SealLink v1.0.0-draft.2

SPEC-06: Universal Grants, Invocations, Re-Delegation, Sessions, and Anti-Rollback Journals

  • Version: 1.0.0-draft.2
  • Status: draft (normative rules decided; external CAS witness transport protocol tracked open in OPEN-QUESTIONS.md)
  • Evidence / Maturity: vectors (vectors/trace-01-mail-offline-revoke.json, vectors/trace-03-delegation-pool-single-use.json, vectors/trace-04-agent-guardian-intake.json, vectors/refusal-coverage-matrix.json)
  • Registries: registry/object-types.json, registry/constraints.json, registry/opreturn-actions.json, registry/refusal-codes.json
  • Schemas: schemas/grant.schema.json, schemas/invocation.schema.json

A seallink-grant/1 (<= 65536 bytes, schemas/grant.schema.json) is the universal authorization instrument across people, organizations, services, and agents (SL-GRNT-001, decided). Every grant carries exactly one of issuer (root grant) or parent (depth-2 child grant).

1.1 Unilateral Base and Optional Contract Binding

  • Unilateral base: An autonomous root grant requires ONLY the issuer's valid SignatureSet matching issuer.role_policy (pinned on chain in link.grant per SL-IDEN-003). A root grant issued on behalf of a ward omits issuer.role_policy, sets payload.guardian_context, and carries top-level guardian_approvals[] satisfying required(derived_event_class) (SL-WIRE-013, SL-ORIG-006). Neither form requires recipient assent or imposes obligations on the recipient.
  • Contract-bound grants: Setting optional contract_id binds the grant to a seallink-contract/1 (SPEC-05): the grant's window MUST nest inside the contract (and any framework contract), all machine_clause_indices MUST be disclosed and match the grant's capabilities, and spending the contract or framework seal terminates the grant (SEAL_SPENT). Action profiles with requires_contract = true refuse unilateral grants (GRANT_CONTRACT_REQUIRED).

1.2 Recipient Modes (SL-GRNT-002, decided)

Every grant selects exactly one recipient mode:

  1. **By Key (mode = "key"):** Names one xonly_64hex public key (suitable for ephemeral key-only workers and hardware keys). Ledger name resolution is skipped for the recipient.
  2. **By Name (mode = "name"):** Names (name, owner_policy). At invocation, the verifier resolves name, confirms its current live output matches owner_policy (NAME_OWNER_MISMATCH), and accepts signatures from the name's current authorized nostr/request key, permitting same-owner key rotation and name renewal without reissuing the grant.
  3. **By Group (mode = "group"):** Names a ThresholdPolicy (m-of-n distinct keys), authorizing execution ONLY when >= m distinct co-recipients sign seallink-invocation/1 (SignatureSet).

1.3 Concrete executor vs. Stateless executor_ref (SL-GRNT-003, decided)

Every action leaf in a service profile declares four orthogonal boolean properties (SPEC-07 §4.1): external_mutation, discloses_data, quota_consuming, and allows_executor_ref. Every grant carries exactly one of:

  • **Concrete executor: {name, key}: Pins one specific service identity and receipt key. MANDATORY** whenever ANY capability in capabilities[] has external_mutation = true, quota_consuming = true, carries quotas, uses single_use revocation, or includes delegate.
  • **Dynamic executor_ref: {provider_of, service_type, label}:** Resolves at verification time against provider_of's current confirmed seallink-manifest/1 providers[] entry (NamePin + service manifest receipt_key) matching (service_type, label). STRICTLY FORBIDDEN if the grant carries any quotas, uses single_use revocation, includes delegate, or includes any action with external_mutation = true or allows_executor_ref = false (GRANT_EXECUTOR_REF_FORBIDDEN).

Rationale: Stateless data-read actions (e.g., mail/read without quotas) have discloses_data = true and external_mutation = false, so resolving the current pinned provider via executor_ref cannot double-spend quotas or cause duplicate side effects.

