SealLink v1.0.0-draft.2

SPEC-04: Origin Certificates, Legal Capacity, and Multi-Guardian Quorums

  • Version: 1.0.0-draft.2
  • Status: draft (core model and acyclic transitions decided; trusted calendar time-interval oracle profile remains open in OPEN-QUESTIONS.md)
  • Evidence / Maturity: vectors (vectors/trace-02-guardian-succession-assent.json, vectors/trace-04-agent-guardian-intake.json, vectors/refusal-coverage-matrix.json)
  • Registries: registry/object-types.json, registry/opreturn-actions.json, registry/refusal-codes.json
  • Schemas: schemas/origin.schema.json, schemas/guardian.schema.json, schemas/contract.schema.json

1. The Three-Record Separation Model and Authenticated Status Spines

A single "who owns whom" record fails when a parent loses parental rights or an agent changes guardians, because a verifier must independently establish: (1) the origin certificate remains permanently authentic; (2) the ledger name still belongs to the subject; (3) the subject has neither emancipated nor ended; and (4) the presenting guardian(s) currently hold live slots meeting the event quorum.

SealLink therefore separates origin, status, binding, roster, and per-slot guardianship into cleanly linked UTXO-backed lines (SL-ORIG-001, decided):

RecordObject TypeAnchor / UTXO SpineQuestion Answered
1. Origin Certificateseallink-origin/1Eternal anchor 0x09 + declares binding_seal, status_seal, and optional roster_seal (disposer_pk, arbiter_pk, challenger_pk)Who certified immutable origin_class (person | agent | organization), salted initial guardians, quorum policy, and name_recovery?
2. Status Spineseallink-capacity/1, seallink-end/1Spends status_seal with 0x09 (capacity/1 continues spine via next_status_vout; end/1 is terminal)While status_seal is unspent, proves neither emancipation nor subject end has occurred without global chain scanning.
3. Name Bindingseallink-name-binding/1Spends binding_seal (or recovery_seal, continuing via next_recovery_vout) with 0x0cWhich ledger registration (name, registration_outpoint) and owner_policy belong to origin_id?
4. Roster Revisionseallink-guardian-roster/1Spends roster_seal (both_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk)) with 0x0fWhat is the current approved revision, revision_size, role keys (disposer_pk, arbiter_pk, challenger_pk), and valid slot set (including recovery of burned slots)?
5. Slot Guardianshipseallink-guardian/1Per-slot UTXO chain (0x12 direct initial activation OR 0x0d Stage 1 pending -> 0x0e Stage 2 active)Who occupies slot i, under what term, and is that slot active?

Identity permanence: Identity rests on the eternal origin_id and its verifiable UTXO spines, not on the mutable ledger name string.


