PROFILE-agent-v1: Bounded Autonomous Agent Tasks, Tool Execution, Isolated Sessions, and Guardian Intake
- Version:
1.0.0-draft.2 - Service Type:
agent-session(registry/service-types.json) - Status:
draft(normative profile rulesdecided) - Evidence / Maturity:
vectors(vectors/trace-03-delegation-pool-single-use.json,vectors/trace-04-agent-guardian-intake.json,vectors/refusal-coverage-matrix.json) - Requires:
SPEC-01,SPEC-02,SPEC-03,SPEC-04,SPEC-05,SPEC-06,SPEC-07 - Schemas:
schemas/profile-agent.schema.json
1. Purpose
This profile defines normative SealLink authorization for autonomous software agents operating on local or hosted stations (including external isolation runtimes such as Swarma Runtime). It separates four distinct operational boundaries:
- **Cognitive work delegation (
agent/brief):** Authorizes an agent run to perform bounded reasoning or drafting work, where proseterms_textis permitted strictly as cognitive guidance. - **Mechanical host tool execution (
agent/tool):** Authorizes concrete typed tool calls (filesystem read/write, repository operations, sandboxed commands) whereterms_textis strictly forbidden. - **Contract-bound isolated sessions (
agent/session):** Authorizes starting, checkpointing, or halting a long-lived agent session bound to a bilateral contract and verifiedconfig_sha256. - **Guardian-verified instruction intake (
agent/guardian-message):** Normatively specifies how an agent runtime's host boundary verifies guardian-authorized instructions for awardagent against its read-only pinnedseallink-origin/1and live guardianship slots (vectors/trace-04-agent-guardian-intake.json).
2. Manifest Declarations and Mutual Authentication (SL-AGNT-001, decided)
- An agent host station
id/station-adeclares in itsseallink-manifest/1service:service_type:"agent-session"actions: subset of["agent/brief", "agent/tool", "agent/session", "agent/guardian-message"]receipt_key: pinned BIP-340receiptkeyendpoint: HTTPS or mutually authenticated local Unix/TLS endpointtls_spki_sha256(for remote endpoints): pinned TLS SPKI hash (or signedtransport-bindingstatement incerts).
- Concrete executor required: Because agent sessions, tool invocations, and guardian instruction delivery carry stateful quotas, sandboxes, and authority boundaries,
executor_refis FORBIDDEN across allagent/*actions (GRANT_EXECUTOR_REF_FORBIDDEN).
3. Orthogonal Action Properties Table
| Action | Kind | external_mutation | discloses_data | quota_consuming | allows_executor_ref | requires_contract | require_seal | Risk Class |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
agent/brief | Cognitive work (terms_text allowed) | false | false | true (seallink/count starts) | false | false | false *(root window_only allowed by policy)* | Class 2 (90m) |
agent/tool | Mechanical effect (GRANT_TEXT_FORBIDDEN) | true | true | true (seallink/count calls) | false | false | true *(or single_use)* | Class 1 (60m) |
agent/session | Mechanical effect (GRANT_TEXT_FORBIDDEN) | true | false | true (seallink/count starts) | false | true (config_sha256 mandatory) | true | Class 1 (60m) |
agent/guardian-message | Mechanical effect (GRANT_TEXT_FORBIDDEN) | false | false | false | false | false | true *(live grant + slot seals; event_class = "effect_grant")* | Class 1 (60m) |
4. Target, Closed Schemas, Arguments, and result_sha256 (SL-AGNT-002, decided)
- Target grammar:
agent/brief,agent/tool,agent/session:station:<host_name>:<workspace_or_slot>(e.g.,station:id/station-a:repo-seallink).agent/guardian-message:ward:<origin_id_64hex>.
- Closed schemas: All
invocation.argumentsand returned result objects MUST validate strictly againstschemas/profile-agent.schema.json:agent/brief:AgentBriefArgs->AgentBriefResultagent/tool:AgentToolArgs->AgentToolResultagent/session:AgentSessionArgs->AgentSessionResultagent/guardian-message:AgentGuardianMessageArgs->AgentGuardianMessageResult
- **Normative
result_sha256(SL-AGNT-003,decided):** For everyoutcome = "executed"receipt,receipt.payload.result_sha256MUST equalSHA256(canonical_JCS(result_object)). - Replay semantics: Duplicate
invocation_idforagent/brief,agent/tool,agent/session, oragent/guardian-messageMUST NOT spawn a second run, second tool execution, or duplicate Authority Frame delivery; the host returns the stored signed receipt (includingoutcome = "uncertain"if a crash interrupted execution inside the external-effect window before receipt persistence).