1.4 Validity Window and Revocation Modes (SL-GRNT-004, decided)

  • Half-open block window: [not_before_height, not_after_height) with recent_block_height <= not_before_height < not_after_height and not_after_height <= issuer_name_expiry_at_issuance for sealed grants. Admission at tip == not_after_height refuses GRANT_WINDOW_CLOSED. Optional min_depth (1..144, defaults to 1) specifies the issuer's minimum required anchor/seal confirmation depth.
  • Two revocation modes:
    • **revocation.mode = "seal" (Standard Default):** Names construction ("W" | "L"), kind ("revocable" | "single_use"), and confirmed seal: {txid, vout, script_policy}. Anchored via OP_RETURN 0x01 (or Merkle batch 0x02 with MerkleProof) committing typed_digest(seallink-issuance/1) (loc = 0x00 default). Spending a revocable seal closes the grant at mempool speed (SEAL_SPENT). A single_use seal MUST use ScriptPolicy template single_use_1_of_2 and follows the branch-aware state machine in SPEC-02 §6.2.
    • **revocation.mode = "window_only" (Root-Only Zero-Tx Ephemeral Mode): Strictly permitted ONLY on root** grants without delegate (parent and delegate MUST be absent), with not_after_height - not_before_height <= 12 blocks. Requires zero ledger transactions. **Executors MUST refuse window_only by default (GRANT_SEAL_REQUIRED)** unless local executor policy explicitly opts in for that action and budget tier. Emergency rotation/removal of the issuer's link.grant (NAME_ROLE_CHANGED) still terminates all live window_only grants immediately.

1.5 Text-vs-Effect Invariant (SL-GRNT-005, decided)

A grant MAY carry optional terms_text solely to guide cognitive work (e.g., agent/brief). Any mechanical effect executor (mail/*, agent/tool, agent/session, wallets, locks, name updaters, blob stores) MUST refuse any grant containing terms_text (GRANT_TEXT_FORBIDDEN).


2.1 Signed Invocation and Acyclic Single-Use Delivery (SL-GRNT-006, decided)

Every execution request is a canonical JCS seallink-invocation/1 (<= 1 MiB) signed by the final grant's recipient (SignatureSet):

  • Binds network, genesis, concrete executor {name, key}, exact action, target, closed typed arguments (validated against the owning profile schema), optional content_salt (SPEC-05 §3), proof_path (1 entry for root grant, 2 entries [parent, child] for delegated child grant, each optionally carrying issuance_txid and batch_proof), 32-byte CSPRNG nonce, and wall-clock half-open window [iat, exp) (iat <= now < exp, no grace, INVOKE_TIME_INVALID).
  • **Acyclic single-use consumption (0x11):** seallink-invocation/1 NEVER embeds use_txid. For a single_use grant:
    • The grantee constructs and signs seallink-invocation/1, computing invocation_content_addr = SHA256(canonical_JCS(invocation)).
    • The grantee broadcasts T_use spending the single_use_1_of_2 seal via branch 0 (grantee, SIGHASH_ALL) with OP_RETURN 0x11 (SINGLE_USE_CONSUMPTION) committing invocation_content_addr.
    • The grantee delivers (seallink-invocation/1, use_txid = txid(T_use)) in the transport envelope alongside inline grant/contract/manifest bytes. The executor verifies T_use on its own chain view (SPEC-02 §6.2).
  • Signed arguments are sole authority: The executor MUST derive effect parameters strictly from payload.arguments (never from transport headers or unsigned wrapper fields) and evaluate every where predicate (SL-WIRE-016) against payload.arguments (INVOKE_CONSTRAINT_FAILED).

2.2 Quota Accounting, Reservation, and Settlement (SL-GRNT-007, decided)

  1. Reserve before effect: Before executing any effect, the executor MUST atomically reserve the maximum possible debit for every quota key consumed by the action in its fenced journal (§6): the grant's own account (and for a child grant, the parent's row account — never the parent's own account) plus operator ceilings (QUOTA_EXCEEDED). A zero ceiling authorizes nothing; missing required quota refuses.
  2. Window modes:
    • term: cumulative across [not_before_height, not_after_height).
    • blocks:<N>: half-open block buckets [not_before_height + k*N, not_before_height + (k+1)*N).
    • seconds:<S>: UTC epoch-aligned buckets [floor(now/S)*S, (floor(now/S)+1)*S) guarded by a durable per-key monotonic clock watermark (QUOTA_CLOCK_REGRESSION).
  3. Settlement (Actual Charge and Release): Once an effect completes with a known actual debit, the executor charges the exact actual debit (exact integer/rational arithmetic rounded upward once per request, zero binary64) and releases the unused reservation difference (reserved = settled + released).
  4. Uncertain outcomes: If an effect outcome is uncertain (timeout, crash, network split), the full reservation MUST be retained until operator/protocol reconciliation; the executor reports outcome = "uncertain" and MUST NOT silently refund or allow replay.
  5. Idempotency and Replay: Request identity is invocation_id = SHA256(canonical_JCS(invocation.payload)) (excluding signatures). A repeated identical invocation_id MUST perform no second effect; the executor returns its stored signed receipt or refuses INVOKE_REPLAY per profile. A reused nonce with a different payload MUST refuse INVOKE_REPLAY.

