke.json`:

1. `id/alice` binds `id/mail-host-a` (by full `NamePin`) for `("mail", "work")` in her `seallink-manifest/1`.
2. `id/alice` signs a unilateral `seallink-grant/1` to `id/alice-acct-agent` (`recipient.mode = "name"`, pinning `id/alice-acct-agent` and its `owner_policy`) using `executor_ref: {"provider_of":"id/alice","service_type":"mail","label":"work"}` (valid because `mail/read` has `external_mutation = false`, `quota_consuming = false`, `allows_executor_ref = true`, and no `quotas`) with `where: {"folder": {"in": ["Invoices"]}}` and confirmed UTXO `seal` anchored by `0x01`.
3. `id/alice` takes all her devices offline.
4. `id/alice-acct-agent` sends a signed `seallink-invocation/1` (`folder = "Invoices"`, `message_id = "msg-2026-001"`) + inline grant + inline manifest to `id/mail-host-a`.
5. `id/mail-host-a` runs `SPEC-06 §4` on its own Namecoin node (resolving `id/alice-acct-agent`'s confirmed name and request key at Step 11a) -> **Admits**, returns `MailReadResult` (`size_bytes = "69"`, matching the exact 69-byte RFC 5322 payload) + raw MIME bytes + signed `seallink-receipt/1` (`outcome = "executed"`, `result_sha256 = SHA256(JCS(MailReadResult))`).
6. A second invocation requesting `folder = "Personal"` fails Step 11d -> **Refuses** `INVOKE_CONSTRAINT_FAILED` (non-closing).
7. Later, `id/alice` spends `seal` from a secondary device. `id/mail-host-a` witnesses the spend in its mempool and durably writes a `closure(cause="SEAL_SPENT")` entry to its fenced journal (`c(0) -> c(1)`).
8. When `id/alice-acct-agent` sends a new `mail/read` invocation for `"Invoices"`, Step 6a of `SPEC-06 §4` hits the durable closure journal and returns the single deterministic refusal code **`GRANT_CLOSED`** with signed `seallink-receipt/1` (`outcome = "refused"`, `refusal_code = "GRANT_CLOSED"`).

---

### 7. Export Boundary (`SPEC-07 §2`)

A `mail` migration manifest (`seallink-migration/1`) exports RFC 5322 message blobs, folder assignments, message IDs, delivery receipts, and accounting evidence (settled `mail/send` counts + uncertain SMTP handoffs). It NEVER exports DKIM signing keys, SMTP relay credentials, TLS private keys, or active bearer tokens.

---

## Part III — Conformance, Open Questions, and SLIP Governance

---

## SealLink Conformance Requirements

- **Version:** `1.0.0-draft.2`
- **Status:** `draft`
- **Normative Language:** [RFC2119], [RFC8174]

---

### 1. Conformance Roles

An implementation claiming conformance to SealLink v1.0 **MUST** declare which of the following roles it implements and MUST pass every required specification section, registry invariant, JSON Schema, and conformance vector listed for that role.

| Conformance Role | Required Specifications | Required Registries & Schemas | Required Vector Suites |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Core Wire Library** | `SPEC-00`, `SPEC-01` | `object-types.json`, `refusal-codes.json`, `constraints.json`, all `schemas/*.schema.json` | `vectors/wire-jcs-and-hashes.json`, `vectors/constraints-and-schemas.json` |
| **Tier 1 Verifier** | Core Wire + `SPEC-02`, `SPEC-03` (§1–4), `SPEC-04`, `SPEC-05`, `SPEC-06` (§1–4, §6) | All `registry/*.json` and `schemas/*.schema.json` | All `vectors/*.json` (including `trace-01` through `trace-04` and `refusal-coverage-matrix.json`) |
| **Effect Executor / Provider** | Tier 1 Verifier + `SPEC-06` (§5 if bearer sessions enabled), `SPEC-07`, plus each supported `PROFILE-*.md` | All `registry/*.json`, `schemas/*.schema.json`, and owning `profile-*.schema.json` | All `vectors/*.json` plus profile-specific traces (`trace-01`, `trace-03`, `trace-04`) |
| **Issuer / Signer** | Core Wire + `SPEC-02` (§3, §5), `SPEC-03` (§1–3, §6), `SPEC-05`, `SPEC-06` (§1, §3) | `object-types.json`, `key-roles.json`, `opreturn-actions.json`, `constraints.json` | `wire-jcs-and-hashes.json`, `ledger-scripts-and-opreturn.json`, `constraints-and-schemas.json` |
| **Institutional / Guardian Authority** | Tier 1 Verifier + Issuer + `SPEC-04` (full), `SPEC-05` (§4–5) | All `registry/*.json`, `origin.schema.json`, `guardian.schema.json`, `credential.schema.json` | `vectors/trace-02-guardian-succession-assent.json`, `vectors/trace-04-agent-guardian-intake.json` |

---

### 2. Mandatory Behavioral Requirements

1. **Deterministic Refusal Ordering:** A conforming verifier MUST emit the exact first refusal code prescribed by `SPEC-01 §7`, `SPEC-05 §4.2`, and `SPEC-06 §4` for every test vector in `vectors/`.
2. **Fail-Closed Unknown Handling:** A conforming implementation MUST refuse unregistered `type` strings (`WIRE_TYPE`), unknown JSON members (`WIRE_MEMBER`), reserved action byte `0x06` (`CHAIN_FRAME_INVALID`), populated `extensions` (`WIRE_CONSTRAINT`), unsupported `ScriptPolicy` templates (`CHAIN_SCRIPT_UNSUPPORTED`), and any `open` construct lacking a locally enabled profile.
3. **Zero Silent Repair:** A conforming parser MUST reject non-canonical JSON (`WIRE_NOT_CANONICAL`) and MUST NOT normalize strings, reorder keys before hashing, coerce integer encodings, or strip unknown members.
4. **No Floating-Point Arithmetic:** Conforming implementations MUST NOT route any `uint53`, `uint64_str`, quota debit, rational quorum, or R8.5 aggregate budget sum through IEEE 754 floating-point arithmetic.
5. **Independent Chain Observation:** A conforming Tier 1 Verifier MUST NOT accept ledger state, block heights, or UTXO spend status from the presenter or issuer; it MUST query its own read-only tx-indexed node cross-checked against at least one independent comparison node (`SPEC-02 §4`).

---

### 3. Interoperability Bar for Advancing Specification Maturity

Per `SPEC-00 §5.1`:
- **`prose` -> `vectors`:** Every `decided` rule and every registered refusal code (`84/84`) is exercised by executable positive, negative, and stateful trace fixtures in `vectors/`, verified automatically by CI via Draft 2020-12 metaschemas and the reference Tier 1 verifier (`tools/seallink_verifier.py`).
- **`vectors` -> `dual-impl`:** At least two independent implementations with disjoint cryptographic and JSON stacks pass 100% of `vectors/` byte-for-byte (identical object IDs, digests, content addresses, refusal codes, and journal commitments).
- **`dual-impl` -> `chain-tested`:** All four end-to-end traces (`trace-01` mail offline + revoke, `trace-02` initial & successor guardian activation + ward assent, `trace-03` parent pool + single-use + crash-uncertain + replay + revoke, `trace-04` ward agent guardian intake) plus TRUC v3 / `P2A` CPFP package relay (`conformance/p2a-regtest/`) are executed and recorded against a live Namecoin Core `nc28.0` regtest (and/or mainnet) network.

---

## SealLink Open Questions and Provisional Parameters

- **Version:** `1.0.0-draft.2`
- **Purpose:** Authoritative registry of every unresolved design item, provisional numeric constant, deferred extension, and unprofiled standard service type. Per `SPEC-00 §5.1`, readers MUST fail closed on any unprofiled `open` construct.

---

### 1. Open Normative Profiles and Protocols

| ID | Owning Spec | Status | Topic | Current Safe Fallback / Blocking Scope |
| --- | --- | :-: | --- | --- |
| `OQ-001` | `SPEC-04 §4` (`SL-ORIG-010`) | `open` | **Trusted calendar time-interval oracle** for human majority boundary `T` (`[t_low, t_high]`). | Fail closed (`GUARDIAN_TIME_BOUNDARY`) whenever credible UTC bounds cannot be established or straddle `T`. Candidate profiles: multi-source Roughtime / signed NTS quorum + chain MTP floor. |
| `OQ-002` | `SPEC-02 §1.1` (`SL-LDGR-002`) | `open` | **Tier 2 light / proof-bundle verifier profile** (`k >= 2` independent UTXO/name proof servers or future authenticated UTXO commitments). | Tier 1 full-node verifier is required for all effect executors. Tier 2 is deferred to post-v1.0. |
| `OQ-003` | `SPEC-06 §6` (`SL-GRNT-014`) | `open` | **External CAS witness wire protocol** (`advance(journal_id, token, pos, from_commit, to_commit)`). | State machine and fencing invariants are `decided`; interoperable wire transport (e.g., HTTP CAS / Raft / consensus-backed service) remains operator-local until profiled. |
| `OQ-004` | `SPEC-03 §4` (`SL-IDEN-009`) | `open` | **HTTPS `.well-known` domain-binding verification** (Channel 2 pairing between `id/<label>` and `d/<label>` or DNSSEC/NIP-05). | Channel 0 (inline) and Channel 1 (local cache / configured mirrors) work unconditionally; Channel 2 is optional and hash-pinned only. |
| `OQ-005` | `SPEC-01 §4.1` (`SL-WIRE-012`) | `open` | **Additional hardware device algorithms** (`fido2-es256`, `fido2-eddsa`, `ssh-ed25519` WebAuthn/SSH wrappers). | v1.0 closes `DeviceList.alg` to `bip340`, `p256`, and `ed25519`. Hardware wrapper formats will be proposed via SLIPs with exact canonical challenge framing. |
| `OQ-006` | `SPEC-02 §6.3` (`SL-LDGR-013`) | `open` | **Production propagation qualification for TRUC v3 / `P2A` (`51024e73`) CPFP revocation.** | Two-node Namecoin Core `nc28.0` regtest 1p1c `submitpackage` + P2P propagation + confirmation is verified (`conformance/p2a-regtest/`, covering `minrelaytxfee = 0.001 NMC/1000 vB` and `240`-sat `P2A` dust floor). Independent operator administration, fee competition, and mainnet propagation remain open before `chain-tested` maturity. |
| `OQ-007` | `SPEC-02 §3.1` (`SL-LDGR-004`), `SPEC-04 §3.1` | `open` | **Threshold ECDSA (`P2WPKH` / single-key branch) operational qualification.** | Native `P2WSH` `m-of-n` via `namepsbt` is the primary v1.0 threshold custody path for name outputs (`nc28.0` standard policy). Institutional single-key roles (`disposer_pk`, `arbiter_pk`, `challenger_pk`, single-key `P2WPKH` seals) require external threshold ECDSA signing qualification if shared across multiple operators. |

---

### 2. Provisional Numeric Constants (Subject to Empirical Calibration Before Freeze)

| ID | Owning Spec | Constant | Provisional Value | Calibration Basis |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `OQ-010` | `SPEC-02 §4` (`SL-LDGR-008`) | `LAG` (reading-node header lag bound) | `1` block | Namecoin block propagation telemetry. |
| `OQ-011` | `SPEC-02 §4` (`SL-LDGR-008`) | `S` (block header future-timestamp bound) | `600` seconds | Namecoin consensus vs clock skew tolerances. |
| `OQ-012` | `SPEC-02 §4` (`SL-LDGR-008`) | `K` (grant `recent_block` recency ceiling) | `432` blocks (~72 h) | Issuance ceremony offline signing latency vs replay window. |
| `OQ-013` | `SPEC-02 §4` (`SL-LDGR-008`) | Risk Class 1 / Class 2 `tip_age` cutoffs | `3600s` / `5400s` | Namecoin block-interval tail distribution (9.88 min mean). |
| `OQ-014` | `SPEC-03 §6` (`SL-IDEN-012`) | Host trust-root admin override delay `D` | `1008` blocks (~7 d) | Incident response window for human owners. |
| `OQ-015` | `SPEC-04 §6` (`SL-ORIG-013`) | Dual-party `name_recovery` minimum delay | `144` blocks min (`1008` recommended) | Live-owner liveness & cancellation window. |

---

### 3. Unprofiled Standard Service Types (`registry/service-types.json`)

The following standard `service_type` names are reserved with `status = "open"` pending dedicated SLIP profiles meeting the `SPEC-07 §4.1` checklist:

| `service_type` | Planned Profile | Notes |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `xmpp` | `PROFILE-xmpp-v1.md` | Sovereign XMPP hosting bound via `manifest.providers[]`. |
| `blob` | `PROFILE-blob-v1.md` | Grant-aware content-addressed blob store (Blossom BUD-01/02/04). |
| `wallet` | `PROFILE-wallet-v1.md` | `seallink/coins` spend & budget execution (concrete executor, UTXO seal, no bearer sessions). |
| `names` | `PROFILE-names-v1.md` | Delegated update-only ledger name operations. |
| `compute` | `PROFILE-compute-v1.md` | Metered LLM/compute proxy (`seallink/cost`, `seallink/tokens`, root `window_only`, bearer sessions). |
| `rental` | `PROFILE-rental-v1.md` | Contract-bound physical/digital asset lease (`requires_contract = true`, arbiter seal). |

---

### 4. Institutional and Scope Boundaries Explicitly Outside v1.0

- **Reversible adult legal capacity (conservatorship):** v1.0 enforces strictly one-way `ward -> autonomous`. Reversible capacity requires a future SLIP addressing judicial contestation and revocation of autonomy.
- **Cross-chain bridge semantics:** v1.0 binds one `network` + `genesis` per object and verification session.

---

## SLIP-XXXX: Title of Proposal

- **SLIP:** `XXXX` *(assigned upon PR submission)*
- **Title:** Short descriptive title
- **Type:** `Core` | `Profile` | `Registry` | `Ledger-Binding` | `Informational`
- **Status:** `Draft` | `Review` | `Accepted` | `Final` | `Withdrawn` | `Superseded`
- **Requires:** List of `SPEC-*` or `SLIP-*` dependencies
- **Authors:** Name <email or SealLink id/>
- **Created:** YYYY-MM-DD

---

### 1. Abstract

One concise paragraph summarizing the proposed addition or change and the problem it solves.

### 2. Motivation and Non-Goals

Why existing `SPEC-00..07` primitives or reverse-DNS custom namespaces (`SPEC-07 §4`) are insufficient, and what is explicitly out of scope.

### 3. Specification

Normative rules using [RFC2119] / [RFC8174] keywords, assigned unique `SL-<AREA>-<NNN>` Rule IDs.

- If adding a **Service Profile or Action Leaf**, include every item required by `SPEC-07 §4.1` (orthogonal action flags: `external_mutation`, `discloses_data`, `quota_consuming`, `allows_executor_ref`, `requires_contract`, `require_seal`, Risk Class; closed argument and result JSON Schemas; `result_sha256` formula; pagination/replay semantics; quota reservation/settlement; export boundary).
- If adding a **Quota Kind**, include every item required by `SPEC-07 §4.2`.
- If adding a **Canonical Object Type, Refusal Code, Key Role, or OP_RETURN Action**, include exact patches to `registry/*.json` and `schemas/*.schema.json`.

### 4. Backwards Compatibility and Fail-Closed Behavior

Explain how unupgraded v1.0 verifiers handle the new construct (must fail closed with a registered refusal code).

### 5. Security and Privacy Considerations

Threat model, DoS/oracle analysis, key-role separation impact, and on-chain privacy impact (`SL-ARCH-012`).

### 6. Conformance Test Vectors

Reference the exact positive, single-defect negative, and stateful-journal test vectors added under `vectors/` and verified by `tools/speclint.py`.

---

### SLIP Lifecycle Process

1. **Draft:** Author opens a PR with `SLIP-XXXX`, updated `registry/` and `schemas/` patches, and conformance vectors. CI (`tools/speclint.py`) MUST pass with zero errors.
2. **Review:** Public technical review and independent verification against schemas and reference tooling.
3. **Accepted:** Consensus among maintainers; vectors verified by at least one implementation.
4. **Final:** Verified across two independent implementations (`dual-impl`) and merged into the next specification release.

---

## Part IV — Machine-Readable Registries (Normative SSOT)

### Registry: constraints.json

*Source:* `registry/constraints.json`

```json
{
  "$comment": "SealLink v1.0 Structured Capability & Constraint Algebra Registry (SPEC-01, SPEC-06). All 7 predicates have linear-time decidable conservative subsumption (child <= parent) with zero Turing-completeness.",
  "protocol": "SealLink",
  "version": "1.0.0-draft.2",
  "comparison_semantics": "conservative_pairwise",
  "predicates": [
    {
      "op": "eq",
      "operand_types": [
        "string",
        "uint64_str",
        "boolean"
      ],
      "match_rule": "arg == operand",
      "narrowing_rule": "child.op == 'eq' and child.operand == parent.operand",
      "description": "Exact equality against a scalar argument value."
    },
    {
      "op": "in",
      "operand_types": [
        "array<string | uint64_str> (nonempty, sorted, distinct, max 256)"
      ],
      "match_rule": "arg in operand",
      "narrowing_rule": "(child.op == 'in' and set(child.operand) <= set(parent.operand)) or (child.op == 'eq' and child.operand in set(parent.operand))",
      "description": "Finite allowlist of exact permitted values."
    },
    {
      "op": "not_in",
      "operand_types": [
        "array<string | uint64_str> (nonempty, sorted, distinct, max 256)"
      ],
      "match_rule": "arg not in operand",
      "narrowing_rule": "(child.op == 'not_in' and set(parent.operand) <= set(child.operand)) or (child.op == 'in' and set(child.operand).isdisjoint(set(parent.operand))) or (child.op == 'eq' and child.operand not in set(parent.operand))",
      "description": "Finite denylist of forbidden values."
    },
    {
      "op": "prefix",
      "operand_types": [
        "string (nonempty)"
      ],
      "match_rule": "arg.startswith(operand)",
      "narrowing_rule": "(child.op == 'prefix' and child.operand.startswith(parent.operand)) or (child.op == 'eq' and child.operand.startswith(parent.operand)) or (child.op == 'in' and all(v.startswith(parent.operand) for v in child.operand))",
      "description": "Exact code-point prefix match (paths, git refs, URI hierarchies)."
    },
    {
      "op": "suffix",
      "operand_types": [
        "string (nonempty)"
      ],
      "match_rule": "arg.endswith(operand)",
      "narrowing_rule": "(child.op == 'suffix' and child.operand.endswith(parent.operand)) or (child.op == 'eq' and child.operand.endswith(parent.operand)) or (child.op == 'in' and all(v.endswith(parent.operand) for v in child.operand))",
      "description": "Exact code-point suffix match (DNS domains, email/XMPP addresses)."
    },
    {
      "op": "range",
      "operand_types": [
        "[uint64_str min, uint64_str max] with min <= max"
      ],
      "match_rule": "min <= int(arg) <= max",
      "narrowing_rule": "(child.op == 'range' and parent.min <= child.min <= child.max <= parent.max) or (child.op == 'eq' and parent.min <= int(child.operand) <= parent.max) or (child.op == 'in' and all(parent.min <= int(v) <= parent.max for v in child.operand))",
      "description": "Closed unsigned 64-bit integer interval [min, max] (per-request amounts, sizes, hours, depths)."
    },
    {
      "op": "hash_eq",
      "operand_types": [
        "hex64 (lowercase SHA-256)"
      ],
      "match_rule": "SHA256(arg_bytes) == operand or arg == operand",
      "narrowing_rule": "child.op == 'hash_eq' and child.operand == parent.operand",
      "description": "Exact 32-byte SHA-256 commitment match (config manifests, document payloads, templates)."
    }
  ],
  "reserved_extension_field": "extensions",
  "reserved_extension_policy": "fail_closed_WIRE_CONSTRAINT",
  "quota_windows": [
    {
      "pattern": "^term$",
      "description": "Cumulative ceiling across the entire grant validity window."
    },
    {
      "pattern": "^blocks:[1-9][0-9]{0,8}$",
      "description": "Half-open block windows anchored at grant not_before_height."
    },
    {
      "pattern": "^seconds:[1-9][0-9]{0,9}$",
      "description": "UTC epoch-aligned fixed clock windows with durable regression watermark."
    }
  ],
  "standard_quota_kinds": [
    {
      "kind": "seallink/coins",
      "unit": "atomic",
      "settlement": "actual_release_remainder"
    },
    {
      "kind": "seallink/cost",
      "unit": "<currency>/<scale>",
      "settlement": "actual_release_remainder"
    },
    {
      "kind": "seallink/tokens",
      "unit": "input-token | output-token",
      "settlement": "actual_release_remainder"
    },
    {
      "kind": "seallink/count",
      "unit": "requests | messages | bytes | operations | starts | calls",
      "settlement": "actual_release_remainder"
    }
  ]
}
```

