SealLink v1.0.0-draft.2

SPEC-03: Identity, Name Value, Manifest, Key Taxonomy, Authentication, and Owner Control

  • Version: 1.0.0-draft.2
  • Status: draft (normative rules decided; domain-binding verification and FIDO2/SSH device extensions tracked open in OPEN-QUESTIONS.md)
  • Evidence / Maturity: vectors (vectors/trace-01-mail-offline-revoke.json, vectors/refusal-coverage-matrix.json)
  • Registries: registry/object-types.json, registry/key-roles.json, registry/service-types.json, registry/refusal-codes.json
  • Schemas: schemas/name-value.schema.json, schemas/manifest.schema.json, schemas/card.schema.json, schemas/invocation.schema.json

1. Name Value Format (520-Byte Protocol Budget)

An actor's ledger name (conventionally id/<label>, which MAY be a human-readable handle or an opaque pseudonymous identifier such as id/u-8f3a91c4e2) carries a compact Restricted JCS JSON object (SPEC-01, schemas/name-value.schema.json) of **at most 520 bytes** (SL-IDEN-001, decided).

1.1 Top-Level Members (SL-IDEN-002, decided)

A SealLink reader MUST match top-level keys link, m, and nostr strictly (refusing duplicates or Unicode simple case-fold aliases with WIRE_DUPLICATE), and MUST ignore unknown owner-defined top-level members.

Top-Level KeyOptionalStructure & PurposeCloses Grants on Edit?
linkYesAuthority & origin root object: closed subset of {cred, grant, notary, origin}. Each of cred, grant, notary is either a single xonly_64hex key or an on-chain threshold pin {"p":"<sha256_of_JCS(ThresholdPolicy)>"}.**Per-role only (SL-IDEN-003)**
mYesSingle manifest head: {"h":"<64hex>","s":<PositiveUint53>} pinning seallink-manifest/1 (JCS sorted keys h, s). Zero URLs or loc allowed.Never
nostrYesOptional transport messaging key: "<64hex>" OR NIP-05 object {"names":{"_":"<64hex>"},"relays":{...}}. Only "_" is read. Zero authority.Never

1.2 Multi-Role Keys, On-Chain Role Policies, and Uniform origin Pin (SL-IDEN-003, decided)

One id/ name MAY publish distinct, strictly isolated role keys or threshold role-policy pins simultaneously inside link:

{"link":{"cred":"<64hex>","grant":{"p":"<64hex>"},"notary":"<64hex>","origin":"<64hex>"},"m":{"h":"<64hex>","s":1}}
  • On-chain role threshold integrity: Every role policy (1-of-1 direct key OR m-of-n ThresholdPolicy pinned as {"p":"<sha256>"}) is anchored **directly inside link.<role> on the ledger** — never governed solely by an off-chain manifest update.
    • When link.<role> is a 64-hex string k, the resolved role policy is {"m":1,"pks":[k]}.
    • When link.<role> is {"p":h}, the presenter supplies the full ThresholdPolicy (inside the signed object's issuer.role_policy and/or manifest.role_policies.<role>), and the verifier MUST confirm SHA256(canonical_JCS(role_policy)) == h (WIRE_SIGNATURE on mismatch). *(For ward-represented seallink-grant/1 objects using guardian_approvals[], issuer.role_policy is omitted on the ward's issuer pin and signing authority is resolved from each approving guardian's link.grant policy per SPEC-04.)*
    • Rotating any key or threshold inside a role policy changes link.<role> via an owner-authored (SIGHASH_ALL) ledger update, triggering the exact per-role closure rule below.
  • Byte budget: With three roles (even with {"p":...} pins) + origin + m, the value is ~405 bytes — well within the 520-byte protocol limit.
  • Per-role history isolation: Rotating or removing link.notary or link.cred MUST NOT close live grants bound to link.grant. Rotating or removing link.grant closes active grants (NAME_ROLE_CHANGED), while leaving eternal credentials and notary acts intact unless closed by 0x0b (h_c).
  • **Privacy-preserving origin pin:** Every origin-certified actor (child, adult, organization, or materialized agent) writes the identical field name link.origin = "<origin_id_64hex>". Public chain observers cannot distinguish subject class or capacity from the name value alone (SL-ARCH-012).
  • Role key disjointness: Within one name, every key appearing in link.grant, link.cred, link.notary, nostr, and manifest.auth_key MUST be disjoint (NAME_VALUE_INVALID if reused).
  • **Name history walk (SL-IDEN-004, decided):** To verify an issuer's grant role policy for an active grant, the verifier resolves the name (refusing NAME_NOT_FOUND if absent on the active chain) and walks the name's confirmed update chain back to issuer.registration: owner_policy and link.grant MUST be unchanged from the grant's recent_block through the tip (renewals, m updates, nostr updates, and unrelated role changes close nothing). An owner-signed (SIGHASH_ALL) change or removal of link.grant (in mempool or block) writes a durable NAME_ROLE_CHANGED closure.