4.1 Constrained Arguments and Predicates
| Action | Argument | Schema Type | Supported where Predicates |
|---|---|---|---|
agent/brief | task_id | string | eq, prefix |
agent/brief | brief_sha256 | hex64 | hash_eq |
agent/brief | max_duration_sec | uint64_str | range |
agent/tool | tool_name | string | eq, in, not_in |
agent/tool | input_sha256 | hex64 | hash_eq |
agent/tool | resource_path | string | eq, prefix |
agent/tool | max_output_bytes | uint64_str | range |
agent/session | op | string (start | checkpoint | halt) | eq, in |
agent/session | session_slot | string | eq, prefix |
agent/session | config_sha256 | hex64 | hash_eq |
agent/session | max_wall_sec | uint64_str | range |
agent/guardian-message | origin_id | hex64 | eq |
agent/guardian-message | subject_ward_name | NameStr | eq |
agent/guardian-message | message_sha256 | hex64 | hash_eq |
agent/guardian-message | channel | string | eq, in |
agent/guardian-message | delivery_mode | string (strict_drop | untrusted_fallback) | eq |
5. Normative Guardian Message Verification (SL-AGNT-004, decided)
An agent host or Bridge mediating incoming guardian messages for a ward agent (origin_class = "agent", guardian_policy present) MUST distinguish between guardian grant authorization (the ward's seallink-grant/1 carrying guardian_context and guardian_approvals[]) and invocation delivery (the signed seallink-invocation/1 signed by the grant's recipient — either the guardian's own delivery key or an authorized Bridge relay key — carrying AgentGuardianMessageArgs), and MUST execute the following deterministic check before delivering any privileged instruction into an agent session's Authority Frame:
- Read-only origin pin: Load the agent's locally pinned
seallink-origin/1and(network, genesis)from read-only host storage outside agent write reach (SPEC-03 §6). - **Event class assignment (
effect_grant):** Because guardian messages direct privileged agent behavior,agent/guardian-messageMUST be classified as **event_class = "effect_grant"** (NEVERroutine_read;SPEC-04 §3.1). A ward grant claimingevent_class = "routine_read"foragent/guardian-messageMUST refuse withGUARDIAN_QUORUM_UNMET. - Full admission pipeline & ward checks: Execute
SPEC-06 §4on theseallink-invocation/1and its wardseallink-grant/1:- Confirm
status_sealis unspent (ORIGIN_STATUS_INCOMPLETE,SUBJECT_ENDED,GUARDIAN_TRANSFER_PENDING) and the latest effectiveroster_sealrevision matches bothgrant.payload.guardian_context.revisionandarguments.revision(ORIGIN_STATUS_INCOMPLETE,GUARDIAN_QUORUM_UNMET). - Verify
grant.guardian_approvals[]perSL-WIRE-013andSL-ORIG-006: every cited slot seal isactiveand unspent on the host's Tier 1 node (GUARDIAN_INACTIVE), everyguardian_approvals[i].signaturesmatches that guardian's livelink.grantpolicy (WIRE_SIGNATURE), all approving slots belong to distinct(name, registration)guardians, and the count meetsrequired("effect_grant")againstrevision_size(GUARDIAN_QUORUM_UNMET). - Confirm
invocation.target == "ward:" + origin_id,arguments.origin_id == origin_id,arguments.subject_ward_name == ward_name, andSHA256(raw_message_bytes) == arguments.message_sha256(and satisfies anywhere.message_sha256hash_eqpredicate when the grant pins one exact message) (INVOKE_CONSTRAINT_FAILED).
- Confirm
- **Normative default
delivery_mode = "strict_drop": For ward agents,strict_dropis the normative default** (AgentGuardianMessageArgs.delivery_mode): any unauthenticated, malformed, or refused external message MUST be dropped at the Bridge/host boundary before entering the model context. Hosts MAY permituntrusted_fallbackONLY when explicitly enabled by local administrator policy and strictly isolated outside the Authority Frame. - Authority Frame & receipt: Only after steps 1–3 succeed MAY the host wrap the verified message (
message_sha256) inside a structured read-only Authority Frame, computeframe_sha256, and emitAgentGuardianMessageResult(delivered = true,verified_slots,verified_guardians,message_sha256,frame_sha256,recorded_at) + signedseallink-receipt/1(vectors/trace-04-agent-guardian-intake.json).
6. Contract-Bound Sessions, Quotas, and config_sha256 (SL-AGNT-005, decided)
- **
agent/sessioncontract requirement:** Everyagent/sessiongrant MUST bindcontract_id(GRANT_CONTRACT_REQUIRED), and the boundseallink-contract/1MUST carryconfig_sha256(SL-CONT-006). Before executingop = "start", the host MUST compute the hash of the assembled runtime profile, skills, and tool allowlist and require exact equality with bothcontract.config_sha256andarguments.config_sha256(CONTRACT_CONFIG_MISMATCH). - Quota reservation:
agent/briefandagent/session(op = "start") reserve1unit from{"kind":"seallink/count","resource":"<target>","unit":"starts"}.agent/toolreserves1unit from{"kind":"seallink/count","resource":"<target>","unit":"calls"}(plus anyseallink/costorseallink/tokensquotas declared on the capability).- For delegated child grants, reservations debit both the child's
ownaccount and the parent'srowaccount (SPEC-06 §2.2), bounded across all sibling rows by R8.5 (SPEC-06 §3).
- Bearer sessions: An admitted
agent/sessionMAY open a short-lived (<= 3600s)seallink-session-open/1bearer slot for non-signing model SDKs (SPEC-06 §5), restricted strictly to compute/tool quotas inside the session ceiling; irreversible financial transfers MUST NOT use bearer sessions.
7. Export Boundary (SPEC-07 §2)
An agent-session migration manifest (seallink-migration/1) exports workspace files, conversation transcripts, checkpoint artifacts, signed receipts, and accounting evidence (settled starts/calls/costs + uncertain reservations). It NEVER exports host signing keys, Keyholder private keys, upstream API tokens, TLS private keys, or active bearer session tokens.