### Registry: key-roles.json

*Source:* `registry/key-roles.json`

```json
{
  "$comment": "SealLink v1.0 Key Role & Custody Registry (SPEC-03). Coherent with registry/object-types.json (verified by tools/speclint.py).",
  "protocol": "SealLink",
  "version": "1.0.0-draft.2",
  "namecoin_coin_type": 7,
  "roles": [
    {
      "role": "name_owner",
      "curve": "secp256k1",
      "scheme": "ECDSA (P2WPKH / P2WSH SIGHASH_ALL)",
      "pubkey_encoding": "compressed_66hex",
      "custody_tier": "cold",
      "derivation_recommendation": "Separate cold seed, m/84'/7'/0'/0/i (fresh key per name or per multisig participant)",
      "published_in": "Namecoin name UTXO ScriptPolicy",
      "allowed_operations": [
        "OP_NAME_NEW",
        "OP_NAME_FIRSTUPDATE",
        "OP_NAME_UPDATE",
        "KEY_COMPROMISE_BREAK (0x0b)",
        "RECOVERY_CANCEL (0x10)"
      ],
      "forbidden_operations": [
        "seallink-grant/1",
        "seallink-auth-challenge/1",
        "messaging",
        "ordinary_fee_funding"
      ]
    },
    {
      "role": "emergency_fee_reserve",
      "curve": "secp256k1",
      "scheme": "ECDSA (P2WPKH SIGHASH_ALL)",
      "pubkey_encoding": "compressed_66hex",
      "custody_tier": "cold",
      "derivation_recommendation": "Cold seed isolated from ALL hot signers, m/84'/7'/3'/0/i",
      "published_in": "Not published (pre-funded cold UTXO)",
      "allowed_operations": [
        "Emergency name update fee funding",
        "CPFP P2A fee-bumping for pre-signed revocations"
      ],
      "forbidden_operations": [
        "seallink-grant/1",
        "seallink-auth-challenge/1",
        "hot_signer_access"
      ]
    },
    {
      "role": "grant",
      "curve": "secp256k1",
      "scheme": "BIP-340 Schnorr",
      "pubkey_encoding": "xonly_64hex",
      "custody_tier": "isolated_signer_with_presence",
      "derivation_recommendation": "Outside wallet accounts (e.g. BIP-85 m/83696968'/2'/7' or hardware/keyvault item); never shares UTXO funding seed",
      "published_in": "Name value link.grant (direct x-only pubkey or ThresholdPolicy SHA-256 pin)",
      "allowed_operations": [
        "seallink-grant/1",
        "seallink-assent/1",
        "seallink-termination/1",
        "seallink-statement/1",
        "seallink-migration/1"
      ],
      "forbidden_operations": [
        "chain_transactions",
        "seal_spends",
        "seallink-auth-challenge/1",
        "messaging"
      ]
    },
    {
      "role": "guardian_quorum",
      "curve": "secp256k1",
      "scheme": "BIP-340 Schnorr (independent per-slot SignatureSets in guardian_approvals[])",
      "pubkey_encoding": "xonly_64hex",
      "custody_tier": "isolated_signer_with_presence",
      "derivation_recommendation": "Each guardian signs its own SignatureSet with its link.grant role policy inside guardian_approvals[] matching guardian_context.revision",
      "published_in": "Each active guardian's Name value link.grant",
      "allowed_operations": [
        "seallink-grant/1",
        "seallink-assent/1"
      ],
      "forbidden_operations": [
        "chain_transactions",
        "seallink-origin/1",
        "seallink-credential/1"
      ]
    },
    {
      "role": "cred",
      "curve": "secp256k1",
      "scheme": "BIP-340 Schnorr",
      "pubkey_encoding": "xonly_64hex",
      "custody_tier": "isolated_signer_with_presence",
      "derivation_recommendation": "Dedicated isolated key outside wallet accounts",
      "published_in": "Name value link.cred (direct x-only pubkey or ThresholdPolicy SHA-256 pin)",
      "allowed_operations": [
        "seallink-origin/1",
        "seallink-guardian/1",
        "seallink-guardian-roster/1",
        "seallink-capacity/1",
        "seallink-end/1",
        "seallink-credential/1"
      ],
      "forbidden_operations": [
        "seallink-grant/1",
        "seallink-notary/1",
        "chain_transactions",
        "seallink-auth-challenge/1"
      ]
    },
    {
      "role": "notary",
      "curve": "secp256k1",
      "scheme": "BIP-340 Schnorr",
      "pubkey_encoding": "xonly_64hex",
      "custody_tier": "isolated_signer_with_presence",
      "derivation_recommendation": "Dedicated isolated key outside wallet accounts",
      "published_in": "Name value link.notary (direct x-only pubkey or ThresholdPolicy SHA-256 pin)",
      "allowed_operations": [
        "seallink-notary/1"
      ],
      "forbidden_operations": [
        "seallink-grant/1",
        "seallink-credential/1",
        "chain_transactions",
        "seallink-auth-challenge/1"
      ]
    },
    {
      "role": "auth",
      "curve": "secp256k1",
      "scheme": "BIP-340 Schnorr",
      "pubkey_encoding": "xonly_64hex",
      "custody_tier": "isolated_signer",
      "derivation_recommendation": "Hot signer seed m/84'/7'/2'/0/i (isolated from funding 0' and dynamic pool 10+)",
      "published_in": "seallink-manifest/1 auth_key (paired with auth_seal)",
      "allowed_operations": [
        "seallink-auth-challenge/1",
        "seallink-auth-upgrade/1"
      ],
      "forbidden_operations": [
        "seallink-grant/1",
        "seallink-assent/1",
        "seallink-owner-command/1",
        "chain_transactions"
      ]
    },
    {
      "role": "recipient",
      "curve": "secp256k1",
      "scheme": "BIP-340 Schnorr",
      "pubkey_encoding": "xonly_64hex",
      "custody_tier": "hot_service_or_keyholder",
      "derivation_recommendation": "Per-task ephemeral key or dedicated request key pinned in grant.recipient",
      "published_in": "seallink-grant/1 recipient (key, name's nostr/request key, or group threshold)",
      "allowed_operations": [
        "seallink-invocation/1",
        "seallink-session-open/1"
      ],
      "forbidden_operations": [
        "seallink-grant/1",
        "seallink-origin/1",
        "seallink-credential/1"
      ]
    },
    {
      "role": "messaging_or_request",
      "curve": "secp256k1",
      "scheme": "BIP-340 Schnorr",
      "pubkey_encoding": "xonly_64hex",
      "custody_tier": "hot_service_or_keyholder",
      "derivation_recommendation": "Generated on host/keyholder (or m/44'/1237'/0'/0/i for personal Nostr)",
      "published_in": "Name value nostr (or directly in grant recipient.key for key-only actors)",
      "allowed_operations": [
        "Transport messaging (e.g. Nostr)",
        "seallink-invocation/1",
        "seallink-session-open/1"
      ],
      "forbidden_operations": [
        "seallink-grant/1",
        "child_grant_signing"
      ]
    },
    {
      "role": "delegation",
      "curve": "secp256k1",
      "scheme": "BIP-340 Schnorr",
      "pubkey_encoding": "xonly_64hex",
      "custody_tier": "isolated_signer",
      "derivation_recommendation": "Per-parent derived key inside dedicated delegation signing service with 1-sig-per-row reservation ledger",
      "published_in": "Parent seallink-grant/1 delegate.key (never in name value)",
      "allowed_operations": [
        "seallink-grant/1"
      ],
      "forbidden_operations": [
        "root_grant_signing",
        "seal_spends",
        "messaging",
        "name_updates"
      ]
    },
    {
      "role": "moderator",
      "curve": "secp256k1",
      "scheme": "BIP-340 Schnorr",
      "pubkey_encoding": "xonly_64hex",
      "custody_tier": "isolated_signer",
      "derivation_recommendation": "Dedicated moderation verdict signing key pinned in contract.moderation.moderator_key",
      "published_in": "seallink-contract/1 moderation.moderator_key",
      "allowed_operations": [
        "seallink-verdict/1"
      ],
      "forbidden_operations": [
        "seallink-grant/1",
        "seallink-assent/1",
        "chain_transactions"
      ]
    },
    {
      "role": "grant_seal",
      "curve": "secp256k1",
      "scheme": "ECDSA (P2WPKH / P2WSH SIGHASH_ALL)",
      "pubkey_encoding": "compressed_66hex",
      "custody_tier": "isolated_signer",
      "derivation_recommendation": "Dynamic account pool m/84'/7'/<acct>=10+'/0/i (xpub kept secret)",
      "published_in": "seallink-grant/1 revocation.seal.script_policy",
      "allowed_operations": [
        "Revocation spend of its own grant seal UTXO"
      ],
      "forbidden_operations": [
        "seallink-grant/1",
        "ordinary_fee_funding"
      ]
    },
    {
      "role": "child_seal",
      "curve": "secp256k1",
      "scheme": "ECDSA (P2WPKH / P2WSH SIGHASH_ALL)",
      "pubkey_encoding": "compressed_66hex",
      "custody_tier": "isolated_signer",
      "derivation_recommendation": "Separate dynamic account outside delegation signer",
      "published_in": "Parent seallink-grant/1 delegate.child_seal_key",
      "allowed_operations": [
        "Revocation spend of child grant seals"
      ],
      "forbidden_operations": [
        "seallink-grant/1",
        "delegation_signer_access"
      ]
    },
    {
      "role": "row_coin",
      "curve": "secp256k1",
      "scheme": "ECDSA (P2WPKH SIGHASH_ALL)",
      "pubkey_encoding": "compressed_66hex",
      "custody_tier": "isolated_signer",
      "derivation_recommendation": "Separate dynamic account >= 10'",
      "published_in": "Parent seallink-grant/1 delegate.groups[].ranges[]",
      "allowed_operations": [
        "Single-use anchor spend enforcing <= 1 child per row"
      ],
      "forbidden_operations": [
        "seallink-grant/1",
        "seal_spends"
      ]
    },
    {
      "role": "stop_coin",
      "curve": "secp256k1",
      "scheme": "ECDSA (P2WPKH SIGHASH_ALL)",
      "pubkey_encoding": "compressed_66hex",
      "custody_tier": "isolated_signer",
      "derivation_recommendation": "Notary-owned dynamic account >= 10'",
      "published_in": "Parent seallink-grant/1 delegate.groups[].ranges[].stop_script_policy",
      "allowed_operations": [
        "Notary per-row termination for cause"
      ],
      "forbidden_operations": [
        "seallink-grant/1",
        "seallink-notary/1"
      ]
    },
    {
      "role": "contract_seal",
      "curve": "secp256k1",
      "scheme": "ECDSA (P2WPKH / P2WSH SIGHASH_ALL)",
      "pubkey_encoding": "compressed_66hex",
      "custody_tier": "isolated_signer_with_presence",
      "derivation_recommendation": "Dedicated contract seal account >= 10'",
      "published_in": "seallink-contract/1 seal.script_policy",
      "allowed_operations": [
        "Contract termination spend (action 0x08)"
      ],
      "forbidden_operations": [
        "seallink-grant/1",
        "ordinary_fee_funding"
      ]
    },
    {
      "role": "guardian_seal",
      "curve": "secp256k1",
      "scheme": "ECDSA (P2WPKH / P2WSH SIGHASH_ALL; threshold ECDSA per OQ-007 for multi-custodian institutions)",
      "pubkey_encoding": "compressed_66hex",
      "custody_tier": "isolated_signer_with_presence",
      "derivation_recommendation": "Dedicated guardianship seal account >= 10'",
      "published_in": "seallink-origin/1, seallink-guardian/1, seallink-guardian-roster/1",
      "allowed_operations": [
        "Slot halt, initial activation (0x12), successor transition (0x0d), slot activation (0x0e), roster transition (0x0f), name binding (0x0c)"
      ],
      "forbidden_operations": [
        "seallink-grant/1",
        "ordinary_fee_funding"
      ]
    },
    {
      "role": "disposable_revoke_seal",
      "curve": "secp256k1",
      "scheme": "ECDSA (P2WPKH SIGHASH_ALL + P2A CPFP anchor output)",
      "pubkey_encoding": "compressed_66hex",
      "custody_tier": "ephemeral_csprng_destroyed_after_presign",
      "derivation_recommendation": "CSPRNG ONLY — NEVER BIP-39 derived; destroy private key immediately after recording pre-signed tx_revoke",
      "published_in": "manifest auth_seal, device-list seal, members-list entry seal",
      "allowed_operations": [
        "One pre-signed fast-revocation transaction with P2A CPFP anchor output"
      ],
      "forbidden_operations": [
        "seed_derivation",
        "key_retention_after_presign"
      ]
    },
    {
      "role": "device",
      "curve": "P-256 | Ed25519 | secp256k1",
      "scheme": "ECDSA-P256 (low-S) | Ed25519 | BIP-340",
      "pubkey_encoding": "alg_tagged_hex",
      "custody_tier": "hardware_device",
      "derivation_recommendation": "Generated inside hardware enclave or device keystore (non-exportable for L2)",
      "published_in": "seallink-device-list/1 (pinned in manifest)",
      "allowed_operations": [
        "seallink-owner-command/1",
        "seallink-statement/1"
      ],
      "forbidden_operations": [
        "seallink-auth-challenge/1",
        "seallink-grant/1",
        "seallink-assent/1",
        "chain_transactions"
      ]
    },
    {
      "role": "receipt",
      "curve": "secp256k1",
      "scheme": "BIP-340 Schnorr",
      "pubkey_encoding": "xonly_64hex",
      "custody_tier": "hot_service",
      "derivation_recommendation": "Dedicated service receipt key (distinct from funding/wallet keys)",
      "published_in": "Service's seallink-manifest/1 service.receipt_key and grant.executor.key",
      "allowed_operations": [
        "seallink-receipt/1",
        "seallink-migration/1"
      ],
      "forbidden_operations": [
        "seallink-grant/1",
        "wallet_spends"
      ]
    },
    {
      "role": "arbiter",
      "curve": "secp256k1",
      "scheme": "BIP-340 Schnorr (off-chain) / ECDSA single compressed key in P2WSH branches (threshold ECDSA per OQ-007 for institutions)",
      "pubkey_encoding": "xonly_64hex_or_compressed_66hex",
      "custody_tier": "isolated_signer_with_presence",
      "derivation_recommendation": "Independent institution/court custody (never co-located with disposer)",
      "published_in": "seallink-origin/1, seallink-guardian-roster/1, seallink-contract/1",
      "allowed_operations": [
        "seallink-guardian/1",
        "seallink-guardian-roster/1",
        "seallink-termination/1",
        "2-of-2 guardian appointment (0x0d)",
        "2-of-2 roster transition (0x0f)",
        "2-of-2 name recovery (0x0c)",
        "arbiter contract termination (0x08)"
      ],
      "forbidden_operations": [
        "unilateral_guardian_appointment",
        "grant_widening",
        "seallink-grant/1"
      ]
    },
    {
      "role": "funding",
      "curve": "secp256k1",
      "scheme": "ECDSA (P2WPKH SIGHASH_ALL)",
      "pubkey_encoding": "compressed_66hex",
      "custody_tier": "hot_service",
      "derivation_recommendation": "Hot signer seed m/84'/7'/0'/0/i",
      "published_in": "Not published",
      "allowed_operations": [
        "Ordinary tx fees, seal pool funding, sponsored client-owned registration funding"
      ],
      "forbidden_operations": [
        "name_owner_control",
        "seallink-grant/1",
        "emergency_fee_reserve"
      ]
    }
  ]
}
```

### Registry: object-types.json

*Source:* `registry/object-types.json`

```json
{
  "$comment": "SealLink v1.0 Canonical Object Type Registry. Authoritative SSOT for object types, byte limits, signing roles, and schema targets. Signing domain tag equals the exact type string under SPEC-01.",
  "protocol": "SealLink",
  "version": "1.0.0-draft.2",
  "types": [
    {
      "type": "seallink-manifest/1",
      "signed": false,
      "auth_mechanism": "name_value_sha256_pin",
      "max_bytes": 16384,
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
      "schema": "schemas/manifest.schema.json",
      "description": "Name-pinned operational manifest: off-chain set heads, self-service declaration, pinned labeled providers, optional role-policy preimages (verified against on-chain link.<role> hashes), and foreign-service auth key/seal."
    },
    {
      "type": "seallink-card/1",
      "signed": false,
      "auth_mechanism": "manifest_sha256_pin",
      "max_bytes": 16384,
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
      "schema": "schemas/card.schema.json",
      "description": "Public unsigned entity metadata card (person, agent, organization, service) authenticated solely via name -> manifest -> card SHA-256 chain."
    },
    {
      "type": "seallink-device-list/1",
      "signed": false,
      "auth_mechanism": "manifest_sha256_pin",
      "max_bytes": 16384,
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
      "schema": "schemas/manifest.schema.json#/$defs/DeviceList",
      "description": "Owner-control plane device list (L0-L2 ceilings, algorithm, presence claim, disposable fast-revocation seal)."
    },
    {
      "type": "seallink-members-list/1",
      "signed": false,
      "auth_mechanism": "manifest_sha256_pin",
      "max_bytes": 262144,
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
      "schema": "schemas/manifest.schema.json#/$defs/MembersList",
      "description": "Manifest-pinned list of managed/member names with owner policy pins and per-entry revocation seals."
    },
    {
      "type": "seallink-certset-head/1",
      "signed": false,
      "auth_mechanism": "manifest_sha256_pin",
      "max_bytes": 4096,
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
      "schema": "schemas/manifest.schema.json#/$defs/CertSetHead",
      "description": "Manifest-pinned head committing to an actor's complete set of self-issued key-binding and configuration statements."
    },
    {
      "type": "seallink-statement/1",
      "signed": true,
      "signer_roles": [
        "grant",
        "device"
      ],
      "max_bytes": 16384,
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
      "schema": "schemas/manifest.schema.json#/$defs/Statement",
      "description": "Typed actor-signed statement for external transport key bindings, host configuration sections, or trust-root rotation/cancellation."
    },
    {
      "type": "seallink-owner-command/1",
      "signed": true,
      "signer_roles": [
        "device"
      ],
      "max_bytes": 16384,
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
      "schema": "schemas/invocation.schema.json#/$defs/OwnerCommand",
      "description": "L0/L1/L2 owner control-plane command for an actor's own executors and managed agent key holders; never valid at foreign verifiers."
    },
    {
      "type": "seallink-auth-challenge/1",
      "signed": true,
      "signer_roles": [
        "auth"
      ],
      "max_bytes": 4096,
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
      "schema": "schemas/invocation.schema.json#/$defs/AuthChallenge",
      "description": "Single-use foreign-service login challenge (provisional key-only or named mode), TTL <= 120s."
    },
    {
      "type": "seallink-auth-upgrade/1",
      "signed": true,
      "signer_roles": [
        "auth"
      ],
      "max_bytes": 4096,
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
      "schema": "schemas/invocation.schema.json#/$defs/AuthUpgrade",
      "description": "Atomic promotion of a provisional key-only service cell to a confirmed named SealLink identity under the same auth key."
    },
    {
      "type": "seallink-origin/1",
      "signed": true,
      "signer_roles": [
        "cred"
      ],
      "max_bytes": 65536,
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
      "schema": "schemas/origin.schema.json",
      "description": "Eternal Origin Certificate establishing immutable subject class (person, agent, organization), salted initial guardian commitments, explicit disposer/arbiter/challenger keys, revision-denominated quorum rules, status/roster UTXO spines, and name_recovery policy."
    },
    {
      "type": "seallink-name-binding/1",
      "signed": false,
      "auth_mechanism": "binding_seal_spend_and_anchor",
      "max_bytes": 4096,
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
      "schema": "schemas/guardian.schema.json#/$defs/NameBinding",
      "description": "Single-use binding record linking an eternal Origin Certificate to a specific name registration outpoint, ScriptPolicy, and optional successor recovery seal."
    },
    {
      "type": "seallink-guardian/1",
      "signed": true,
      "signer_roles": [
        "cred",
        "arbiter"
      ],
      "max_bytes": 16384,
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
      "schema": "schemas/guardian.schema.json#/$defs/GuardianRecord",
      "description": "Acyclic revocable guardianship record supporting direct initial activation (mode=initial, 0x12) and two-stage successor appointment/activation (mode=appointed, 0x0d -> 0x0e)."
    },
    {
      "type": "seallink-guardian-roster/1",
      "signed": true,
      "signer_roles": [
        "cred",
        "arbiter"
      ],
      "max_bytes": 32768,
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
      "schema": "schemas/guardian.schema.json#/$defs/GuardianRoster",
      "description": "Governed roster transition authorized by disposer+arbiter roster_seal spend (0x0f), advancing revision, adjusting approved revision_size, rotating challenger_pk, or re-anchoring burned slots."
    },
    {
      "type": "seallink-capacity/1",
      "signed": true,
      "signer_roles": [
        "cred"
      ],
      "max_bytes": 16384,
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
      "schema": "schemas/guardian.schema.json#/$defs/CapacityRecord",
      "description": "Eternal emancipation / legal-capacity record transitioning a ward toward autonomous status upon status_seal spend and confirmed name transfer."
    },
    {
      "type": "seallink-end/1",
      "signed": true,
      "signer_roles": [
        "cred"
      ],
      "max_bytes": 8192,
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
      "schema": "schemas/guardian.schema.json#/$defs/EndRecord",
      "description": "Eternal subject-end record (human death, agent dematerialization, organization dissolution) spending status_seal terminally and permanently closing guardianship and admission."
    },
    {
      "type": "seallink-contract/1",
      "signed": false,
      "auth_mechanism": "all_party_assents_and_anchor",
      "max_bytes": 65536,
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
      "schema": "schemas/contract.schema.json#/$defs/Contract",
      "description": "N-party structured contract with salted per-clause selective disclosure, explicit machine_clause_indices, ward origin_id party binding, optional framework link, confirmed contract termination seal, and optional agreed configuration hash."
    },
    {
      "type": "seallink-assent/1",
      "signed": true,
      "signer_roles": [
        "grant",
        "guardian_quorum"
      ],
      "max_bytes": 32768,
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
      "schema": "schemas/contract.schema.json#/$defs/Assent",
      "description": "Symmetric native party assent binding a signer (via signatures) or a ward's guardian quorum (via guardian_approvals[]) to a contract, guardianship appointment, or migration manifest."
    },
    {
      "type": "seallink-termination/1",
      "signed": true,
      "signer_roles": [
        "grant",
        "arbiter"
      ],
      "max_bytes": 16384,
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
      "schema": "schemas/contract.schema.json#/$defs/TerminationStatement",
      "description": "Signed termination evidence committed inside a contract-seal spend (action 0x08); the seal spend alone terminates."
    },
    {
      "type": "seallink-verdict/1",
      "signed": true,
      "signer_roles": [
        "moderator"
      ],
      "max_bytes": 16384,
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
      "schema": "schemas/contract.schema.json#/$defs/Verdict",
      "description": "Chained violation verdict record referencing salted request/response hashes and rule identifier, optionally anchored in grant-seal spend (0x03)."
    },
    {
      "type": "seallink-credential/1",
      "signed": true,
      "signer_roles": [
        "cred"
      ],
      "max_bytes": 65536,
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
      "schema": "schemas/credential.schema.json#/$defs/Credential",
      "description": "General third-party verifiable credential (eternal or revocable), anchored by signed-form content address (0x09) and bounded by compromise height h_c (0x0b)."
    },
    {
      "type": "seallink-credential-withdrawal/1",
      "signed": false,
      "auth_mechanism": "credential_seal_spend",
      "max_bytes": 1024,
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
      "schema": "schemas/credential.schema.json#/$defs/CredentialWithdrawal",
      "description": "Unsigned cause commitment authenticated by spending a revocable credential's seal (action 0x0a)."
    },
    {
      "type": "seallink-credential-break/1",
      "signed": false,
      "auth_mechanism": "owner_policy_name_update_sighash_all",
      "max_bytes": 1024,
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
      "schema": "schemas/credential.schema.json#/$defs/CredentialBreak",
      "description": "Chain-reconstructible compromise-height (h_c) break payload authenticated by the issuer's name OwnerPolicy (action 0x0b)."
    },
    {
      "type": "seallink-notary/1",
      "signed": true,
      "signer_roles": [
        "notary"
      ],
      "max_bytes": 65536,
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
      "schema": "schemas/credential.schema.json#/$defs/NotaryAct",
      "description": "General notary act (contract notarization, document copy, fact attestation, or optional child-grant attestation), supporting eternal (anchor-height) and revocable modes."
    },
    {
      "type": "seallink-grant/1",
      "signed": true,
      "signer_roles": [
        "grant",
        "delegation",
        "guardian_quorum"
      ],
      "max_bytes": 65536,
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
      "schema": "schemas/grant.schema.json",
      "description": "Universal revocable (or root-only short-lived window_only) capability grant: unilateral by default, optionally contract-bound, signed via signatures or ward guardian_approvals[], with 7-predicate Constraint Algebra, separate additive quotas, and bounded depth-2 re-delegation."
    },
    {
      "type": "seallink-issuance/1",
      "signed": false,
      "auth_mechanism": "issuance_anchor_op_return",
      "max_bytes": 2048,
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
      "schema": "schemas/grant.schema.json#/$defs/IssuancePrep",
      "description": "Canonical issuance preparation committed in action 0x01 OP_RETURN, binding grant_id, grant signatures, and optional contract assents."
    },
    {
      "type": "seallink-invocation/1",
      "signed": true,
      "signer_roles": [
        "recipient",
        "messaging_or_request"
      ],
      "max_bytes": 1048576,
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
      "schema": "schemas/invocation.schema.json#/$defs/Invocation",
      "description": "Signed execution request carrying concrete action, target, typed arguments, ordered proof path, nonce, and wall-clock [iat, exp) window."
    },
    {
      "type": "seallink-receipt/1",
      "signed": true,
      "signer_roles": [
        "receipt"
      ],
      "max_bytes": 65536,
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
      "schema": "schemas/invocation.schema.json#/$defs/Receipt",
      "description": "Executor-signed accounting and outcome receipt (executed, refused, uncertain) with reserved, settled, and released quota amounts."
    },
    {
      "type": "seallink-session-open/1",
      "signed": true,
      "signer_roles": [
        "recipient",
        "messaging_or_request"
      ],
      "max_bytes": 16384,
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
      "schema": "schemas/invocation.schema.json#/$defs/SessionOpen",
      "description": "Signed invocation establishing, extending, or closing a short-lived (<= 3600s) bearer session for non-signing clients."
    },
    {
      "type": "seallink-journal-entry/1",
      "signed": false,
      "auth_mechanism": "hash_chain_and_external_cas_witness",
      "max_bytes": 4096,
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
      "schema": "schemas/invocation.schema.json#/$defs/JournalEntry",
      "description": "Canonical entry in an anti-rollback hash-chained journal (closures, reservations, settlements, single-use consumption, nonces, manifest heads, recovery boundaries)."
    },
    {
      "type": "seallink-migration/1",
      "signed": true,
      "signer_roles": [
        "receipt",
        "grant"
      ],
      "max_bytes": 65536,
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-07",
      "schema": "schemas/invocation.schema.json#/$defs/MigrationManifest",
      "description": "Replaceable-service portable state and accounting handover manifest signed by old provider, holder, and new provider."
    }
  ]
}
```