2. Key Taxonomy and Cold Custody Rules

All 22 key roles, curves, derivation accounts, and permitted signing domains are authoritatively fixed in registry/key-roles.json (SL-IDEN-005, decided):

  1. Cold isolation: name_owner (separate cold seed m/84'/7'/0') and emergency_fee_reserve (cold seed m/84'/7'/3', strictly isolated from all hot signers so a hot compromise cannot drain emergency update/CPFP fees) MUST NEVER reside on an agent host or ordinary hot wallet.
  2. Authority separation: grant, cred, and notary keys sign ONLY their registered BIP-340 domains (registry/object-types.json) and NEVER sign ledger transactions or spend seals.
  3. Auth vs Device vs Messaging:
    • auth (m/84'/7'/2'/0/i) authenticates to foreign services ONLY (seallink-auth-challenge/1, seallink-auth-upgrade/1) and confers zero grant, contract assent, or effect authority.
    • device keys control the owner's own executors and agent key holders ONLY (seallink-owner-command/1, seallink-statement/1) and MUST NEVER sign foreign login challenges, assents, or grants (DEVICE_UNAUTHORIZED).
    • messaging_or_request keys carry messages and invoke grants only where explicitly named as recipient; they NEVER issue grants or child grants.
  4. **Dynamic seal/row/stop pool (>= 10'):** Per-seal keys (grant_seal, child_seal, row_coin, stop_coin, contract_seal, guardian_seal) live in independent hardened accounts >= 10' with operator-secret xpubs.
  5. Disposable fast-revocation seals: auth_seal, device seals, and member-entry seals MUST be generated from a CSPRNG (NEVER BIP-39), pre-signed with a P2A CPFP anchor output (SL-LDGR-013), and destroyed immediately after recording tx_revoke.

*(Concrete custody deployments — hardware enclaves, HSMs, Keyholder daemons — are informative and documented in guides/GUIDE-01-custody-and-signers.md.)*


The single m pin in the name value authenticates one canonical JCS seallink-manifest/1 object (<= 16384 bytes, schemas/manifest.schema.json) (SL-IDEN-006, decided).