2.1 Origin-Certified Class and Private Commitments (SL-ORIG-002, decided)

  1. Subject class (person, agent, organization) is established solely by a verified seallink-origin/1 signed by an issuer cred policy trusted under local verifier policy.
  2. Self-declared seallink-card/1 fields prove nothing; if a card is present for a verified origin, card.kind MUST match origin_class (ORIGIN_UNVERIFIED on mismatch).
  3. Two conflicting trusted origin certificates for one registration MUST refuse (ORIGIN_UNVERIFIED). Absence of an origin certificate yields class unverified.
  4. Pre-registration issuance: seallink-origin/1 is signed and anchored before name registration (h_origin < h_firstupdate), identifying the subject by subject_initial_key and committing claims.intended_name and claims.intended_owner_policy.
  5. Privacy of birth and initial guardians: seallink-origin/1 MUST NOT store plaintext majority_unix or plaintext initial guardian names:
    • claims.majority_commitment (optional) commits to {"majority_unix": T} using salted selective disclosure with an independent 32-byte CSPRNG salt (SL-WIRE-014).
    • Each guardian_policy.slots[i].initial_guardian_commitment commits to the initial guardian's complete NamePin ({name, registration, owner_policy}) using salted selective disclosure with its own independent 32-byte CSPRNG salt (SL-WIRE-014). Initial activation (0x12) opens (salt_i, initial_guardian_NamePin) and verifies exact commitment equality.
  6. **Authenticated status discovery and continuation (status_seal):** seallink-origin/1 MUST pin a confirmed status_seal (controlled by capacity_authority / end authority). Any verifier checking current status walks the status spine from origin.status_seal on its own node:
Current Spine StateObserved Spend of Current status_sealNext Spine StateVerifier Action
initialUnspent at tip and no valid spend in mempool.initial (ward if guardian_policy present, else autonomous)Continue verification.
initialConfirmed 0x09 matching presented seallink-capacity/1 (issuer verified at anchor height) creating next_status_policy at next_status_vout.emancipated (successor status_seal = (T_cap, next_status_vout))Continue walking from (T_cap, next_status_vout); require confirmed handover transfer (SL-ORIG-011).
initial or emancipatedConfirmed 0x09 matching presented seallink-end/1 (issuer verified at anchor height).ended (terminal; no successor seal)Durably close all guardianship slots and refuse SUBJECT_ENDED.
initial or emancipatedSpent in mempool or block without matching presented capacity/1 or end/1, or malformed next_status_vout / invalid issuer.incompleteFail closed with ORIGIN_STATUS_INCOMPLETE.
  1. Eternal validity & compromise cutoff: Verified against issuer.role_policy (link.cred) **at h_origin**, surviving routine key rotation and name expiry, provided h_origin < h_c under any 0x0b compromise break (CRED_ISSUER_CLOSED). Issuer services MUST enforce durable idempotency by request_sha256.

2.2 Single-Use Name Binding (SL-ORIG-003, decided)

  1. seallink-origin/1 names a pre-created single-use binding_seal.
  2. After OP_NAME_FIRSTUPDATE confirms at h_firstupdate > h_origin with output matching intended_owner_policy, the registrar spends binding_seal (SIGHASH_ALL) with OP_RETURN 0x0c committing id(seallink-name-binding/1) naming (origin_id, seq=1, name, registration, owner_policy).
  3. The subject's name value writes "link": {"origin": "<origin_id_64hex>"} (SL-IDEN-003). Removing or altering link.origin in a later update NEVER unbinds an already confirmed registration.
  4. Reverse uniqueness: A registration already bound to one origin_id MUST refuse any second initial binding (ORIGIN_BINDING_INVALID).

3. Multi-Guardian Slots, Closed Event Classes, and Slot Transitions

3.1 Revision-Denominated Quorums and Verifier-Derived event_class (SL-ORIG-004, SL-ORIG-005, decided)

  1. origin.guardian_policy initializes revision = 1, revision_size = N (1 <= N <= 32), explicit compressed secp256k1 ECDSA keys **disposer_pk, independent arbiter_pk** (arbiter_pk != disposer_pk), and pre-activation **challenger_pk** (CompressedPubkey66; institutional multi-custodian roles use threshold ECDSA tracked under OQ-007), roster_seal (both_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk)), appointment_delay_blocks, a closed 4-class QuorumMap, and slots[1..N] (each beginning in initial_vacant with vacant_utxo locked by both_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk)).
  2. **Closed 4-class linear GuardianEventClass (verifier-derived — NEVER signer-chosen):** ONLY objects carrying payload.guardian_context (seallink-grant/1 and seallink-assent/1) map to GuardianEventClass. The four classes form a strict linear order routine_read < effect_grant < contract_assent < custody_change. The verifier deterministically derives the required class from the object type, target, and capabilities (taking the highest matching class across all capabilities in a grant) and MUST verify payload.guardian_context.event_class == derived_class (GUARDIAN_QUORUM_UNMET on mismatch):
GuardianEventClassNormative Carrier Objects & Scope (Highest Matching Class Applies)
routine_readStateless read-only seallink-grant/1 (external_mutation = false, no quotas, no delegate, not single_use, no contract_id, and NOT agent/guardian-message).
effect_grantUnilateral seallink-grant/1 (no delegate, no contract_id) with quotas, external_mutation = true, single_use revocation, OR action agent/guardian-message (PROFILE-agent-v1).
contract_assentseallink-assent/1 with target_type = "seallink-contract/1", OR any contract-bound seallink-grant/1 (contract_id present, without delegate).
custody_changeDelegating seallink-grant/1 (delegate present), OR seallink-assent/1 with target_type = "seallink-migration/1".