### Registry: opreturn-actions.json

*Source:* `registry/opreturn-actions.json`

```json
{
  "$comment": "SealLink v1.0 OP_RETURN Commitment Framing Registry (SPEC-02). All standard frames fit strictly within Bitcoin/Namecoin MAX_OP_RETURN_RELAY = 83 bytes.",
  "protocol": "SealLink",
  "version": "1.0.0-draft.2",
  "magic_ascii": "SLNK",
  "magic_hex": "534c4e4b",
  "max_relay_script_bytes": 83,
  "header_format": "OP_RETURN(0x6a) PUSH5(0x05) magic(4B='SLNK') action(1B) PUSH_N(1B) payload(N bytes)",
  "standard_payload_format": "version(1B=0x01) || commitment(32B) || loc_type(1B) || pointer(0B | 32B)",
  "locator_types": [
    {
      "code": "0x00",
      "name": "none",
      "pointer_bytes": 0,
      "standard_script_bytes": 42,
      "description": "No public locator on chain. Default for private documents delivered inline or via E2EE transport."
    },
    {
      "code": "0x01",
      "name": "content_sha256",
      "pointer_bytes": 32,
      "standard_script_bytes": 74,
      "description": "Content-addressed SHA-256 pointer (e.g., Blossom BUD-01 / HTTP content store)."
    },
    {
      "code": "0x02",
      "name": "bt_v2",
      "pointer_bytes": 32,
      "standard_script_bytes": 74,
      "description": "BitTorrent v2 (BEP 52) SHA-256 infohash."
    },
    {
      "code": "0x05",
      "name": "nostr_event_id",
      "pointer_bytes": 32,
      "standard_script_bytes": 74,
      "description": "Raw 32-byte NIP-01 Nostr event ID (e.g., kind 30079 addressable mirror)."
    }
  ],
  "actions": [
    {
      "code": "0x01",
      "name": "GRANT_ISSUANCE",
      "status": "decided",
      "version": "0x01",
      "commitment": "typed_digest(seallink-issuance/1)",
      "allowed_locators": [
        "0x00",
        "0x01",
        "0x05"
      ],
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
      "description": "Anchors a root or child grant issuance (unilateral or contract-bound)."
    },
    {
      "code": "0x02",
      "name": "BATCH_ANCHOR",
      "status": "decided",
      "version": "0x01",
      "commitment": "seallink_merkle_root_sha256",
      "allowed_locators": [
        "0x00",
        "0x01",
        "0x02",
        "0x05"
      ],
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-02",
      "description": "Anchors a domain-separated SHA-256 Merkle root (SPEC-02 §5.3: sorted unique 32B digests, tagged leaves/nodes, odd-node promotion without duplication)."
    },
    {
      "code": "0x03",
      "name": "GRANT_VIOLATION_TERMINATION",
      "status": "decided",
      "version": "0x01",
      "commitment": "typed_digest(seallink-verdict/1)",
      "allowed_locators": [
        "0x00",
        "0x01",
        "0x05"
      ],
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
      "description": "Optional evidence inside a grant-seal spend referencing a signed moderation/violation verdict."
    },
    {
      "code": "0x04",
      "name": "NOTARY_ACT",
      "status": "decided",
      "version": "0x01",
      "commitment": "content_addr(seallink-notary/1)",
      "allowed_locators": [
        "0x00",
        "0x01",
        "0x05"
      ],
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
      "description": "Anchors the signed form of a general notary act (contract notarization, copy, fact, or child attestation)."
    },
    {
      "code": "0x05",
      "name": "NOTARY_WITHDRAWAL_FOR_CAUSE",
      "status": "decided",
      "version": "0x01",
      "commitment": "sha256_cause_commitment",
      "allowed_locators": [
        "0x00",
        "0x01",
        "0x05"
      ],
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
      "description": "Authenticated by spending the notary seal or row stop coin; records withdrawal for cause."
    },
    {
      "code": "0x06",
      "name": "RESERVED",
      "status": "reserved",
      "version": "0x01",
      "commitment": "none",
      "allowed_locators": [],
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-02",
      "description": "Reserved unused action byte; readers encountering 0x06 MUST refuse with CHAIN_FRAME_INVALID."
    },
    {
      "code": "0x07",
      "name": "CONTRACT_ANCHOR",
      "status": "decided",
      "version": "0x01",
      "commitment": "contract_id",
      "allowed_locators": [
        "0x00",
        "0x01",
        "0x05"
      ],
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
      "description": "Anchors an N-party contract (and optional on-chain assent spend)."
    },
    {
      "code": "0x08",
      "name": "CONTRACT_TERMINATION",
      "status": "decided",
      "version": "0x01",
      "commitment": "typed_digest(seallink-termination/1)",
      "allowed_locators": [
        "0x00",
        "0x01",
        "0x05"
      ],
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
      "description": "Optional signed termination statement inside a contract-seal spend."
    },
    {
      "code": "0x09",
      "name": "CREDENTIAL_OR_ORIGIN_ANCHOR",
      "status": "decided",
      "version": "0x01",
      "commitment": "content_addr(signed_form)",
      "allowed_locators": [
        "0x00",
        "0x01",
        "0x05"
      ],
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
      "description": "Anchors the complete signed form of seallink-origin/1, seallink-credential/1, seallink-capacity/1 (spending status_seal), or seallink-end/1 (terminally spending status_seal)."
    },
    {
      "code": "0x0a",
      "name": "CREDENTIAL_WITHDRAWAL_FOR_CAUSE",
      "status": "decided",
      "version": "0x01",
      "commitment": "typed_digest(seallink-credential-withdrawal/1)",
      "allowed_locators": [
        "0x00",
        "0x01",
        "0x05"
      ],
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
      "description": "Authenticated by spending a revocable credential or guardianship seal; binds cause hash."
    },
    {
      "code": "0x0b",
      "name": "KEY_COMPROMISE_BREAK",
      "status": "decided",
      "version": "0x01",
      "custom_payload_format": "version(1B=0x01) || typed_digest(32B) || h_c_le64(8B) || loc_type(1B=0x00)",
      "script_bytes": 50,
      "commitment": "typed_digest(seallink-credential-break/1)",
      "allowed_locators": [
        "0x00"
      ],
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
      "description": "OwnerPolicy-authenticated compromise height h_c for a credential or notary role key; anchors < h_c survive, >= h_c refuse."
    },
    {
      "code": "0x0c",
      "name": "NAME_BINDING",
      "status": "decided",
      "version": "0x01",
      "commitment": "id(seallink-name-binding/1)",
      "allowed_locators": [
        "0x00",
        "0x01",
        "0x05"
      ],
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
      "description": "Committed when spending an origin's single-use binding_seal (or governed dual-party recovery_seal) to bind origin_id to a name registration."
    },
    {
      "code": "0x0d",
      "name": "GUARDIAN_APPOINTMENT",
      "status": "decided",
      "version": "0x01",
      "commitment": "content_addr(seallink-guardian/1)",
      "allowed_locators": [
        "0x00",
        "0x01",
        "0x05"
      ],
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
      "description": "Stage 1 successor appointment (activation_mode=appointed): committed when spending a vacant guardianship slot UTXO (disposer + arbiter 2-of-2 P2WSH) to create the CSV-delayed pending slot output."
    },
    {
      "code": "0x0e",
      "name": "GUARDIAN_ACTIVATION",
      "status": "decided",
      "version": "0x01",
      "commitment": "id(seallink-guardian/1)",
      "allowed_locators": [
        "0x00"
      ],
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
      "description": "Stage 2 activation: committed when the appointed guardian spends the CSV-unlocked pending slot output to create the active either_of_2(guardian, disposer) slot seal at vout 0."
    },
    {
      "code": "0x0f",
      "name": "GUARDIAN_ROSTER_TRANSITION",
      "status": "decided",
      "version": "0x01",
      "commitment": "content_addr(seallink-guardian-roster/1)",
      "allowed_locators": [
        "0x00",
        "0x01",
        "0x05"
      ],
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
      "description": "Committed when spending roster_seal (disposer + arbiter 2-of-2 P2WSH) to advance guardianship revision, resize approved revision_size, rotate challenger_pk, or re-anchor a burned slot."
    },
    {
      "code": "0x10",
      "name": "RECOVERY_CANCEL",
      "status": "decided",
      "version": "0x01",
      "commitment": "id(seallink-name-binding/1)",
      "allowed_locators": [
        "0x00"
      ],
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
      "description": "Committed inside an owner-authored (SIGHASH_ALL) OP_NAME_UPDATE of the live existing name prior to h_rec + delay_blocks to abort a pending dual-party recovery and restore prior binding admission."
    },
    {
      "code": "0x11",
      "name": "SINGLE_USE_CONSUMPTION",
      "status": "decided",
      "version": "0x01",
      "commitment": "content_addr(seallink-invocation/1)",
      "allowed_locators": [
        "0x00"
      ],
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
      "description": "Committed when the grantee spends a single_use_1_of_2 grant seal via branch 0 (grantee) with SIGHASH_ALL to authorize at-most-once execution of the referenced invocation."
    },
    {
      "code": "0x12",
      "name": "GUARDIAN_INITIAL_ACTIVATION",
      "status": "decided",
      "version": "0x01",
      "commitment": "content_addr(seallink-guardian/1)",
      "allowed_locators": [
        "0x00",
        "0x01",
        "0x05"
      ],
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
      "description": "Direct initial activation (activation_mode=initial): committed when spending an origin's initial_vacant slot UTXO for the disclosed initial_guardian_commitment (with guardian assent) directly to active_policy at active_vout."
    }
  ]
}
```

### Registry: refusal-codes.json

*Source:* `registry/refusal-codes.json`

```json
{
  "$comment": "SealLink v1.0 Authoritative Refusal Code Registry. No normative document may emit a refusal code absent from this file. Verifiers report the FIRST failing code in each pipeline's deterministic check order.",
  "protocol": "SealLink",
  "version": "1.0.0-draft.2",
  "codes": [
    {
      "code": "WIRE_SIZE",
      "category": "wire",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-01",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Document exceeds type max_bytes or nesting depth > 16."
    },
    {
      "code": "WIRE_JSON",
      "category": "wire",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-01",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Invalid UTF-8, BOM present, trailing bytes, or malformed RFC 8259 JSON object."
    },
    {
      "code": "WIRE_DUPLICATE",
      "category": "wire",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-01",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Duplicate object member name (after escape resolution) or Unicode fold alias in name value."
    },
    {
      "code": "WIRE_VALUE",
      "category": "wire",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-01",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Forbidden JSON value (e.g., null)."
    },
    {
      "code": "WIRE_NUMBER",
      "category": "wire",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-01",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "JSON number has sign, fraction, exponent, leading zero, or exceeds 2^53 - 1."
    },
    {
      "code": "WIRE_INTEGER",
      "category": "wire",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-01",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Number-form or string-form integer violates grammar or schema bound."
    },
    {
      "code": "WIRE_STRING",
      "category": "wire",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-01",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "String contains forbidden control character (< U+0020 except U+000A in multiline prose fields, U+007F DEL, C1 U+0080..U+009F) or unpaired surrogate."
    },
    {
      "code": "WIRE_NOT_CANONICAL",
      "category": "wire",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-01",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Re-encoded Restricted RFC 8785 JCS bytes differ from input octets."
    },
    {
      "code": "WIRE_TYPE",
      "category": "wire",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-01",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Unregistered, unsupported, or unexpected object type string."
    },
    {
      "code": "WIRE_MEMBER",
      "category": "wire",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-01",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Missing required member, unknown member, or member type/form mismatch."
    },
    {
      "code": "WIRE_KEY",
      "category": "wire",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-01",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Malformed public key encoding or invalid curve point."
    },
    {
      "code": "WIRE_SIGNATURE",
      "category": "wire",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-01",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Malformed signature encoding, failed cryptographic verification, policy mismatch, or SignatureSet threshold unmet."
    },
    {
      "code": "WIRE_CONSTRAINT",
      "category": "wire",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-01",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Malformed or unsupported Constraint Algebra predicate or populated reserved extension."
    },
    {
      "code": "CHAIN_MISMATCH",
      "category": "ledger",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-02",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Node network or genesis hash does not match verifier's pinned chain."
    },
    {
      "code": "CHAIN_UNHEALTHY",
      "category": "ledger",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-02",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": true,
      "description": "Reading node is in IBD, unreachable, missing txindex, or lags header tip beyond LAG."
    },
    {
      "code": "CHAIN_NODE_DISAGREEMENT",
      "category": "ledger",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-02",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": true,
      "description": "A healthy independent comparison node disagrees on chain tip or sits ahead of reading node."
    },
    {
      "code": "CHAIN_CLOCK_ERROR",
      "category": "ledger",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-02",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": true,
      "description": "Verifier clock regressed below durable monotonic mark or block header exceeds future bound S."
    },
    {
      "code": "CHAIN_TIP_STALE",
      "category": "ledger",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-02",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": true,
      "description": "Tip age max(now - header_time, now - first_sight) exceeds action risk-class cutoff."
    },
    {
      "code": "CHAIN_OBSERVATION_VOID",
      "category": "ledger",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-02",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": true,
      "description": "Chain tip changed between start and end reads of a single observation."
    },
    {
      "code": "CHAIN_SCRIPT_UNSUPPORTED",
      "category": "ledger",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-02",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Output script does not match any supported ScriptPolicy template or compiled scriptPubKey."
    },
    {
      "code": "CHAIN_TX_CONSTRUCTION",
      "category": "ledger",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-02",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Transaction violates Witness construction profile (non-SegWit input, non-SIGHASH_ALL, unconfirmed funding, bad linkage)."
    },
    {
      "code": "CHAIN_FRAME_INVALID",
      "category": "ledger",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-02",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Missing, duplicate, reserved, or malformed SLNK OP_RETURN commitment frame or invalid Merkle inclusion proof."
    },
    {
      "code": "CHAIN_DEPTH_INSUFFICIENT",
      "category": "ledger",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-02",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": true,
      "description": "Required transaction confirmation depth is below max(signed_min_depth, operator_floor)."
    },
    {
      "code": "CHAIN_RECENCY_INVALID",
      "category": "ledger",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-02",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Recent block hash R is off active chain or anchor height falls outside (R, R + K]."
    },
    {
      "code": "SEAL_UNAVAILABLE",
      "category": "ledger",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-02",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": true,
      "description": "Seal UTXO is unconfirmed, has mismatched script, single-use seal not yet spent by grantee, or chain read is inconclusive; never treated as unspent or closed."
    },
    {
      "code": "SEAL_SPENT",
      "category": "ledger",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-02",
      "creates_closure": true,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Validated revocation spend of a live seal UTXO (mempool or block); recorded as permanent closure."
    },
    {
      "code": "NAME_NOT_FOUND",
      "category": "identity",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": true,
      "description": "Name does not exist or has no confirmed output on active chain."
    },
    {
      "code": "NAME_EXPIRED",
      "category": "identity",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Name output has reached or passed expiry height (h + D)."
    },
    {
      "code": "NAME_OWNER_MISMATCH",
      "category": "identity",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Name UTXO ScriptPolicy does not match pinned owner policy or transferred away."
    },
    {
      "code": "NAME_WRITER_UNVERIFIED",
      "category": "identity",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Current name value was not authored by pinned ScriptPolicy with SIGHASH_ALL on all required signatures."
    },
    {
      "code": "NAME_HISTORY_UNAVAILABLE",
      "category": "identity",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": true,
      "description": "Name transaction history walk exceeded operator step bound or node could not supply history."
    },
    {
      "code": "NAME_VALUE_INVALID",
      "category": "identity",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Name value exceeds 520 bytes or violates strict link / m member grammar."
    },
    {
      "code": "NAME_ROLE_CHANGED",
      "category": "identity",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
      "creates_closure": true,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Owner-signed change or removal of the bound role key or role-policy pin in name history (durable closure for active grants)."
    },
    {
      "code": "MANIFEST_UNAVAILABLE",
      "category": "identity",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": true,
      "description": "Manifest or pinned off-chain set bytes are missing from presentation and configured stores."
    },
    {
      "code": "MANIFEST_MISMATCH",
      "category": "identity",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Manifest or set bytes fail SHA-256 pin, name, network, or seq equality."
    },
    {
      "code": "MANIFEST_ROLLBACK",
      "category": "identity",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Manifest or set seq decreased (or hash changed at equal seq) while journaled anchoring_txid remains on active chain."
    },
    {
      "code": "AUTH_CHALLENGE_EXPIRED",
      "category": "identity",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Auth challenge TTL > 120s or now >= expires_at."
    },
    {
      "code": "AUTH_CHALLENGE_INVALID",
      "category": "identity",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Wrong audience, reused/unknown nonce, provisional policy failure, or upgrade binding mismatch."
    },
    {
      "code": "AUTH_KEY_UNPINNED",
      "category": "identity",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Manifest lacks paired auth_key/auth_seal or key mismatch."
    },
    {
      "code": "DEVICE_UNAUTHORIZED",
      "category": "identity",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-03",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Device key not in pinned device list, level ceiling insufficient, or presented to a foreign verifier."
    },
    {
      "code": "ORIGIN_UNVERIFIED",
      "category": "origin",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Origin certificate missing, untrusted issuer policy, class mismatch, or invalid anchor."
    },
    {
      "code": "ORIGIN_BINDING_INVALID",
      "category": "origin",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Single-use name binding seal missing, out of height order, or registration already bound."
    },
    {
      "code": "ORIGIN_STATUS_INCOMPLETE",
      "category": "origin",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": true,
      "description": "Origin status_seal or roster_seal was spent on chain, but the corresponding capacity/1, end/1, or guardian-roster/1 record was not presented or failed hash verification."
    },
    {
      "code": "WARD_AUTONOMOUS_FORBIDDEN",
      "category": "origin",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Subject has ward status; autonomous signature without satisfying guardian quorum is forbidden."
    },
    {
      "code": "GUARDIAN_INACTIVE",
      "category": "origin",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Guardianship slot is vacant, pending delay, vetoed, contested/burned, halted, expired, or closed."
    },
    {
      "code": "GUARDIAN_QUORUM_UNMET",
      "category": "origin",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Valid distinct guardian slot signatures do not meet verifier-derived event_class threshold against approved revision_size."
    },
    {
      "code": "GUARDIAN_TRANSFER_PENDING",
      "category": "origin",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": true,
      "description": "Guardianship ended (majority or capacity/1); admission paused for both sides until confirmed name transfer and update."
    },
    {
      "code": "GUARDIAN_TIME_BOUNDARY",
      "category": "origin",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": true,
      "description": "Credible wall-clock interval straddles majority boundary T or cannot be established; admission paused."
    },
    {
      "code": "SUBJECT_ENDED",
      "category": "origin",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
      "creates_closure": true,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Verified seallink-end/1 record permanently terminates all admission for this subject."
    },
    {
      "code": "RECOVERY_FORBIDDEN",
      "category": "origin",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-04",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Origin sets name_recovery=none, recovery delay incomplete, or cancelled by live OwnerPolicy (0x10)."
    },
    {
      "code": "CONTRACT_NOT_PRESENTED",
      "category": "contract",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": true,
      "description": "Grant or action profile requires a bound contract (and framework if named) that was not presented."
    },
    {
      "code": "CONTRACT_ID_MISMATCH",
      "category": "contract",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Recomputed salted contract_id (or framework_id) does not match bound reference."
    },
    {
      "code": "CONTRACT_ASSENT_INVALID",
      "category": "contract",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Missing, expired, replayed, or invalid party seallink-assent/1."
    },
    {
      "code": "CONTRACT_SEAL_MISSING",
      "category": "contract",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Required contract or framework seal is absent, unconfirmed, or has mismatched ScriptPolicy."
    },
    {
      "code": "CONTRACT_TERMS_MISMATCH",
      "category": "contract",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Grant window, executor, or machine capabilities violate bound contract, framework nesting, or undisclosed machine_clause_indices."
    },
    {
      "code": "CONTRACT_CONFIG_MISMATCH",
      "category": "contract",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Agreed configuration manifest hash does not match runtime configuration."
    },
    {
      "code": "CRED_ANCHOR_MISSING",
      "category": "credential",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": true,
      "description": "Signed-form credential or notary anchor (0x09 / 0x04) missing or below required depth."
    },
    {
      "code": "CRED_ISSUER_CLOSED",
      "category": "credential",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
      "creates_closure": true,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Credential anchor height >= owner-authenticated compromise height h_c (0x0b)."
    },
    {
      "code": "CRED_WINDOW_CLOSED",
      "category": "credential",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Current chain height outside credential validity window."
    },
    {
      "code": "CRED_REVOKED_FOR_CAUSE",
      "category": "credential",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
      "creates_closure": true,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Revocable credential or notary seal spent with verified cause commitment (0x0a / 0x05)."
    },
    {
      "code": "NOTARY_REQUIRED",
      "category": "credential",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-05",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Missing or invalid notary act where required by parent policy or verifier policy."
    },
    {
      "code": "GRANT_CLOSED",
      "category": "grant",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
      "creates_closure": true,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Grant or ancestor link is permanently closed in durable closure journal."
    },
    {
      "code": "GRANT_WINDOW_CLOSED",
      "category": "grant",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Validated tip height outside half-open [not_before_height, not_after_height) window."
    },
    {
      "code": "GRANT_SEAL_REQUIRED",
      "category": "grant",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Grant uses revocation=window_only, but executor policy requires a confirmed UTXO seal."
    },
    {
      "code": "GRANT_EXECUTOR_MISMATCH",
      "category": "grant",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Grant executor (or resolved executor_ref) does not match this service's pinned identity."
    },
    {
      "code": "GRANT_EXECUTOR_REF_FORBIDDEN",
      "category": "grant",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Dynamic executor_ref used with stateful quotas, external mutation, single-use revocation, or re-delegation."
    },
    {
      "code": "GRANT_CONTRACT_REQUIRED",
      "category": "grant",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Action profile requires a bilateral contract (requires_contract=true), but grant is unilateral."
    },
    {
      "code": "GRANT_TEXT_FORBIDDEN",
      "category": "grant",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Mechanical effect executor refused a grant carrying operative free-text terms."
    },
    {
      "code": "GRANT_NOT_DELEGABLE",
      "category": "grant",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Child grant presented under a parent without delegation rights or exceeding depth 2."
    },
    {
      "code": "GRANT_CHILD_WIDER",
      "category": "grant",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Child grant fails mechanical Constraint Algebra narrowing, row cap, whole-parent pool aggregate (R8.5), window, or template check against parent."
    },
    {
      "code": "GRANT_ROW_INVALID",
      "category": "grant",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Child ordinal out of range, row coin not spent by anchor, overlapping row/stop ranges (R8.6), or stop coin invalid/aliased."
    },
    {
      "code": "GRANT_ROW_STOPPED",
      "category": "grant",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
      "creates_closure": true,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Notary spent the row stop coin; row permanently closed for cause."
    },
    {
      "code": "INVOKE_ACTION_DENIED",
      "category": "invocation",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Requested action is unsupported by executor or absent from grant capabilities."
    },
    {
      "code": "INVOKE_CONSTRAINT_FAILED",
      "category": "invocation",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Signed invocation target or arguments violate a grant capability where-predicate or profile check."
    },
    {
      "code": "INVOKE_TIME_INVALID",
      "category": "invocation",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Wall-clock now outside invocation half-open [iat, exp) window."
    },
    {
      "code": "INVOKE_REPLAY",
      "category": "invocation",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Duplicate nonce or already-consumed single-use grant."
    },
    {
      "code": "QUOTA_EXCEEDED",
      "category": "invocation",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Request exceeds own grant quota, parent row cap, session cap, or operator ceiling."
    },
    {
      "code": "QUOTA_CLOCK_REGRESSION",
      "category": "invocation",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": true,
      "description": "Clock regressed below durable period watermark for a seconds-based quota."
    },
    {
      "code": "SESSION_INVALID",
      "category": "invocation",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Unknown, expired, closed, or slot-mismatched bearer session token."
    },
    {
      "code": "JOURNAL_LOST",
      "category": "journal",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": true,
      "description": "Local journal or external CAS witness unreadable, mismatched, or behind witness (rollback detected)."
    },
    {
      "code": "JOURNAL_FENCED",
      "category": "journal",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-06",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": true,
      "description": "Writer no longer holds the active external witness fencing token."
    },
    {
      "code": "SERVICE_PROVIDER_UNBOUND",
      "category": "service",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-07",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Resource owner's manifest does not bind this service's pinned NamePin as provider for the claimed label/type."
    },
    {
      "code": "SERVICE_MIGRATION_INVALID",
      "category": "service",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-07",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Export/import handover incomplete, unclosed predecessor grant, credentials leaked in export, or rollback."
    },
    {
      "code": "FEDERATION_POLICY_DENIED",
      "category": "service",
      "owning_spec": "SPEC-07",
      "creates_closure": false,
      "retryable": false,
      "description": "Peer failed trust policy, screening cap, human disclosure gate, or Contour A PII routing invariant."
    }
  ]
}
```

