SPEC-03: Identity, Name Value, Manifest, Key Taxonomy, Authentication, and Owner Control
- Version:
1.0.0-draft.2 - Status:
draft(normative rulesdecided; domain-binding verification and FIDO2/SSH device extensions trackedopeninOPEN-QUESTIONS.md) - Evidence / Maturity:
vectors(vectors/trace-01-mail-offline-revoke.json,vectors/refusal-coverage-matrix.json) - Registries:
registry/object-types.json,registry/key-roles.json,registry/service-types.json,registry/refusal-codes.json - Schemas:
schemas/name-value.schema.json,schemas/manifest.schema.json,schemas/card.schema.json,schemas/invocation.schema.json
1. Name Value Format (520-Byte Protocol Budget)
An actor's ledger name (conventionally id/<label>, which MAY be a human-readable handle or an opaque pseudonymous identifier such as id/u-8f3a91c4e2) carries a compact Restricted JCS JSON object (SPEC-01, schemas/name-value.schema.json) of **at most 520 bytes** (SL-IDEN-001, decided).
1.1 Top-Level Members (SL-IDEN-002, decided)
A SealLink reader MUST match top-level keys link, m, and nostr strictly (refusing duplicates or Unicode simple case-fold aliases with WIRE_DUPLICATE), and MUST ignore unknown owner-defined top-level members.
| Top-Level Key | Optional | Structure & Purpose | Closes Grants on Edit? |
|---|---|---|---|
link | Yes | Authority & origin root object: closed subset of {cred, grant, notary, origin}. Each of cred, grant, notary is either a single xonly_64hex key or an on-chain threshold pin {"p":"<sha256_of_JCS(ThresholdPolicy)>"}. | **Per-role only (SL-IDEN-003)** |
m | Yes | Single manifest head: {"h":"<64hex>","s":<PositiveUint53>} pinning seallink-manifest/1 (JCS sorted keys h, s). Zero URLs or loc allowed. | Never |
nostr | Yes | Optional transport messaging key: "<64hex>" OR NIP-05 object {"names":{"_":"<64hex>"},"relays":{...}}. Only "_" is read. Zero authority. | Never |
1.2 Multi-Role Keys, On-Chain Role Policies, and Uniform origin Pin (SL-IDEN-003, decided)
One id/ name MAY publish distinct, strictly isolated role keys or threshold role-policy pins simultaneously inside link:
{"link":{"cred":"<64hex>","grant":{"p":"<64hex>"},"notary":"<64hex>","origin":"<64hex>"},"m":{"h":"<64hex>","s":1}}
- On-chain role threshold integrity: Every role policy (
1-of-1direct key ORm-of-nThresholdPolicypinned as{"p":"<sha256>"}) is anchored **directly insidelink.<role>on the ledger** — never governed solely by an off-chain manifest update.- When
link.<role>is a 64-hex stringk, the resolved role policy is{"m":1,"pks":[k]}. - When
link.<role>is{"p":h}, the presenter supplies the fullThresholdPolicy(inside the signed object'sissuer.role_policyand/ormanifest.role_policies.<role>), and the verifier MUST confirmSHA256(canonical_JCS(role_policy)) == h(WIRE_SIGNATUREon mismatch). *(For ward-representedseallink-grant/1objects usingguardian_approvals[],issuer.role_policyis omitted on the ward'sissuerpin and signing authority is resolved from each approving guardian'slink.grantpolicy perSPEC-04.)* - Rotating any key or threshold inside a role policy changes
link.<role>via an owner-authored (SIGHASH_ALL) ledger update, triggering the exact per-role closure rule below.