3.1 Manifest Members

  1. **sets** (optional): Hash + monotonic seq pins for up to four off-chain JCS sets:
    • card (seallink-card/1): Public entity metadata card (person | agent | organization | service, display name, transports, relays, role, contact). Self-declared kind carries zero authority; if an origin/1 is verified, card.kind MUST match origin_class.
    • devices (seallink-device-list/1): Owner control-plane devices (label, alg ∈ {bip340, p256, ed25519}, key, presence, ceiling ∈ {0,1,2}, seal).
    • members (seallink-members-list/1): Up to 1,024 managed/member actor pins (name, owner_policy, seal). Verifiers MUST bound per-issuer journaled entries to prevent unbounded state growth.
    • certs (seallink-certset-head/1): Head committing to an actor's self-signed seallink-statement/1 records (config-section, transport-binding, root-rotate, root-cancel, each with a closed subject schema).
  2. **service** (optional): Self-declaration when this actor operates a service (service_type, actions, receipt_key, endpoint, optional tls_spki_sha256 pin). Discovery only; never substitutes for a pinned grant executor key.
  3. **providers** *(optional, SL-IDEN-007, decided)*: Labeled bindings declaring which external service actors host this actor's resources. Each entry binds (service_type, label) to a full **provider: NamePin** ({name, registration, owner_policy}) plus optional transport_key:
   "providers": [
     {
       "label": "work",
       "provider": {
         "name": "id/mail-host-a",
         "owner_policy": {"kind": "key", "pk": "02..."},
         "registration": {"txid": "...", "vout": 0}
       },
       "service_type": "mail"
     }
   ]
  • Each (service_type, label) pair MUST be unique within providers.
  • Provider continuity: Because provider pins (name, registration, owner_policy), an attacker who re-registers an expired provider name string cannot hijack dynamic executor_ref delegations (SERVICE_PROVIDER_UNBOUND if holder's manifest lacks a matching (service_type, label, provider) entry; NAME_OWNER_MISMATCH if the pinned provider name's confirmed ledger output does not match provider.owner_policy). Switching providers requires an explicit owner-authored manifest update.
  • **auth_key + auth_seal** (paired optional): Dedicated BIP-340 foreign-service login key and its disposable fast-revocation seal.
  • **role_policies** (optional availability hint ONLY): Carries full ThresholdPolicy preimages for on-chain link.<role>.p pins. A role_policies entry has ZERO authority unless SHA256(canonical_JCS(policy)) equals the confirmed on-chain link.<role>.p hash (SL-IDEN-003).

3.2 Monotonicity, Removal, and Reorg Rules (SL-IDEN-008, decided)

Verifiers journal (seq, manifest_sha256, anchoring_txid) for the manifest and (seq, sha256) plus removal marks for each set, keyed by (name, registration):

  • On confirmed updates while anchoring_txid remains on the active chain: manifest.seq MUST strictly increase (new > old), and every retained set's seq MUST NOT decrease (new >= old; equal seq with different sha256 refuses MANIFEST_ROLLBACK).
  • Omitting a previously present set in a valid newer manifest records a durable removal mark at its highest seen seq; reintroducing the set requires a strictly higher seq.
  • If anchoring_txid is orphaned by a chain reorg, the verifier adopts the highest confirmed manifest on the new active chain while retaining all recorded removal marks and seal closures.
  • Revocation independence: Validated seal spends MUST be processed and journaled even if seallink-manifest/1 is unavailable.

4. Non-Exclusive Four-Channel Distribution Cascade

Verifiers resolve seallink-manifest/1 and pinned off-chain sets using a strictly non-exclusive cascade (SL-IDEN-009, decided cascade / open domain-binding verification profile in OPEN-QUESTIONS.md):

PriorityChannelAvailability & Policy
0InlineSupplied directly by the presenter/peer alongside the request. Always works, including for opaque names with zero domain and zero Nostr key.
1Local Cache / Configured StoresVerifier's local hash cache or operator-configured Blossom (GET /<sha256>) / HTTP mirrors.
2**HTTPS .well-known**Optional; used ONLY if the name explicitly declares a verified domain -> https://<domain>/.well-known/seallink/<object>/<sha256>, under strict SSRF/redirect-denial policy.
3**Nostr Relay (kind 30079)**Optional; used ONLY if the name publishes a nostr pubkey -> query verifier-configured relays for addressable event kind 30079 authored by that key with tag ["d", "seallink-manifest"] (or seallink-card, etc.).

Bytes from ANY channel are accepted if and only if SHA256(bytes) equals the confirmed ledger/manifest pin and full JCS/schema validation passes (MANIFEST_MISMATCH otherwise). Missing bytes refuse MANIFEST_UNAVAILABLE without silent unconfigured outbound fetches.