### Registry: service-types.json

*Source:* `registry/service-types.json`

```json
{
  "$comment": "SealLink v1.0 Service Types Registry (SPEC-03, SPEC-07). Standard lowercase types are reserved and updated via SLIPs. Permissionless custom types use reverse-domain namespace (e.g., com.example/car-lock).",
  "protocol": "SealLink",
  "version": "1.0.0-draft.2",
  "custom_namespace_regex": "^[a-z0-9-]+(\\.[a-z0-9-]+)+/[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]{0,63}$",
  "standard_types": [
    {
      "service_type": "mail",
      "profile": "profiles/PROFILE-mail-v1.md",
      "status": "decided",
      "default_require_seal": true,
      "default_requires_contract": false,
      "supports_executor_ref": true,
      "description": "Sovereign email hosting and delegated mailbox access (read, list, send) decoupled from identity."
    },
    {
      "service_type": "agent-session",
      "profile": "profiles/PROFILE-agent-v1.md",
      "status": "decided",
      "default_require_seal": true,
      "default_requires_contract": false,
      "supports_executor_ref": false,
      "description": "Bounded autonomous agent task briefs, tool execution, contract-bound isolated sessions, and guardian-verified instruction intake."
    },
    {
      "service_type": "xmpp",
      "profile": null,
      "status": "open",
      "default_require_seal": true,
      "default_requires_contract": false,
      "supports_executor_ref": true,
      "description": "Sovereign XMPP instant messaging hosting where the actor's manifest declares the active server."
    },
    {
      "service_type": "blob",
      "profile": null,
      "status": "open",
      "default_require_seal": true,
      "default_requires_contract": false,
      "supports_executor_ref": true,
      "description": "Replaceable content-addressed blob storage (e.g., Blossom BUD-01/02/04 grant-aware profile)."
    },
    {
      "service_type": "wallet",
      "profile": null,
      "status": "open",
      "default_require_seal": true,
      "default_requires_contract": false,
      "supports_executor_ref": false,
      "description": "Grant-gated cryptocurrency/payment execution service (strictly concrete executor and UTXO seal)."
    },
    {
      "service_type": "names",
      "profile": null,
      "status": "open",
      "default_require_seal": true,
      "default_requires_contract": false,
      "supports_executor_ref": false,
      "description": "Delegated ledger name-update service (update-only; registration and transfers require separate custody)."
    },
    {
      "service_type": "compute",
      "profile": null,
      "status": "open",
      "default_require_seal": false,
      "default_requires_contract": false,
      "supports_executor_ref": false,
      "description": "Model inference proxy / metered compute service (supports window_only ephemeral grants and bearer sessions)."
    },
    {
      "service_type": "rental",
      "profile": null,
      "status": "open",
      "default_require_seal": true,
      "default_requires_contract": true,
      "supports_executor_ref": false,
      "description": "Physical or digital asset rental / lease control (vehicles, apartments, hardware); requires bilateral contract."
    }
  ]
}
```

---

## Part V — Formal Wire JSON Schemas (Normative SSOT)

### Schema: card.schema.json

*Source:* `schemas/card.schema.json`

```json
{
  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
  "$id": "https://seallink.org/releases/v1.0.0-draft.2/schemas/card.schema.json",
  "title": "SealLink v1.0 Public Entity Card",
  "type": "object",
  "additionalProperties": false,
  "required": [
    "type",
    "network",
    "name",
    "seq",
    "kind",
    "display",
    "transports",
    "relays",
    "role",
    "contact",
    "replaces"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "type": {
      "const": "seallink-card/1"
    },
    "network": {
      "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
    },
    "name": {
      "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
    },
    "seq": {
      "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
    },
    "kind": {
      "type": "string",
      "enum": [
        "person",
        "agent",
        "organization",
        "service"
      ]
    },
    "display": {
      "type": "string",
      "maxLength": 256
    },
    "operator": {
      "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
    },
    "transports": {
      "type": "array",
      "maxItems": 32,
      "items": {
        "type": "object",
        "additionalProperties": false,
        "required": [
          "transport",
          "address"
        ],
        "properties": {
          "transport": {
            "type": "string",
            "minLength": 1,
            "maxLength": 64
          },
          "address": {
            "type": "string",
            "minLength": 1,
            "maxLength": 512
          }
        }
      }
    },
    "relays": {
      "type": "array",
      "maxItems": 32,
      "items": {
        "type": "string",
        "pattern": "^wss?://.+$",
        "maxLength": 512
      }
    },
    "role": {
      "type": "string",
      "maxLength": 512
    },
    "contact": {
      "type": "string",
      "maxLength": 256
    },
    "replaces": {
      "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
    }
  }
}
```

### Schema: common.schema.json

*Source:* `schemas/common.schema.json`

```json
{
  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
  "$id": "https://seallink.org/releases/v1.0.0-draft.2/schemas/common.schema.json",
  "title": "SealLink v1.0 Shared Wire Primitives",
  "$defs": {
    "Hex64": {
      "type": "string",
      "pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$"
    },
    "XOnlyPubkey64": {
      "type": "string",
      "pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$",
      "description": "Valid BIP-340 x-only secp256k1 public key."
    },
    "CompressedPubkey66": {
      "type": "string",
      "pattern": "^0[23][0-9a-f]{64}$",
      "description": "Valid compressed secp256k1 public key."
    },
    "Sig128": {
      "type": "string",
      "pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{128}$",
      "description": "Strict 64-byte signature (BIP-340, P-256 low-S raw r||s, or RFC 8032 Ed25519) in lowercase hex."
    },
    "Uint53": {
      "type": "integer",
      "minimum": 0,
      "maximum": 9007199254740991
    },
    "PositiveUint53": {
      "type": "integer",
      "minimum": 1,
      "maximum": 9007199254740991
    },
    "Vout": {
      "type": "integer",
      "minimum": 0,
      "maximum": 4294967295
    },
    "Uint64Str": {
      "type": "string",
      "pattern": "^(0|[1-9][0-9]{0,19})$",
      "description": "Exact unsigned 64-bit integer encoded as canonical decimal string (<= 18446744073709551615)."
    },
    "Network": {
      "type": "string",
      "enum": [
        "main",
        "regtest"
      ]
    },
    "NameStr": {
      "type": "string",
      "minLength": 1,
      "maxLength": 255,
      "pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9./_-]{0,254}$"
    },
    "Outpoint": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "txid",
        "vout"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "txid": {
          "$ref": "#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "vout": {
          "$ref": "#/$defs/Vout"
        }
      }
    },
    "ScriptPolicy": {
      "oneOf": [
        {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "kind",
            "pk"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "kind": {
              "const": "key"
            },
            "pk": {
              "$ref": "#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66"
            }
          }
        },
        {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "kind",
            "m",
            "pks"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "kind": {
              "const": "multisig"
            },
            "m": {
              "type": "integer",
              "minimum": 1,
              "maximum": 15
            },
            "pks": {
              "type": "array",
              "minItems": 1,
              "maxItems": 15,
              "uniqueItems": true,
              "items": {
                "$ref": "#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66"
              },
              "description": "Strictly sorted in ascending lexicographical hex order; verifier MUST also enforce 1 <= m <= len(pks)."
            }
          }
        },
        {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "kind",
            "template",
            "keys"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "kind": {
              "const": "branch"
            },
            "template": {
              "enum": [
                "either_of_2",
                "both_of_2"
              ]
            },
            "keys": {
              "type": "object",
              "additionalProperties": false,
              "required": [
                "a",
                "b"
              ],
              "properties": {
                "a": {
                  "$ref": "#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66"
                },
                "b": {
                  "$ref": "#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66"
                }
              }
            }
          }
        },
        {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "kind",
            "template",
            "keys"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "kind": {
              "const": "branch"
            },
            "template": {
              "const": "arbiter_or_both"
            },
            "keys": {
              "type": "object",
              "additionalProperties": false,
              "required": [
                "a",
                "b",
                "arbiter"
              ],
              "properties": {
                "a": {
                  "$ref": "#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66"
                },
                "b": {
                  "$ref": "#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66"
                },
                "arbiter": {
                  "$ref": "#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66"
                }
              }
            }
          }
        },
        {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "kind",
            "template",
            "keys"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "kind": {
              "const": "branch"
            },
            "template": {
              "const": "single_use_1_of_2"
            },
            "keys": {
              "type": "object",
              "additionalProperties": false,
              "required": [
                "issuer",
                "grantee"
              ],
              "properties": {
                "issuer": {
                  "$ref": "#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66"
                },
                "grantee": {
                  "$ref": "#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66"
                }
              }
            }
          }
        },
        {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "kind",
            "template",
            "keys",
            "delay_blocks"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "kind": {
              "const": "branch"
            },
            "template": {
              "const": "guardian_slot_pending"
            },
            "keys": {
              "type": "object",
              "additionalProperties": false,
              "required": [
                "disposer",
                "challenger",
                "guardian"
              ],
              "properties": {
                "disposer": {
                  "$ref": "#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66"
                },
                "challenger": {
                  "$ref": "#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66"
                },
                "guardian": {
                  "$ref": "#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66"
                }
              }
            },
            "delay_blocks": {
              "type": "integer",
              "minimum": 1,
              "maximum": 52560
            }
          }
        }
      ]
    },
    "NamePin": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "name",
        "registration",
        "owner_policy"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "name": {
          "$ref": "#/$defs/NameStr"
        },
        "registration": {
          "$ref": "#/$defs/Outpoint"
        },
        "owner_policy": {
          "$ref": "#/$defs/ScriptPolicy"
        }
      }
    },
    "RoleIssuerPin": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "name",
        "registration",
        "owner_policy",
        "role_policy"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "name": {
          "$ref": "#/$defs/NameStr"
        },
        "registration": {
          "$ref": "#/$defs/Outpoint"
        },
        "owner_policy": {
          "$ref": "#/$defs/ScriptPolicy"
        },
        "role_policy": {
          "$ref": "#/$defs/ThresholdPolicy"
        }
      }
    },
    "Seal": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "txid",
        "vout",
        "script_policy"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "txid": {
          "$ref": "#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "vout": {
          "$ref": "#/$defs/Vout"
        },
        "script_policy": {
          "$ref": "#/$defs/ScriptPolicy"
        }
      }
    },
    "ThresholdPolicy": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "m",
        "pks"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "alg": {
          "type": "string",
          "enum": [
            "bip340",
            "p256",
            "ed25519"
          ],
          "description": "Omitted defaults to bip340. Non-bip340 permitted ONLY on device-authorized object types."
        },
        "m": {
          "type": "integer",
          "minimum": 1,
          "maximum": 32
        },
        "pks": {
          "type": "array",
          "minItems": 1,
          "maxItems": 32,
          "uniqueItems": true,
          "items": {
            "type": "string",
            "pattern": "^([0-9a-f]{64}|0[23][0-9a-f]{64})$"
          },
          "description": "Strictly sorted in ascending lexicographical hex order; verifier MUST also enforce 1 <= m <= len(pks)."
        }
      }
    },
    "SignatureEntry": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "pk",
        "sig"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "pk": {
          "type": "string",
          "pattern": "^([0-9a-f]{64}|0[23][0-9a-f]{64})$"
        },
        "sig": {
          "$ref": "#/$defs/Sig128"
        }
      }
    },
    "SignatureSet": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "policy",
        "sigs"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "policy": {
          "$ref": "#/$defs/ThresholdPolicy"
        },
        "sigs": {
          "type": "array",
          "minItems": 1,
          "maxItems": 32,
          "items": {
            "$ref": "#/$defs/SignatureEntry"
          }
        }
      }
    },
    "GuardianApproval": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "slot",
        "revision",
        "guardian_name",
        "signatures"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "slot": {
          "type": "integer",
          "minimum": 1,
          "maximum": 32
        },
        "revision": {
          "$ref": "#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
        },
        "guardian_name": {
          "$ref": "#/$defs/NameStr"
        },
        "signatures": {
          "$ref": "#/$defs/SignatureSet"
        }
      }
    },
    "GuardianApprovals": {
      "type": "array",
      "minItems": 1,
      "maxItems": 32,
      "items": {
        "$ref": "#/$defs/GuardianApproval"
      },
      "description": "Ordered by strictly ascending slot number. Each entry's SignatureSet MUST exactly match that active slot guardian's resolved link.grant policy."
    },
    "GuardianEventClass": {
      "type": "string",
      "enum": [
        "routine_read",
        "effect_grant",
        "contract_assent",
        "custody_change"
      ],
      "description": "Strict linear precedence: routine_read < effect_grant < contract_assent < custody_change."
    },
    "GuardianContext": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "origin_id",
        "ward_name",
        "revision",
        "event_class"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "origin_id": {
          "$ref": "#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "ward_name": {
          "$ref": "#/$defs/NameStr"
        },
        "revision": {
          "$ref": "#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
        },
        "event_class": {
          "$ref": "#/$defs/GuardianEventClass"
        }
      }
    },
    "RationalQuorum": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "num",
        "den",
        "min"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "num": {
          "type": "integer",
          "minimum": 1,
          "maximum": 32
        },
        "den": {
          "type": "integer",
          "minimum": 1,
          "maximum": 32
        },
        "min": {
          "type": "integer",
          "minimum": 1,
          "maximum": 32
        }
      },
      "description": "Verifier MUST enforce 1 <= num <= den and 1 <= min <= revision_size."
    },
    "QuorumMap": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "routine_read",
        "effect_grant",
        "contract_assent",
        "custody_change"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "routine_read": {
          "$ref": "#/$defs/RationalQuorum"
        },
        "effect_grant": {
          "$ref": "#/$defs/RationalQuorum"
        },
        "contract_assent": {
          "$ref": "#/$defs/RationalQuorum"
        },
        "custody_change": {
          "$ref": "#/$defs/RationalQuorum"
        }
      }
    },
    "MerkleProof": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "root",
        "leaf_digest",
        "steps"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "root": {
          "$ref": "#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "leaf_digest": {
          "$ref": "#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "steps": {
          "type": "array",
          "maxItems": 16,
          "items": {
            "type": "object",
            "additionalProperties": false,
            "required": [
              "side",
              "hash"
            ],
            "properties": {
              "side": {
                "type": "string",
                "enum": [
                  "L",
                  "R"
                ]
              },
              "hash": {
                "$ref": "#/$defs/Hex64"
              }
            }
          }
        }
      }
    },
    "ProofPathEntry": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "grant_id"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "grant_id": {
          "$ref": "#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "issuance_txid": {
          "$ref": "#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "batch_proof": {
          "$ref": "#/$defs/MerkleProof"
        }
      }
    },
    "ConstraintPredicate": {
      "oneOf": [
        {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "eq"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "eq": {
              "type": [
                "string",
                "boolean"
              ]
            }
          }
        },
        {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "in"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "in": {
              "type": "array",
              "minItems": 1,
              "maxItems": 256,
              "uniqueItems": true,
              "items": {
                "type": "string"
              }
            }
          }
        },
        {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "not_in"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "not_in": {
              "type": "array",
              "minItems": 1,
              "maxItems": 256,
              "uniqueItems": true,
              "items": {
                "type": "string"
              }
            }
          }
        },
        {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "prefix"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "prefix": {
              "type": "string",
              "minLength": 1,
              "maxLength": 512
            }
          }
        },
        {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "suffix"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "suffix": {
              "type": "string",
              "minLength": 1,
              "maxLength": 512
            }
          }
        },
        {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "range"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "range": {
              "type": "array",
              "minItems": 2,
              "maxItems": 2,
              "items": {
                "$ref": "#/$defs/Uint64Str"
              }
            }
          }
        },
        {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "hash_eq"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "hash_eq": {
              "$ref": "#/$defs/Hex64"
            }
          }
        }
      ]
    },
    "Quota": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "kind",
        "resource",
        "unit",
        "max",
        "window"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "kind": {
          "type": "string",
          "minLength": 1,
          "maxLength": 128
        },
        "resource": {
          "type": "string",
          "minLength": 1,
          "maxLength": 256
        },
        "unit": {
          "type": "string",
          "minLength": 1,
          "maxLength": 64
        },
        "max": {
          "$ref": "#/$defs/Uint64Str"
        },
        "window": {
          "type": "string",
          "pattern": "^(term|blocks:[1-9][0-9]{0,8}|seconds:[1-9][0-9]{0,9})$"
        }
      }
    },
    "Capability": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "action",
        "target"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "action": {
          "type": "string",
          "pattern": "^[a-z0-9._-]+(/[a-z0-9._-]+)+$",
          "maxLength": 128
        },
        "target": {
          "type": "string",
          "minLength": 1,
          "maxLength": 256
        },
        "where": {
          "type": "object",
          "maxProperties": 32,
          "additionalProperties": {
            "$ref": "#/$defs/ConstraintPredicate"
          }
        },
        "quotas": {
          "type": "array",
          "maxItems": 32,
          "items": {
            "$ref": "#/$defs/Quota"
          }
        },
        "extensions": {
          "not": {},
          "description": "Reserved for future versions; any presence MUST refuse with WIRE_CONSTRAINT."
        }
      }
    },
    "SetPin": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "seq",
        "sha256"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "seq": {
          "$ref": "#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
        },
        "sha256": {
          "$ref": "#/$defs/Hex64"
        }
      }
    }
  }
}
```