- When
- Byte budget: With three roles (even with
{"p":...}pins) +origin+m, the value is ~405 bytes — well within the 520-byte protocol limit. - Per-role history isolation: Rotating or removing
link.notaryorlink.credMUST NOT close live grants bound tolink.grant. Rotating or removinglink.grantcloses active grants (NAME_ROLE_CHANGED), while leaving eternal credentials and notary acts intact unless closed by0x0b(h_c). - **Privacy-preserving
originpin:** Every origin-certified actor (child, adult, organization, or materialized agent) writes the identical field namelink.origin = "<origin_id_64hex>". Public chain observers cannot distinguish subject class or capacity from the name value alone (SL-ARCH-012). - Role key disjointness: Within one name, every key appearing in
link.grant,link.cred,link.notary,nostr, andmanifest.auth_keyMUST be disjoint (NAME_VALUE_INVALIDif reused). - **Name history walk (
SL-IDEN-004,decided):** To verify an issuer'sgrantrole policy for an active grant, the verifier resolves the name (refusingNAME_NOT_FOUNDif absent on the active chain) and walks the name's confirmed update chain back toissuer.registration:owner_policyandlink.grantMUST be unchanged from the grant'srecent_blockthrough the tip (renewals,mupdates,nostrupdates, and unrelated role changes close nothing). An owner-signed (SIGHASH_ALL) change or removal oflink.grant(in mempool or block) writes a durableNAME_ROLE_CHANGEDclosure.
2. Key Taxonomy and Cold Custody Rules
All 22 key roles, curves, derivation accounts, and permitted signing domains are authoritatively fixed in registry/key-roles.json (SL-IDEN-005, decided):
- Cold isolation:
name_owner(separate cold seedm/84'/7'/0') andemergency_fee_reserve(cold seedm/84'/7'/3', strictly isolated from all hot signers so a hot compromise cannot drain emergency update/CPFP fees) MUST NEVER reside on an agent host or ordinary hot wallet. - Authority separation:
grant,cred, andnotarykeys sign ONLY their registered BIP-340 domains (registry/object-types.json) and NEVER sign ledger transactions or spend seals. - Auth vs Device vs Messaging:
auth(m/84'/7'/2'/0/i) authenticates to foreign services ONLY (seallink-auth-challenge/1,seallink-auth-upgrade/1) and confers zero grant, contract assent, or effect authority.devicekeys control the owner's own executors and agent key holders ONLY (seallink-owner-command/1,seallink-statement/1) and MUST NEVER sign foreign login challenges, assents, or grants (DEVICE_UNAUTHORIZED).messaging_or_requestkeys carry messages and invoke grants only where explicitly named as recipient; they NEVER issue grants or child grants.
- **Dynamic seal/row/stop pool (
>= 10'):** Per-seal keys (grant_seal,child_seal,row_coin,stop_coin,contract_seal,guardian_seal) live in independent hardened accounts>= 10'with operator-secret xpubs. - Disposable fast-revocation seals:
auth_seal, device seals, and member-entry seals MUST be generated from a CSPRNG (NEVER BIP-39), pre-signed with aP2ACPFP anchor output (SL-LDGR-013), and destroyed immediately after recordingtx_revoke.
*(Concrete custody deployments — hardware enclaves, HSMs, Keyholder daemons — are informative and documented in guides/GUIDE-01-custody-and-signers.md.)*
3. Unified Manifest (seallink-manifest/1) and Off-Chain Sets
The single m pin in the name value authenticates one canonical JCS seallink-manifest/1 object (<= 16384 bytes, schemas/manifest.schema.json) (SL-IDEN-006, decided).
3.1 Manifest Members
- **
sets** (optional): Hash + monotonicseqpins for up to four off-chain JCS sets:card(seallink-card/1): Public entity metadata card (person | agent | organization | service, display name, transports, relays, role, contact). Self-declaredkindcarries zero authority; if anorigin/1is verified,card.kindMUST matchorigin_class.devices(seallink-device-list/1): Owner control-plane devices (label, alg ∈ {bip340, p256, ed25519}, key, presence, ceiling ∈ {0,1,2}, seal).members(seallink-members-list/1): Up to 1,024 managed/member actor pins(name, owner_policy, seal). Verifiers MUST bound per-issuer journaled entries to prevent unbounded state growth.certs(seallink-certset-head/1): Head committing to an actor's self-signedseallink-statement/1records (config-section,transport-binding,root-rotate,root-cancel, each with a closedsubjectschema).