*(Roster transitions 0x0f, emancipation seallink-capacity/1, subject end seallink-end/1, and dual-party name recovery 0x0c are governed directly by their dedicated on-chain seals and issuer.role_policy — never by guardian_approvals[] — so a deadlocked or burned guardian quorum never blocks institutional governance.)*

  1. **Revision-denominated threshold (SL-ORIG-005):** For derived class E with quorum {num, den, min} from the active roster revision, required distinct valid guardian slots MUST be computed strictly against **revision_size** (NEVER against transient active slot count):
   required(E) = max(min, ceil(num * revision_size / den))
  1. Distinct guardian rule: Only an autonomous actor MAY hold a guardianship slot. Two slots MAY NOT simultaneously be held by the same (name, registration). Each approving slot supplies its own independent SignatureSet inside guardian_approvals[] matching that guardian's resolved link.grant policy (SL-WIRE-013), so a multi-key guardian satisfies its own threshold independently and counts as at most one slot.

3.2 Guardianship Consistency Invariants (SL-ORIG-016, decided)

Every verifier validating seallink-origin/1, seallink-guardian-roster/1, or seallink-guardian/1 MUST enforce these mechanical invariants:

  1. Rational quorum bounds: For every entry {num, den, min} in quorums, 1 <= num <= den <= 32 and 1 <= min <= revision_size MUST hold (WIRE_INTEGER on violation).
  2. Exact slot coverage: len(slots) == revision_size, all slot numbers MUST be distinct, and the set of slot numbers MUST equal {1, ..., revision_size} (WIRE_INTEGER on violation).
  3. Key independence and script binding: disposer_pk != arbiter_pk MUST hold (ORIGIN_UNVERIFIED on violation). roster_seal.script_policy and every vacant_utxo / new_vacant_policy MUST compile to both_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk). Every Stage 1 pending_policy MUST compile to guardian_slot_pending with disposer == active_roster.disposer_pk, challenger == active_roster.challenger_pk, guardian == guardian_seal_pk, and delay_blocks == effective_delay_blocks >= origin.guardian_policy.appointment_delay_blocks (CHAIN_SCRIPT_UNSUPPORTED on script/key mismatch; GUARDIAN_INACTIVE on delay shortfall). Every active_policy MUST compile to either_of_2(guardian_seal_pk, active_roster.disposer_pk).
  4. Term ceiling against majority: For a human ward (origin_class = "person") whose claims.majority_commitment is opened to {"majority_unix": T}, every seallink-guardian/1 carrying a calendar term MUST satisfy term.not_after_unix <= T (GUARDIAN_INACTIVE on violation).

3.3 Protocol-Level Ward Non-Autonomy (SL-ORIG-006, decided)

While a subject is in ward status (verified origin/1 with guardian_policy present and no completed emancipation), every verifier evaluating a seallink-grant/1 or seallink-assent/1 for that subject MUST enforce this exact refusal precedence:

  1. Missing payload.guardian_context or carrying top-level signatures instead of guardian_approvals[] -> **WARD_AUTONOMOUS_FORBIDDEN**
  2. payload.guardian_context.origin_id or ward_name mismatch -> **ORIGIN_UNVERIFIED**
  3. payload.guardian_context.revision mismatch with latest effective roster revision, OR any guardian_approvals[i].revision != payload.guardian_context.revision -> **GUARDIAN_QUORUM_UNMET**
  4. For each entry in guardian_approvals[] (strictly ascending slot, checked at wire step -> WIRE_SIGNATURE): slot not in active roster, slot state != active, active guardian name != entry.guardian_name, calendar/ceiling term expired, or two approving slots resolve to the same (name, registration) -> **GUARDIAN_INACTIVE**
  5. Approving guardian's entry.signatures.policy does not equal that guardian's resolved link.grant policy at tip, or BIP-340 verification fails -> **WIRE_SIGNATURE**
  6. payload.guardian_context.event_class != derived_class, OR count of distinct satisfied slots < required(derived_class) -> **GUARDIAN_QUORUM_UNMET**

3.4 Initial Activation (0x12), Acyclic Two-Stage Appointment (0x0d/0x0e), and Slot State Machine (SL-ORIG-007, decided)

To eliminate txid <-> hash cycles, preserve privacy of initial guardians, and eliminate indefinite challenger vetoes, slot activation supports two explicit modes in seallink-guardian/1 (activation_mode):

  1. **Initial Slot Activation (activation_mode = "initial", 0x12):**
    • Each slot declared in origin.guardian_policy.slots[i] begins in state **initial_vacant** at vacant_utxo (both_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk)).
    • To activate initial guardian G_init without delay: the presenter opens (salt_i, initial_guardian_NamePin) verifying commit(salt_i, initial_guardian_NamePin) == origin.guardian_policy.slots[i].initial_guardian_commitment (SL-WIRE-014); G_init signs seallink-assent/1 (target_type = "seallink-guardian/1"); and issuer signs seallink-guardian/1 with activation_mode = "initial", revision = 1, prev_outpoint = vacant_utxo, active_vout, and active_policy = either_of_2(guardian_seal_pk, disposer_pk).
    • Both disposer_pk and arbiter_pk co-sign one PSBT spending vacant_utxo (both_of_2), creating active_policy at active_vout, and anchoring content_addr(seallink-guardian/1) in OP_RETURN 0x12 (GUARDIAN_INITIAL_ACTIVATION).
    • Once confirmed at h_init (T_init), the live active slot seal is deterministically **(T_init, active_vout)**. activation_mode = "initial" is permitted ONLY from initial_vacant at revision = 1; appointing ANY successor MUST use activation_mode = "appointed" below.
  2. **Stage 1 — Successor Appointment (activation_mode = "appointed", 0x0d, creates pending_delay):**
    • Incoming guardian G_new signs seallink-assent/1 (target_type = "seallink-guardian/1").
    • Appointing authority (issuer.role_policy, verified against link.cred at h_app) signs the acyclic seallink-guardian/1 with activation_mode = "appointed", committing prev_outpoint (the vacant or initial_vacant UTXO), pending_vout, pending_policy (guardian_slot_pending with {disposer: active_roster.disposer_pk, challenger: active_roster.challenger_pk, guardian: guardian_seal_pk} and delay_blocks = effective_delay_blocks), and active_policy (either_of_2(guardian_seal_pk, active_roster.disposer_pk)).
    • Both disposer_pk and arbiter_pk co-sign one PSBT spending prev_outpoint (both_of_2), creating pending_policy at pending_vout, and anchoring content_addr(seallink-guardian/1) in OP_RETURN 0x0d.
    • Once confirmed at h_app with txid T_app, the pending slot outpoint is deterministically **(T_app, pending_vout)**. During [h_app, h_app + delay_blocks), the slot has zero authority; disposer_pk or challenger_pk MAY spend (T_app, pending_vout) to veto the appointment.
  3. **Stage 2 — Activation (0x0e, removes challenger veto permanently):**
    • At height H >= h_app + delay_blocks, G_new spends (T_app, pending_vout) via the CSV-unlocked <guardian> branch (SIGHASH_ALL), creating active_policy (either_of_2(guardian_seal_pk, active_roster.disposer_pk)) at output vout = 0, and anchoring id(seallink-guardian/1) in OP_RETURN 0x0e.
    • Once confirmed at h_act with txid T_act, the live active slot seal is deterministically **(T_act, 0)**. challenger_pk is absent from active_policy and has zero power once activated.
  4. Fast Halt (1 party, mempool speed): Either guardian resigns OR disposer_pk halts immediately by spending the active slot seal (either_of_2) to a fresh vacant UTXO locked by both_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk) (optionally carrying 0x0a for-cause withdrawal, which bars re-appointment without a new ruling). First observation in mempool permanently terminates that guardian's authority (GUARDIAN_INACTIVE on ward actions; SEAL_SPENT on direct seal check).