### Schema: contract.schema.json

*Source:* `schemas/contract.schema.json`

```json
{
  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
  "$id": "https://seallink.org/releases/v1.0.0-draft.2/schemas/contract.schema.json",
  "title": "SealLink v1.0 Contracts, Assent, Termination & Violation Verdicts",
  "$defs": {
    "Contract": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "type",
        "network",
        "genesis",
        "profile",
        "contract_salt",
        "parties",
        "window",
        "clause_commitments"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "type": {
          "const": "seallink-contract/1"
        },
        "network": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
        },
        "genesis": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "profile": {
          "type": "string",
          "minLength": 1,
          "maxLength": 128
        },
        "contract_salt": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "parties": {
          "type": "array",
          "minItems": 2,
          "maxItems": 32,
          "items": {
            "oneOf": [
              {
                "type": "object",
                "additionalProperties": false,
                "required": [
                  "role",
                  "signing_policy"
                ],
                "properties": {
                  "role": {
                    "type": "string",
                    "minLength": 1,
                    "maxLength": 64
                  },
                  "name_pin": {
                    "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NamePin"
                  },
                  "signing_policy": {
                    "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ThresholdPolicy"
                  }
                }
              },
              {
                "type": "object",
                "additionalProperties": false,
                "required": [
                  "role",
                  "ward_origin_id",
                  "name_pin"
                ],
                "properties": {
                  "role": {
                    "type": "string",
                    "minLength": 1,
                    "maxLength": 64
                  },
                  "ward_origin_id": {
                    "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                  },
                  "name_pin": {
                    "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NamePin"
                  }
                }
              }
            ]
          }
        },
        "window": {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "not_before_height"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "not_before_height": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
            },
            "not_after_height": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
            },
            "not_after_unix": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
            }
          }
        },
        "clause_commitments": {
          "type": "array",
          "minItems": 1,
          "maxItems": 256,
          "items": {
            "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
          },
          "description": "Ordered H_tag('seallink-clause/1', salt_32B || canonical_JCS(clause_obj)) per SPEC-01 §5 using independent 32-byte CSPRNG salts."
        },
        "machine_clause_indices": {
          "type": "array",
          "maxItems": 64,
          "uniqueItems": true,
          "items": {
            "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
          },
          "description": "Strictly sorted zero-based indices into clause_commitments[] carrying machine-enforced terms; executors MUST require disclosure of every listed index."
        },
        "framework_id": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "seal": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Seal"
        },
        "assent_output": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Seal"
        },
        "config_sha256": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "moderation": {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "rules_sha256",
            "moderator_key",
            "moderator_kind"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "rules_sha256": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "moderator_key": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/XOnlyPubkey64"
            },
            "moderator_kind": {
              "type": "string",
              "enum": [
                "person",
                "agent"
              ]
            }
          }
        }
      }
    },
    "AssentPayload": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "type",
        "network",
        "genesis",
        "target_type",
        "target_id",
        "party_role",
        "issued_at",
        "expires_at",
        "nonce"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "type": {
          "const": "seallink-assent/1"
        },
        "network": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
        },
        "genesis": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "target_type": {
          "type": "string",
          "enum": [
            "seallink-contract/1",
            "seallink-guardian/1",
            "seallink-guardian-roster/1",
            "seallink-migration/1"
          ]
        },
        "target_id": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "party_role": {
          "type": "string",
          "minLength": 1,
          "maxLength": 64
        },
        "party_name": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
        },
        "guardian_context": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/GuardianContext"
        },
        "issued_at": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
        },
        "expires_at": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
        },
        "nonce": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        }
      }
    },
    "Assent": {
      "oneOf": [
        {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "payload",
            "signatures"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "payload": {
              "allOf": [
                {
                  "$ref": "#/$defs/AssentPayload"
                },
                {
                  "not": {
                    "required": [
                      "guardian_context"
                    ]
                  }
                }
              ]
            },
            "signatures": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SignatureSet"
            }
          }
        },
        {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "payload",
            "guardian_approvals"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "payload": {
              "allOf": [
                {
                  "$ref": "#/$defs/AssentPayload"
                },
                {
                  "required": [
                    "guardian_context"
                  ]
                }
              ]
            },
            "guardian_approvals": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/GuardianApprovals"
            }
          }
        }
      ]
    },
    "TerminationStatement": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "payload",
        "signatures"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "payload": {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "type",
            "network",
            "genesis",
            "contract_id",
            "termination_branch",
            "reason",
            "issued_at"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "type": {
              "const": "seallink-termination/1"
            },
            "network": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
            },
            "genesis": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "contract_id": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "termination_branch": {
              "type": "string",
              "enum": [
                "issuer_only",
                "either_party",
                "both_together",
                "arbiter"
              ]
            },
            "reason": {
              "type": "string",
              "minLength": 1,
              "maxLength": 2048
            },
            "verdict_id": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "issued_at": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
            }
          }
        },
        "signatures": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SignatureSet"
        }
      }
    },
    "Verdict": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "payload",
        "signatures"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "payload": {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "type",
            "network",
            "genesis",
            "grant_id",
            "contract_id",
            "rules_sha256",
            "violated_rule",
            "request_salted_sha256",
            "response_salted_sha256",
            "ordinal",
            "tip_height"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "type": {
              "const": "seallink-verdict/1"
            },
            "network": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
            },
            "genesis": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "grant_id": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "contract_id": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "rules_sha256": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "violated_rule": {
              "type": "string",
              "minLength": 1,
              "maxLength": 128
            },
            "request_salted_sha256": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "response_salted_sha256": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "ordinal": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
            },
            "prev_verdict_id": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "tip_height": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
            }
          }
        },
        "signatures": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SignatureSet"
        }
      }
    }
  }
}
```

### Schema: credential.schema.json

*Source:* `schemas/credential.schema.json`

```json
{
  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
  "$id": "https://seallink.org/releases/v1.0.0-draft.2/schemas/credential.schema.json",
  "title": "SealLink v1.0 Verifiable Credentials & General Notary Acts",
  "$defs": {
    "Credential": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "payload",
        "signatures"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "payload": {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "type",
            "network",
            "genesis",
            "credential_kind",
            "issuer",
            "subject",
            "claims",
            "lifecycle",
            "not_before_height",
            "issued_at"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "type": {
              "const": "seallink-credential/1"
            },
            "network": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
            },
            "genesis": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "credential_kind": {
              "type": "string",
              "pattern": "^[a-z0-9._-]+(/[a-z0-9._-]+)*$",
              "maxLength": 128
            },
            "issuer": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/RoleIssuerPin"
            },
            "subject": {
              "oneOf": [
                {
                  "type": "object",
                  "additionalProperties": false,
                  "required": [
                    "mode",
                    "key"
                  ],
                  "properties": {
                    "mode": {
                      "const": "key"
                    },
                    "key": {
                      "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/XOnlyPubkey64"
                    }
                  }
                },
                {
                  "type": "object",
                  "additionalProperties": false,
                  "required": [
                    "mode",
                    "name_pin"
                  ],
                  "properties": {
                    "mode": {
                      "const": "name"
                    },
                    "name_pin": {
                      "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NamePin"
                    }
                  }
                }
              ]
            },
            "claims": {
              "type": "object",
              "maxProperties": 64,
              "additionalProperties": {
                "oneOf": [
                  {
                    "type": "string",
                    "maxLength": 1024
                  },
                  {
                    "type": "boolean"
                  },
                  {
                    "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
                  }
                ]
              },
              "description": "Typed scalar claims constrained further by credential_kind profile."
            },
            "claim_commitments": {
              "type": "object",
              "maxProperties": 64,
              "additionalProperties": {
                "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
              },
              "description": "Optional per-claim salted hashes H_tag('seallink-clause/1', salt_32B || JCS(claim_obj)) using an independent 32-byte CSPRNG salt per claim."
            },
            "lifecycle": {
              "type": "string",
              "enum": [
                "eternal",
                "revocable"
              ]
            },
            "revocation_seal": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Seal"
            },
            "not_before_height": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
            },
            "not_after_height": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
            },
            "not_after_unix": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
            },
            "issued_at": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
            }
          },
          "allOf": [
            {
              "if": {
                "properties": {
                  "lifecycle": {
                    "const": "revocable"
                  }
                }
              },
              "then": {
                "required": [
                  "revocation_seal"
                ]
              }
            },
            {
              "if": {
                "properties": {
                  "lifecycle": {
                    "const": "eternal"
                  }
                }
              },
              "then": {
                "not": {
                  "required": [
                    "revocation_seal"
                  ]
                }
              }
            }
          ]
        },
        "signatures": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SignatureSet"
        }
      }
    },
    "CredentialWithdrawal": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "type",
        "genesis",
        "credential_id",
        "cause_sha256"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "type": {
          "const": "seallink-credential-withdrawal/1"
        },
        "genesis": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "credential_id": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "cause_sha256": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        }
      }
    },
    "CredentialBreak": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "type",
        "genesis",
        "issuer",
        "role",
        "compromised_policy",
        "name_input",
        "h_c"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "type": {
          "const": "seallink-credential-break/1"
        },
        "genesis": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "issuer": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NamePin"
        },
        "role": {
          "type": "string",
          "enum": [
            "cred",
            "notary"
          ]
        },
        "compromised_policy": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ThresholdPolicy"
        },
        "name_input": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Outpoint"
        },
        "h_c": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
        }
      }
    },
    "NotaryAct": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "payload",
        "signatures"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "payload": {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "type",
            "network",
            "genesis",
            "act_kind",
            "notary",
            "lifecycle",
            "target_sha256",
            "details",
            "tip_height",
            "tip_hash",
            "attested_at"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "type": {
              "const": "seallink-notary/1"
            },
            "network": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
            },
            "genesis": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "act_kind": {
              "type": "string",
              "enum": [
                "contract-notarization",
                "certified-copy",
                "fact-attestation",
                "child-within-parent"
              ]
            },
            "notary": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/RoleIssuerPin"
            },
            "lifecycle": {
              "type": "string",
              "enum": [
                "eternal",
                "revocable"
              ]
            },
            "notary_seal": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Seal"
            },
            "target_sha256": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "details": {
              "oneOf": [
                {
                  "type": "object",
                  "additionalProperties": false,
                  "required": [
                    "kind",
                    "contract_id"
                  ],
                  "properties": {
                    "kind": {
                      "const": "contract-notarization"
                    },
                    "contract_id": {
                      "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                    },
                    "notary_clause_sha256": {
                      "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                    }
                  }
                },
                {
                  "type": "object",
                  "additionalProperties": false,
                  "required": [
                    "kind",
                    "original_sha256",
                    "media_type"
                  ],
                  "properties": {
                    "kind": {
                      "const": "certified-copy"
                    },
                    "original_sha256": {
                      "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                    },
                    "media_type": {
                      "type": "string",
                      "minLength": 1,
                      "maxLength": 128
                    }
                  }
                },
                {
                  "type": "object",
                  "additionalProperties": false,
                  "required": [
                    "kind",
                    "fact_schema",
                    "fact_sha256"
                  ],
                  "properties": {
                    "kind": {
                      "const": "fact-attestation"
                    },
                    "fact_schema": {
                      "type": "string",
                      "minLength": 1,
                      "maxLength": 128
                    },
                    "fact_sha256": {
                      "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                    }
                  }
                },
                {
                  "type": "object",
                  "additionalProperties": false,
                  "required": [
                    "kind",
                    "parent_grant_id",
                    "child_grant_id",
                    "ordinal"
                  ],
                  "properties": {
                    "kind": {
                      "const": "child-within-parent"
                    },
                    "parent_grant_id": {
                      "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                    },
                    "child_grant_id": {
                      "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                    },
                    "ordinal": {
                      "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
                    }
                  }
                }
              ]
            },
            "tip_height": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
            },
            "tip_hash": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "attested_at": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
            }
          },
          "allOf": [
            {
              "if": {
                "properties": {
                  "lifecycle": {
                    "const": "revocable"
                  }
                }
              },
              "then": {
                "required": [
                  "notary_seal"
                ]
              }
            },
            {
              "if": {
                "properties": {
                  "lifecycle": {
                    "const": "eternal"
                  }
                }
              },
              "then": {
                "not": {
                  "required": [
                    "notary_seal"
                  ]
                }
              }
            }
          ]
        },
        "signatures": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SignatureSet"
        }
      }
    }
  }
}
```

### Schema: grant.schema.json

*Source:* `schemas/grant.schema.json`

```json
{
  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
  "$id": "https://seallink.org/releases/v1.0.0-draft.2/schemas/grant.schema.json",
  "title": "SealLink v1.0 Universal Grant & Issuance Preparation",
  "oneOf": [
    {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "payload",
        "signatures"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "payload": {
          "allOf": [
            {
              "$ref": "#/$defs/GrantPayload"
            },
            {
              "not": {
                "required": [
                  "guardian_context"
                ]
              }
            },
            {
              "if": {
                "required": [
                  "issuer"
                ]
              },
              "then": {
                "properties": {
                  "issuer": {
                    "required": [
                      "role_policy"
                    ]
                  }
                }
              }
            }
          ]
        },
        "signatures": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SignatureSet"
        }
      }
    },
    {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "payload",
        "guardian_approvals"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "payload": {
          "allOf": [
            {
              "$ref": "#/$defs/GrantPayload"
            },
            {
              "required": [
                "issuer",
                "guardian_context"
              ]
            },
            {
              "not": {
                "required": [
                  "parent"
                ]
              }
            }
          ]
        },
        "guardian_approvals": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/GuardianApprovals"
        }
      }
    }
  ],
  "$defs": {
    "GrantIssuer": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "name",
        "registration",
        "owner_policy"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "name": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
        },
        "registration": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Outpoint"
        },
        "owner_policy": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ScriptPolicy"
        },
        "role_policy": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ThresholdPolicy"
        }
      }
    },
    "GrantPayload": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "type",
        "network",
        "genesis",
        "recipient",
        "capabilities",
        "not_before_height",
        "not_after_height",
        "recent_block",
        "revocation"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "type": {
          "const": "seallink-grant/1"
        },
        "network": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
        },
        "genesis": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "issuer": {
          "$ref": "#/$defs/GrantIssuer"
        },
        "parent": {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "grant_id",
            "ordinal"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "grant_id": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "ordinal": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
            }
          }
        },
        "contract_id": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "recipient": {
          "oneOf": [
            {
              "type": "object",
              "additionalProperties": false,
              "required": [
                "mode",
                "key"
              ],
              "properties": {
                "mode": {
                  "const": "key"
                },
                "key": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/XOnlyPubkey64"
                }
              }
            },
            {
              "type": "object",
              "additionalProperties": false,
              "required": [
                "mode",
                "name",
                "owner_policy"
              ],
              "properties": {
                "mode": {
                  "const": "name"
                },
                "name": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
                },
                "owner_policy": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ScriptPolicy"
                }
              }
            },
            {
              "type": "object",
              "additionalProperties": false,
              "required": [
                "mode",
                "threshold"
              ],
              "properties": {
                "mode": {
                  "const": "group"
                },
                "threshold": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ThresholdPolicy"
                }
              }
            }
          ]
        },
        "executor": {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "name",
            "key"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "name": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
            },
            "key": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/XOnlyPubkey64"
            }
          }
        },
        "executor_ref": {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "provider_of",
            "service_type",
            "label"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "provider_of": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
            },
            "service_type": {
              "type": "string",
              "minLength": 1,
              "maxLength": 128
            },
            "label": {
              "type": "string",
              "pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]{0,63}$"
            }
          }
        },
        "capabilities": {
          "type": "array",
          "minItems": 1,
          "maxItems": 64,
          "items": {
            "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Capability"
          }
        },
        "terms_text": {
          "type": "string",
          "minLength": 1,
          "maxLength": 8192,
          "description": "Cognitive work guidance ONLY; mechanical effect executors MUST refuse any grant carrying terms_text."
        },
        "not_before_height": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
        },
        "not_after_height": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
        },
        "recent_block": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "min_depth": {
          "type": "integer",
          "minimum": 1,
          "maximum": 144,
          "description": "Optional issuer-requested minimum confirmation depth for anchor/seal (omitted defaults to 1)."
        },
        "revocation": {
          "oneOf": [
            {
              "type": "object",
              "additionalProperties": false,
              "required": [
                "mode",
                "construction",
                "kind",
                "seal"
              ],
              "properties": {
                "mode": {
                  "const": "seal"
                },
                "construction": {
                  "type": "string",
                  "enum": [
                    "W",
                    "L"
                  ]
                },
                "kind": {
                  "type": "string",
                  "enum": [
                    "revocable",
                    "single_use"
                  ]
                },
                "seal": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Seal"
                }
              }
            },
            {
              "type": "object",
              "additionalProperties": false,
              "required": [
                "mode"
              ],
              "properties": {
                "mode": {
                  "const": "window_only"
                }
              },
              "description": "Root-only zero-tx ephemeral mode (not_after - not_before <= 12 blocks); refused by default unless executor policy permits."
            }
          ]
        },
        "delegate": {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "key",
            "child_seal_key",
            "pools",
            "groups"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "key": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/XOnlyPubkey64"
            },
            "child_seal_key": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66"
            },
            "pools": {
              "type": "array",
              "maxItems": 32,
              "items": {
                "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Quota"
              }
            },
            "notaries": {
              "type": "array",
              "maxItems": 4,
              "items": {
                "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NamePin"
              }
            },
            "groups": {
              "type": "array",
              "minItems": 1,
              "maxItems": 16,
              "items": {
                "type": "object",
                "additionalProperties": false,
                "required": [
                  "template",
                  "ranges"
                ],
                "properties": {
                  "template": {
                    "type": "object",
                    "additionalProperties": false,
                    "required": [
                      "executor",
                      "recipient_rule",
                      "capabilities",
                      "notary_mode"
                    ],
                    "properties": {
                      "executor": {
                        "type": "object",
                        "additionalProperties": false,
                        "required": [
                          "name",
                          "key"
                        ],
                        "properties": {
                          "name": {
                            "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
                          },
                          "key": {
                            "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/XOnlyPubkey64"
                          }
                        }
                      },
                      "recipient_rule": {
                        "$ref": "#/$defs/RecipientRule"
                      },
                      "capabilities": {
                        "type": "array",
                        "minItems": 1,
                        "maxItems": 64,
                        "items": {
                          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Capability"
                        }
                      },
                      "notary_mode": {
                        "type": "string",
                        "enum": [
                          "none",
                          "optional_stop",
                          "required_act"
                        ]
                      },
                      "notary_name": {
                        "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
                      }
                    }
                  },
                  "ranges": {
                    "type": "array",
                    "minItems": 1,
                    "maxItems": 16,
                    "items": {
                      "type": "object",
                      "additionalProperties": false,
                      "required": [
                        "txid",
                        "first",
                        "count",
                        "script_policy"
                      ],
                      "properties": {
                        "txid": {
                          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                        },
                        "first": {
                          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Vout"
                        },
                        "count": {
                          "type": "integer",
                          "minimum": 1,
                          "maximum": 4096
                        },
                        "script_policy": {
                          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ScriptPolicy"
                        },
                        "stop_txid": {
                          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                        },
                        "stop_first": {
                          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Vout"
                        },
                        "stop_script_policy": {
                          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ScriptPolicy"
                        }
                      },
                      "dependentRequired": {
                        "stop_txid": [
                          "stop_first",
                          "stop_script_policy"
                        ],
                        "stop_first": [
                          "stop_txid",
                          "stop_script_policy"
                        ],
                        "stop_script_policy": [
                          "stop_txid",
                          "stop_first"
                        ]
                      }
                    }
                  }
                }
              }
            }
          }
        },
        "guardian_context": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/GuardianContext"
        }
      },
      "allOf": [
        {
          "oneOf": [
            {
              "required": [
                "issuer"
              ],
              "not": {
                "required": [
                  "parent"
                ]
              }
            },
            {
              "required": [
                "parent"
              ],
              "not": {
                "required": [
                  "issuer"
                ]
              }
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "oneOf": [
            {
              "required": [
                "executor"
              ],
              "not": {
                "required": [
                  "executor_ref"
                ]
              }
            },
            {
              "required": [
                "executor_ref"
              ],
              "not": {
                "required": [
                  "executor"
                ]
              }
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "if": {
            "required": [
              "parent"
            ]
          },
          "then": {
            "not": {
              "required": [
                "delegate"
              ]
            }
          }
        },
        {
          "if": {
            "properties": {
              "revocation": {
                "properties": {
                  "mode": {
                    "const": "window_only"
                  }
                },
                "required": [
                  "mode"
                ]
              }
            }
          },
          "then": {
            "not": {
              "anyOf": [
                {
                  "required": [
                    "delegate"
                  ]
                },
                {
                  "required": [
                    "parent"
                  ]
                }
              ]
            }
          }
        },
        {
          "if": {
            "required": [
              "executor_ref"
            ]
          },
          "then": {
            "not": {
              "required": [
                "delegate"
              ]
            },
            "properties": {
              "revocation": {
                "not": {
                  "properties": {
                    "kind": {
                      "const": "single_use"
                    }
                  },
                  "required": [
                    "kind"
                  ]
                }
              },
              "capabilities": {
                "items": {
                  "not": {
                    "required": [
                      "quotas"
                    ]
                  }
                }
              }
            }
          }
        }
      ]
    },
    "RecipientRule": {
      "oneOf": [
        {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "mode",
            "key"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "mode": {
              "const": "exact_key"
            },
            "key": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/XOnlyPubkey64"
            }
          }
        },
        {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "mode",
            "name",
            "owner_policy"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "mode": {
              "const": "exact_name"
            },
            "name": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
            },
            "owner_policy": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ScriptPolicy"
            }
          }
        },
        {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "mode",
            "operators"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "mode": {
              "const": "member_class"
            },
            "operators": {
              "type": "array",
              "minItems": 1,
              "maxItems": 16,
              "items": {
                "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NamePin"
              }
            }
          }
        }
      ]
    },
    "IssuancePrep": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "type",
        "genesis",
        "grant_id",
        "grant_content_addr"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "type": {
          "const": "seallink-issuance/1"
        },
        "genesis": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "grant_id": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "grant_content_addr": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "contract_id": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "assent_content_addrs": {
          "type": "array",
          "minItems": 2,
          "maxItems": 32,
          "items": {
            "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
          }
        }
      }
    }
  }
}
```