2.3 Signed Receipt (SL-GRNT-008, decided)

Every executor answers with a seallink-receipt/1 signed by its pinned receipt key (executor.key), recording invocation_id, grant_id, action, outcome ("executed" | "refused" | "uncertain"), optional refusal_code, settlements[], optional result_sha256, and observation (tip_height, tip_hash, recorded_at). Callers MUST verify receipts solely against their pinned executor.key.


3. Bounded Depth-2 Re-Delegation

A root seallink-grant/1 MAY authorize bounded child grants by including delegate (SL-GRNT-009, decided). Maximum authority path depth is 2 (root -> child; children MUST NOT carry delegate and MUST use revocation.mode = "seal" bound to delegate.child_seal_key, GRANT_NOT_DELEGABLE).

  1. Separated delegation and child-seal keys:
    • delegate.key (xonly_64hex) signs child grants ONLY (disjoint from issuer, recipient, and messaging keys; held in an isolated delegation signing service enforcing at-most-one signature per row, guides/GUIDE-01-custody-and-signers.md).
    • delegate.child_seal_key (compressed_66hex) controls the issuer revocation branch of every child grant's seal (held outside the delegation signer so the delegator can revoke children even if the delegation signer is compromised).
  2. **Grouped rows, row coins, and pairwise disjointness (R8.6):**
    • delegate.groups holds 1..16 groups; each group pairs a template (concrete executor, closed recipient_rule (exact_key | exact_name | member_class), capabilities[], and notary_mode) with 1..16 ranges of 1..4096 pre-confirmed P2WPKH row coins (confirmed <= parent.recent_block).
    • **Disjoint coin ranges (R8.6):** Every (txid, vout) across ALL row ranges and ALL stop-coin ranges across ALL groups in delegate.groups, as well as the parent's own seal and linkage output, MUST be pairwise disjoint (GRANT_ROW_INVALID).
    • Global 1-based ordinal enumerates rows in signed group/range order. A child naming parent: {grant_id, ordinal} MUST have its issuance anchor (0x01 or 0x02) spend the exact row coin for ordinal (GRANT_ROW_INVALID), enforcing on chain that at most one child per row exists.
  3. **Whole-parent aggregate budget (R8.5) and mechanical child narrowing (SL-GRNT-010, decided):** Every verifier MUST check BOTH the whole parent allocation AND the individual child:
    • **Whole-parent budget sum (R8.5):** For every quota key q = (kind, resource, unit, window) appearing in any group template's capabilities[].quotas, let rows(g) = sum(r.count for r in g.ranges) and cap(g, q) be the maximum ceiling for q in group g's template (summed across capabilities in g that share q). Using exact integer arithmetic (overflow -> GRANT_CHILD_WIDER), the verifier MUST confirm a matching pool entry pool_max(q) exists in delegate.pools and:
     sum over all groups g of (rows(g) * cap(g, q)) <= pool_max(q)

Failure refuses GRANT_CHILD_WIDER. (This invariant prevents sibling rows at different executors from exceeding the parent's total budget.)

  • Child-within-parent check:
    • C.genesis == P.genesis, C.contract_id == P.contract_id (if present), C.executor == template.executor, and C.revocation.mode == "seal" with issuer branch controlled by P.delegate.child_seal_key;
    • [C.not_before_height, C.not_after_height) ⊆ [P.not_before_height, P.not_after_height);
    • Every capability in C.capabilities mechanically narrows a capability in template.capabilities under the 7-predicate Constraint Algebra (SL-WIRE-017), and every child quota <= the template's row cap;
    • C.recipient satisfies template.recipient_rule (exact_key matches mode="key"; exact_name matches mode="name" with equal name and owner_policy; member_class checks live unspent membership of C.recipient in at least one pinned operator's confirmed seallink-members-list/1).
  • **Optional notary and stop coins (SL-GRNT-011, decided):**
    • "none" (default): mechanical narrowing under SL-GRNT-010 requires no notary.
    • "optional_stop": range specifies confirmed P2WPKH stop coins controlled by a pinned notary; spending a stop coin permanently closes that row for cause across all verifiers (GRANT_ROW_STOPPED).
    • "required_act": additionally requires a verified seallink-notary/1 (act_kind = "child-within-parent") act (NOTARY_REQUIRED).