- **
service** (optional): Self-declaration when this actor operates a service (service_type, actions, receipt_key, endpoint, optionaltls_spki_sha256pin). Discovery only; never substitutes for a pinned grant executor key. - **
providers** *(optional,SL-IDEN-007,decided)*: Labeled bindings declaring which external service actors host this actor's resources. Each entry binds(service_type, label)to a full **provider: NamePin** ({name, registration, owner_policy}) plus optionaltransport_key:
"providers": [
{
"label": "work",
"provider": {
"name": "id/mail-host-a",
"owner_policy": {"kind": "key", "pk": "02..."},
"registration": {"txid": "...", "vout": 0}
},
"service_type": "mail"
}
]
- Each
(service_type, label)pair MUST be unique withinproviders. - Provider continuity: Because
providerpins(name, registration, owner_policy), an attacker who re-registers an expired provider name string cannot hijack dynamicexecutor_refdelegations (SERVICE_PROVIDER_UNBOUNDif holder's manifest lacks a matching(service_type, label, provider)entry;NAME_OWNER_MISMATCHif the pinned provider name's confirmed ledger output does not matchprovider.owner_policy). Switching providers requires an explicit owner-authored manifest update. - **
auth_key+auth_seal** (paired optional): Dedicated BIP-340 foreign-service login key and its disposable fast-revocation seal. - **
role_policies** (optional availability hint ONLY): Carries fullThresholdPolicypreimages for on-chainlink.<role>.ppins. Arole_policiesentry has ZERO authority unlessSHA256(canonical_JCS(policy))equals the confirmed on-chainlink.<role>.phash (SL-IDEN-003).
3.2 Monotonicity, Removal, and Reorg Rules (SL-IDEN-008, decided)
Verifiers journal (seq, manifest_sha256, anchoring_txid) for the manifest and (seq, sha256) plus removal marks for each set, keyed by (name, registration):
- On confirmed updates while
anchoring_txidremains on the active chain:manifest.seqMUST strictly increase (new > old), and every retained set'sseqMUST NOT decrease (new >= old; equalseqwith differentsha256refusesMANIFEST_ROLLBACK). - Omitting a previously present set in a valid newer manifest records a durable removal mark at its highest seen
seq; reintroducing the set requires a strictly higherseq. - If
anchoring_txidis orphaned by a chain reorg, the verifier adopts the highest confirmed manifest on the new active chain while retaining all recorded removal marks and seal closures. - Revocation independence: Validated seal spends MUST be processed and journaled even if
seallink-manifest/1is unavailable.
4. Non-Exclusive Four-Channel Distribution Cascade
Verifiers resolve seallink-manifest/1 and pinned off-chain sets using a strictly non-exclusive cascade (SL-IDEN-009, decided cascade / open domain-binding verification profile in OPEN-QUESTIONS.md):
| Priority | Channel | Availability & Policy |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | Inline | Supplied directly by the presenter/peer alongside the request. Always works, including for opaque names with zero domain and zero Nostr key. |
| 1 | Local Cache / Configured Stores | Verifier's local hash cache or operator-configured Blossom (GET /<sha256>) / HTTP mirrors. |
| 2 | **HTTPS .well-known** | Optional; used ONLY if the name explicitly declares a verified domain -> https://<domain>/.well-known/seallink/<object>/<sha256>, under strict SSRF/redirect-denial policy. |
| 3 | **Nostr Relay (kind 30079)** | Optional; used ONLY if the name publishes a nostr pubkey -> query verifier-configured relays for addressable event kind 30079 authored by that key with tag ["d", "seallink-manifest"] (or seallink-card, etc.). |
Bytes from ANY channel are accepted if and only if SHA256(bytes) equals the confirmed ledger/manifest pin and full JCS/schema validation passes (MANIFEST_MISMATCH otherwise). Missing bytes refuse MANIFEST_UNAVAILABLE without silent unconfigured outbound fetches.