### Schema: guardian.schema.json

*Source:* `schemas/guardian.schema.json`

```json
{
  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
  "$id": "https://seallink.org/releases/v1.0.0-draft.2/schemas/guardian.schema.json",
  "title": "SealLink v1.0 Name Binding, Guardianship, Roster Transition, Capacity & Subject End",
  "$defs": {
    "NameBinding": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "type",
        "network",
        "genesis",
        "origin_id",
        "seq",
        "name",
        "registration",
        "owner_policy"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "type": {
          "const": "seallink-name-binding/1"
        },
        "network": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
        },
        "genesis": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "origin_id": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "seq": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
        },
        "name": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
        },
        "registration": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Outpoint"
        },
        "owner_policy": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ScriptPolicy"
        },
        "supersedes_binding_id": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "next_recovery_vout": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Vout",
          "description": "Output index in the 0x0c recovery transaction holding the successor both_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk) recovery_seal."
        },
        "next_recovery_policy": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ScriptPolicy"
        }
      },
      "dependentRequired": {
        "next_recovery_vout": [
          "next_recovery_policy"
        ],
        "next_recovery_policy": [
          "next_recovery_vout"
        ]
      }
    },
    "GuardianTerm": {
      "oneOf": [
        {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "mode"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "mode": {
              "const": "indefinite"
            }
          }
        },
        {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "mode",
            "not_after_unix",
            "ceiling_height"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "mode": {
              "const": "calendar"
            },
            "not_after_unix": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
            },
            "ceiling_height": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
            }
          }
        }
      ]
    },
    "GuardianRecord": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "payload",
        "signatures"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "payload": {
          "oneOf": [
            {
              "type": "object",
              "additionalProperties": false,
              "required": [
                "type",
                "network",
                "genesis",
                "activation_mode",
                "origin_id",
                "issuer",
                "slot",
                "revision",
                "guardian",
                "prev_outpoint",
                "active_vout",
                "active_policy",
                "term"
              ],
              "properties": {
                "type": {
                  "const": "seallink-guardian/1"
                },
                "network": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
                },
                "genesis": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                },
                "activation_mode": {
                  "const": "initial"
                },
                "origin_id": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                },
                "issuer": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/RoleIssuerPin"
                },
                "slot": {
                  "type": "integer",
                  "minimum": 1,
                  "maximum": 32
                },
                "revision": {
                  "const": 1
                },
                "guardian": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NamePin"
                },
                "prev_outpoint": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Outpoint"
                },
                "active_vout": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Vout",
                  "description": "Output index in the 0x12 initial-activation tx holding active_policy; active outpoint derives as (txid_0x12, active_vout)."
                },
                "active_policy": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ScriptPolicy",
                  "description": "MUST be either_of_2(guardian_seal_pk, disposer_pk)."
                },
                "term": {
                  "$ref": "#/$defs/GuardianTerm"
                }
              }
            },
            {
              "type": "object",
              "additionalProperties": false,
              "required": [
                "type",
                "network",
                "genesis",
                "activation_mode",
                "origin_id",
                "issuer",
                "slot",
                "revision",
                "guardian",
                "prev_outpoint",
                "pending_vout",
                "pending_policy",
                "active_policy",
                "term",
                "effective_delay_blocks"
              ],
              "properties": {
                "type": {
                  "const": "seallink-guardian/1"
                },
                "network": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
                },
                "genesis": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                },
                "activation_mode": {
                  "const": "appointed"
                },
                "origin_id": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                },
                "issuer": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/RoleIssuerPin"
                },
                "slot": {
                  "type": "integer",
                  "minimum": 1,
                  "maximum": 32
                },
                "revision": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
                },
                "guardian": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NamePin"
                },
                "prev_outpoint": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Outpoint"
                },
                "pending_vout": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Vout",
                  "description": "Output index in the 0x0d appointment tx holding pending_policy; pending outpoint derives acyclically as (anchor_txid, pending_vout)."
                },
                "pending_policy": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ScriptPolicy",
                  "description": "MUST be guardian_slot_pending with challenger == active_roster.challenger_pk and delay_blocks == effective_delay_blocks."
                },
                "active_policy": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ScriptPolicy",
                  "description": "MUST be either_of_2(guardian_seal_pk, disposer_pk) created at vout 0 by Stage 2 activation (0x0e)."
                },
                "term": {
                  "$ref": "#/$defs/GuardianTerm"
                },
                "effective_delay_blocks": {
                  "type": "integer",
                  "minimum": 1,
                  "maximum": 52560
                }
              }
            }
          ]
        },
        "signatures": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SignatureSet"
        }
      }
    },
    "GuardianRoster": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "payload",
        "signatures"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "payload": {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "type",
            "network",
            "genesis",
            "origin_id",
            "issuer",
            "prev_revision",
            "revision",
            "revision_size",
            "disposer_pk",
            "arbiter_pk",
            "challenger_pk",
            "prev_roster_outpoint",
            "next_roster_vout",
            "next_roster_policy",
            "effective_delay_blocks",
            "quorums",
            "slots"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "type": {
              "const": "seallink-guardian-roster/1"
            },
            "network": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
            },
            "genesis": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "origin_id": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "issuer": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/RoleIssuerPin"
            },
            "prev_revision": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
            },
            "revision": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
            },
            "revision_size": {
              "type": "integer",
              "minimum": 1,
              "maximum": 32
            },
            "disposer_pk": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66"
            },
            "arbiter_pk": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66"
            },
            "challenger_pk": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66"
            },
            "prev_roster_outpoint": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Outpoint"
            },
            "next_roster_vout": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Vout"
            },
            "next_roster_policy": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ScriptPolicy"
            },
            "effective_delay_blocks": {
              "type": "integer",
              "minimum": 1,
              "maximum": 52560
            },
            "quorums": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/QuorumMap"
            },
            "slots": {
              "type": "array",
              "minItems": 1,
              "maxItems": 32,
              "items": {
                "oneOf": [
                  {
                    "type": "object",
                    "additionalProperties": false,
                    "required": [
                      "slot",
                      "action",
                      "active_outpoint",
                      "guardian_id"
                    ],
                    "properties": {
                      "slot": {
                        "type": "integer",
                        "minimum": 1,
                        "maximum": 32
                      },
                      "action": {
                        "const": "retain_active"
                      },
                      "active_outpoint": {
                        "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Outpoint"
                      },
                      "guardian_id": {
                        "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                      }
                    }
                  },
                  {
                    "type": "object",
                    "additionalProperties": false,
                    "required": [
                      "slot",
                      "action",
                      "vacant_outpoint"
                    ],
                    "properties": {
                      "slot": {
                        "type": "integer",
                        "minimum": 1,
                        "maximum": 32
                      },
                      "action": {
                        "const": "retain_vacant"
                      },
                      "vacant_outpoint": {
                        "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Outpoint"
                      }
                    }
                  },
                  {
                    "type": "object",
                    "additionalProperties": false,
                    "required": [
                      "slot",
                      "action",
                      "new_vacant_vout",
                      "new_vacant_policy"
                    ],
                    "properties": {
                      "slot": {
                        "type": "integer",
                        "minimum": 1,
                        "maximum": 32
                      },
                      "action": {
                        "const": "new_vacant"
                      },
                      "new_vacant_vout": {
                        "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Vout"
                      },
                      "new_vacant_policy": {
                        "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ScriptPolicy"
                      }
                    }
                  }
                ]
              }
            }
          }
        },
        "signatures": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SignatureSet"
        }
      }
    },
    "CapacityRecord": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "payload",
        "signatures"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "payload": {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "type",
            "network",
            "genesis",
            "origin_id",
            "issuer",
            "status_prev_outpoint",
            "next_status_vout",
            "next_status_policy",
            "subject_new_owner_policy",
            "basis_sha256",
            "issued_at"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "type": {
              "const": "seallink-capacity/1"
            },
            "network": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
            },
            "genesis": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "origin_id": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "issuer": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/RoleIssuerPin"
            },
            "status_prev_outpoint": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Outpoint"
            },
            "next_status_vout": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Vout"
            },
            "next_status_policy": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ScriptPolicy"
            },
            "subject_new_owner_policy": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ScriptPolicy"
            },
            "basis_sha256": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "issued_at": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
            }
          }
        },
        "signatures": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SignatureSet"
        }
      }
    },
    "EndRecord": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "payload",
        "signatures"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "payload": {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "type",
            "network",
            "genesis",
            "origin_id",
            "issuer",
            "status_prev_outpoint",
            "reason",
            "basis_sha256",
            "issued_at"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "type": {
              "const": "seallink-end/1"
            },
            "network": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
            },
            "genesis": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "origin_id": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "issuer": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/RoleIssuerPin"
            },
            "status_prev_outpoint": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Outpoint"
            },
            "reason": {
              "type": "string",
              "enum": [
                "death",
                "dematerialization",
                "dissolution"
              ]
            },
            "basis_sha256": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "issued_at": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
            }
          }
        },
        "signatures": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SignatureSet"
        }
      }
    }
  }
}
```

### Schema: invocation.schema.json

*Source:* `schemas/invocation.schema.json`

```json
{
  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
  "$id": "https://seallink.org/releases/v1.0.0-draft.2/schemas/invocation.schema.json",
  "title": "SealLink v1.0 Invocation, Receipt, Sessions, Auth, Owner Control, Journal & Migration",
  "$defs": {
    "Invocation": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "payload",
        "signatures"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "payload": {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "type",
            "network",
            "genesis",
            "executor",
            "action",
            "target",
            "arguments",
            "proof_path",
            "nonce",
            "iat",
            "exp"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "type": {
              "const": "seallink-invocation/1"
            },
            "network": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
            },
            "genesis": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "executor": {
              "type": "object",
              "additionalProperties": false,
              "required": [
                "name",
                "key"
              ],
              "properties": {
                "name": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
                },
                "key": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/XOnlyPubkey64"
                }
              }
            },
            "action": {
              "type": "string",
              "pattern": "^[a-z0-9._-]+(/[a-z0-9._-]+)+$",
              "maxLength": 128
            },
            "target": {
              "type": "string",
              "minLength": 1,
              "maxLength": 256
            },
            "arguments": {
              "type": "object",
              "maxProperties": 64,
              "description": "Closed per-action arguments object validated against the owning action profile schema (e.g. profile-mail.schema.json, profile-agent.schema.json)."
            },
            "content_salt": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "proof_path": {
              "type": "array",
              "minItems": 1,
              "maxItems": 2,
              "items": {
                "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ProofPathEntry"
              }
            },
            "nonce": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "iat": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
            },
            "exp": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
            }
          }
        },
        "signatures": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SignatureSet"
        }
      }
    },
    "Receipt": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "payload",
        "signatures"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "payload": {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "type",
            "network",
            "genesis",
            "executor_name",
            "invocation_id",
            "grant_id",
            "action",
            "outcome",
            "tip_height",
            "tip_hash",
            "recorded_at"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "type": {
              "const": "seallink-receipt/1"
            },
            "network": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
            },
            "genesis": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "executor_name": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
            },
            "invocation_id": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "grant_id": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "action": {
              "type": "string",
              "minLength": 1,
              "maxLength": 128
            },
            "outcome": {
              "type": "string",
              "enum": [
                "executed",
                "refused",
                "uncertain"
              ]
            },
            "refusal_code": {
              "type": "string",
              "minLength": 1,
              "maxLength": 64
            },
            "settlements": {
              "type": "array",
              "maxItems": 32,
              "items": {
                "type": "object",
                "additionalProperties": false,
                "required": [
                  "kind",
                  "resource",
                  "unit",
                  "reserved",
                  "settled",
                  "released"
                ],
                "properties": {
                  "kind": {
                    "type": "string",
                    "minLength": 1,
                    "maxLength": 128
                  },
                  "resource": {
                    "type": "string",
                    "minLength": 1,
                    "maxLength": 256
                  },
                  "unit": {
                    "type": "string",
                    "minLength": 1,
                    "maxLength": 64
                  },
                  "reserved": {
                    "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint64Str"
                  },
                  "settled": {
                    "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint64Str"
                  },
                  "released": {
                    "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint64Str"
                  }
                }
              }
            },
            "result_sha256": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "tip_height": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
            },
            "tip_hash": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "recorded_at": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
            }
          }
        },
        "signatures": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SignatureSet"
        }
      }
    },
    "SessionOpen": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "payload",
        "signatures"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "payload": {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "type",
            "network",
            "genesis",
            "executor",
            "proof_path",
            "op",
            "slot_binding",
            "quotas",
            "nonce",
            "iat",
            "exp"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "type": {
              "const": "seallink-session-open/1"
            },
            "network": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
            },
            "genesis": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "executor": {
              "type": "object",
              "additionalProperties": false,
              "required": [
                "name",
                "key"
              ],
              "properties": {
                "name": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
                },
                "key": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/XOnlyPubkey64"
                }
              }
            },
            "proof_path": {
              "type": "array",
              "minItems": 1,
              "maxItems": 2,
              "items": {
                "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ProofPathEntry"
              }
            },
            "op": {
              "type": "string",
              "enum": [
                "open",
                "extend",
                "close"
              ]
            },
            "session_id": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "slot_binding": {
              "type": "string",
              "minLength": 1,
              "maxLength": 256
            },
            "quotas": {
              "type": "array",
              "maxItems": 32,
              "items": {
                "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Quota"
              }
            },
            "nonce": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "iat": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
            },
            "exp": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
            }
          }
        },
        "signatures": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SignatureSet"
        }
      }
    },
    "AuthChallenge": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "payload",
        "signatures"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "payload": {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "type",
            "service_id",
            "nonce",
            "issued_at",
            "expires_at",
            "auth_pubkey"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "type": {
              "const": "seallink-auth-challenge/1"
            },
            "service_id": {
              "type": "string",
              "minLength": 1,
              "maxLength": 255
            },
            "name": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
            },
            "nonce": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "issued_at": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
            },
            "expires_at": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
            },
            "auth_pubkey": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/XOnlyPubkey64"
            }
          }
        },
        "signatures": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SignatureSet"
        }
      }
    },
    "AuthUpgrade": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "payload",
        "signatures"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "payload": {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "type",
            "service_id",
            "account_id",
            "name",
            "auth_pubkey",
            "firstupdate_txid",
            "nonce",
            "issued_at",
            "expires_at"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "type": {
              "const": "seallink-auth-upgrade/1"
            },
            "service_id": {
              "type": "string",
              "minLength": 1,
              "maxLength": 255
            },
            "account_id": {
              "type": "string",
              "minLength": 1,
              "maxLength": 255
            },
            "name": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
            },
            "auth_pubkey": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/XOnlyPubkey64"
            },
            "firstupdate_txid": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "nonce": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "issued_at": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
            },
            "expires_at": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
            }
          }
        },
        "signatures": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SignatureSet"
        }
      }
    },
    "OwnerCommand": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "payload",
        "signatures"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "payload": {
          "oneOf": [
            {
              "type": "object",
              "additionalProperties": false,
              "required": [
                "type",
                "network",
                "genesis",
                "owner",
                "target_executor",
                "level",
                "command",
                "arguments",
                "nonce",
                "iat",
                "exp"
              ],
              "properties": {
                "type": {
                  "const": "seallink-owner-command/1"
                },
                "network": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
                },
                "genesis": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                },
                "owner": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
                },
                "target_executor": {
                  "type": "string",
                  "minLength": 1,
                  "maxLength": 255
                },
                "level": {
                  "type": "integer",
                  "enum": [
                    0,
                    1,
                    2
                  ]
                },
                "command": {
                  "const": "agent-dispatch"
                },
                "arguments": {
                  "type": "object",
                  "additionalProperties": false,
                  "required": [
                    "run_id",
                    "brief_sha256"
                  ],
                  "properties": {
                    "run_id": {
                      "type": "string",
                      "minLength": 1,
                      "maxLength": 128
                    },
                    "brief_sha256": {
                      "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                    },
                    "grant_id": {
                      "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                    }
                  }
                },
                "nonce": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                },
                "iat": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
                },
                "exp": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
                }
              }
            },
            {
              "type": "object",
              "additionalProperties": false,
              "required": [
                "type",
                "network",
                "genesis",
                "owner",
                "target_executor",
                "level",
                "command",
                "arguments",
                "nonce",
                "iat",
                "exp"
              ],
              "properties": {
                "type": {
                  "const": "seallink-owner-command/1"
                },
                "network": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
                },
                "genesis": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                },
                "owner": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
                },
                "target_executor": {
                  "type": "string",
                  "minLength": 1,
                  "maxLength": 255
                },
                "level": {
                  "type": "integer",
                  "enum": [
                    1,
                    2
                  ]
                },
                "command": {
                  "const": "session-terminate"
                },
                "arguments": {
                  "type": "object",
                  "additionalProperties": false,
                  "required": [
                    "session_id",
                    "reason"
                  ],
                  "properties": {
                    "session_id": {
                      "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                    },
                    "reason": {
                      "type": "string",
                      "minLength": 1,
                      "maxLength": 256
                    }
                  }
                },
                "nonce": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                },
                "iat": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
                },
                "exp": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
                }
              }
            },
            {
              "type": "object",
              "additionalProperties": false,
              "required": [
                "type",
                "network",
                "genesis",
                "owner",
                "target_executor",
                "level",
                "command",
                "arguments",
                "nonce",
                "iat",
                "exp"
              ],
              "properties": {
                "type": {
                  "const": "seallink-owner-command/1"
                },
                "network": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
                },
                "genesis": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                },
                "owner": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
                },
                "target_executor": {
                  "type": "string",
                  "minLength": 1,
                  "maxLength": 255
                },
                "level": {
                  "const": 2
                },
                "command": {
                  "const": "policy-apply"
                },
                "arguments": {
                  "type": "object",
                  "additionalProperties": false,
                  "required": [
                    "statement_id",
                    "config_sha256"
                  ],
                  "properties": {
                    "statement_id": {
                      "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                    },
                    "config_sha256": {
                      "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                    }
                  }
                },
                "nonce": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                },
                "iat": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
                },
                "exp": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
                }
              }
            },
            {
              "type": "object",
              "additionalProperties": false,
              "required": [
                "type",
                "network",
                "genesis",
                "owner",
                "target_executor",
                "level",
                "command",
                "arguments",
                "nonce",
                "iat",
                "exp"
              ],
              "properties": {
                "type": {
                  "const": "seallink-owner-command/1"
                },
                "network": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
                },
                "genesis": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                },
                "owner": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
                },
                "target_executor": {
                  "type": "string",
                  "minLength": 1,
                  "maxLength": 255
                },
                "level": {
                  "const": 2
                },
                "command": {
                  "const": "keyholder-halt"
                },
                "arguments": {
                  "type": "object",
                  "additionalProperties": false,
                  "required": [
                    "scope"
                  ],
                  "properties": {
                    "scope": {
                      "type": "string",
                      "enum": [
                        "all",
                        "run",
                        "device"
                      ]
                    },
                    "target_id": {
                      "type": "string",
                      "minLength": 1,
                      "maxLength": 128
                    }
                  }
                },
                "nonce": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                },
                "iat": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
                },
                "exp": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
                }
              }
            }
          ]
        },
        "signatures": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SignatureSet"
        }
      }
    },
    "JournalEntry": {
      "oneOf": [
        {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "type",
            "journal_id",
            "pos",
            "prev_commitment",
            "kind",
            "body"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "type": {
              "const": "seallink-journal-entry/1"
            },
            "journal_id": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "pos": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
            },
            "prev_commitment": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "kind": {
              "const": "closure"
            },
            "body": {
              "type": "object",
              "additionalProperties": false,
              "required": [
                "subject_kind",
                "subject_id",
                "cause",
                "observed_at"
              ],
              "properties": {
                "subject_kind": {
                  "type": "string",
                  "enum": [
                    "grant",
                    "contract",
                    "credential",
                    "seal",
                    "role",
                    "row",
                    "guardian_slot",
                    "origin"
                  ]
                },
                "subject_id": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                },
                "cause": {
                  "type": "string",
                  "minLength": 1,
                  "maxLength": 64
                },
                "spend_txid": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                },
                "observed_height": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
                },
                "observed_at": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
                }
              }
            }
          }
        },
        {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "type",
            "journal_id",
            "pos",
            "prev_commitment",
            "kind",
            "body"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "type": {
              "const": "seallink-journal-entry/1"
            },
            "journal_id": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "pos": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
            },
            "prev_commitment": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "kind": {
              "const": "reservation"
            },
            "body": {
              "type": "object",
              "additionalProperties": false,
              "required": [
                "invocation_id",
                "grant_id",
                "account",
                "quota_kind",
                "resource",
                "unit",
                "window",
                "bucket_id",
                "amount",
                "recorded_at"
              ],
              "properties": {
                "invocation_id": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                },
                "grant_id": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                },
                "account": {
                  "type": "string",
                  "enum": [
                    "own",
                    "row",
                    "session"
                  ]
                },
                "quota_kind": {
                  "type": "string",
                  "minLength": 1,
                  "maxLength": 128
                },
                "resource": {
                  "type": "string",
                  "minLength": 1,
                  "maxLength": 256
                },
                "unit": {
                  "type": "string",
                  "minLength": 1,
                  "maxLength": 64
                },
                "window": {
                  "type": "string",
                  "pattern": "^(term|blocks:[1-9][0-9]{0,8}|seconds:[1-9][0-9]{0,9})$"
                },
                "bucket_id": {
                  "type": "string",
                  "minLength": 1,
                  "maxLength": 64
                },
                "amount": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint64Str"
                },
                "recorded_at": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
                }
              }
            }
          }
        },
        {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "type",
            "journal_id",
            "pos",
            "prev_commitment",
            "kind",
            "body"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "type": {
              "const": "seallink-journal-entry/1"
            },
            "journal_id": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "pos": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
            },
            "prev_commitment": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "kind": {
              "const": "settlement"
            },
            "body": {
              "type": "object",
              "additionalProperties": false,
              "required": [
                "invocation_id",
                "grant_id",
                "outcome",
                "settled",
                "released",
                "receipt_sha256",
                "recorded_at"
              ],
              "properties": {
                "invocation_id": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                },
                "grant_id": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                },
                "outcome": {
                  "type": "string",
                  "enum": [
                    "executed",
                    "refused",
                    "uncertain"
                  ]
                },
                "settled": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint64Str"
                },
                "released": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint64Str"
                },
                "receipt_sha256": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                },
                "recorded_at": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
                }
              }
            }
          }
        },
        {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "type",
            "journal_id",
            "pos",
            "prev_commitment",
            "kind",
            "body"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "type": {
              "const": "seallink-journal-entry/1"
            },
            "journal_id": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "pos": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
            },
            "prev_commitment": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "kind": {
              "const": "single-use-consumed"
            },
            "body": {
              "type": "object",
              "additionalProperties": false,
              "required": [
                "grant_id",
                "invocation_id",
                "use_txid",
                "receipt_sha256",
                "recorded_at"
              ],
              "properties": {
                "grant_id": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                },
                "invocation_id": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                },
                "use_txid": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                },
                "receipt_sha256": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                },
                "recorded_at": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
                }
              }
            }
          }
        },
        {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "type",
            "journal_id",
            "pos",
            "prev_commitment",
            "kind",
            "body"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "type": {
              "const": "seallink-journal-entry/1"
            },
            "journal_id": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "pos": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
            },
            "prev_commitment": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "kind": {
              "const": "nonce"
            },
            "body": {
              "type": "object",
              "additionalProperties": false,
              "required": [
                "scope",
                "nonce",
                "invocation_id",
                "expires_at"
              ],
              "properties": {
                "scope": {
                  "type": "string",
                  "enum": [
                    "invocation",
                    "auth",
                    "assent",
                    "owner-command"
                  ]
                },
                "nonce": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                },
                "invocation_id": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                },
                "expires_at": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
                }
              }
            }
          }
        },
        {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "type",
            "journal_id",
            "pos",
            "prev_commitment",
            "kind",
            "body"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "type": {
              "const": "seallink-journal-entry/1"
            },
            "journal_id": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "pos": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
            },
            "prev_commitment": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "kind": {
              "const": "manifest-head"
            },
            "body": {
              "type": "object",
              "additionalProperties": false,
              "required": [
                "name",
                "registration",
                "seq",
                "manifest_sha256",
                "anchoring_txid"
              ],
              "properties": {
                "name": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
                },
                "registration": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Outpoint"
                },
                "seq": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
                },
                "manifest_sha256": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                },
                "anchoring_txid": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                }
              }
            }
          }
        },
        {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "type",
            "journal_id",
            "pos",
            "prev_commitment",
            "kind",
            "body"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "type": {
              "const": "seallink-journal-entry/1"
            },
            "journal_id": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "pos": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
            },
            "prev_commitment": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "kind": {
              "const": "recovery"
            },
            "body": {
              "type": "object",
              "additionalProperties": false,
              "required": [
                "fenced_at",
                "prev_write_token",
                "new_write_token"
              ],
              "properties": {
                "fenced_at": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
                },
                "prev_write_token": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
                },
                "new_write_token": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
                }
              }
            }
          }
        },
        {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "type",
            "journal_id",
            "pos",
            "prev_commitment",
            "kind",
            "body"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "type": {
              "const": "seallink-journal-entry/1"
            },
            "journal_id": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "pos": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
            },
            "prev_commitment": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "kind": {
              "const": "boundary"
            },
            "body": {
              "type": "object",
              "additionalProperties": false,
              "required": [
                "block_height",
                "block_hash",
                "header_time"
              ],
              "properties": {
                "block_height": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
                },
                "block_hash": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                },
                "header_time": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
                }
              }
            }
          }
        }
      ]
    },
    "MigrationManifest": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "payload",
        "signatures"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "payload": {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "type",
            "network",
            "genesis",
            "migration_id",
            "holder",
            "service_type",
            "source_executor",
            "dest_executor",
            "journal_pos",
            "journal_commitment",
            "inventory_sha256",
            "outstanding_exposure",
            "issued_at"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "type": {
              "const": "seallink-migration/1"
            },
            "network": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
            },
            "genesis": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "migration_id": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "holder": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NamePin"
            },
            "service_type": {
              "type": "string",
              "minLength": 1,
              "maxLength": 128
            },
            "source_executor": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NamePin"
            },
            "dest_executor": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NamePin"
            },
            "journal_pos": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
            },
            "journal_commitment": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "inventory_sha256": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            },
            "outstanding_exposure": {
              "type": "array",
              "items": {
                "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Quota"
              }
            },
            "issued_at": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
            }
          }
        },
        "signatures": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SignatureSet"
        }
      }
    }
  }
}
```