5. Provisional Onboarding and Foreign-Service Authentication

A foreign replaceable service authenticates actors using seallink-auth-challenge/1 and seallink-auth-upgrade/1 (SL-IDEN-010, decided):

  1. Challenge lifecycle: Service generates a 32-byte CSPRNG nonce, records issued_at and expires_at (issued_at < expires_at <= issued_at + 120), pins its own service_id, and records the challenge durably. Client signs with auth_key (never device, grant, or name_owner). Service verifies SPEC-01 §7, checks issued_at <= now < expires_at (AUTH_CHALLENGE_EXPIRED), checks audience/nonce (AUTH_CHALLENGE_INVALID), and atomically consumes the nonce before creating any session.
  2. Named mode: Service resolves name, walks owner history, verifies manifest/1, confirms manifest.auth_key == auth_pubkey (AUTH_KEY_UNPINNED), and confirms manifest.auth_seal is unspent (SEAL_SPENT if spent, SEAL_UNAVAILABLE if unconfirmed or inconclusive). Existing service accounts MUST retain their original (name, registration, owner_policy) binding; a re-registered name string MUST NOT take over an old account.
  3. Provisional key-only onboarding: A service MAY admit a challenge without name into a strictly rate- and storage-capped local cell (zero effect, PII-release, or federation rights).
  4. Sponsored client-owned registration & atomic upgrade: A sponsor MAY fund UTXOs controlled exclusively by the client so the client broadcasts OP_NAME_NEW and (>= 12 blocks later) OP_NAME_FIRSTUPDATE (sponsor never owns the name). Once confirmed at required depth, client signs seallink-auth-upgrade/1 under the same auth_key to atomically bind the confirmed registration to the provisional cell.
  5. Authentication is NOT authorization: A successful login session confers zero authority to spend funds, disclose data to third parties, or bypass grant checks.

6. Owner Control Plane (Own Executors and Trust-Root Pin)

For commanding an actor's own hosts, executors, and managed agent key holders (SL-IDEN-011, decided):

  1. Device levels and closed command set: seallink-owner-command/1 carries a closed command enum (agent-dispatch, session-terminate, policy-apply, keyholder-halt) with typed arguments schemas (schemas/invocation.schema.json):
    • L0: Cognitive work / read-only dispatch (agent-dispatch with level = 0); zero effects.
    • L1: Policy-bounded operational control (agent-dispatch, session-terminate within local executor caps).
    • L2: High-assurance presence-verified device (presence = true, ceiling = 2): may issue policy-apply (paired with an L2-signed seallink-statement/1), keyholder-halt, and fast device revocation (tx_revoke).
    • Level inheritance: Any agent run launched by an seallink-owner-command/1 inherits its level ceiling; the run's key holder MUST NOT sign effects above that level.
  2. Foreign boundary: Device keys MUST NEVER be accepted by foreign services (DEVICE_UNAUTHORIZED).
  3. **Host Trust-Root Pin and Delayed Admin Override (SL-IDEN-012, decided):** An isolated host/runtime pins (network, genesis, root_name, registration, owner_policy, pinned_grant_policy) in admin-owned read-only storage outside agent write reach. Routine rotation uses a root-rotate statement signed by the old policy. Unassisted administrator overwrite enters a mandatory pending delay D (default 1008 blocks) with out-of-band owner alerts on every load; the old policy OR the name's cold owner_policy MAY cancel before effective_height via root-cancel.

7. Security Considerations

  • No silent downgrade of manifest: Once a verifier observes a confirmed manifest for (name, registration), missing or malformed manifests refuse without falling back to stale caches.
  • Bidi spoofing in Entity Cards: Clients rendering card.display or card.role SHOULD isolate untrusted text and flag Unicode bidirectional controls (U+202A..202E, U+2066..2069).
  • Key compromise blast radius: Separating auth, grant, cred, notary, device, and name_owner ensures a leaked mobile login key cannot forge contracts, grants, origin certificates, or hijack the ledger name.

8. References

  • Normative: [RFC8785], [BIP-340], [RFC8032], [SEC1], [JSON-SCHEMA-2020-12].
  • Informative: [NC28].