4. Deterministic Admission Order (Invocation Pipeline)

An executor MUST evaluate an incoming seallink-invocation/1 in this exact 12-step order, returning the first failure (SL-GRNT-012, decided). Early recipient authentication runs strictly before cached-receipt lookup and blockchain RPCs to prevent unauthenticated DoS, cached-receipt harvesting, and state-oracle leakage:

  1. **Invocation wire check (SPEC-01 §7):** Parse and verify seallink-invocation/1 syntax, JCS, closed schema, profile argument schema, keys, and self-consistent SignatureSet -> WIRE_*
  2. Early local request checks (pre-chain):
    • 2a. Wall-clock half-open window iat <= now < exp -> INVOKE_TIME_INVALID
    • 2b. invocation.executor equals this executor's pinned (name, receipt_key) -> GRANT_EXECUTOR_MISMATCH
  3. Presented bundle wire, early recipient authentication, and replay check (pre-chain):
    • 3a. Wire pipeline on presented grant(s), optional contract(s), and optional manifest(s) -> WIRE_*
    • 3b. If leaf grant uses recipient.mode = "key" or "group", verify invocation.signatures.policy equals grant.recipient immediately -> WIRE_SIGNATURE (runs before any cached-receipt lookup so forged callers cannot probe or retrieve cached receipts)
    • 3c. For key and group recipients (whose authentication succeeded in Step 3b): check local journal replay/nonce table. If invocation_id already has a stored terminal receipt, return that cached receipt (or INVOKE_REPLAY if profile forbids cached return). If invocation_id has an unsettled reservation (crash inside the external-effect window before receipt persistence), return outcome = "uncertain" while retaining the reservation and executing zero second effect. If nonce was already used for a different invocation_id, refuse INVOKE_REPLAY. *(For recipient.mode = "name", this identical replay/crash-recovery check runs immediately after Step 11a once the recipient's on-chain key is verified.)*
  4. **Consistent chain observation (SPEC-02 §4):** Check in strict order:
    • 4a. Chain/genesis pin -> CHAIN_MISMATCH
    • 4b. Reading node health (!IBD, txindex=1, header lag <= LAG) -> CHAIN_UNHEALTHY
    • 4c. Independent comparison peer veto -> CHAIN_NODE_DISAGREEMENT
    • 4d. Monotonic UTC clock watermark and header future bound S -> CHAIN_CLOCK_ERROR
    • 4e. Action risk-class tip freshness (tip_age) -> CHAIN_TIP_STALE
  5. **Journal continuity (§6):** Check external CAS witness readability, local store readability, and journal_id match (JOURNAL_LOST), then active write_token (JOURNAL_FENCED), then position/commitment continuity (JOURNAL_LOST)
  6. Durable closure check: Check local closure journal for every grant ID, contract ID, framework ID, issuer role, and row in proof_path, in strict order:
    • 6a. Closed grant or ancestor grant -> INVOKE_REPLAY if closed specifically by SINGLE_USE_CONSUMED (for a new invocation_id), else GRANT_CLOSED
    • 6b. Stopped row -> GRANT_ROW_STOPPED
    • 6c. Closed issuer role -> NAME_ROLE_CHANGED
    • 6d. Closed seal -> SEAL_SPENT
  7. **Issuer identity, origin, and guardianship (SPEC-03, SPEC-04):**
    • 7a. Resolve root issuer name (NAME_NOT_FOUND), liveness (NAME_EXPIRED), history walk availability (NAME_HISTORY_UNAVAILABLE), SIGHASH_ALL writer check (NAME_WRITER_UNVERIFIED), owner_policy match (NAME_OWNER_MISMATCH), 520B name value grammar (NAME_VALUE_INVALID). For autonomous issuers (no verified ward origin): verify link.grant continuity (NAME_ROLE_CHANGED), verify issuer.role_policy matches link.grant and equals root_grant.signatures.policy (WIRE_SIGNATURE).