5. Provisional Onboarding and Foreign-Service Authentication
A foreign replaceable service authenticates actors using seallink-auth-challenge/1 and seallink-auth-upgrade/1 (SL-IDEN-010, decided):
- Challenge lifecycle: Service generates a 32-byte CSPRNG
nonce, recordsissued_atandexpires_at(issued_at < expires_at <= issued_at + 120), pins its ownservice_id, and records the challenge durably. Client signs withauth_key(neverdevice,grant, orname_owner). Service verifiesSPEC-01 §7, checksissued_at <= now < expires_at(AUTH_CHALLENGE_EXPIRED), checks audience/nonce (AUTH_CHALLENGE_INVALID), and atomically consumes the nonce before creating any session. - Named mode: Service resolves
name, walks owner history, verifiesmanifest/1, confirmsmanifest.auth_key == auth_pubkey(AUTH_KEY_UNPINNED), and confirmsmanifest.auth_sealis unspent (SEAL_SPENTif spent,SEAL_UNAVAILABLEif unconfirmed or inconclusive). Existing service accounts MUST retain their original(name, registration, owner_policy)binding; a re-registered name string MUST NOT take over an old account. - Provisional key-only onboarding: A service MAY admit a challenge without
nameinto a strictly rate- and storage-capped local cell (zero effect, PII-release, or federation rights). - Sponsored client-owned registration & atomic upgrade: A sponsor MAY fund UTXOs controlled exclusively by the client so the client broadcasts
OP_NAME_NEWand (>= 12blocks later)OP_NAME_FIRSTUPDATE(sponsor never owns the name). Once confirmed at required depth, client signsseallink-auth-upgrade/1under the sameauth_keyto atomically bind the confirmed registration to the provisional cell. - Authentication is NOT authorization: A successful login session confers zero authority to spend funds, disclose data to third parties, or bypass grant checks.
6. Owner Control Plane (Own Executors and Trust-Root Pin)
For commanding an actor's own hosts, executors, and managed agent key holders (SL-IDEN-011, decided):
- Device levels and closed command set:
seallink-owner-command/1carries a closed command enum (agent-dispatch,session-terminate,policy-apply,keyholder-halt) with typedargumentsschemas (schemas/invocation.schema.json):- L0: Cognitive work / read-only dispatch (
agent-dispatchwithlevel = 0); zero effects. - L1: Policy-bounded operational control (
agent-dispatch,session-terminatewithin local executor caps). - L2: High-assurance presence-verified device (
presence = true,ceiling = 2): may issuepolicy-apply(paired with an L2-signedseallink-statement/1),keyholder-halt, and fast device revocation (tx_revoke). - Level inheritance: Any agent run launched by an
seallink-owner-command/1inherits itslevelceiling; the run's key holder MUST NOT sign effects above that level.
- L0: Cognitive work / read-only dispatch (
- Foreign boundary: Device keys MUST NEVER be accepted by foreign services (
DEVICE_UNAUTHORIZED). - **Host Trust-Root Pin and Delayed Admin Override (
SL-IDEN-012,decided):** An isolated host/runtime pins(network, genesis, root_name, registration, owner_policy, pinned_grant_policy)in admin-owned read-only storage outside agent write reach. Routine rotation uses aroot-rotatestatement signed by the old policy. Unassisted administrator overwrite enters a mandatory pending delayD(default1008blocks) with out-of-band owner alerts on every load; the old policy OR the name's coldowner_policyMAY cancel beforeeffective_heightviaroot-cancel.
7. Security Considerations
- No silent downgrade of manifest: Once a verifier observes a confirmed manifest for
(name, registration), missing or malformed manifests refuse without falling back to stale caches. - Bidi spoofing in Entity Cards: Clients rendering
card.displayorcard.roleSHOULD isolate untrusted text and flag Unicode bidirectional controls (U+202A..202E,U+2066..2069). - Key compromise blast radius: Separating
auth,grant,cred,notary,device, andname_ownerensures a leaked mobile login key cannot forge contracts, grants, origin certificates, or hijack the ledger name.
8. References
- Normative: [RFC8785], [BIP-340], [RFC8032], [SEC1], [JSON-SCHEMA-2020-12].
- Informative: [NC28].