### Schema: manifest.schema.json

*Source:* `schemas/manifest.schema.json`

```json
{
  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
  "$id": "https://seallink.org/releases/v1.0.0-draft.2/schemas/manifest.schema.json",
  "title": "SealLink v1.0 Manifest, Sets & Statements",
  "type": "object",
  "additionalProperties": false,
  "required": [
    "type",
    "network",
    "owner",
    "seq"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "type": {
      "const": "seallink-manifest/1"
    },
    "network": {
      "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
    },
    "owner": {
      "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
    },
    "seq": {
      "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
    },
    "sets": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "properties": {
        "card": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SetPin"
        },
        "certs": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SetPin"
        },
        "devices": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SetPin"
        },
        "members": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SetPin"
        }
      }
    },
    "service": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "service_type",
        "actions",
        "receipt_key",
        "endpoint"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "service_type": {
          "type": "string",
          "minLength": 1,
          "maxLength": 128
        },
        "actions": {
          "type": "array",
          "minItems": 1,
          "maxItems": 256,
          "uniqueItems": true,
          "items": {
            "type": "string",
            "minLength": 1,
            "maxLength": 128
          }
        },
        "receipt_key": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/XOnlyPubkey64"
        },
        "endpoint": {
          "type": "string",
          "minLength": 1,
          "maxLength": 1024
        },
        "tls_spki_sha256": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        }
      }
    },
    "providers": {
      "type": "array",
      "maxItems": 64,
      "items": {
        "type": "object",
        "additionalProperties": false,
        "required": [
          "service_type",
          "label",
          "provider"
        ],
        "properties": {
          "service_type": {
            "type": "string",
            "minLength": 1,
            "maxLength": 128
          },
          "label": {
            "type": "string",
            "pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]{0,63}$"
          },
          "provider": {
            "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NamePin"
          },
          "transport_key": {
            "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/XOnlyPubkey64"
          }
        }
      }
    },
    "auth_key": {
      "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/XOnlyPubkey64"
    },
    "auth_seal": {
      "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Seal"
    },
    "role_policies": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "description": "Optional preimages for on-chain link.<role>.p threshold pins. Zero authority unless SHA256(JCS(policy)) equals the confirmed on-chain link.<role>.p hash.",
      "properties": {
        "grant": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ThresholdPolicy"
        },
        "cred": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ThresholdPolicy"
        },
        "notary": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ThresholdPolicy"
        }
      }
    }
  },
  "dependentRequired": {
    "auth_key": [
      "auth_seal"
    ],
    "auth_seal": [
      "auth_key"
    ]
  },
  "$defs": {
    "DeviceList": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "type",
        "network",
        "owner",
        "seq",
        "devices"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "type": {
          "const": "seallink-device-list/1"
        },
        "network": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
        },
        "owner": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
        },
        "seq": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
        },
        "devices": {
          "type": "array",
          "minItems": 1,
          "maxItems": 32,
          "items": {
            "type": "object",
            "additionalProperties": false,
            "required": [
              "label",
              "alg",
              "key",
              "presence",
              "ceiling",
              "seal"
            ],
            "properties": {
              "label": {
                "type": "string",
                "minLength": 1,
                "maxLength": 64
              },
              "alg": {
                "type": "string",
                "enum": [
                  "bip340",
                  "p256",
                  "ed25519"
                ]
              },
              "key": {
                "type": "string",
                "pattern": "^([0-9a-f]{64}|0[23][0-9a-f]{64})$"
              },
              "presence": {
                "type": "boolean"
              },
              "ceiling": {
                "type": "integer",
                "enum": [
                  0,
                  1,
                  2
                ]
              },
              "seal": {
                "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Seal"
              }
            }
          }
        }
      }
    },
    "MembersList": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "type",
        "network",
        "owner",
        "seq",
        "entries"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "type": {
          "const": "seallink-members-list/1"
        },
        "network": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
        },
        "owner": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
        },
        "seq": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
        },
        "entries": {
          "type": "array",
          "maxItems": 1024,
          "items": {
            "type": "object",
            "additionalProperties": false,
            "required": [
              "name",
              "owner_policy",
              "seal"
            ],
            "properties": {
              "name": {
                "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
              },
              "owner_policy": {
                "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ScriptPolicy"
              },
              "seal": {
                "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Seal"
              }
            }
          }
        }
      }
    },
    "CertSetHead": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "type",
        "network",
        "issuer_name",
        "seq",
        "count",
        "set_sha256"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "type": {
          "const": "seallink-certset-head/1"
        },
        "network": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
        },
        "issuer_name": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
        },
        "seq": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
        },
        "count": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
        },
        "set_sha256": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        }
      }
    },
    "Statement": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "payload",
        "signatures"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "payload": {
          "oneOf": [
            {
              "type": "object",
              "additionalProperties": false,
              "required": [
                "type",
                "network",
                "genesis",
                "issuer",
                "statement_kind",
                "subject",
                "seq",
                "not_before",
                "not_after",
                "body_sha256"
              ],
              "properties": {
                "type": {
                  "const": "seallink-statement/1"
                },
                "network": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
                },
                "genesis": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                },
                "issuer": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NamePin"
                },
                "statement_kind": {
                  "const": "config-section"
                },
                "subject": {
                  "type": "object",
                  "additionalProperties": false,
                  "required": [
                    "host_id",
                    "section"
                  ],
                  "properties": {
                    "host_id": {
                      "type": "string",
                      "minLength": 1,
                      "maxLength": 128
                    },
                    "section": {
                      "type": "string",
                      "minLength": 1,
                      "maxLength": 128
                    }
                  }
                },
                "seq": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
                },
                "not_before": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
                },
                "not_after": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
                },
                "body_sha256": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                }
              }
            },
            {
              "type": "object",
              "additionalProperties": false,
              "required": [
                "type",
                "network",
                "genesis",
                "issuer",
                "statement_kind",
                "subject",
                "seq",
                "not_before",
                "not_after"
              ],
              "properties": {
                "type": {
                  "const": "seallink-statement/1"
                },
                "network": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
                },
                "genesis": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                },
                "issuer": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NamePin"
                },
                "statement_kind": {
                  "const": "transport-binding"
                },
                "subject": {
                  "type": "object",
                  "additionalProperties": false,
                  "required": [
                    "transport",
                    "endpoint",
                    "key_alg",
                    "key_hex"
                  ],
                  "properties": {
                    "transport": {
                      "type": "string",
                      "enum": [
                        "https-tls-spki",
                        "nostr",
                        "matrix",
                        "xmpp",
                        "ssh"
                      ]
                    },
                    "endpoint": {
                      "type": "string",
                      "minLength": 1,
                      "maxLength": 512
                    },
                    "key_alg": {
                      "type": "string",
                      "enum": [
                        "sha256-spki",
                        "bip340",
                        "ed25519",
                        "p256"
                      ]
                    },
                    "key_hex": {
                      "type": "string",
                      "pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64,130}$"
                    }
                  }
                },
                "seq": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
                },
                "not_before": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
                },
                "not_after": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
                }
              }
            },
            {
              "type": "object",
              "additionalProperties": false,
              "required": [
                "type",
                "network",
                "genesis",
                "issuer",
                "statement_kind",
                "subject",
                "seq",
                "not_before",
                "not_after"
              ],
              "properties": {
                "type": {
                  "const": "seallink-statement/1"
                },
                "network": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
                },
                "genesis": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                },
                "issuer": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NamePin"
                },
                "statement_kind": {
                  "const": "root-rotate"
                },
                "subject": {
                  "type": "object",
                  "additionalProperties": false,
                  "required": [
                    "host_id",
                    "new_role_policy"
                  ],
                  "properties": {
                    "host_id": {
                      "type": "string",
                      "minLength": 1,
                      "maxLength": 128
                    },
                    "new_role_policy": {
                      "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ThresholdPolicy"
                    }
                  }
                },
                "seq": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
                },
                "not_before": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
                },
                "not_after": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
                }
              }
            },
            {
              "type": "object",
              "additionalProperties": false,
              "required": [
                "type",
                "network",
                "genesis",
                "issuer",
                "statement_kind",
                "subject",
                "seq",
                "not_before",
                "not_after"
              ],
              "properties": {
                "type": {
                  "const": "seallink-statement/1"
                },
                "network": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
                },
                "genesis": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                },
                "issuer": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NamePin"
                },
                "statement_kind": {
                  "const": "root-cancel"
                },
                "subject": {
                  "type": "object",
                  "additionalProperties": false,
                  "required": [
                    "host_id",
                    "override_id"
                  ],
                  "properties": {
                    "host_id": {
                      "type": "string",
                      "minLength": 1,
                      "maxLength": 128
                    },
                    "override_id": {
                      "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
                    }
                  }
                },
                "seq": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
                },
                "not_before": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
                },
                "not_after": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
                }
              }
            }
          ]
        },
        "signatures": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SignatureSet"
        }
      }
    }
  }
}
```

### Schema: name-value.schema.json

*Source:* `schemas/name-value.schema.json`

```json
{
  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
  "$id": "https://seallink.org/releases/v1.0.0-draft.2/schemas/name-value.schema.json",
  "title": "SealLink v1.0 Ledger Name Value (520-Byte Budget)",
  "description": "Formal schema for SealLink-recognized top-level members in a Namecoin name value. Unknown owner-defined top-level members are permitted and ignored by SealLink readers (SL-IDEN-002).",
  "type": "object",
  "additionalProperties": true,
  "properties": {
    "link": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "minProperties": 1,
      "properties": {
        "grant": {
          "$ref": "#/$defs/RoleKeyOrPolicyPin"
        },
        "cred": {
          "$ref": "#/$defs/RoleKeyOrPolicyPin"
        },
        "notary": {
          "$ref": "#/$defs/RoleKeyOrPolicyPin"
        },
        "origin": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        }
      }
    },
    "m": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "h",
        "s"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "h": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "s": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
        }
      }
    },
    "nostr": {
      "oneOf": [
        {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/XOnlyPubkey64"
        },
        {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "names"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "names": {
              "type": "object",
              "required": [
                "_"
              ],
              "properties": {
                "_": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/XOnlyPubkey64"
                }
              },
              "additionalProperties": {
                "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/XOnlyPubkey64"
              }
            },
            "relays": {
              "type": "object",
              "additionalProperties": {
                "type": "array",
                "maxItems": 16,
                "items": {
                  "type": "string",
                  "pattern": "^wss?://.+$",
                  "maxLength": 256
                }
              }
            }
          }
        }
      ]
    }
  },
  "$defs": {
    "RoleKeyOrPolicyPin": {
      "oneOf": [
        {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/XOnlyPubkey64"
        },
        {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "p"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "p": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64",
              "description": "SHA-256 of canonical JCS ThresholdPolicy (m-of-n BIP-340 keys). Any change to the role policy requires an owner-authored ledger update."
            }
          }
        }
      ]
    }
  }
}
```

### Schema: origin.schema.json

*Source:* `schemas/origin.schema.json`

```json
{
  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
  "$id": "https://seallink.org/releases/v1.0.0-draft.2/schemas/origin.schema.json",
  "title": "SealLink v1.0 Origin Certificate (Birth, Materialization, Incorporation)",
  "type": "object",
  "additionalProperties": false,
  "required": [
    "payload",
    "signatures"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "payload": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "type",
        "network",
        "genesis",
        "origin_class",
        "issuer",
        "request_sha256",
        "subject_initial_key",
        "binding_seal",
        "status_seal",
        "claims",
        "name_recovery"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "type": {
          "const": "seallink-origin/1"
        },
        "network": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Network"
        },
        "genesis": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "origin_class": {
          "type": "string",
          "enum": [
            "person",
            "agent",
            "organization"
          ]
        },
        "issuer": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/RoleIssuerPin"
        },
        "request_sha256": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "subject_initial_key": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/XOnlyPubkey64"
        },
        "binding_seal": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Seal"
        },
        "status_seal": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Seal",
          "description": "Authenticated status spine UTXO; while unspent, proves neither seallink-capacity/1 nor seallink-end/1 has occurred."
        },
        "claims": {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "intended_name",
            "intended_owner_policy"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "intended_name": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
            },
            "intended_owner_policy": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/ScriptPolicy"
            },
            "majority_commitment": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64",
              "description": "Salted selective-disclosure commitment H_tag('seallink-clause/1', salt_32B || JCS({majority_unix: T})) with an independent 32-byte CSPRNG salt."
            },
            "config_sha256": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
            }
          }
        },
        "guardian_policy": {
          "type": "object",
          "additionalProperties": false,
          "required": [
            "revision",
            "revision_size",
            "disposer_pk",
            "arbiter_pk",
            "challenger_pk",
            "roster_seal",
            "appointment_delay_blocks",
            "quorums",
            "slots"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "revision": {
              "const": 1
            },
            "revision_size": {
              "type": "integer",
              "minimum": 1,
              "maximum": 32
            },
            "disposer_pk": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66",
              "description": "Single compressed ECDSA key for disposer branch of both_of_2/either_of_2/guardian_slot_pending seals (institutions use threshold ECDSA per OQ-007)."
            },
            "arbiter_pk": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66",
              "description": "Independent arbiter compressed ECDSA key for both_of_2 vacant/roster seals (MUST differ from disposer_pk)."
            },
            "challenger_pk": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66",
              "description": "Designated pre-activation challenger compressed ECDSA key checked against guardian_slot_pending.keys.challenger."
            },
            "roster_seal": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Seal",
              "description": "both_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk) seal spent with action 0x0f to advance guardianship revision."
            },
            "appointment_delay_blocks": {
              "type": "integer",
              "minimum": 1,
              "maximum": 52560
            },
            "quorums": {
              "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/QuorumMap"
            },
            "slots": {
              "type": "array",
              "minItems": 1,
              "maxItems": 32,
              "items": {
                "type": "object",
                "additionalProperties": false,
                "required": [
                  "slot",
                  "initial_guardian_commitment",
                  "vacant_utxo"
                ],
                "properties": {
                  "slot": {
                    "type": "integer",
                    "minimum": 1,
                    "maximum": 32
                  },
                  "initial_guardian_commitment": {
                    "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64",
                    "description": "Salted selective-disclosure commitment H_tag('seallink-clause/1', salt_i || JCS(initial_guardian_NamePin)) using an independent 32-byte CSPRNG salt."
                  },
                  "vacant_utxo": {
                    "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Outpoint"
                  }
                }
              }
            }
          }
        },
        "capacity_authority": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NamePin"
        },
        "name_recovery": {
          "oneOf": [
            {
              "type": "object",
              "additionalProperties": false,
              "required": [
                "mode"
              ],
              "properties": {
                "mode": {
                  "const": "none"
                }
              }
            },
            {
              "type": "object",
              "additionalProperties": false,
              "required": [
                "mode",
                "disposer_pk",
                "arbiter_pk",
                "delay_blocks",
                "recovery_seal"
              ],
              "properties": {
                "mode": {
                  "const": "dual_party_delayed"
                },
                "disposer_pk": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66"
                },
                "arbiter_pk": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/CompressedPubkey66"
                },
                "delay_blocks": {
                  "type": "integer",
                  "minimum": 144,
                  "maximum": 52560
                },
                "recovery_seal": {
                  "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Seal"
                }
              }
            }
          ]
        }
      }
    },
    "signatures": {
      "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/SignatureSet"
    }
  }
}
```

### Schema: profile-agent.schema.json

*Source:* `schemas/profile-agent.schema.json`

```json
{
  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
  "$id": "https://seallink.org/releases/v1.0.0-draft.2/schemas/profile-agent.schema.json",
  "title": "SealLink PROFILE-agent-v1 Action Arguments and Result Schemas",
  "$defs": {
    "AgentBriefArgs": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "task_id",
        "brief_sha256",
        "max_duration_sec"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "task_id": {
          "type": "string",
          "minLength": 1,
          "maxLength": 128
        },
        "brief_sha256": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "max_duration_sec": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint64Str"
        },
        "artifact_channel": {
          "type": "string",
          "minLength": 1,
          "maxLength": 256
        }
      }
    },
    "AgentBriefResult": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "task_id",
        "status",
        "output_sha256",
        "completed_at"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "task_id": {
          "type": "string",
          "minLength": 1,
          "maxLength": 128
        },
        "status": {
          "type": "string",
          "enum": [
            "completed",
            "stopped",
            "failed"
          ]
        },
        "output_sha256": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "completed_at": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
        }
      }
    },
    "AgentToolArgs": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "tool_name",
        "input_sha256",
        "max_output_bytes"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "tool_name": {
          "type": "string",
          "pattern": "^[a-z0-9._-]+$",
          "maxLength": 128
        },
        "input_sha256": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "resource_path": {
          "type": "string",
          "minLength": 1,
          "maxLength": 512
        },
        "max_output_bytes": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint64Str"
        }
      }
    },
    "AgentToolResult": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "tool_name",
        "exit_code",
        "output_sha256",
        "output_bytes"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "tool_name": {
          "type": "string",
          "minLength": 1,
          "maxLength": 128
        },
        "exit_code": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
        },
        "output_sha256": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "output_bytes": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint64Str"
        }
      }
    },
    "AgentSessionArgs": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "op",
        "session_slot",
        "config_sha256"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "op": {
          "type": "string",
          "enum": [
            "start",
            "checkpoint",
            "halt"
          ]
        },
        "session_slot": {
          "type": "string",
          "minLength": 1,
          "maxLength": 128
        },
        "config_sha256": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "max_wall_sec": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint64Str"
        }
      }
    },
    "AgentSessionResult": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "session_slot",
        "state",
        "config_sha256",
        "recorded_at"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "session_slot": {
          "type": "string",
          "minLength": 1,
          "maxLength": 128
        },
        "state": {
          "type": "string",
          "enum": [
            "running",
            "checkpointed",
            "halted"
          ]
        },
        "config_sha256": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "recorded_at": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
        }
      }
    },
    "AgentGuardianMessageArgs": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "origin_id",
        "subject_ward_name",
        "revision",
        "message_sha256",
        "channel",
        "delivery_mode"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "origin_id": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "subject_ward_name": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
        },
        "revision": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/PositiveUint53"
        },
        "message_sha256": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "channel": {
          "type": "string",
          "minLength": 1,
          "maxLength": 128
        },
        "delivery_mode": {
          "type": "string",
          "enum": [
            "strict_drop",
            "untrusted_fallback"
          ],
          "description": "strict_drop is the normative default for ward agents: unauthenticated messages are dropped before entering the model context."
        }
      }
    },
    "AgentGuardianMessageResult": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "delivered",
        "frame_sha256",
        "message_sha256",
        "verified_slots",
        "verified_guardians",
        "recorded_at"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "delivered": {
          "type": "boolean"
        },
        "frame_sha256": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "message_sha256": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "verified_slots": {
          "type": "array",
          "minItems": 1,
          "maxItems": 32,
          "uniqueItems": true,
          "items": {
            "type": "integer",
            "minimum": 1,
            "maximum": 32
          }
        },
        "verified_guardians": {
          "type": "array",
          "minItems": 1,
          "maxItems": 32,
          "items": {
            "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/NameStr"
          }
        },
        "recorded_at": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
        }
      }
    }
  }
}
```

### Schema: profile-mail.schema.json

*Source:* `schemas/profile-mail.schema.json`

```json
{
  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
  "$id": "https://seallink.org/releases/v1.0.0-draft.2/schemas/profile-mail.schema.json",
  "title": "SealLink PROFILE-mail-v1 Action Arguments and Result Schemas",
  "$defs": {
    "MailListArgs": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "folder",
        "page"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "folder": {
          "type": "string",
          "minLength": 1,
          "maxLength": 256
        },
        "sender_domain": {
          "type": "string",
          "minLength": 1,
          "maxLength": 255
        },
        "max_bytes": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint64Str"
        },
        "snapshot_id": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "page": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
        }
      }
    },
    "MailListResult": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "snapshot_id",
        "page",
        "has_more",
        "messages"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "snapshot_id": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "page": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
        },
        "has_more": {
          "type": "boolean"
        },
        "messages": {
          "type": "array",
          "maxItems": 200,
          "items": {
            "type": "object",
            "additionalProperties": false,
            "required": [
              "message_id",
              "folder",
              "sender_domain",
              "size_bytes",
              "received_at"
            ],
            "properties": {
              "message_id": {
                "type": "string",
                "minLength": 1,
                "maxLength": 256
              },
              "folder": {
                "type": "string",
                "minLength": 1,
                "maxLength": 256
              },
              "sender_domain": {
                "type": "string",
                "minLength": 1,
                "maxLength": 255
              },
              "size_bytes": {
                "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint64Str"
              },
              "received_at": {
                "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
              }
            }
          }
        }
      }
    },
    "MailReadArgs": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "folder",
        "message_id"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "folder": {
          "type": "string",
          "minLength": 1,
          "maxLength": 256
        },
        "message_id": {
          "type": "string",
          "minLength": 1,
          "maxLength": 256
        },
        "sender_domain": {
          "type": "string",
          "minLength": 1,
          "maxLength": 255
        },
        "max_bytes": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint64Str"
        }
      }
    },
    "MailReadResult": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "message_id",
        "folder",
        "sender_domain",
        "size_bytes",
        "mime_sha256",
        "received_at"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "message_id": {
          "type": "string",
          "minLength": 1,
          "maxLength": 256
        },
        "folder": {
          "type": "string",
          "minLength": 1,
          "maxLength": 256
        },
        "sender_domain": {
          "type": "string",
          "minLength": 1,
          "maxLength": 255
        },
        "size_bytes": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint64Str"
        },
        "mime_sha256": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "received_at": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
        }
      }
    },
    "MailSendArgs": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "to",
        "subject",
        "body_sha256",
        "size_bytes"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "to": {
          "type": "string",
          "minLength": 3,
          "maxLength": 320
        },
        "subject": {
          "type": "string",
          "minLength": 1,
          "maxLength": 512
        },
        "body_sha256": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "size_bytes": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint64Str"
        }
      }
    },
    "MailSendResult": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "message_id",
        "body_sha256",
        "queued_at"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "message_id": {
          "type": "string",
          "minLength": 1,
          "maxLength": 256
        },
        "body_sha256": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Hex64"
        },
        "queued_at": {
          "$ref": "common.schema.json#/$defs/Uint53"
        }
      }
    }
  }
}
```

---

## Part VI — Informative Implementation Guides

---

## GUIDE-01: Custody, Signers, Namecoin PSBT, and Agent Runtime Integration

- **Version:** `1.0.0-draft.2`
- **Status:** Informative Implementation Guide (non-normative)
- **Purpose:** Collects unobservable local operator duties, hardware custody guidance, Namecoin `namepsbt` workflows, and Agent Isolation Runtime integration patterns that intentionally remain outside the normative wire specification (`spec/SPEC-00`…`SPEC-07`).