    • 7b. If origin-certified (link.origin or pinned origin): check in strict order: origin/1 validity & trust (ORIGIN_UNVERIFIED), name-binding/1 validity (ORIGIN_BINDING_INVALID), status_seal and roster_seal completeness (ORIGIN_STATUS_INCOMPLETE), subject end (SUBJECT_ENDED), pending emancipation transfer (GUARDIAN_TRANSFER_PENDING), calendar majority time boundary (GUARDIAN_TIME_BOUNDARY); if ward, enforce SL-ORIG-006 order (WARD_AUTONOMOUS_FORBIDDEN, then GUARDIAN_INACTIVE, then WIRE_SIGNATURE, then GUARDIAN_QUORUM_UNMET).
  8. **Contract and framework checks (SPEC-05):** Check in strict order: action requires contract (GRANT_CONTRACT_REQUIRED); if contract_id present: presentation (CONTRACT_NOT_PRESENTED), ID recomputation (CONTRACT_ID_MISMATCH), party assents (CONTRACT_ASSENT_INVALID), confirmed seal presence & ScriptPolicy match (CONTRACT_SEAL_MISSING), seal spend (SEAL_SPENT) or inconclusive seal (SEAL_UNAVAILABLE), disclosed machine_clause_indices & window nesting (CONTRACT_TERMS_MISMATCH), runtime config_sha256 if required (CONTRACT_CONFIG_MISMATCH).
  9. **Re-delegation checks (depth 2, §3):** Check in strict order: parent delegation rights & depth <= 2 (GRANT_NOT_DELEGABLE), whole-parent R8.5 aggregate pool sum (GRANT_CHILD_WIDER), R8.6 disjointness & ordinal row coin spend (GRANT_ROW_INVALID), stop coin live (GRANT_ROW_STOPPED), optional notary act (NOTARY_REQUIRED), child signatures.policy equals parent.delegate.key (WIRE_SIGNATURE), mechanical child narrowing against group template (GRANT_CHILD_WIDER).
  10. Grant window, revocation / single-use seal, and executor binding:
    • 10a. Grant height window [not_before_height, not_after_height) -> GRANT_WINDOW_CLOSED
    • 10b. If revocation.mode = "window_only": enforce not_after_height - not_before_height <= 12 (WIRE_INTEGER), then executor opt-in policy (GRANT_SEAL_REQUIRED)
    • 10c. If revocation.mode = "seal": verify issuance 0x01/0x02 frame & Merkle proof (CHAIN_FRAME_INVALID), recent_block recency (CHAIN_RECENCY_INVALID), Witness W construction (CHAIN_TX_CONSTRUCTION), anchor depth (CHAIN_DEPTH_INSUFFICIENT); then evaluate seal:
    • revocable (SPEC-02 §6.1): revoked -> write closure + SEAL_SPENT; unavailable -> SEAL_UNAVAILABLE
    • single_use (SPEC-02 §6.2): awaiting_spend -> SEAL_UNAVAILABLE; revoked -> write closure + SEAL_SPENT; pending_confirm -> CHAIN_DEPTH_INSUFFICIENT; consumed with distinct invocation_id -> INVOKE_REPLAY
    • 10d. Verify executor or resolve executor_ref: forbid executor_ref on stateful/mutating/single-use/delegating grants (GRANT_EXECUTOR_REF_FORBIDDEN); verify holder's confirmed manifest (MANIFEST_UNAVAILABLE, then MANIFEST_MISMATCH, then MANIFEST_ROLLBACK), confirm provider NamePin binding (SERVICE_PROVIDER_UNBOUND) and provider owner_policy (NAME_OWNER_MISMATCH), confirm resolved (name, receipt_key) matches this executor (GRANT_EXECUTOR_MISMATCH)
  11. Named recipient, action, text ban, and constraints:
    • 11a. If leaf grant uses recipient.mode = "name", resolve recipient name (NAME_NOT_FOUND), check liveness (NAME_EXPIRED), check owner_policy (NAME_OWNER_MISMATCH), verify invocation.signatures.policy against its authorized request key (WIRE_SIGNATURE), and then execute the Step 3c local journal replay / crash-recovery check (INVOKE_REPLAY, cached receipt, or uncertain)
    • 11b. Action supported and present in grant.capabilities (INVOKE_ACTION_DENIED)
    • 11c. Mechanical effect text ban (GRANT_TEXT_FORBIDDEN)
    • 11d. Target match and 7-predicate where evaluation against invocation.arguments (INVOKE_CONSTRAINT_FAILED)
  12. Pre-effect recheck and atomic reservation: Re-bracket chain tip (CHAIN_OBSERVATION_VOID, then CHAIN_TIP_STALE) and re-check live seals (SEAL_SPENT), verify seconds-window monotonic clock (QUOTA_CLOCK_REGRESSION), atomically write nonce + reservation entries to fenced journal (QUOTA_EXCEEDED, then JOURNAL_FENCED, then JOURNAL_LOST)