Complete Slot State Transition Table

Because Namecoin lacks output covenants, a malicious spender could spend a slot UTXO to an invalid output script ("burning" the slot). Every possible spend is handled deterministically:

Current StateObserved Spend / EventNext StateGuardian AuthorityRecovery Path
initial_vacantValid 0x12 tx (both_of_2) for disclosed initial_guardian_commitment + guardian assent creating active_policy at active_vout.active (outpoint (T_init, active_vout))ActiveNormal operation.
initial_vacantValid 0x0d tx (both_of_2, activation_mode = "appointed") creating pending_policy at pending_vout.pending_delay (outpoint (T_app, pending_vout))NoneStage 2 after delay_blocks.
initial_vacantAny other spend of vacant_utxo.contested_burnedNoneseallink-guardian-roster/1 (0x0f).
vacantValid 0x0d tx (both_of_2, activation_mode = "appointed") creating pending_policy at pending_vout.pending_delay (outpoint (T_app, pending_vout))NoneStage 2 after delay_blocks.
vacantAny other spend (including 0x12) of vacant_utxo.contested_burnedNoneseallink-guardian-roster/1 (0x0f).
pending_delaySpend by disposer_pk or challenger_pk before Stage 2.vetoed (if recreated as both_of_2 at vout = 0 -> vacant, else contested_burned)NoneNew 0x0d or 0x0f roster transition.
pending_delayValid 0x0e tx (<guardian> CSV branch) creating active_policy at vout = 0.active (outpoint (T_act, 0))ActiveNormal operation.
pending_delayAny malformed spend of (T_app, pending_vout).contested_burnedNoneseallink-guardian-roster/1 (0x0f).
activeSpend of active seal creating valid both_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk) at vout = 0 (with optional 0x0a).vacantEndedNew 0x0d appointment.
activeSpend of active seal to ANY other script ("slot burn").contested_burnedEndedseallink-guardian-roster/1 (0x0f).
Anyseallink-capacity/1 transfer completed OR seallink-end/1 verified.closedEndedTerminal.

To change approved revision_size (e.g., reducing 2 -> 1 when one parent loses parental rights, adding a slot, rotating disposer_pk/arbiter_pk/challenger_pk, updating quorums, or re-anchoring a contested_burned slot):

  1. Authorization without old-roster quorum: Roster transitions are authorized strictly by disposer_pk + arbiter_pk co-signing a PSBT spending the current roster_seal (both_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk)), combined with issuer.role_policy (link.cred) signing seallink-guardian-roster/1 and waiting effective_delay_blocks. They NEVER require signatures from the old guardian roster, ensuring deadlocked or burned rosters remain recoverable.
  2. The 0x0f transaction creates next_roster_policy (both_of_2(new_disposer_pk, new_arbiter_pk)) at next_roster_vout, creates any new_vacant slot UTXOs at their declared new_vacant_vout indices, and anchors content_addr(seallink-guardian-roster/1) via OP_RETURN 0x0f.
  3. payload.revision MUST equal prev_revision + 1, and payload MUST satisfy all SL-ORIG-016 invariants (len(slots) == revision_size, 1 <= num <= den, 1 <= min <= revision_size, disposer_pk != arbiter_pk).
  4. The new roster takes effect after effective_delay_blocks confirmations (>= origin.guardian_policy.appointment_delay_blocks). While roster_seal is spent and seallink-guardian-roster/1 is not presented (or fails verification), verifiers fail closed with ORIGIN_STATUS_INCOMPLETE.
  5. **Issuer-key survival (SL-ORIG-008, decided):** Both seallink-guardian/1 and seallink-guardian-roster/1 verify issuer.role_policy (link.cred) at their confirmed anchor height, bounded by 0x0b (h_c), so routine issuer key rotation never orphans wards.