---

### 1. Key Custody and Personal Key Services

Normative key-role isolation lives in `SPEC-03 §2` and `registry/key-roles.json`. Recommended concrete custody mappings:

1. **Cold `name_owner` and `emergency_fee_reserve`:** Air-gapped hardware wallet or offline paper-backed cold seed strictly separated from hot signers. Store public derivation metadata (paths, account indices, name registrations, `ScriptPolicy` preimages) alongside offline backups so recovery never depends on memory.
2. **Multi-custodian `P2WSH` names (e.g., `2-of-3` child name or `3-of-5` organization):**
   - Each custodian stores their key share in independent hardware storage on an independently administered device.
   - Per-share offline backups SHOULD be authenticated-encrypted ciphertext split with Shamir or Reed-Solomon erasure coding across disjoint physical locations (never apply Reed-Solomon directly to raw private keys).
   - Never share a cloud account or administrator across two custodians of the same threshold.
3. **Personal Key Service (macOS / Linux / Windows / iOS / Android):**
   - Exposes a local signing daemon with **typed field display** and **hardware presence (biometric / PIN)** per signature for `grant`, `cred`, `notary`, and L2 `device` keys.
   - Example macOS custody: non-exportable software `secp256k1` generic-password item in the macOS Data Protection Keychain gated by Touch ID (`biometryCurrentSet`, no passcode fallback) for BIP-340 `grant` keys, and hardware Secure Enclave `P-256` keys for L2 `device` commands.

---

### 2. Namecoin Core 28 `P2WSH` Multisig Workflow (`namepsbt`) and P2A CPFP

Verified against Namecoin Core `nc28.0` (`src/script/solver.cpp:146-148`, `IsWitnessProgram(true, ...)`):
- Standard `OP_NAME_FIRSTUPDATE` (`OP_2DROP OP_2DROP`) and `OP_NAME_UPDATE` (`OP_2DROP OP_DROP`) outputs with trailing native `P2WSH` (`OP_0 PUSH32 SHA256(witnessScript)`) pass default node standardness and relay policy without `-acceptnonstdtxn` (up to 3,600-byte witness script, 100 stack items, 80 bytes/item — supporting up to `15-of-15` multisig).
- Namecoin Core's built-in single-key wallet cannot sign multisig name outputs directly; construct and co-sign name updates using **PSBT (`namepsbt`)**:
  1. Coordinator constructs the unsigned `OP_NAME_UPDATE` PSBT spending the current `P2WSH` name UTXO and locking `0.01 NMC` to the target `ScriptPolicy`, supplying `witnessScript` in the PSBT input metadata.
  2. Each of `k` custodians independently verifies the decoded name, 520-byte JCS value, destination `ScriptPolicy`, and fee outputs, then signs with strict **`SIGHASH_ALL` (`0x01`)**.
  3. Coordinator finalizes and broadcasts the combined witness transaction.
- **Pre-signed disposable revocations (`SL-LDGR-013`):** Construct `tx_revoke` as a TRUC v3 transaction ([BIP-431]) carrying one standard 4-byte `P2A` witness v1 anchor output `51024e73` (`OP_1 PUSH2 0x4e73`, [BIP-433]) valued at `>= 240` base units (the `P2A` dust floor). Because Namecoin Core `nc28.0` sets default `minrelaytxfee = 0.001 NMC / 1000 vB`, broadcast a zero-fee `tx_revoke` together with a v3 CPFP child via 1p1c package relay (`submitpackage`) funding the combined package fee (`conformance/p2a-regtest/`). Do not use bare `OP_TRUE`, which is `nonstandard` in `nc28.0`.

---

### 3. Delegation Signing Service: Crash-Safe Reservation Ledger

Normative rule `SPEC-06 §3` requires a delegation signing service holding `delegate.key` to sign **at most one** child grant per `(parent_grant_id, ordinal)` row. Because verifiers cannot observe internal signer state, the crash-safe storage protocol is specified here as implementation guidance:

1. **States per `(parent_grant_id, ordinal)`:** `empty` -> `reserved` -> `signed` (or `held` on ambiguous write failure; `ledger_lost` if hash-chain continuity fails).
2. **Three-phase durable commit:** Before invoking `delegate.key`, write a pre-sign `mark` -> append hash-chained reservation entry binding the exact child `grant_id` -> advance external witness head (`SPEC-06 §6`) -> sign -> persist signature.
3. **Deterministic conflict handling:**
   - Identical retry (`same grant_id`) returns the stored signature without re-signing.
   - Different payload for the same ordinal refuses (`PLACE_CONFLICT`).
   - Interrupted write or crash between signature and persistence transitions the row to `held` (`PLACE_HELD`); never auto-retry and never re-use the row unless operator reconciliation proves the key was never used for that ordinal.
   - If the confirmed chain shows a child anchor spending the row coin without a matching ledger entry, immediately alert the operator of key compromise outside the ledger and halt the delegation service.

---

### 4. Integrating SealLink with an Agent Isolation Runtime (e.g., Swarma Runtime)

Normative verification rules for agent tasks, sessions, and guardian-signed instructions live in `profiles/PROFILE-agent-v1.md`. Recommended host OS deployment pattern:

1. **Read-Only Trust Pin Mount:** At agent materialization/launch, the host administrator writes the agent's immutable `origin.json` (`seallink-origin/1`), `chain-pin.json` (`network` + `genesis`), and read-only `seallink-verify` binary to an admin-owned directory mounted strictly read-only into the agent's OS sandbox (`/etc/seallink:ro` via Linux `MS_RDONLY` bind-mount or macOS `root`-owned `0444` + Seatbelt profile). The agent's OS user cannot mutate these files and holds no private signing keys.
2. **Curator Profile and Single Standing Rule:** The profile assembler (`Curator`) computes `config_sha256` (pinned in `origin/1` and `agent/session` contracts) and embeds one standing rule in the agent's system prompt: trust only the verified read-only Authority Frame from the Session Host and `seallink-verify`; treat all other text as untrusted data. Never hardcode live grants or guardian lists into static system prompts.
3. **External Runtime Bridge (`Bridge` -> `Session Host`):** A separate OS-isolated `Bridge` daemon intercepts external messaging transports (Nostr, Matrix, XMPP) and runs the normative `agent/guardian-message` verification steps (`PROFILE-agent-v1.md §5`) on its own Namecoin node before wrapping verified messages into the Session Host's read-only Authority Frame.
4. **In-Sandbox Self-Verification and Keyholder Run-Origin Gate:** Even if a signed packet reaches the agent indirectly, the agent can invoke `seallink-verify --origin /etc/seallink/origin.json <packet>` over a read-only local socket to the host's chain observer. Outbound request signing is mediated by an isolated `Keyholder` daemon (`SO_PEERCRED`/`LOCAL_PEERCRED`) that binds each agent run to its admitted origin and enforces monotonic operator policies and inherited L0–L2 ceilings (`SPEC-03 §6`).

---

## Appendix A — Migration Traceability

## SealLink v1.0 Rule Inventory and Migration Traceability

**Historical source corpus migrated into cleanroom SealLink v1.0:**
- `swarma-link-spec` v0.1.67 (`protocol/*`, `decisions/0001..0004`, `LIP-0001` through `LIP-0038`, `LIP-0014-source-contract-proposals`, `KEY-MAP.md`, `KEY-REGISTRY.md`, `UNRESOLVED_QUESTIONS.md`)
- `FINAL-ru.md` (Birth & Materialization Certificates / Guardianship design, `P1`–`P20`, 24 specification items)
- `book/ru/` v2.0 (Swarma Runtime & Platform boundary)

**Purpose:** Trace every behavior-critical invariant from the historical draft corpus to its exact SealLink v1.0 `SL-*` rule ID, schema/registry artifact, and conformance vector — or explicitly record why it was superseded, deferred to `OPEN-QUESTIONS.md`, or retired.

---

### 1. Critical Behavioral Rule Traceability (Rule-Level Mapping)

| Historical Rule / Source | Invariant | SealLink v1.0 Rule ID(s) | Status | Witness / Vector |
| --- | --- | --- | :-: | --- |
| `protocol/observation.md`, `LIP-0008 §4` | Independent verification on verifier's own chain view; local pins only | `SL-ARCH-001`, `SL-LDGR-002`, `SL-LDGR-008` | `decided` | `trace-01` |
| `LIP-0020 W1–W9` | Restricted RFC 8785 JCS, no `null`, `uint53`/`uint64_str`, 3 hashes, tagged digests | `SL-WIRE-001`–`SL-WIRE-011`, `SL-WIRE-018` | `decided` | `wire-jcs-and-hashes.json` |
| `LIP-0020 W11.11`, `LIP-0008 §12.6` | Monotonic attenuation (`child <= parent`) checked mechanically | `SL-ARCH-005`, `SL-WIRE-015`–`SL-WIRE-017`, `SL-GRNT-010` | `decided` | `constraints-and-schemas.json`, `trace-03` |
| `LIP-0021 O3.2` | Three distinct Namecoin prefix grammars (`NAME_NEW`, `NAME_FIRSTUPDATE`, `NAME_UPDATE`) | `SL-LDGR-005` | `decided` | `ledger-scripts-and-opreturn.json` |
| `LIP-0021 O3.3` | Owner authorship requires spent previous name input + strict `SIGHASH_ALL` (`0x01`) | `SL-LDGR-007` | `decided` | `trace-01` |
| `LIP-0021 O3.5`, `LIP-0010`, `LIP-0027` | Three-valued seal semantics (`unspent` / `revoked` / `unavailable`; missing != unspent) | `SL-ARCH-002`, `SL-LDGR-011` | `decided` | `trace-01`, `trace-03` |
| `LIP-0022` | Tip snapshot bracket, single-node comparison veto, dual `tip_age` (`first_sight`), recency `(R, R+K]` | `SL-LDGR-008` | `decided` *(constants `open`: `OQ-010..013`)* | `trace-01` |
| `LIP-0023` | Witness construction profile `W`, non-malleable SegWit inputs, linkage `seal_vout + 1` | `SL-LDGR-009` | `decided` | `ledger-scripts-and-opreturn.json` |
| `LIP-0002` | `single_use_1_of_2` branch attribution (issuer revoke vs grantee use), input-first scan | `SL-LDGR-004`, `SL-LDGR-012`, `SL-GRNT-006` | `decided` | `trace-03` |
| `LIP-0003` | Batch anchor `0x02` Merkle commitment | `SL-LDGR-014` | `decided` | `ledger-scripts-and-opreturn.json` |
| `LIP-0005` | Framed `OP_RETURN` action & non-exclusive locator table | `SL-LDGR-010`, `registry/opreturn-actions.json` | `decided` (`0x06` reserved) | `ledger-scripts-and-opreturn.json` |
| `LIP-0010`, `LIP-0033` | 520B name value budget, single `m` pin, 4-channel non-exclusive distribution cascade | `SL-IDEN-001`–`SL-IDEN-004`, `SL-IDEN-009` | `decided` *(domain bind `open`: `OQ-004`)* | `trace-01` |
| `LIP-0010 H51`, `LIP-0029` | Disposable CSPRNG fast-revocation seal + TRUC/P2A CPFP fee-bump output | `SL-LDGR-013`, `SL-IDEN-005` | `decided` format *(2-node regtest passed; prod propagation `open`: `OQ-006`)* | `ledger-scripts-and-opreturn.json`, `conformance/p2a-regtest/` |
| `KEY-REGISTRY` Rules 1–3, `KEY-MAP` | Strict key-role separation + cold `emergency_fee_reserve` (`m/84'/7'/3'`) | `SL-ARCH-006`, `SL-IDEN-005`, `registry/key-roles.json` | `decided` | `speclint.py` cross-registry check |
| `LIP-0034` | Dedicated `auth_key` + `auth_seal`, provisional key-only cells, atomic `auth-upgrade` | `SL-IDEN-010` | `decided` | `schemas/invocation.schema.json` |
| `LIP-0029`, `LIP-0015` | L0–L2 owner control plane, level inheritance, trust-root pin + delayed admin override | `SL-IDEN-011`, `SL-IDEN-012` | `decided` *(FIDO2/SSH `open`: `OQ-005`)* | `schemas/invocation.schema.json` |
| `LIP-0017 C10–C12` | N-party salted contracts, framework depth 1, confirmed contract seal determines termination type | `SL-CONT-001`–`SL-CONT-006` | `decided` | `wire-jcs-and-hashes.json`, `trace-02` |
| `LIP-0011 J8` | Chained violation verdicts (`0x03`) and salted invocation attribution | `SL-CONT-007` | `decided` | `schemas/contract.schema.json` |
| `LIP-0032`, `LIP-0021 §7.6` | Eternal vs revocable credentials (`0x09`/`0x0a`), owner-authenticated `h_c` break (`0x0b`), general notary (`0x04`/`0x05`) | `SL-CONT-008`–`SL-CONT-011` | `decided` | `schemas/credential.schema.json` |
| `LIP-0006 §7`, `LIP-0035` | Unilateral base grant; mechanical effect executors refuse `terms_text`; reserve before effect | `SL-ARCH-004`, `SL-GRNT-001`, `SL-GRNT-005`, `SL-GRNT-007` | `decided` | `constraints-and-schemas.json`, `trace-01` |
| `LIP-0026 R8.5` | Whole-parent aggregate budget sum across all row groups (`sum(rows * cap) <= pool_max`) | `SL-GRNT-010` | `decided` | `trace-03` |
| `LIP-0026 R8.6` | Pairwise-disjoint row-coin and stop-coin ranges across all groups | `SL-GRNT-009` | `decided` | `trace-03` |
| `LIP-0027 H1–H4` | Notary per-row stop coins (`GRANT_ROW_STOPPED`) | `SL-GRNT-011` | `decided` | `schemas/grant.schema.json` |
| `LIP-0025 M4.6` | Hash-chained anti-rollback journal + external CAS witness fencing + `+7200s` recovery boundary | `SL-GRNT-014` | `decided` *(witness wire `open`: `OQ-003`)* | `trace-01`, `trace-03` |
| `LIP-0028` | Short-lived (`<= 3600s`) bearer sessions with per-use chain/seal recheck | `SL-GRNT-013` | `decided` | `schemas/invocation.schema.json` |
| `LIP-0009` | Replaceable services, 3-class export boundary, 4-step exclusive cut-over | `SL-SERV-001`–`SL-SERV-003` | `decided` | `PROFILE-mail-v1.md`, `PROFILE-agent-v1.md` |
| `LIP-0036` | Two-phase federated screening (zero PII) -> L2-gated Contour A targeted disclosure | `SL-SERV-004` | `decided` | `SPEC-07 §3` |
| `LIP-0038` | Effect leaves (`post-message`, `spend-coins`, `name-update`, `model-call`) | `SL-SERV-005`, `OPEN-QUESTIONS.md` | **Deferred** (except `mail` & `agent-session` profiles) | `PROFILE-mail-v1.md`, `PROFILE-agent-v1.md` |
| `LIP-0024 §2`, `LIP-0004`, `LIP-0016 §2–3` | Legacy v0.1/v3 wire formats, Nostr `kind 8181`, seal endorsement, UTXO cert head `0x06` | **Retired** | Retired | Replaced by `SPEC-01`/`03`/`05`/`06` |

---

### 2. Guardianship and Origin Certificate Traceability (`FINAL-ru.md` `P1`–`P20` & 24 Items)

| Item | Topic | SealLink v1.0 Resolution | Status |
| --- | --- | --- | :-: |
| `P1–P2` | Origin-certified class (`person`, `agent`, `organization`) distinct from unverified cards | `SL-ARCH-008`, `SL-ORIG-002` | `decided` |
| `P3–P4` | Three-record separation (`origin/1`, `name-binding/1`, `guardian/1`) + identity permanence | `SL-ORIG-001`, `SL-ORIG-003` | `decided` |
| `P5` | Pre-registration issuance + single-use `binding_seal` (`0x0c`) + reverse uniqueness | `SL-ORIG-002`, `SL-ORIG-003` | `decided` |
| `P6–P7` | Privacy of public chain (`link.origin`) + salted commitments for initial guardians and `majority_unix` | `SL-ARCH-012`, `SL-IDEN-003`, `SL-ORIG-002` | `decided` |
| `P8–P9` | $N$ equal guardian slots + revision-denominated quorums + 4-class linear verifier-derived `event_class` + `SL-ORIG-016` consistency | `SL-ORIG-004`, `SL-ORIG-005`, `SL-ORIG-016` | `decided` |
| `P10` | Protocol-level ward non-autonomy (`WARD_AUTONOMOUS_FORBIDDEN`, `guardian_approvals[]`) | `SL-ORIG-006`, `SL-WIRE-013` | `decided` |
| `P11–P13` | Direct initial activation (`0x12`), acyclic two-stage appointment (`0x0d` pending -> `0x0e` active), explicit `challenger_pk`, fast halt, slot burn recovery via `0x0f` roster transition | `SL-ORIG-007`, `SL-ORIG-015` | `decided` |
| `P14` | Native `P2WSH` `m-of-n` multisig name ownership via `namepsbt` (ECDSA, no FROST on P2WPKH, no covenant renewal branch) | `SL-LDGR-004`, `SL-LDGR-006` | `decided` *(threshold ECDSA `open`: `OQ-007`)* |
| `P15–P16` | Calendar vs indefinite terms; asymmetric safety pause at majority boundary `T` | `SL-ORIG-009`, `SL-ORIG-010` | **Time oracle `open`** (`OQ-001`) |
| `P17` | Authenticated completeness via `status_seal` and `roster_seal` spines (`ORIGIN_STATUS_INCOMPLETE`) | `SL-ORIG-001`, `SL-ORIG-002`, `SL-ORIG-015` | `decided` |
| `P18` | Four ward admission states (`under_guardianship`, `halted`, `transfer_pending`, `autonomous`) + fresh subject `ScriptPolicy` on emancipation | `SL-ORIG-011` | `decided` |
| `P19` | Eternal `seallink-end/1` terminating `status_seal` (`SUBJECT_ENDED`); issuer-key survival at anchor height | `SL-ORIG-008`, `SL-ORIG-012` | `decided` |
| `P20` | Dual-mode `name_recovery` (`none` vs `dual_party_delayed`) + live-owner `0x10` `RECOVERY_CANCEL` veto | `SL-ORIG-013`, `SL-ORIG-014` | `decided` |

---

### 3. Historical Corpus Disposition Summary (38 Draft LIPs)

- **Core Backbone Consolidated (`SPEC-00`–`SPEC-07`):** `LIP-0001`, `0002`, `0003`, `0005`, `0006`, `0007`, `0008`, `0009`, `0010`, `0011`, `0012`, `0014`, `0015`, `0016` (§1/§3.1/§4), `0017`, `0018`, `0019`, `0020`, `0021`, `0022`, `0023`, `0025`, `0026`, `0027`, `0028`, `0029`, `0031`, `0032`, `0033`, `0034`, `0035`, `0036`, `0037`.
- **Moved to Profiles (`profiles/`) or Open Profiles (`OPEN-QUESTIONS.md`):** `LIP-0009` (`blob`), `LIP-0030` (`PROFILE-agent-v1.md` + external Swarma Runtime), `LIP-0038` (`wallet`, `names`, `compute`).
- **Moved to Informative Guide (`guides/GUIDE-01-custody-and-signers.md`):** `LIP-0013` (§3.4/§3.6 Authority Frame & Keymaker run-origin gate), `LIP-0014` companion (Keychain/Curator host seams, delegation signer reservation ledger), `KEY-MAP.md` operational tips.
- **Retired (Cleanroom v1.0):** `protocol/*` v0.1 bytes, `LIP-0004` (v3 & Nostr `kind 8181`), `LIP-0013` v3 / Matrix `8185`, `LIP-0014` v3 `/2` & `8186`, `LIP-0016` §2–3 UTXO cert head `0x06`, `LIP-0024` §2 seal endorsement.

---

## Appendix B — Conformance Vector Manifest

### Conformance Vector Manifest

Full machine-verifiable JSON vector files live under `vectors/` in the tagged repository.

| File | Bytes | SHA-256 | Suite Description |
| --- | ---: | --- | --- |
| `vectors/constraints-and-schemas.json` | 33522 | `19f653269ad30c2515851c9a408b5d61bc973cb190ad39430d33fe7715df9798` | All 7 Constraint Algebra predicates (match + conservative narrowing), negative schema/semantic fixtures, and SL-ORIG-016 guardianship consistency fixtures. |
| `vectors/ledger-scripts-and-opreturn.json` | 19484 | `b427e0e037dc0efc6d33238bd88b9271483260499dfc85e10abc44e5fe8be0d8` | Namecoin prefix scripts (NAME_NEW/NAME_FIRSTUPDATE/NAME_UPDATE), ScriptPolicy compilations, TRUC/P2A CPFP, SLNK OP_RETURN frames (0x01-0x12), and 5-leaf Merkle batch 0x02 proofs. |
| `vectors/refusal-coverage-matrix.json` | 920330 | `df8c20029018c1c23ecf432f29ca0ba2eb325cf280c2bd53890db535ca3320ab` | Executable 84/84 refusal-code conformance matrix exercising every registered refusal code through tools/seallink_verifier.py and tools/seallink_ref.py. |
| `vectors/trace-01-mail-offline-revoke.json` | 38594 | `31beec8cce922c67d30580a10a6630d5a475d5d852b36eaed457fe0d2b9a9044` | Executable RFC 8448-style trace: mail/read via executor_ref and named recipient while issuer offline, 69B MIME result, constraint refusal, mempool seal spend closure, and exact GRANT_CLOSED refusal. |
| `vectors/trace-02-guardian-succession-assent.json` | 57289 | `04bcc0f62b585fe3c8d58d53f31b74f84e80b0bf8eb16908bfa127b8dfb2b2fa` | Executable RFC 8448-style trace: private origin/1 + status_seal, initial slot activation (0x12) -> fast halt -> acyclic Stage 1 (0x0d) -> Stage 2 (0x0e) -> roster transition (0x0f), and ward contract assent via guardian_approvals[] (ward alone refused, old guardian refused, active successor admitted). |
| `vectors/trace-03-delegation-pool-single-use.json` | 72291 | `fa157f05cefe5ef878d70b899abc016382629da5a871721d1b161d546ca86dd0` | Executable RFC 8448-style trace: parent delegation with 2 groups sharing 1 pool (R8.5 & R8.6 positive/negative), acyclic single-use branch-0 execution (0x11), crash-in-effect-window uncertain recovery, Step 3b auth-before-cache check, authenticated replay idempotency, new-nonce replay refusal, and issuer branch-1 revocation. |
| `vectors/trace-04-agent-guardian-intake.json` | 62184 | `79b4ac5b924e02dc45b2da4540d2a2842d633d4158d427dfe79e76462a840e08` | Executable PROFILE-agent-v1 trace for agent/guardian-message: strict_drop rejects unauthenticated caller (WIRE_SIGNATURE), inactive guardian slot (GUARDIAN_INACTIVE), downgraded routine_read event_class (GUARDIAN_QUORUM_UNMET), and admits 2-of-2 effect_grant guardian_approvals[] into an Authority Frame. |
| `vectors/wire-jcs-and-hashes.json` | 25231 | `8454f7208cc363e92c14cd8e20ed7aa1599858211eac38cdabcca1797082f617` | Restricted RFC 8785 JCS positive/negative vectors, 3 hashes, clause_commit, and BIP-340 SignatureSet checks. |