When a client harness cannot sign per-request invocations (e.g., an SDK accepting only a base URL and bearer token), an executor MAY support short-lived sessions (SL-GRNT-013, decided):

  1. Recipient's key holder sends a signed seallink-session-open/1 (<= 16384 bytes, op = "open" | "extend" | "close") with slot_binding, bounded quotas <= grant.quotas, and exp <= now + 3600 (at most 1 hour ahead).
  2. Executor runs the full admission pipeline (§4), binds a 32-byte CSPRNG bearer token (storing ONLY SHA256(token) in its journal), and returns the token once over a local socket or mutually authenticated encrypted channel.
  3. Every unsigned in-session request MUST re-run live chain observation, seal checks, and recipient channel-key checks before reserving from (grant, row, session) accounts (SESSION_INVALID on mismatch, expiry, or any link closure).
  4. Unsigned in-session requests lack per-request non-repudiation and retry idempotency; executors MUST NOT enable bearer sessions for wallets, name updates, or irreversible financial transfers.

Every stateful SealLink verifier/executor (tracking closures, single-use consumption, quota reservations, nonces, and manifest heads) MUST guard against backup-restore and equal-position forks using a hash-chained journal + external CAS witness (SL-GRNT-014, decided state machine / open witness wire transport in OPEN-QUESTIONS.md):

  1. Hash chain: Random 32-byte journal_id; commitment c(0) = H_tag("seallink-journal/1", journal_id), c(n) = H_tag("seallink-journal/1", c(n-1) || canonical_JCS(entry_n)). Every entry_n MUST validate against the closed discriminated JournalEntry schema (schemas/invocation.schema.json) with entry_n.pos == n and entry_n.prev_commitment == c(n-1).
  2. External witness: An append-only CAS register stored strictly outside the local store's backup domain, holding (journal_id, pos, commitment, write_token). Only advance(journal_id, token, pos, from_commit, to_commit) mutates it; fencing strictly increments write_token.
  3. Write order: Check continuity -> durably write local entry -> advance external witness -> execute effect.
  4. Continuity precedence: (1) witness readable, (2) local store readable, (3) matching journal_id -> else JOURNAL_LOST; (4) active write_token held -> else JOURNAL_FENCED (checked before position comparison so partitioned replicas fence cleanly); (5) store.pos == witness.pos and equal commitment (Intact), or store.pos == witness.pos + 1 with matching prev_commitment (Pending completion), else JOURNAL_LOST.
  5. Attended recovery (start anew): Record recovery entry with fenced_at, wait for a confirmed ledger block boundary whose header_time > fenced_at + 7200s (exceeding Namecoin's +2h future-header consensus bound to prove the block was accepted after fencing), and conservatively treat all pre-fencing uncertain reservations as consumed.

7. Security Considerations

  • No cross-executor quota sharing: Two independent executors MUST NEVER spend from one apparent grant quota; split budgets across separate concrete-executor grants or parent row groups verified under R8.5.
  • Closure write failure: If writing a newly observed SEAL_SPENT closure to the journal fails, the verifier MUST refuse admission and halt further admission for that seal until durable storage recovers.
  • **window_only containment:** Executors opting into root window_only MUST enforce low per-grant and global operator ceilings so a compromised grant key's damage is bounded even before an emergency name update propagates.

8. References

  • Normative: [RFC8785], [BIP-340], [BIP-141], [JSON-SCHEMA-2020-12].
  • Informative: [RFC8448].