4. Guardianship Terms: Indefinite vs. Calendar Time

Subject / Modeterm FormTermination Rule (SL-ORIG-009, decided)
Agent / Indefinite{"mode":"indefinite"}Lives until slot seal spend, verified seallink-capacity/1, verified seallink-end/1, or compromise cutoff h_c.
Human Minor / Calendar{"mode":"calendar","not_after_unix":T,"ceiling_height":H_max}Guardianship ends automatically at calendar majority T (bounded by T <= opened majority_unix per SL-ORIG-016, and never exceeding H_max, which is a failsafe ceiling and never extends past T).

**Asymmetric Safety Rule at Majority Boundary (SL-ORIG-010, open time-interval oracle profile; safety rule decided):** Block intervals drift by weeks over 18 years; chain median time past (MTP) is an auxiliary necessary constraint (MTP < T for guardian admission), never sufficient alone.

  • Guardian admission is allowed ONLY if the entire credible UTC interval [t_low, t_high] lies strictly below T (and tip is fresh under SPEC-02).
  • Independent adult admission requires t_low >= T plus confirmed emancipation transfer (SL-ORIG-011).
  • If [t_low, t_high] straddles T, tip is stale, or the credible interval cannot be established, admission pauses for BOTH sides (GUARDIAN_TIME_BOUNDARY). *(The normative trusted time-interval oracle profile is tracked in OPEN-QUESTIONS.md.)*

5. Ward Admission State Machine, Emancipation, and Subject End

5.1 Four Ward Admission States (SL-ORIG-011, decided)

A verifier evaluating any action for an origin-certified actor walks origin/1, status_seal, roster_seal, binding_seal, and active slot seals:

StateConditionPermitted Admission
1. Under Guardianshipstatus_seal unspent (no capacity/1 or end/1); unexpired; active slot(s) at latest effective roster revision satisfy required(derived_event_class) via guardian_approvals[]; confirmed name binding matches current owner_policy.Actions authorized by guardian quorum (and separate service grant where required).
2. Guardianship HaltedNot emancipated, but active slots cannot meet required(derived_event_class) (halted, vacant, pending, or contested_burned).None (GUARDIAN_INACTIVE if cited slot is inactive; GUARDIAN_QUORUM_UNMET if valid active slots fall below required).
3. Transfer PendingCalendar T reached OR verified seallink-capacity/1 spent status_seal, but name output has NOT yet been confirmed-transferred to subject_new_owner_policy with subject's own SIGHASH_ALL name update.None for either side (GUARDIAN_TRANSFER_PENDING). Name renewal, revocation, and handover transfer remain allowed.
4. Autonomouscapacity/1 (+ t_low >= T for human) verified, confirmed name transfer to subject_new_owner_policy, confirmed subject-authored update, and binding line updated.Full autonomous protocol admission; guardianship slots permanently closed.
  • Emancipation rule: Transferring a ward's name upon majority/emancipation MUST move the name UTXO to a fresh ScriptPolicy generated by the subject — never hand guardians' old shared key shares to the subject.
  • **Subject End (SL-ORIG-012, decided):** An eternal seallink-end/1 record spending status_seal terminally (0x09, creating no successor status_seal) permanently closes all guardianship slots and refuses all future admission (SUBJECT_ENDED). Silence or lost keys NEVER constitute proof of end.

6. Dual-Mode Name Recovery (name_recovery) and Seal Continuation

seallink-origin/1 immutably declares one of two recovery policies at issuance (SL-ORIG-013, decided):

  1. **"mode": "none" (Irreversible Binding):** No third party can ever re-bind origin_id to a new ledger name. Attempting recovery refuses RECOVERY_FORBIDDEN.
  2. **"mode": "dual_party_delayed" (Governed Recovery):**
    • origin/1 pins disposer_pk, independent arbiter_pk (disposer_pk != arbiter_pk), delay_blocks >= 144 (recommended >= 1008), and a both_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk) recovery_seal.
    • To recover after catastrophic key loss, both disposer_pk and arbiter_pk co-sign a transaction T_rec spending the live recovery_seal with OP_RETURN 0x0c committing a new seallink-name-binding/1 (seq = prev_seq + 1, naming the new confirmed registration, new owner_policy, supersedes_binding_id, AND continuation next_recovery_vout + next_recovery_policy = both_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk)).
    • Once T_rec confirms at h_rec, the live recovery seal advances to (T_rec, next_recovery_vout). During [h_rec, h_rec + delay_blocks), the previous binding stops admitting and the new binding sits in pending_delay (RECOVERY_FORBIDDEN for both bindings).
    • **Live-owner cancellation veto (SL-ORIG-014, decided):** At any block strictly prior to h_rec + delay_blocks, the existing name's current owner_policy MAY broadcast an owner-authored (SIGHASH_ALL) OP_NAME_UPDATE containing OP_RETURN 0x10 (RECOVERY_CANCEL) committing id(pending_name_binding/1). Observing confirmed 0x10 cryptographically proves the old keys are alive, permanently aborts the pending recovery (RECOVERY_FORBIDDEN for the cancelled binding), **immediately restores admission under the prior NameBinding**, and preserves the continued recovery_seal at (T_rec, next_recovery_vout) for any genuine future recovery.
    • Old grants bound to the old name/key NEVER carry over to a recovered name.

Recovery Seal State Transition Table

Current StateObserved Chain EventNext StateAdmitted Binding
active_binding(B_k)recovery_seal unspent.active_binding(B_k)B_k
active_binding(B_k)Valid 0x0c spend (T_rec at h_rec) creating next_recovery_policy at next_recovery_vout committing B_{k+1}.pending_recovery(B_{k+1}) (successor seal (T_rec, next_recovery_vout))None (RECOVERY_FORBIDDEN during delay).
pending_recovery(B_{k+1})Owner-authored SIGHASH_ALL OP_NAME_UPDATE of B_k.name with 0x10 committing id(B_{k+1}) confirmed at < h_rec + delay_blocks.active_binding(B_k) (successor seal (T_rec, next_recovery_vout))**B_k restored immediately**; B_{k+1} permanently aborted (RECOVERY_FORBIDDEN).
pending_recovery(B_{k+1})Tip reaches H >= h_rec + delay_blocks with no 0x10 cancel.active_binding(B_{k+1})**B_{k+1} active**; B_k permanently superseded (ORIGIN_BINDING_INVALID).
AnyMalformed spend of recovery_seal (missing 0x0c or missing valid next_recovery_vout).incompleteFail closed (ORIGIN_STATUS_INCOMPLETE).

7. Security Considerations

  • Three-place key custody limit: A 2-of-3 child name (Parent A, Parent B, Notary) survives any 1 lost share, but any 2 colluding holders can spend the name UTXO. Preventing both single-point loss and 2-party collusion requires 3-of-4 with an independent 4th custodian.
  • Name renewal obligation: Over an 18-year childhood on Namecoin (D = 36000), guardians execute ~27–30 renewals. Off-chain agreements SHOULD define when the 3rd custodian co-signs renewals while keeping the on-chain script at full threshold (SL-LDGR-006).
  • Compromised issuer key: Independent arbiter_pk requirements (SL-ORIG-007, SL-ORIG-013, SL-ORIG-015) prevent unilateral appointment, roster takeover, or name recovery; cold multisig owner_policy protects institutional issuers.

8. References

  • Normative: [BIP-112], [BIP-141], [BIP-174], [BIP-340], [RFC8785].
  • Informative: [RFC8448], [NC28].